Showing posts with label Hiroshima. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hiroshima. Show all posts

Saturday, August 9, 2014

(OT) Japanese Prime Minister Copies and Pastes Speech for Hiroshima AND Nagasaki Memorial Ceremonies for Atomic Bomb Victims


Somehow quite fitting for Mr. Shinzo Abe, who, along with his Minister of Education and Science, remains staunch supporter of Ms. Haruko Obokata, who copied and pasted and photoshopped her way to a very brief scientific fame (turned infamy) as a "Nature" author on STAP cells.

Unlike Ms. Obokata, who copied and pasted other people's work (among many other misconducts) without citation, Prime Minister Abe claims his is no misconduct, because the speeches he lifted for this year's ceremonies were his own speeches for the same occasions last year.

Tokyo Shinbun (8/8/2014) says the opening few paragraphs of Mr. Abe's speech in Hiroshima on August 6, 2014 were almost identical to his speech in 2013.

2013 speech on the left, 2014 speech on the right. Only the parts highlighted in blue are different:


It apparently got better (I know I should say "worse") in Nagasaki. Mr. Abe's speech on August 9, 2014 was identical except for the number of years since the atomic bomb was dropped in Nagasaki:


The Prime Minister's Office has the temerity to say this after the Hiroshima ceremony, according to Kyodo News (via Nikkan Sports):

首相のあいさつは、犠牲者を悼み、平和に力を尽くす決意を述べたものだ。その姿勢は昨年も本年も全く変わりはない

Prime Minister's speech is to mourn for the victims and to express his determination to do his utmost for peace. This attitude is the same as the last year.

平和への祈りや追悼の気持ちは、政府も被爆者やその遺族、地元の人たちと変わりはない。そういう部分はどうしても同じようになってしまう

Praying for peace and mourning [for the victims] are shared by the government, atomic bomb victims and their families, and local residents. The part [that expresses such feeling] ends up being similar, no matter what.


Similar? How about "identical"?

I was amused by the reaction in Japan on Twitter, where people were rightfully angry and upset that the prime minister didn't bother to change this year's speech from the last year's, and that it was such an insult to the victims, Japanese citizens, and foreign dignitaries who attended the ceremonies. Many of them seem to think a prime minister, or any politician, is supposed to write his/her own speech, and that the more world-class he/she is the better speech he/she writes and gives.

'Tatemae' hurts.

To me, the ultimate insult is that the Japanese government hasn't owned up to its own culpability for the two atomic bombs dropped in Japan in August 1945, as 2011 NHK Special revealed, and that most Japanese refuse to face the possibility that their government was fully aware that those planes were carrying atomic bombs but let the bombing happen anyway, if the NHK documentary is correct. (For those who wants to know more about the NHK documentary, see my posts from last year, here and here.)

Meanwhile, Mr. Abe's comrade in copying and pasting, Ms. Obokata, is still with Riken drawing nice salary no doubt while she gets ready for delicate lab work and preparing tea, thanks to the strong pressure Mr. Abe and his Education Minister exerted on Riken, a research institution funded by public money, not to fire her.

Sunday, August 18, 2013

(Special Post for August 15 - Part 2) Japan's General Staff Office Knew About Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombing in Advance and Did Nothing, According to 2011 NHK Documentary


(Continued from Part 1)

Some ask, "Why didn't Japan surrender after Hiroshima, or sooner?" Japan had been suing for peace at least since May 1945, sending secret delegations to contact the Allied Forces. The sticking point did seem to be about the status of the Emperor, but by July the surrender completely in the Allied Forces' terms - unconditional surrender - was being considered as the only alternative. Japan had nothing to fight with, and was defenseless. There were only a handful of major cities (Kyoto, Niigata, Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki) that hadn't been bombed and incinerated. But the negotiations dragged on, going nowhere.

Atomic bombing of Nagasaki has an added irony, as the bomb made by a Christian country destroyed a Catholic church with worshipers in it in a city where the Christians endured harsh state persecution for centuries and kept their faith.

Here's Part 2 of the 2011 NHK documentary "Atomic bombing - top secret information that was never utilized (原爆投下 活かされなかった極秘情報)".

I am aware that this part is even longer than Part 1, but I hope you have time to read it.

Summary of Part 2:

August 6, 1945. The Imperial Army's special intelligence unit picked up the call sign in V600s at 3AM - one of the "special task planes". It was accompanied by a short-wave message to Washington, then followed by a wireless voice communication to the base in Saipan: "Approaching the target".

Major Eizo Hori (see Part 1), head of the Division 2 of the General Staff Office that oversees the special intelligence unit, reported to his superiors that the weather reconnaissance plane was followed by the "special task plane" coming to Hiroshima. The General Staff Office sat on the information and did not share it with the regional headquarter in Hiroshima. The bomb was detonated 5 hours later at 8:15AM over unsuspecting residents of Hiroshima. There was no air raid siren. "Enola Gay" and the accompanying B29s were uncontested all the way to the target.

Three days later on August 9, again 5 hours before the atomic bomb explosion over Nagasaki, the intelligence unit picked up the same call sign in V600 again, and this time the B29 was heading for Kyushu. In light of what had happened in Hiroshima, the information was again immediately delivered all the way to the head of the General Staff Office. The cabinet ministers [more than half of whom were either current or former high-ranking military officers] were in a meeting in the Imperial Palace to discuss what to do in light of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima that practically wiped out the city in an instant. They couldn't come to any conclusion, but the Chief of Staff Umezu assured them there would be no second atomic bombing.

Meanwhile, a pilot of Shidenkai - Japanese fighter plane that could take out B29s - was waiting on the runway of a base in Kyushu. The sortie order never came. The group of B29s, including "Bockscar", on seeing the visibility of the first target of Kokura City in Fukuoka Prefecture was low, went on to the second target. The atomic bomb was dropped over a Catholic church in Nagasaki.

Survivors, who were intimately involved in the atomic bombing of the two cities and were interviewed by NHK, are still left with the question, "Why didn't the government do anything?"



原爆投下 活(い)かされなかった極秘情報 by gataro-clone

================
(26:50 - August 6, 1945)

August 6, 1945, 3AM. The Imperial Army special intelligence unit caught a call sign in V600s. The "special task plane" was heading toward Japan [for the first time]. Major Eizo Hori, of the General Staff Office, received the information.

"On August 6, this plane with a call sign in V600s issued a short-wave message. We didn't know what the message was, but it went to Washington. Then, it made the wireless voice communication to the US base in Iojima, saying

"We are approaching the target."


That "special task plane" was B29 "Enola Gay", carrying the atomic bomb to be used in the real battlefield for the first time in human history.


Lieutenant Russel Guggenbach was on board a B29 accompanying "Enola Gay" to film the bombing:

"They told us this was a big day, that we will be using, dropping our special bomb. Our target would be, in order, Hiroshima, Kokura, and Nagasaki. This is what we were trained for. Others were still training missions, but this was the real thing."


"Enola Gay" departed Tinian Island, flew over Iojima, and headed toward Hiroshima.

=================

(28:35 - Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945)

August 6. The regional headquarter of the Imperial Army at Hiroshima Castle had been on the heightened alert against air raids. Ms. Yoshie Oka, then 14-year-old student, was working at the headquarter running messages, as part of the student mobilization during the war.

In the early hours of that day, neighboring cities had been attacked by large formations of B29 bombers - Nishinomiya [in Hyogo Prefecture], Imabari [Ehime Prefecture in Shikoku] and Ube [in Yamaguchi Prefecture]. The General Staff Office in Tokyo had had the information of the impending attacks in advance, so it had contacted the regional headquarters which then issued air raid alerts for the residents of those cities.


The regional headquarter in Hiroshima was in the underground vault to escape air raids. The next target might be Hiroshima. Ms. Oka and others were there the whole night, so that they could issue air raid alerts as soon as possible.

"Yes, we were tense, and unsettled. We were wondering what was going on that night. We stayed up all night, till the morning of August 6."


Slightly past 7AM, a solitary B29 entered Hiroshima, about one hour before the atomic bomb was to be dropped.

Major Eizo Hori's voice:

"About 7:20AM, there was a plane coming from Bungo Channel into Hiroshima. It was a B29. Judging by the radio wave it emitted, it was a weather reconnaissance plane."


Major Hori's analysis was correct. According to the mission order issued by the US government, it was a weather reconnaissance plane. The instruction was that the weather aircraft fly first, and using the call sign of "V675" instruct the "Enola Gay", which was following the weather aircraft.

Major Hori:

"Then, as it flew over Hiroshima, this B29 emitted short-wave signal, again it was in V600s. This was so out of the ordinary, we thought. We knew the "special task plane" was approaching."


However, the General Staff Office in Tokyo did not share this information with the regional headquarter in Hiroshima.

Not knowing the "special task plane" was following the weather reconnaissance plane, the regional headquarter called off the alert.

Ms. Yoshie Oka [who was at the regional headquarter running errands]:

"That plane flew over us without doing anything, and we were all relieved. The commander and his staff stayed up all night, so they thought it should be OK if they went back home, eat something and take a short 30-minute nap and come back."


Voice of Lieutenant Guggenbach, who was on board a B29 following "Enola Gay" to document the bombing:

"...none of our planes were ever shot at. Never saw a flight.. Prior to getting to Hiroshima, I did get out of my seat and I did stand behind the bombardier and the pilot. So I did have a look straight at the front of the plane."

8:15AM:



Destroyed Hiroshima, without even an air raid siren:


Unprotected, many residents perished.

====================

(34:10 - Why the information wasn't used)

Why didn't the top military officials give the information of the "special task plane" to the Hiroshima regional headquarter? We still don't know the answer.

Mr. Ryoji Hasegawa, who worked in the special intelligence unit, saw in this very room his superior mortified because the information they conveyed to the top officials hadn't been used.

"His face said everything - 'My opinion was not accepted. I am so frustrated.'"


(Hasegawa continues with some heat:)

"'Japan was being attacked, to death probably, and yet people are too slow to respond.' My superior's recognition was not shared with the other members of the General Staff Office."


====================

(35:16 - Hiroshima)

Ms. Yoshie Oka again. She was working as a student at the regional headquarter. Although she was only 700 meters away from the hypocenter, she was unharmed because she was in the underground vault. But her 60 classmates who were out in the nearby field all perished.


If only there had been an air raid alert. Ms. Oka is chagrined even today.

"We were working in this underground vault, and we were saved, with no injuries. If there had been an early air raid alert and people had taken shelters in the underground vaults, many people wouldn't have had to die, many more people would have survived."


Ms. Oka tended her injured classmates after the bomb dropped. But all she could do was to watch them die, one after another.

"A mother was holding her badly injured daughter and cried. But the daughter said, 'Don't cry, mother. I am dying, serving the country.' And she made a smile on her badly burned face and died peacefully. Every day was like that. It was hard. All we could do was to watch."

====================

(37:45 - August 7, August 8)

August 7, the day after the bombing of Hiroshima. Even after the news of destruction of Hiroshima reached them, the Imperial Army wouldn't admit it was an atomic bomb.

Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister, demanded the affirmation of the fact. To that, the Imperial Army staff answered,

"The US is saying it was an atomic bomb, but it is also possible that it was just a conventional bomb with large explosive power."


Minister Togo said the Army, who denied the existence of an atomic bomb, was trying to minimize the effect of the bomb as little as possible.

However, the General Staff Office admitted, among themselves, that it was an atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima.

On August 8, two days after the bomb was dropped, an award ceremony was performed by the General Staff Office in the courtyard of the headquarter of the special intelligence unit. The feat of identifying the call sign of the B29 that dropped the atomic bomb was hailed as great achievement.

We found someone who was present at the ceremony. Mr. Kunio Tanaka, 90, was a captain of the special intelligence unit. Mr. Tanaka listened to the officer from the General Staff Office explaining that the B29 with the call sign in V600s was carrying an atomic bomb.

"'The plane was carrying the most terrible weapon, atomic bomb. If the same kind of planes come again, we will stop them. We will pursue and destroy them. You all did a great job.' We received the praise from him."

However, the very next day, the same tragedy was repeated in Nagasaki.

=====================

(41:08 - August 9)

Before dawn on August 9. The same call sign came in - V675, exactly the same as in Hiroshima. It was coming from Tinian Island, just like before.

We found someone who was monitoring this very call sign. Mr. Arao Ota, 90, was a lieutenant in the intelligence unit. He spoke about the day for the first time on camera.

"It was the same special radio wave used by the B29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. It was coming from the airfield on Tinian Island. We didn't know what it said, all we knew was the radio wave was emitted. But it was me who caught the call sign. I knew it was out of the ordinary, I felt fear. I thought there was a high probability that within a few hours an atomic bomb would be dropped somewhere in Japan."


This information did reach the top officers in the military. We found the document that backs it up, at the Military History Department of the Ministry of Defense.

It was Lieutenant Colonel Tadao Inoue of the General Staff Office who left the document. He was a close advisor to Chief of General Staff Yoshijiro Umezu.

This is a memorandum kept by Lieutenant Colonel Inoue. There was a running note on August 9, 1945:

"Special bomb V675. We knew in advance, via communication [radio wave], 5 hours before Nagasaki was bombed."


So, the information of the bomber with atomic bomb approaching had indeed reached the top of the General Staff Office 5 hours before the bombing.

======================

(44:15 - Omura airbase)

Omura Airbase, 15 kilometers north of Nagasaki. In order to protect the entire Kyushu, a detachment of fighter planes was stationed in the airbase.

Mr. Minoru Honda, 88, was a pilot there. Mr. Honda and his fellow pilots flew "Shidenkai" (Purple Thunder). Shidenkai was one of the few fighter planes that could go as high as B29, to 10,000 meters. Mr. Honda says he was determined to take out B29 with the atomic bomb if it came again, even if that meant a suicide attack.

Mr. Honda happened to witness the atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima from the sky two days earlier. He was on his way from Hyogo to his base in Omura.

"Just as I was flying over the Hiroshima Castle, I was blown off the course. The heavy Shidenkay was blown off. The plane became uncontrollable, and I must have dropped at least 500 meters. I finally regained control of the plane, and looked up ahead. Then I saw a cloud of red and black rapidly rising. The city of Hiroshima, which I had just looked on moments ago, disappeared. I couldn't see the city. I thought I had gone crazy. I couldn't tell if that was real."

======================

(46:45 - Nagasaki bombing)

August 9, 9AM. After taking off Tinian, the B29 with the second atomic bomb was approaching Kyushu - "Bockscar". It went first to Kokura City in Fukuoka Prefecture, but since the visibility was bad it moved on to the second target, Nagasaki.

However, no order came to Mr. Honda's unit to make a sortie. That B29 was approaching Nagasaki was confirmed, but they weren't told the B29 was carrying an atomic bomb.

Shidenkai pilot Minoru Honda looks puzzled:

"B29 is not impregnable. I actually shot it down. It is extremely difficult, but it's not impossible to shoot it down. Even today, I am vexed. Why didn't they issue us a sortie order? They lacked information that much?"


======================

(48:35 - What the top echelon of the military was doing when the bomb dropped in Nagasaki)

August 9, 10:30AM. The Conference of Supreme Leaders of War was on-going at the Imperial Palace all morning. They had received information of further deterioration of the war.

On August 9, 1945, Soviet Union, which had remained neutral, declared war against Japan, and the troops were crossing the Manchurian border.

The topic of the meeting that day was whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration and make an unconditional surrender. But if they surrendered, what would happen to the status of the Emperor? Would they be harshly prosecuted as war criminals? They couldn't decide what to do.


The top military officers present in the meeting, including Chief of Staff Umezu, insisted that it was possible to continue the war even after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and said the following:

Umezu: "It is true that the damage from the atomic bomb is extremely heavy, but I doubt that the US can keep using the bombs one after another."


There will be no atomic bombing the second time. As the B29 with the atomic bomb was approaching Nagasaki, the military was repeating the baseless assertion. [NHK's word, literally.]

At 11:02AM, while the meeting was still on-going, an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.



Again, there wasn't even an air raid siren.


==================

(51:10 - Aftermath - "Day after the fair")

Mr. Arao Ota, who caught the call sign from Tinian Island and reported on the danger of the second atomic bombing, still can't understand.

"I am so mortified. We knew it! If they used the information and did all they could, then we might have been able to accept it. But there was no indication that they used the information. All the more I'm mortified."


Major Eizo Hori, who reported the information collected by the special intelligence unit to the top officers in the General Staff Office, had hardly anything to say about the Nagasaki bombing. In his post-war document, he simply wrote:

"The same call sign was caught again on August 9, but nothing was done. A day after the fair."



Mr. Minoru Honda, who was waiting for a sortie order at Omura Airbase, was ordered to carry injured people to the hospitals after the bombing.

"I can't forget, till I die. People without any hair, naked with no clothes on, melted. How could a horrendous thing like this be allowed in this world? I cried and cried. I didn't even know why I was crying. I still remember. I feel helpless. As a soldier, I feel helpless, I feel sorry."


We shared our new information with Mr. Honda, that the top military officers had information of the bomber with the atomic bomb approaching Nagasaki 5 hours in advance. The truth, the first time in 66 years.

(Mr. Honda says in a shaky voice, in sheer disbelief, disgust, and anger:)

「分かってたん。それじゃなんで命令ださんですかそしたら?5時間もあったら十分待機できたはずですよねえ。」

"So they knew. Then why didn't they issue orders? 5 hours were more than enough to thoroughly prepare."

「これが日本の姿ですかね。こんなこと、またおきるんじゃないですかね、こんなこと許しておったら。」

"So this is Japan. Such a thing, I think it will happen again, if we let them get away with it."


=====================

(55:20 - burning the record)

On August 11, with Japan's surrender all but certain, an order was issued to the special intelligence unit - destroy all information, including intelligence information, kept at the headquarter in Tokyo.

Mr. Ryoji Hasegawa was ordered to burn the documents. He says with some heat:

"I was told to burn them, and then turn them into dust. Destroy evidence. Destroy evidence of the existence of the unit."


Mr. Hasegawa says he kept burning the documents there, until the day of surrender.

Everything, including the fact that the Imperial Army knew about the activities surrounding the atomic bombing, was made to cease to exist.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic bombs dropped on defenseless people. Many lives and living were destroyed in an instant.

Knowing the grave danger approaching, the military leaders did not share the information. Two tragedies keep asking us about the responsibility of those who lead the nation.

(THE END)

=====================

This is beyond incompetence. They purposefully withheld the key information and lied.

NHK does not speculate why the top military (essentially the government) decided to sit on the information, but the documentary seems almost begging us to "read between the lines" when the scene was described with highest ranking officers and government officials meeting to decide what to do on the day of Nagasaki bombing.

Excuse can be made for the Imperial Army that by that time, having tens of thousands of people killed on one bombing raid must have seemed like nothing. In March that year, more than 100,000 people perished in Tokyo in one night in a massive incendiary bombing. Hundreds of B29 had been dropping bombs indiscriminately over cities. A few B29s flying toward Hiroshima may have hardly seemed worthy of any attention, even though they were with the peculiar call signs and did unusual things (like short-wave communication to Washington).

But all they needed to do might have been to sound an air raid siren so that people would stay in bomb shelters, and to send fighter planes to at least harass the B29s so that the B29s would abandon the missions (and drop the charge in the ocean, instead of over the targets).

Instead, they withheld, lied. The B29s were uncontested. It is almost as if the military wanted the bombs to go off.

The documentary was aired two years ago. Since then, arm-chair general (or I should say cosplay tank commander) Shinzo Abe has become the prime minister for the second time. Despite the revelation from, of all people, NHK, most Japanese don't seem to care that ordinary Japanese in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were essentially abandoned by the central government in August 1945. From what I can tell, this documentary doesn't seem to have caused much impact in Japan at all.

The Japanese continue to let them get away with it.

It is an inconvenient truth, which doesn't suit anyone's narrative. The Japanese government wouldn't want to admit to any of this, after 68 years of having gotten away with it. Japanese people who condemn senseless killing of civilians by the US using atomic bombs would want to keep their narrative that the attacks were "surprise attacks" by the US. They have to remain the victims of the atomic bombs dropped by the US. They probably wouldn't want to admit that they were victims of their own government.

Mr. Honda the Shidenkai pilot said it will be repeated if people let them get away with it. Many would say it has been repeated, most recently on March 11, 2011 and its aftermath. It will be repeated.

-----

P.S. Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu received a sentence of life in prison in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, but died while in prison in 1949 because of colon cancer. If he lived, I have no doubt that he was pardoned, like most others who also received the life sentence. He is enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine.

Saturday, August 17, 2013

(Special Post for August 15 - Part 1) Japan's General Staff Office Knew About Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombing in Advance and Did Nothing, According to 2011 NHK Documentary


(8/18/2013: Part 2 has been uploaded. They knew the B29 headed for Hiroshima was carrying the atomic bomb, they knew the B29 headed for Nagasaki was carrying the atomic bomb. They knew hours in advance.)

===================

There is an NHK documentary that was aired two years ago on August 6, 2011, on the anniversary day of Hiroshima atomic bombing. I was unaware of this documentary until I saw a tweet a few days ago that had the link to a blogpost by Councilman Koichi Ohyama of Minamisoma City, Fukushima on September 25, 2012.

Mr. Ohyama's post from one year ago quotes the NHK documentary's announcement from two years ago, which says that the top officers of Japanese imperial army knew in advance the impending US attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and did not do anything.

Atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been described (at least in Japan) as "beyond expectation" (just like the Fukushima nuclear accident) and "surprise attacks" with no pre-warning by the US, who used to dump leaflets in Japanese from the planes to warn civilians of impending attacks.

But NHK says the top military officers in imperial Japan knew, and did nothing. The military essentially was the government during the war.

I had never heard of such a thing.

So I looked for the video of this documentary and watched it.


原爆投下 活(い)かされなかった極秘情報 by gataro-clone

To share what I learned with readers who do not speak Japanese, the following is my first-pass translation (not all strictly literal, subject to revision; links added for reference) from the NHK documentary titled "Atomic bombing - top secret information that was never utilized (原爆投下 活かされなかった極秘情報)", aired on August 6, 2011. Since the documentary is one-hour long, I have broken up into two parts with my summary for each, for easier reading.

Summary of Part 1:

Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been considered "beyond expectation", "surprise attack". However, the General Staff Office of the Japanese Imperial Army knew about the secretive US activities on Tinian Island in the Northern Mariana Islands since June 1945. The special intelligence unit directly controlled by the General Staff Office had been monitoring the code signs of B29s on the Northern Mariana Islands, and it noticed the peculiar code signs of about a dozen B29s that suddenly appeared on the island of Tinian in June 1945, two months before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intelligence unit sensed these planes were on some unknown, special mission. The information was quickly shared with the top military officials.

Japan had been aware of the US efforts to develop atomic bombs, and it had started its own efforts to develop atomic bombs in 1943. But when the government had to abandon the effort in June 1945, it convinced itself that uranium extraction was impossible for anyone, including the United States. The Japanese government had information on successful detonation of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945 in New Mexico, but it again convinced itself that it couldn't be an atomic bomb.

The intelligence unit continued to monitor B29s with V600 call signs and kept informing the top officials. They did not connect the dots, and the mysterious B29s on Tinian Island remained mysteries as the fateful August 6, 1945 approached.


============

(Preamble)

Tinian Island in the Northern Mariana Islands. August 6, 1945. North Field. Secret B-29 planes was about to depart, to drop the "special bombs" - atomic bombs on Japan.

An atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Three days later, the same happened in Nagasaki.

So far, the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is considered to have been utterly "beyond expectation" for the Japanese, "surprise attacks". However, in fact, the Japanese military intelligence unit had known in advance the US activities surrounding the atomic bombing. They were monitoring the US military communications.

NHK has uncovered what little information left on the matter, and found eyewitnesses, diaries, audio tapes of the deceased officers in charge of intelligence. What NHK has found out is the fact that the military knew the danger was imminent but nothing was done.

The military intelligence unit had started tracking what they called "special task planes" which became active in June 1945 on Tinian Island, two months before the atomic bombing. On August 6, 1945, they knew the movement of the bomber approaching Hiroshima.

In case of Nagasaki, the top officers of the military knew the bomber was approaching Nagasaki, 5 hours before the bomb was dropped.

Was there anything that could have been done?

People who had been involved and who had said nothing since the end of the World War II have started to talk.

There was no air-raid siren. People were exposed to radiation and heat from the atomic bombs, without any protection. More than 200,000 people died in 1945 alone in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why was nothing done, when they had intelligence surrounding the atomic bombing?

For the first time in 66 years, here's the truth.

============

(5:02 - Intelligence)

The former headquarters of the special army intelligence unit in Suginami-Ward in Tokyo. Ryoji Hasegawa, 88, was a second lieutenant of the Japanese Imperial Army. He was told never to disclose even the existence of the unit, which became active in the spring of 1945. The unit was directly under the General Staff Office, charged with collecting the enemy intelligence. One of the tasks for Hasegawa was to collect information on B-29 bombers, as the US air raids using B-29 on Japan intensified in March 1945.

There were more than 100 members in the special intelligence unit. They were listening in on the Morse code used between the bombers and the bases. The messages were mostly encrypted, and deciphering was difficult. However, there was a short signal at the top that was not encrypted.

That was a call sign. It started with "V", followed by three digits, and that would let the receiver know who was sending the message.

The monitoring records of the Japanese military. Most of the records were destroyed after the war, but NHK found some that survived. Most call signs were from the Mariana Islands.

The special intelligence unit noticed that bombers from each island had different call signs. Saipan: V400s, Guam: V500s, and Tinian: V700s. By monitoring the call signs, they could tell how many bombers were coming from which island. The unit was able to predict where they were headed, by continuously monitoring the call signs.

Hasegawa: "We would collect the information, and tell the General Staff Office how many B29 bombers were likely to go which direction. 200 here, 300 there..."

=============

(9:40 - V600 call signs from Tinian Island in June 1945)

June 1945. The special intelligence unit noticed something abnormal. They caught mysterious call signs that they had never heard before. Hasegawa says, "They were call signs in V600s. We'd seen 400s, 500s and 700s, and they come from Saipan, Guam, Tinian. But now, V600s. Something was wrong, we thought."

They were coming from Tinian Island. On the island that had been using call signs in 700s, there was now a new group of B29 bombers using call signs in 600s. What was their purpose? The unit strengthened its monitoring capability to watch closely.

Tinian Island was taken by the US in August 1944. North Field of Tinian Island, which was the base for Japan bombing raids. A special unit arrived there in June 1945 and started using call signs in V600s. It was the 509th Composite Group, which later dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


One of the Group was Mr. Russel Guggenbach (spelling is my guess), 88. He participated in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a crew member of B29. Mr. Guggenbach says the contact with other units was strictly forbidden on the island.

"The new commander informed us that there was going to be new officer, a new bomb was being developed, and if successful the bomb would shorten the war. We were told we were on the tight security, and we should obey orders and what we learned, what we saw, we learned to keep it ourselves. We were not supposed to tell even to our best friends."


The US was spending 2 billion dollars to develop atomic bombs.

There were about 10 B29s of this special unit on Tinian Island that used the call signs in V600s. Compared to other B29s that went on the air raids on Japan, 200 or 300 planes at a time, it was incredibly small. Guggenbach says they did the pin-point bombing practice in the nearby small islands, though they didn't know the final destination. All their training, says Guggenbach, "was for this special bomb, on a special mission."

===============

(15:03 - How much did the top Japanese military officers know about this information?)

Major Eizo Hori was in charge of providing intelligence collected by the special intelligence unit to the top officers in the General Staff Office. He died 16 years ago, but according to his family he had always blamed himself for not being able to stop the atomic bombing. His family kept an audio tape that Hori made several years before his death, about the special unit on Tinian Island.

"Unit with the call signs in 600s, it was a mysterious unit. When we followed the numbers carefully, we found that there were only 12 or 13 of them. So far, B29s were in hundreds. Something was wrong. We started to call them "special task plane". Something was very wrong, and we did our best to keep track of them..."


Major Hori's information of the "special task planes" was conveyed all the way to the top of the General Staff Office. However, Hori said he didn't know at that time that the "special task" was atomic bombing.

===============

(17:57 - What the military/Hideki Tojo knew about the US atomic bomb development)

Japanese Imperial Army had known from early on that the US had been developing nuclear bombs. In the spring of 1943, General Hideki Tojo, who was then the Minister of War, spoke to people in charge of weapon development. He said,

"We also have information that the development of atomic bombs is in an advanced stage in the US. This development may decide the fate of the war."


General Tojo then ordered the aviation headquarters to start the development of atomic bombs.

The best and the brightest in the nation were gathered. One of them was Mr. Kunihiko Kigoshi, 92. He was in charge of developing the uranium compound to be used in the bombs. Dr. Yoshio Nishina of Institute of Physical and Chemical Research led the group of researchers including Mr. Kigoshi.

Mr. Kigoshi says Dr. Nishina was frequently called to the aviation headquarters of the Japanese Imperial Army to be asked about the progress on atomic bomb development.

"After Dr. Nishina returned from the aviation headquarters, we were called to his office and told to do our best. I believe he was under significant pressure from the Army."


In the mountainous region of Fukushima Prefecture, uranium ore was being mined by school students. Mr. Kiwamu Ariga, 80, was one of the students mobilized for the war efforts to mine uranium. He and his fellow students mined, and then transported uranium ore on their backs.

One day, to inspire the students doing the harsh labor, an army officer came and spoke to the students. Mr. Ariga says,

"The officer told us that a bomb will be made from the stones we were carrying. He said a small matchbox-size [bomb] would destroy a large city like New York in an instant. So keep up your effort, said the officer."


However, the Imperial Army gave up on developing the atomic bomb at the end of June, 1945. It was due to lack of materials and resources, as the US air raids became too frequent.

But that was not the reason cited in an Army report. The report said, "It turned out that it was impossible to extract radioactive uranium. In the US, they came to the conclusion that it was impossible."

As an excuse for discontinuing the development, the Army made a baseless assertion that even the US couldn't do it [extract uranium]. [This is by NHK's narrator - i.e. NHK's opinion.]

Mr. Kigoshi says,

"They had to have a reason for discontinuing. If they thought the US might succeed, that would mean Japan would totally lose. The environment was such that it prohibited that kind of thought from entering into people's minds."


===============

(23:27 - The US succeeds in the first atomic bomb detonation in New Mexico)

But right after Japan halted the development of atomic bombs, the US carried out the first successful atomic bomb experiment in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. Fragments of this information were delivered to the General Staff Office. But no one dared admit it was an atomic bomb.

After the war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled the history of the war. A person who served as secretary to the Minister of War wrote a memo on the incident:

"We had the report of a new weapon tested in New Mexico that had large explosive power. But no one thought it was an atomic bomb."


Mr. Kigoshi, who was involved in Japan's effort to develop atomic bombs, says it was impossible for the top Army officers not to know it was an atomic bomb.

"Of course, even at that time, they must have thought the bomb was utilizing nuclear fission, I believe. Japan's development effort was just too small-scale. I thought it would be the US who would succeed."


The Imperial Army refused to recognize that the US had succeeded in developing an atomic bomb. Mysterious B29s on Tinian Island, dubbed "special task planes" by the Japanese intelligence, remained mysterious. The fateful day approached.

(To be continued in Part 2 of the post)

Sunday, August 5, 2012

OT: For the People Who Suffered On August 6, 1945 and After, from the Atomic Bomb Detonated in Hiroshima


Music sent by an anonymous reader of this blog. Thank you.

"Wander My Friends" by Bear McCreary:

Japan Marks 67th Anniversary of Atomic Bombing in Hiroshima


If you think that this year people pay more attention to the anniversary of the atomic bomb dropped in Hiroshima in 1945 because of the Fukushima accident and ongoing radiation contamination, you really have to look for the news.

Yomiuri Online headlines on August 6, 2012, from the top:

  • LDP to submit "reprimand of the prime minister" on August 7

  • Successor to Shuttle to be outsourced to 3 private companies, says NASA

  • Table Tennis women's team advance to final, guaranteed medal

  • Koji Murobushi won Bronze in Hammer Throw (the rest is all Olympics)


Asahi online headlines:
  • Murobushi won Bronze in Hammer Throw

  • Hiding radiation exposure has been done for long time

  • Men's 100-meter dash won by Bolt

  • Japan's men's fencing team won silver in team foil

  • (In the Social News section) Namie-machi mayor to attend the ceremony in Hiroshima


Mainichi online headlines:
  • Shooting in the US midwest at a Sikh temple, 6 dead 3 seriously injured

  • Typhoon No.11 causing heavy rain in Okinawa

  • Hiroshima Peace Ceremony, from Fukushima to Hiroshima


On Twitter, of people I follow (not many, I admit), only one person tweeted "silent prayers for the atomic bomb victims" (he is a nuclear researcher).

Japanese athletes are doing extremely well, I think, in London Olympics. Of the Olympic news not mentioned above,

Men's medley relay in swimming: Silver
Men's boxing (bantam class): advanced to semi-final
Women's soccer: advanced to semi-final
Men's soccer: advanced to semi-final

The fantastic rumor about the opening ceremony is still going strong by the way. There is a tangential twist to the story, as people express outrage against Governor of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara who reportedly said "Westerners do judo like wild animals", calling it "reishizumu" (that's racism in Japanese-English or English-Japanese) against white people.

I would think there are westerners who are proud that their judo style is like wild animals.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

#Radiation in Japan: Map of "Black Rain" Finally Made 66 Years After Hiroshima Bombing

Speaking of RERF - Radiation Effect Research Foundation - which succeeded the notorious ABCC - Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission - in 1975, RERF just came up with the area map of so-called "black rain" after the Hiroshima bombing. They had the survey data of 13,000 people all along, but sat on it for 66 years.

And surprise, surprise. The map shows the area where the "black rain" - radioactive fallout that fell with the rain - fell to be much, much bigger than what the government has admitted so far.

And not at all surprisingly, Toshiteru Okubo, chairman of RERF, says "Personally I do not think this data is important. It's hard to believe the black rain caused an acute radiation sickness anyway."

The chairman is right. People who have said they suffer the effect of radioactive fallout that they received by the black rain are not suffering an acute radiation sickness that would have caused them to die in a short period of time after the exposure.

From Yomiuri Shinbun, local Hiroshima version (12/21/2011):

日米の共同研究機関・放射線影響研究所(放影研、広島市南区・長崎市)が、原爆投下後に降った「黒い雨」を浴びた約1万3000人の調査データを基に作製した分布図が公表された20日、援護策の拡充を求める住民団体などから「援護地域の拡大につながる可能性がある」と期待の声が上がった。一方、放影研は「新しく判明したことはない」と健康被害の解明には否定的だが、国の検討会にデータが提供される見通しで、援護地域見直しをめぐる議論が注目される。

On December 20, Radiation Effect Research Foundation, a cooperative Japan-US research organization (RERF, Minami-ku in Hiroshima City and in Nagasaki City) disclosed the distribution map of "black rain" that fell after the nuclear bomb exploded over Hiroshima. The map was created from the survey data of about 13,000 people who were exposed to the black rain. Citizens' groups calling for more assistance for the bomb victims are hopeful that this may result in more areas becoming eligible for assistance. On the other hand, RERF says "There is no new discovery", insisting [the map] would not help in understanding health damages. But it is likely that the data will be submitted to a study group of the national government, and discussions may ensue as to whether the support areas should be revised.

 援護対象外の住民らで組織する県「黒い雨」原爆被害者の会連絡協議会の高野正明会長(73)は「データの公表は有意義だ」と評価。その上で「現在の援護対象地域外でも降ったとする分布があり、援護地域の拡大に役立てば」と期待を寄せた。

Masaaki Takano, chairman of the Council of "Black Rain" Atomic Bomb Victims, praised the disclosure of the data as significant. He is hopeful that it will be used to expand the support areas, as the data shows the black rain fell outside the current support areas.

 県と広島市などは2010年7月、被爆者ら2万7147人分のアンケートを基に、厚生労働省に対して、指定する降雨地域より広範に降ったとして、援護地域の拡大を求める要望書を出した。この日の分布図公開について、市調査課の漆原正浩課長は「これまでの認定地域とは一部で食い違いがあるのがわかる。貴重なデータだが、どのように利用されるか国の判断を注視していきたい」と話した。

In July 2010, Hiroshima Prefecture and Hiroshima City submitted a request to the Ministry of Health and Labor to expand the support areas based on the survey of 27,147 people including atomic bomb victims, as the rain fell in much wider areas than the designated support area. Commenting on today's disclosure of the distribution map, a Hiroshima City official said, "The map clearly shows the areas [where the rain fell] that are different from the existing support areas. It's valuable data, but we will wait to see how the national government will decide to use it."

 放影研はすでに厚労省に今回のデータを提供。同省原子爆弾被爆者援護対策室の和田康紀室長は「(公開されたデータを)検討会で議論するかどうかは、座長と相談して決めたい」とした。

RERF has already submitted the data to the Ministry of Health and Labor. The head of the section in the Ministry to support atomic bomb victims said, "We would like to consult with the chairman of the study group to decide whether the data (disclosed today) should be discussed in the stidy group."

 一方、放影研で記者会見した大久保利晃理事長は、雨が降った時期や量などが確認できず、「爆心地付近で直爆を受けた人を中心にした調査。(黒い雨のデータにするには)内容が簡単過ぎるし、偏りがある」と指摘。その上で「私個人は、今回のデータがそれほど大事とは思っていない。雨を浴びて、重い急性症状を引き起こしたとも考えられない」との見方を示した。

On the other hand, Toshiteru Okubo, chairman of RERF, held a press conference at RERF [in Hiroshima City]. He pointed out that the timing of the precipitation and the amount could not be confirmed, and said "The survey was done on people who had a direct exposure to the atomic bomb near the hypocenter. To call this the data for black rain, the data is too simplistic and biased." He added, "Personally I don't think the data is that important. It's hard to believe the black rain caused an acute radiation illness anyway."

I couldn't find the map posted anywhere at the RERF site, which Chairman Okubo is holding in the picture below (from Yomiuri):

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Radioactive Cesium from Breast Milk from Mothers in Hiroshima Prefecture, 840 km from Fukushima I Nuke Plant

One mother had lived in Hiroshima since before the March 11 nuclear accident. The expert at Hiroshima University who measured the density of radioactive cesium suspect it is internal radiation from ingesting contaminated food.

Hiroshima is over 840 kilometers from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

From Chugoku Shinbun (10/12/2011):

内部被曝(ひばく)防止に取り組む市民団体「繋(つな)がろう広島」は11日、広島県内在住の母親2人の母乳から微量の放射性物質が検出されたと発表した。東日本大震災後に東京から避難した1人と以前から県内に住む1人。測定に協力した広島大は「授乳には問題ない値」としている。

A citizens' group called "Tsunagaro Hiroshima (Let's connect, Hiroshima" announced on October 11 that a minute amount of radioactive materials has been detected from the breast milk of two mothers who live in Hiroshima Prefecture. One of them escaped from Tokyo after the March 11 disaster; the other had lived in Hiroshima since before the disaster. The researcher at Hiroshima University who measured the breast milk says there is no problem feeding their babies with the breast milk.

 検査は10月上旬、震災後に関東地方から広島県内に避難してきた4人と、震災前から同県内に住む2人の計6人を対象に実施。それぞれ100ccの母乳を採り、同大大学院工学研究院の静間清教授が検出器で調べた。

The survey was done in early October on 4 people who evacuated to Hiroshima from the Kanto region after the March 11 disaster, and on 2 people who had lived in Hiroshima since before the disaster. 100 cc of the breast milk was taken from each mother, and tested by Professor Kiyoshi Shizuma of Hiroshima University Graduate School of Engineering.

 その結果、いずれも30代の2人から微量の放射性セシウムを検出した。厚生労働省は、牛乳・乳製品の放射性セシウムの暫定規制値(1キログラム当たり200ベクレル)を母乳の指標とする。同団体は2人の意向で具体的数値を明らかにしていないが、厚労省の指標は大幅に下回っているという。

A minute amount of radioactive cesium was detected from two mothers in their thirties. The Ministry of Health and Labor uses the provisional safety limit for milk and dairy products for radioactive cesium (200 becquerels/kg) for the breast milk. The citizens' group has not disclosed the detailed numbers as the mothers do not wish the numbers to be disclosed, but says they are well below the standard set by the Ministry of Health and Labor.

 静間教授は「以前から県内に住む1人は食材からの摂取の可能性がある」とみて継続検査する。

Professor Shizuma will continue to monitor the mother who has lived in Hiroshima since before the accident, as "It is possible that radioactive cesium came from ingesting the contaminated food."

 同団体の三田拓代表は「行政には母乳や尿の検査態勢を整え、食品の放射線量の測定場所を設けるよう求めていく」としている。

The leader of the citizens' group says he will ask the prefectural government to set up a system to test the breast milk and urine, and to measure the radiation in food.