Government Commission's Final Report on #Fukushima Nuke Accident Blames Government, Experts, TEPCO

The investigation commission on the Fukushima accident set up by the Cabinet Office of the government has just issued its final report.

You can download your own copy from this page, but the main report in English has to wait.

This commission conducted the investigation and carried out interviews with people involved since the start of the nuclear accident in March last year in private, unlike the National Diet commission who also released its final report recently.

Some have criticized the government commission for not making its sessions open to public. I don't think it is necessarily a bad thing. The National Diet commission should be applauded for its openness and its highly critical final report (anyone reading?), but in some of the public testimonies of the commission that I watched it was rather a place for the expert commissioners to display (or show off) their expertise and knowledge of the nuclear issues in general.

So, will there be information only obtainable in the closed sessions? We'll find out, but someone at Jiji Tsushin has clearly been assigned to read the voluminous report, and he/she has been putting up short articles. Judging from these articles, the government investigation commission is just as critical, if not way more, as the Diet investigation commission. Some of the points from Jiji articles (7/23/2012, here, here and here, in Japanese):

• Detailed analysis and timeline from the time the water injection into RPVs failed till the damages to RPVs and Containment Vessels occurred;

• Conclusion on how and when the core melt happened and progressed cannot be made because the actual survey at the plant is highly difficult [to say the least...];

• Experts from TEPCO, NISA, and Nuclear Safety Commission at the PM's Official Residence failed to provide expert opinion and advice, adding to the distrust by PM Kan of these "in-house" experts;

• Head of NISA couldn't answer Kan's question about the precise locations of emergency diesel generators [... should he be asking such details?];

• PM Kan decided to go to Fukushima I Nuke Plant on March 12 morning because he (said he) had "the food feel for the place" when it came to technical aspects of nuclear energy;

• Communication process was haphazard, direct communication between TEPCO and PM's Official Residence, without NISA's intermediation, had never been assumed or planned;

• TEPCO, even though they were well trained and knowledgeable, they critically lacked the ability to think in a flexible and proactive manner;

• TEPCO's organization was too vertically segmented to deal with the accident;

• TEPCO didn't seem eager to find out what was happening at the plant in the early hours and days of the accident.

If you can think flexibly and proactively and you are curious, you wouldn't be working at TEPCO or NISA (or any ministry or government agency), I'm afraid.

The last Jiji Tsushin article linked above has examples of TEPCO's "inattention" to details and its vertically segmented organization:

From March 12 to 21, nearly 1,000 personal dosimeters were sent to Fukushima I Nuke Plant from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuke Plant in Niigata (operated by TEPCO) and from Shikoku Electric Power Company. However, TEPCO employees didn't ask for [?] the equipment needed [to use those dosimeters], they were never used. Until the end of March, only one dosimeter was available per work group of several workers.

On the first day of the accident on March 11, Masao Yoshida, general manager of the plant, instructed [his managers] to plan for water injection using fire engines. However, because of TEPCO's vertically segmented organization, no one thought it was his job to do so.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Accident: "I'm Not Responsible" Says Naoto Kan, Former Prime Minister of Japan

From Jiji Tsushin (7/11/2012):

自己責任を否定＝原発事故調に反論－菅前首相

Former Prime Minister Kan denies responsibility for self, argues against the Diet Investigation Commission['s conclusions]

民主党の菅直人前首相は１１日付のブログで、東京電力福島第１原発事故について「原因の大半は、事故発生の２０１１年３月１１日以前にある。これが私の結論だ」と述べ、自らの責任を否定する一方、東電や経済産業省原子力安全・保安院の対応を批判した。

In his blog post dated July 11, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan, of Democratic Party of Japan, commented on the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident by saying, "Almost all the causes for the accident had existed before March 11, 2011, the day the accident happened. And that's my conclusion." He denied his own responsibility, and criticized the response [to the accident] by TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

国会の事故調査委員会が報告書で、首相官邸の過剰な現場介入を「事故の進展を止められず、被害を最小化できなかった最大の要因」と結論付けたことへの反論。菅氏は当面、ブログで持論を連載する。

It is a rebuttal to the Diet Investigation Commission's report that concluded the excessive interference by the Prime Minister's Office with the efforts at the plant was "the largest factor that prevented [TEPCO from] arresting the progress of the accident and minimizing the damage". Mr. Kan plans to write about his conclusions on his blog for a while.

Mr. Kan sounds very familiar. Just blame the predecessors. It's the default position of the current president of the United States.

Mr. Kan's blog is here, if you read Japanese: http://ameblo.jp/n-kan-blog/

(Or "Blame Canada"...)

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National Diet Independent Investigation Commission's Report on Fukushima Accident Is Out

The English version has the summary and appendices, with the main report to be coming soon. It is available at this page: http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/

(The Japanese version with the main report is here: http://naiic.go.jp/report/)

I haven't been able to view any of the files since yesterday. Every time I try to download the PDF files from the site, my PC freezes up and Adobe Flash crashes.

Main points (from various media reports):

• The Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident was a "man-made disaster".

• TEPCO and the government was continuously kicking the can down the road, delaying the implementation of costly countermeasures against earthquake and tsunami.

• It cannot be denied that the earthquake may have caused the damage to the plant.

• The Prime Minister's Office's interference in the early days of the accident exacerbated the confusion.

• There was little basis for the no-entry zone that the government set.

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National Diet's Independent Commission on #Fukushima Accident Agrees with TEPCO's Shimizu that TEPCO Had No Intention of "Withdrawing Completely" from the Plant

The independent investigation commission of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident set up by the National Diet called TEPCO's ex-president Masataka Shimizu as witness on June 8 in an open hearing, and on June 9 held a commission meeting (also open to public) to summarize the main findings so far.

Unlike the private independent investigation commission whose report was released in March this year, the Diet's commission concluded that TEPCO did NOT intend to "withdraw completely" from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant when President Shimizu was trying frantically to reach the top officials from late March 14 till early hours of March 15 last year.

From Jiji Tsushin (6/9/2012):

「全員撤退」意図せずと認定＝官邸の過剰介入批判－福島原発事故・国会事故調

National Diet's Independent Investigation Commission of Fukushima Nuclear Accident acknowledges that TEPCO didn't intend to "withdraw completely", criticizes the excessive intervention by the Prime Minister's Office

東京電力福島第１原発事故を検証する国会の事故調査委員会（黒川清委員長）は９日、公開で委員会を開き、今月末の報告書作成に向け論点整理を行った。この中で、東電の清水正孝前社長による「撤退」申し入れについて、「東電が全員撤退を決めたとは認められず、官邸が東電の撤退を阻止した事実はない」と認定した。

The National Diet's Independent Investigation Commission of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident (Chairman Kiyoshi Kurokawa) held a public commission meeting on June 9 to organize the issues to be presented in the final report due at the end of June. In the meeting, regarding the proposal from then-President of TEPCO Masataka Shimizu to "withdraw", the Commission acknowledged that "it doesn't consider that TEPCO decided a complete withdrawal [from the plant] and that it is not a fact that the Prime Minister's Office interrupted the TEPCO's withdrawal".

昨年３月１４日夜から翌１５日未明にかけての撤退申し入れをめぐっては、第１原発からの「全員撤退」と解釈した菅直人前首相ら官邸側と、「一部要員を残すつもりだった」とする東電側の主張が対立していた。

Over the proposal to withdraw from March 14 night till early morning of March 15 last year, the officials at the Prime Minister's Official Residence including then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan have been at odds with TEPCO's management. The former understood the proposal as "complete withdrawal", while the latter insisted "they were going to keep the core members at the plant".

事故調は菅氏や清水氏らの証言などを基に、「全員撤退の意思はなかった」とした上で、その後の対応について「原子炉の状況を最も把握していた現場の使命感がポイントだった」と指摘。「官邸が現場と直接やりとりする想定していない方法で介入し、頻繁に電話が入るような事態が起きた」と官邸を批判した。

Based on the testimonies from Mr. Kan, Mr. Shimizu and others, the Commission determined that "there was no intention to withdraw completely". As to the response afterwards, the Commission pointed out that "the key was the sense of mission held by the people at the plant who understood the condition of the reactors best". It criticized the Prime Minister's Official Residence by saying "it intervened in a way that was never intended such as communicating directly with the plant [management], and [the plant management] had to answer the frequent calls."

What is not mentioned in the above Jiji article is exactly what word Mr. Shimizu used when he tried to reach Mr. Kaieda (Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry overseeing the nuclear safety agency).

In his testimony on June 8, Mr. Shimizu said he consistently used the word "退避 (tai-hi)" when speaking with the government officials and never　the word "撤退 (tettai)" as apparently understood by the officials in the Kan administration and by PM Kan himself. OK, what's the difference? Some would ask "What difference does that make?"

Having followed TEPCO's announcements and press conferences since March last year, I've come to notice that the company sometimes use peculiar language that differs significantly from the common-sense understanding of the general public. One such example is the "water puddle" TEPCO said existed in the basements of reactor buildings and turbine buildings early on in the accident. At TEPCO, standing water more than 30 centimeter deep flooding the entire basement is called "water puddle" (水たまり）. Then I noticed the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency officials used the same word to describe the flooded basement. More recently, independent journalist Ryuichi Kino noticed TEPCO's new president used exactly the same language as the top bureaucrats at the top ministries.

Maybe it does matter, at least to TEPCO and the government officials, what exact language to use in a certain occasion, in order to be precisely understood by the other party.

Since I like the saying "The Devil is in the details", I looked up the words in the Japanese language dictionary.

Mr. Shimizu's word of choice was "退避 (tai-hi)". According to one of the most authoritative Japanese language dictionaries (三省堂 大辞林), it means:

その場所から離れて危険をさけること。
To leave the place and avoid danger.

What PM Kan and Mr. Kaieda said they understood as Shimizu meant was "撤退 (tettai)", which means:

軍隊などが陣地などを取り払って退くこと。
To remove a position/base as in the military and withdraw

The former does have a connotation that the move is temporary, whereas the latter, by removing a position/base, is a permanent withdrawal, in defeat.

Both Mr. Kan and Mr. Kaieda also said they thought it was an "all-out" withdrawal, because Mr. Shimizu didn't use the word "partial". Shimizu said he was surprised that the administration understood his carefully chosen word "temporary shelter" - "taihi" as "all-out withdrawal" - "tettai".

The Diet commission's conclusion was that it was a case of miscommunication. TEPCO's Shimizu thought he was telling these officials that he wanted his workers to temporarily take shelter in a less irradiated location while keeping the core people at the plant. Messrs Kan and Kaieda thought "taihi" and "tettai" were the same thing and decided Shimizu was announcing an all-out withdrawal from the plant. It seems Mr. Shimizu's mistake was he thought he was talking to high-ranking bureaucrats with whom he had dealt before the accident. Unlike many politicians neither Mr. Kan nor Mr. Kaieda had been trained in law (Kan was an applied physics major, Kaieda political science) or through elite bureaucracy. (Mr. Edano would have understood Mr. Shimizu perfectly, but Mr. Edano says he never spoke with Mr. Shimizu.)

TEPCO workers and workers from affiliate companies (Hitachi, Toshiba, Kandenko, etc. and their subcontractors) remained at the plant as the radiation levels were several hundred millisieverts/hour and at one point exceeding 1 sievert/hour (see the AP article from 3/16/2011 at the link), with only 2 meals per day and sleeping on the floor as the government refused to provide workers with better food and other provisions. And the world hailed them as heroes as "Fukushima 50".

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#Fukushima Accident Investigation: It's Naoto Kan's Turn to Take the Witness Stand in the Diet Commission

For all Naoto Kan fans, here's the link at Nico Nico Video (you need an account if you don't have one):

http://live.nicovideo.jp/watch/lv93459134?ref=nicotop

At IWJ's USTREAM Channel:

http://t.co/aU6Of2kC

(Watching the testimony at Nico Nico)

He's now blaming Haruki Madarame.

Why was he in the meeting with the opposition leaders to begin with on March 11, 2011 when the situation deteriorated rapidly in Fukushima I Nuke Plant?

Just like Yukio Edano, Kan is busy painting himself as "victim" who was left out of the info loop.

About TEPCO "withdrawal" - Kaieda came in the morning of March 15, 2011.

...

It was the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency who declined help from the US, one of the commissioners just said.

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Yukio Edano Blamed Everyone Else for Fukushima Accident Response, Portrayed Himself as Not Knowing Much

in his testimony in front of the Diet Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima nuclear accident on Sunday, which was netcast live by the Commission and also by Nico Nico (which was far better without the annoying commercials).

According to the mainstream newspapers, Mr. Edano "apologized" during the testimony on May 27.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (5/27/2012):

情報公開「不十分」枝野氏陳謝…国会事故調

"Not enough" information disclosure, Mr. Edano apologized in the Diet Commission on the accident

国会の「東京電力福島原子力発電所事故調査委員会」（黒川清委員長）は２７日、事故当時の官房長官だった枝野経済産業相を参考人として呼び、公開で聴取した。

The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, headed by Chairman Kiyoshi Kuroda, called Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Edano as a witness for the public hearing on May 27. Mr. Edano was the Chief Cabinet Secretary when the nuclear accident happened.

枝野氏は政府の情報発信を中核的に担ったスポークスマンとして、「情報を政府として十分に集約し、それに基づく予想、想定ができなかったことが反省すべきことだ」と述べ、政府の情報集約とその公開が不十分だったことを認め、陳謝した。

As the then-spokesman in charge of disseminating information from the government, Mr. Edano said, "As the government, we could not collect enough information, and could not form expectations and assumptions based on the information. That is what should be reflected upon", admitting that collection and dissemination of the information by the government was inadequate, and he apologized.

　枝野氏は、政府の対応が混乱したことについて、「（情報発信のあり方は）全部、経験と勘で、ノウハウを個人が積み上げて行われている」と述べ、体系だった広報体制が取れない仕組みそのものに欠陥があると指摘した。その上で、「私の思っていたことと、伝わっていることが違うということは、少なからず生じた」と振り返った。

As to the confusion in the government response [to the accident], Mr. Edano said, "(Information dissemination) is done on an individual basis, on experience and intuition", pointing out that the lack of coherent, systematic public relation structure itself was the problem. He also said, "There were more than a few occasions when what I intended and what was disseminated differed."

　福島第一原発の事故では、政府が事故当日の昨年３月１１日夜、３キロ・メートル圏内の住民に避難を指示し、１２日朝には１０キロ・メートル圏内、同日夜には２０キロ・メートル圏内へと、次々に避難対象地域を拡大したことが周辺住民に不信を広げた。

In the Fukushima I Nuclear Plant accident, the government instructed the residents within the 3-kilometer radius from the plant to evacuate on the night of March 11, 2011. On the morning of March 12, the evacuation zone was expanded to 10-kilometer radius, and in the evening it was further expanded to 20-kilometer radius, causing distrust among the residents.

Apology was not what I came away getting from Mr. Edano. He didn't know, he didn't remember, and it was always someone else's problem. Here's my personal note as I watched the testimony (not the verbatim words of his):

About setting the initial evacuation zone at 3-kilometer radius, and then to 20-kilometer radius after the Reactor 1 explosion on March 12, 2011:

Edano said he didn't know why it was set at 3-kilometer radius. He said he didn't remember why it was set at 20 kilometers, didn't remember who suggested it. He also said he didn't know the evacuation zone designation couldn't be lifted unless the situation improved.

About Reactor 1 vent:

It turned out that the Fukushima plant had been trying to vent but having difficulties. TEPCO headquarters was no use. So we issued a legal order to vent. (What would that do?)

About then-Prime Minister Kan's visit to the plant on March 12, 2011:

He said it was Kan himself who wanted to go, even if he might be in the way of the work at the plant. He advised Kan that there would be political ramifications, but Kan thought getting the first-hand information was more important.

About TEPCO's withdrawal from Fuku-I:

Edano didn't seem to recall what exactly was said. He kept talking something but that was not really about the subject.

About the duration of evacuation:

No one, including him, knew that the evacuation would be lengthy. ("Beyond expectation" is another of his famous remarks.)

About SPEEDI:

Edano said he didn't know about the system (hard to believe, as the system is always used in the nuclear emergency drills conducted every year) until March 15 or 16. He said the Ministry of Education officials told him that they couldn't do the simulation because there was no data on the actual amount of radioactive materials being dispersed from the source (Fuku-I). (So? The Ministry was doing the calculation using an emission unit method.) He said he instructed the Ministry to do their best to calculate from what observed data available. "The Ministry of Education is the one who has to sweat", he said, meaning it was the Ministry of Education who should be working hard (till they sweat) and coming up with the simulation and recommendation, not him or the government.

About "No immediate effect on health" refrain of his:

Asked by one of the commissioners who is an evacuee from Fukushima because of the nuclear accident why Edano kept saying "There is no immediate effect on health", Edano snapped at her and said "You should review the transcripts of my press conferences." Edano said it was regrettable that his words were taken to mean what he didn't intended. Later he said the information should have been more detailed, but essentially blamed the recipients of his message for misunderstanding.

About his "core melt" reference in the press conference on March 13, 2011:

Edano said he wasn't aware of the NISA mentioning the possibility of the core melt the previous day (March 12, 2011). (Huh?)

Mr. Edano portrayed himself as if he was an outsider just doing his job of public relations as the Chief Cabinet Secretary, without knowing in details what was going on. Most Japanese (and probably the British) know what the Chief Cabinet Secretary is. He is decidedly not a mere mouthpiece of the administration.　It is a ministerial position wielding power and influence.

But Mr. Edano got away with it in the testimony. No hard questions.

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#Fukushima Accident Investigation: Yukio "There Is No Immediate Effect" Edano Takes the Witness Stand in the Diet Commission

(UPDATE 5/27/2012) More on his actual testimony in my latest post.

=====================================

The commission session starts at 1PM on May 27, 2012 (Japan Standard Time).

His testimony with simultaneous English interpretation can be seen on the USTREAM channel by the Japan's Diet Independent Commission on the Fukushima nuclear accident: http://t.co/HQvX5dRN

Japanese-only channel: http://t.co/wn3B8g4k

Yukio Edano, current Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, was the Chief Cabinet Secretary under Prime Minister Naoto Kan when the nuclear accident started in March 2011.

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Banri Kaieda Says Then-PM Naoto Kan Couldn't Decide Whether to Declare a Nuclear Emergency Without Knowing "Legal Basis"

. . . (sigh).

The Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission set up by the Diet called Banri Kaieda as witness on May 17.

Kaieda was the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry who oversaw the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency when the Fukushima nuclear accident happened in March 2011. After losing the leadership election of the Democratic Party of Japan to Yoshihiko Noda in August last year, thanks partly to NHK, he has kept a low profile unlike Naoto Kan (who went on a media blitz to spread his version of the accident), Yukio Edano (who quickly became the Minister of the Economy), or Goshi Hosono (who was promoted from a personal assistant to Kan to the minister in charge of the nuclear accident and then to the Minister of the Environment).

The hearing lasted two and a half hours, and the media reporting it picked different aspects of his testimony. So, from several newspapers and NHK, here's what Kaieda had to say about the early days of the worst nuclear accident in Japan. Nikkei Shinbun has the most extensive coverage. (Emphasis is mine.)

From Nikkei Shinbun (5/17/2012):

• In accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, TEPCO notified the Ministry of Economy at 4:45PM on March 11, 2011 after the loss of power to Reactor 1 and Reactor due to the tsunami. Kaieda, as Minister of Economy, requested then-Prime Minister Kan to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. But it took PM Kan until after 7PM to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation.
  
  Kaieda said "It took a long time to obtain Mr. Kan's agreement [to declare a Nuclear Emergency and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters]" because Kan had to be satisfied with information such as the condition of the reactors and the legal basis for [declaring, etc.].

• About injecting seawater into the reactors to cool, Kaieda said Mr. Kan expressed his concern that injecting seawater might cause re-criticality.

• Kaieda felt that TEPCO didn't start the injection of seawater immediately because the company was hesitant to decommission the reactors. [If you pour in seawater into a reactor, the reactor cannot be restored.]

• Kaieda received a telephone call on late night on March 14, 2011 from Masataka Shimizu, then-President of TEPCO, who told Kaieda that he would like to evacuate the workers from Fukushima I Nuke Plant to Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant. Kaieda interpreted the call to mean it was a "complete withdrawal".

• Kaieda emphasized that he thought "it was a grave mistake" for Kan to closet himself in his office on the 5th floor of the Prime Minister's Official Residence. The risk control center [for the nuclear accident] was located in the basement.

• Kaida felt that it was like a telephone game among the PM's Official Residence, TEPCO Headquarters, and Fukushima I Nuke Plant.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (5/17/2012):

• Kaieda requested Kan that he declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, but Kan asked "what's the basis?" So then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano and PM's assistants [no doubt including Goshi Hosono] had to pour over the related laws and regulations. In the meantime, Kan did other things including attending a meeting with the opposition party leaders.

From NHK (5/17/2012):

• About the delay in the vent to lower the pressure inside the Containment Vessel [of Reactor 1], Kaieda said he thought "TEPCO is hesitant, because the company wants to minimize the accident".

I didn't know the reason for the delay in declaring a Nuclear Emergency. I didn't know TEPCO's proposal to evacuate the workers was to Fukushima II Nuke Plant. As to injecting seawater (or for that matter, any kind of water) may have been hard with increasing pressure inside the RPV.

Two interesting points:

• There was no one who was able to tell then-Prime Minister Kan, "Prime Minister, just do it", when Kan wasted everyone's time by wanting to know the legal basis for declaring a Nuclear Emergency. Instead, Kan insisted on knowing the legal basis, and Edano (and no doubt Hosono) went to look up the information for their Prime Minister when every second might have counted. Not really a picture of a resolute leader as Kan wants to portray himself.

• TEPCO's "complete withdrawal" was what Kaieda thought, not necessarily what then-President Shimizu of TEPCO told him. He didn't tell Kaieda that he wanted complete withdrawal, but since he didn't tell Kaieda that it would be partial withdrawal either, in Kaieda's mind it was "complete withdrawal".

Yukio Edano's turn as the witness will come on May 27.　Goshi Hosono will be interviewed by the commission on May 19, but it will be closed to public, according to Mainichi (5/18/2012). Hosono says he requested the open hearing, but the commission said no, because Hosono was not in a decision-making position when the accident started. (Huh?)

On May 28, Naoto Kan will be the witness.

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TEPCO's Chairman Katsumata: PM Kan's Meddling Excessive During the First Critical Hours of the Accident

Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata of TEPCO appeared before the Diet investigation commission on the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant Accident on May 14. For the most part, just like when they called TEPCO's then-VP Muto, the commissioners didn't seem to be successful at drawing any useful information from him.

But one thing he said about then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan caught my attention because I didn't know about it.

From Jiji Tsushin (part; 5/14/2012):

東京電力福島第１原発事故を検証する国会の事故調査委員会（委員長＝黒川清・元日本学術会議会長）は１４日、東電の勝俣恒久会長を参考人として招き、公開で事情聴取した。勝俣会長は菅直人前首相が事故直後、第１原発の吉田昌郎前所長に携帯電話で直接指示していたことについて、「所長は復旧に全力を尽くすのが一番大事。時間を取られるのは芳しいことではない」と批判した。

The Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (Chairman Kiyoshi Kurokawa, former head of the Science Council of Japan under the Cabinet Office) held a public hearing on May 14 with TEPCO's Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata as a witness. Chairman Katsumata referred to then Prime Minister Naoto Kan giving direct orders to Masao Yoshida, the plant manager of Fukushima I Nuke Plant, over the cellphone immediately after the start of the accident. Katsumata criticized that "the plant manager's primary duty was to do his best to restore the plant. It was not a good thing that he [Yoshida] had to take time dealing with the prime minister".

Well we could also say that it should have been the job of the TEPCO headquarters in Tokyo to shield Yoshida from having to answer phone calls from the prime minister who claimed to know a lot about nuclear power because he had a technical degree (he went on to become a patent attorney after graduation), so that the plant manager could do his job at the plant.

Mr. Katsumata, whatever you think of him as the head of "evil" TEPCO, is extremely sharp, which was very evident last year when I watched his press conference. It would take equally intelligent and clever people to get information out of him, but the Diet commissioners have been more keen on grand-standing (as the sessions are open to public and netcast live).

The Diet's commission will call then-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda on May 16. We'll see if the commissioners do better job on Kaieda.

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US National Academy of Sciences to Set Up Fukushima Investigation Commission

So reports Mainichi Shinbun (4/10/2012):

東京電力福島第１原発事故について、米国最大の学術団体「米科学アカデミー」が独自の事故調査委員会（事故調）を設置したことが分かった。今後２年かけ、事故原因や日本の原子力政策を調査、米国の原発や原子力政策改善に反映させる。

It has just been revealed that the US National Academy of Sciences has set up its own commission to investigate the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. In the next two years, the commission will investigate the cause of the accident and Japan's nuclear policies in order to improve the nuclear power plants in the US and the US nuclear policies.

　関係者によると、事故調は米議会の要請で設置された。米国内の専門家約２０人に参加を呼びかける。さらに日本の原子力分野の研究者や技術者にもアドバイザーとして委員会への参加を要請する。日本原子力学会などの専門家を念頭に置いているものとみられる。

According to the people involved, the commission has been set up by the request from the US Congress. About 20 experts in the US will be asked to join. Japanese nuclear researchers and engineers will be asked to participate as advisors. They will probably be the experts who are the members of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan.

　福島原発事故をめぐっては、日本でも政府、国会、民間など複数の調査委員会が事故の真相解明に取り組んでいる。米国での調査はこれらの調査結果を参考にしながら、事故の教訓を分析し、米国内の原発の安全性向上や使用済み核燃料保管といった日米共通の課題解決に生かす。

Over the Fukushima nuclear accident, there are several investigation commissions set up in Japan by the cabinet, the Diet or by a private entity to uncover what happened. The US's commission will refer to the results of these Japanese commissions, analyze the lessons learned from the accident, and use them to solve the problems that are shared by both Japan and the US, including enhancing safety of nuclear power plants and storage of spent fuel.

事故調のトップを務める米科学アカデミー原子力放射線研究委員会責任者のケビン・クローリー氏は「事故調のメンバーを日本に派遣し、日本政府、東京電力、専門家などに話を聞きたい。また、米国政府や世界の原子力産業など幅広い関係者から情報を集めたい」と話す。

The commission will be headed by Kevin Crowley, Director of Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board at the National Academy of Sciences. Dr. Crowley says, "We would like to send the commission members to Japan to hear from the Japanese government, TEPCO and experts. We would like to collect information from a wide range of people including those in the US government and the nuclear industry people around the world."

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Haruki Madarame: "No Memory of First Week of the Accident Because I Couldn't Sleep"

The NISA's head in the early days of the accident says he didn't advise the PM because he was a liberal arts major.

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) set up by the Japan's Diet is eliciting some interesting reactions (or excuses I should say) from the officials in charge of Japan's nuclear policies who also oversaw the initial government response to the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident.

The Commission held its fourth hearing on February 15, 2012 which was net-cast live (archived here, if you understand Japanese). The following is from what's been reported in the media about the hearing, as tweeted by the Commission (@jikocho):

From Sankei Shinbun (2/15/2012):

官邸への助言など、事故当時のそれぞれの行動について、班目氏は「１週間以上寝ていないのでほとんど記憶がない。私がいた場所は固定電話が２回線で携帯も通じず、できる助言は限りがあった」と説明。

About the advice to the Prime Minister and other activities during the early days of the accident, Mr. Madarame said, "I didn't sleep for more than a week, and I hardly remember anything. There were only two landlines where I was, and there was no cellphone signal. What advice I could give was limited."

寺坂氏は「私は文系なので、官邸内の対応は理系の次長に任せた」と述べた。

Mr. Terasaka [who was the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency then] said, "I am a liberal arts major. So I delegated the dealings with the Prime Minister's Residence to my subordinate who was a science major."

班目氏は津波や全電源喪失に備える原発の安全指針について「瑕疵（かし）があったと認めざるを得ない。おわびしたい」と謝罪。指針が改善されなかった背景について「低い安全基準を事業者が提案し、規制当局がのんでしまう。国がお墨付きを与えたから安全だとなり、事業者が安全性を向上させる努力をしなくなる悪循環に陥っていた」と言及し、「わが国は（対策を）やらなくてもいいという言い訳に時間をかけ、抵抗があってもやるという意思決定ができにくいシステムになっている」と述べた。

As to the safety guidelines for nuclear power plant to prepare for the tsunami and station blackout, Mr. Madarame apologized by saying "I have to admit there were flaws. I would like to apologize." As to why the guidelines weren't improved, Madarame said, "Low safety standards are proposed by the plant operators, and the regulatory agencies simply rubber-stamp them. With the approval from the national government, they are considered safe, and there is no incentive for the operators to improve safety. It is a vicious cycle." He also said, "The system in this country is set up so that people spend much time in making up excuses for not doing anything, and decision-making is not done against opposition."

He speaks the truth on that point.

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