Japan's Major Newspapers Have Timely "Scoops" on the Government "Suppression" of Information on Nuclear Issues After the Fukushima I NPP Accident

as the vocal opposition to the State Secrecy Protection Law (which is now in the Upper House) from the press, legal experts, scholars, celebrities, net citizens and citizens in the real (physical) world continues in Japan.

Mainichi, Asahi, and Tokyo Shinbun in particular have been expressing the fear, real or imagined, that anything related to the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident can be categorized by the national government as "state secret" and suppressed.

As if to prove their point, Mainichi and Asahi each published an article, supposedly disclosing the secret documents (both of which appear, simply, not to have been designated for public release and consumption - i.e. internal ministerial documents) related to the nuclear accident that they had obtained (Mainichi through information disclosure request, Asahi through insider leaking the information).

First, Mainichi says it has obtained a 30-page document, a report of the visit to Chernobyl in March 2012 by the delegation of the Cabinet Office, through information disclosure request. No reason is given why Mainichi requested this report one year and eight months later.

From Mainichi Shinbun, via Yahoo News (12/1/2013):

東京電力福島第１原発事故への対応の参考にするとして内閣府が２０１２年３月、ロシアなどへ職員を派遣し、旧ソ連チェルノブイリ原発事故（１９８６年）の被災者支援を定めた「チェルノブイリ法」の意義を否定する報告書をまとめていたことが分かった。同法の理念を受け継いだ「子ども・被災者生活支援法」の法案作成時期と重なるが、非公表のまま関係の近い原発推進派の団体などに配られていた。

It has been revealed that the Cabinet Office complied the report that denied the significance of [so-called] "Chernobyl Act", which was established to support the victims after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 in the former Soviet Union. The Cabinet Office had sent officials in March 2012 to Russia and other countries to help decide the government response to the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. It was when the "Children and Disaster Victims Support Act", which inherited the principle from the Chernobyl Act, was being drafted. However, the trip report was never made public; instead it was distributed to pro-nuclear groups that had a close association [with the officials who went on the trip].

支援法は、線量が一定以上の地域を対象に幅広い支援をうたって１２年６月に成立したが、今年１０月に支援地域を福島県内の一部に限定した基本方針が決まっており、成立を主導した国会議員らからは「国は早い時期から隠れて骨抜きを図っていたのではないか」と不信の声が上がる。

The "Children and Disaster Victims Support Act" was passed in June 2012, promising extensive support for [people] in the areas with certain levels of radiation exposure. However, in October 2013 the basic policy was set to limit the support areas to part of Fukushima Prefecture only. The members of the National Diet who led the effort to pass the Act now suspect that the national government was secretly planning to water down the Act from early on.

報告書はＡ４判３０ページで、内閣府原子力被災者生活支援チームが作成。毎日新聞の情報公開請求で開示された。調査団は同チームの菅原郁郎事務局長補佐（兼・経済産業省経済産業政策局長）を団長に、復興庁職員を含む約１０人。ウクライナ、ベラルーシ（２月２８日〜３月６日）とロシア（３月４〜７日）を２班で視察し、各政府関係者や研究者から聞き取りした。

The 30-page trip report was written by the Cabinet Office Support Team for Nuclear Disaster Victims, and it was obtained by the information disclosure request from Mainichi Shinbun. The 10-person delegation was headed by Ikuro Sugawara, assistant Secretary General of the team (and Director General of Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau at Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). The delegation went to Ukraine and Belarus (from 2/28 to 3/6/2012) and Russia (3/4 to 3/7/2012) in two groups, and interviewed government officials and researchers there.

報告書は、チェルノブイリ法が年間被ばく線量１ミリシーベルトと５ミリシーベルトを基準に移住の権利や義務を定めたことについて「（区域設定が）過度に厳しい」として「補償や支援策が既得権になり、自治体や住民の反対のため区域の解除や見直しができない」「膨大なコストに対し、見合う効果はない」「日本で採用するのは不適当」などの証言を並べ、同法の意義を否定。両事故の比較で、福島での健康影響対策は適切だったと強調もしている。

While the "Chernobyl Act" confers the right to relocate [to residents] in the areas with annual radiation exposure exceeding 1 millisievert and the obligation to relocate in the areas with annual radiation exposure exceeding 5 millisieverts, the report denies the significance of the "Chernobyl Act" by saying "(Designation of the areas) are too strict", and citing testimonies such as "Compensation and support schemes become vested rights, and lifting or modifying the designated areas cannot be done due to opposition from municipalities and residents", "there is no benefit that justifies the enormous cost", "The Chernobyl Act is not appropriate to adopt in Japan". In comparing both nuclear accidents, the report also emphasizes that the [government] measures against health effects in Fukushima Prefecture were appropriate.

支援法の成立を主導した谷岡郁子元参院議員（当時民主）は「視察自体聞いていない」。川田龍平参院議員（みんな）は「できるだけ被害を矮小（わいしょう）化したい意図が当時からあったことが分かる。支援法つぶしが目的だろう」と話した。

Ms. Kuniko Tanioka, former Councilor (then of Democratic Party of Japan) who led the effort to pass the Children and Disaster Victims Support Act says, "I haven't heard about the visit itself." Councilor Ryuhei Kawada (of Your Party) says, "It's clear that [the government] intended to downplay the damage at that time. The purpose was probably to squash the Children and Disaster Victims Support Act."

菅原氏は「自分は支援法に関与していない」と反論。一方で、支援法が低線量被ばくによる健康影響の可能性を認めて自主避難者の意思を尊重しているのに対し、菅原氏は「当時健康影響は過剰に強調されていた。それより心のケアが大事だと伝えるため、報告書を持っていろんな人に説明した」と述べ、チェルノブイリ法や支援法と異なる理念を広めるのに使ったことは認めた。これまで原発を推進する立場の有識者団体や、支援法を主導した議員とは別の一部議員などに配ったという。

Mr. Sugawara argues that he wasn't involved with the Children and Disaster Victims Support Act. However, he admits that he used the report to spread a different idea from the Chernobyl Act and the Children and Disaster Victims Support Act, and says "At that time the health effects were exaggerated. So we explained to people by showing the report that the psychological care was more important." The report was distributed to pro-nuclear expert groups and members of the Diet who were not leading the effort to pass the Children and Disaster Victims Support Act.

また当時復興相として調査を指示した平野達男参院議員は「チェルノブイリ法の実情を見てくるよう指示した」と説明したが、「今読めば一方的過ぎると言われても仕方ない」と内容の偏りを認めた。菅原氏らが報告書をどう使ったかは知らなかったといい、「結果としてそういう（公表せず一部の人に配る）使われ方をした。いろいろな考え方を持っている人に配るべきだった」と話した。

Councilor Tatsuo Hirano, then-Minister of Reconstruction who ordered the trip says he instructed the officials to see how the Chernobyl Act was implemented, but he admits that the report may be biased. "You could say it is one-sided, if you read it today." Mr. Hirano says he didn't know how the report was used by Mr. Sugawara and his people. "The report ended up (being distributed to a small number of people without being made public). It should have been distributed to people with different opinions."

Haven't heard of it? Well Ms. Tanioka, it was your party who was in charge of the national government at that time. According to Mainichi, the report is biased because it lacks more dire testimonies, comments, research results from Ukraine and Belarus.

The so-called "Chernobyl Act" is revered in Japan among people who are worried about the effect of radiation from the accident as the infallible and scientific standard to deal with a nuclear accident and the victims of a nuclear accident.

Then, Asahi says it has obtained a document created in March 2011 right after the start of the Fukushima I NPP accident by an official at Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (which was simultaneously the promoter and the regulator of the nuclear industry in Japan at that time).

(Asahi also says it was TEPCO who caused the nuclear accident, not the 9.1 earthquake and huge tsunami caused by the quake.)

From Asahi Shinbun (12/2/2013; part):

福島事故直後に「原子力再生」　経産省が機密文書

Confidential document by METI: "Nuclear power revival" right after the Fukushima accident

２０１１年３月に東京電力が福島第一原発事故を起こした直後、経済産業省が「原子力の再生」や「原発輸出の再構築」をめざす内部文書をつくっていたことがわかった。事故の混乱が続いている最中にもかかわらず、原発推進政策の維持を図ろうとしていた。

Right after Tokyo Electric Power Company caused the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident in March 2011, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry created an internal document for "the revival of nuclear power" and "rebuilding the nuclear power plant export", it has been revealed. The ministry was trying to maintain the policy to promote nuclear power in the middle of confusion after the nuclear accident.

朝日新聞は、３月下旬の日付で情報管理が必要な「機密」扱いの「原子力エネルギー再復興へ向けて」と題する文書を入手した。関係者によると、原発にくわしい幹部がつくり、エネルギー政策にかかわる幹部級に配られた。事故後の方針を確認したり政策を立案したりするたたき台の一つになったという。

Asahi Shinbun obtained the "classified" (meaning the document requires access control) document dated in late March 2011 and titled "For the revival of nuclear power". According to the source, the document was created by the officials knowledgeable about nuclear power (plants), and distributed to the officials involved in energy policies. This document became one of the bases for confirming and planning the policies after the accident.

冒頭の「趣意」には「原子力なきエネルギー安定供給は成り立たない」「原子力存続に向けた政府の再決意を表明する」と書かれている。そのうえで「原子力再生を果たし、インフラ輸出基盤を再構築」と記し、原発の維持と輸出促進を確認した。「経産省の再生そのもの」とも強調し、最重要政策に位置づけている。

The "Executive Summary" at the top says "There is no stable energy supply without nuclear power," and "This is to declare the renewed determination by the national government to continue nuclear power." Further, it says "[We will] revive nuclear power, and rebuild the base for infrastructure export," reaffirming the maintaining of nuclear power plants and promotion of the export [of nuclear power plants]. It emphasizes [the revival of nuclear power] is "the revival of METI itself", and positions it as the most important policy [of the government].

輸出では「今回の悲劇に潜む情報を分析し、世界に共有する」としている。原発輸出を進める安倍政権は「事故の経験と教訓を世界と共有する」と唱えており、その原型と言える。

In the export [section], it says "we will analyze the information from this tragedy and share it with the world". The mantra of the Abe administration, in promoting the export of nuclear power plants, is "to share the experience and lessons of the accident with the world", and this internal document may have served as a prototype.

さらに、（１）（事故の）応急措置（２）緊急時宣言（３）原子力規制委員会の形成（４）東電解体と新電力事業体制の確立、という項目があり、とるべき具体策が並ぶ。このうち規制委は１２年９月、民主党政権でつくられた。文書では新基準で審査したうえで「合格原発の稼働」としており、民主党政権や「原発活用」を掲げる安倍政権の再稼働方針とも重なっている。

Further, there are sections discussing the detailed plans such as: (1) Emergency response to the accident, (2) Emergency declaration (3) Forming the Nuclear Regulation Authority, (4) Dissolution of TEPCO and establishment of new electric power business structure. The Nuclear Regulation Authority was set up in September 2012 under the DPJ administration. According to the document, [nuclear power plants] to be inspected under the new standard and "restart the plants that pass the inspection", which dovetails with the policy under the DPJ administrations and the Abe administration whose policy is to "utilize nuclear power plants".

当時、経産省資源エネルギー庁にいた官僚は「原発に知見のある幹部が文書をつくった。政策に通じた幹部の考えが実現するのは自然の流れだ」と説明する。

A bureaucrat who worked at the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy under METI at that time says, "The document was created by high-ranking officials knowledgeable about nuclear power plants. It is only natural that the ideas from the officials who know a lot about policy-making get implemented.

特定秘密保護法案では原発にかかわる文書なども秘匿されかねない。国民がこれらの政策立案過程を検証できなくなる恐れもある。

Under the State Secrecy Protection Law, documents related to nuclear power plants may be concealed. Citizens may not be able to examine the policy planning process.

As usual in Japan, neither newspaper even lets the readers see the documents. There is no link, no embed. We as the readers have to take their word for it.

Both Mainichi and Asahi had more than a year, if they wanted, to dig up and report their respective information, and examine the policy planning process as much as they liked. They didn't. But suddenly, with the State Secrecy Protection Law with its potential threat to press freedom which they didn't bother exercising much since the start of the nuclear accident, they cough up the information as if to prove their worth to the public.

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LDP's Finance Minister (and Former Prime Minister) Taro Aso on Nuke Plant Policy: "The Government Made Them Do It"

Electric power companies in Japan, that is.

Mr. Taro Aso, who is also the vice prime minister in the Abe administration, is very well known for his loose tongue since his days as the prime minister (September 2008 to September 2009). His "hurry up and die" remark in January this year is nothing new, as he said practically the same thing when he was the prime minister.

He's not very good at prevaricating, like other Japanese politicians. Maybe his Roman Catholic faith keeps him honest, in a way.

According to Jiji Tsushin article below, Aso apparently openly admitted that it was the national government who forced the electric power companies to go into the nuclear power business, as the national policy.

Well, everyone knows that, but you're not supposed to say it. But Aso did, and it was newsworthy enough for Jiji.

From Jiji Tsushin (3/5/2013):

原発「国がやらせた」＝麻生財務相が異例発言－諮問会議

Unusual remark by Finance Minister Aso in the the meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy: "The national government made them do" the nuclear power plants

内閣府が５日公表した２月２８日の経済財政諮問会議の議事要旨で、麻生太郎副総理兼財務相がエネルギー政策に関連して「間違いなく電力会社に対して、国として原発政策をやらせた」と述べていたことが明らかになった。原発推進に対する政府の責任を真っ向から認める閣僚発言は異例だ。

According to the minutes summary of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy meeting on February 28, which was disclosed on March 5 by the Cabinet Office, Mr. Taro Aso, vice prime minister and finance minister, referring to the [government's] energy policy, said "The national government definitely did make the electric power companies do the nuclear power plants." It is very rare for a minister to openly admit to the national government's responsibility in promoting nuclear power.

麻生財務相はまた、東京電力福島第１原発事故後の原発運転停止を踏まえ、「こうなったらいきなり『あなたたち（電力会社）の責任』みたいな顔をすると、『大丈夫だと言ったのは国ではないか』ということになる」と電力会社の本音も代弁。

Mr. Aso also touched on the shutdown of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, and said, "If we just turn around after the accident and pretend "it's all your (electric power companies') fault", they would be unhappy and say "It was you [the national government] who said it was safe"", speaking for the electric power companies.

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Ishihara: "It's Plain Stupid to Abandon Nuclear Plants!" (and Nuclear Technology, Probably)

Donation from electric power companies to his new party must be swelling by the minute.

According to Jiji Tsushin (10/24/2012), Mr. Ishihara, who was still the governor of Tokyo at that time, made the remark in a press conference at J-Village in Naraha-machi, Fukushima, after he toured Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant on October 24, 2012 in suits (without Tyvek) accompanied by the governors of Ibaraki and Gunma Prefectures.

東京都の石原慎太郎知事、茨城県の橋本昌知事、群馬県の大沢正明知事は２４日、福島県の東京電力福島第１原発を視察した。石原氏は視察後、原発事故対応の拠点となっている楢葉町の「Ｊヴィレッジ」で、記者団に「大きな反省点はあるが、その事故をもって人間が開発した現代的な新しい技術体系を放り出すのは愚かだ」と述べ、原発の必要性を強調した。

Governor of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara, Governor of Ibaraki Masaru Hashimoto, and Governor of Gunma Masaaki Oosawa visited Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant on October 24. After the visit, Mr. Ishihara emphasized the necessity of nuclear power plants to the press at J-Village in Naraha-machi, saying "There are points which we should seriously reflect upon, but to throw away the modern, new technology system created by the mankind just because of the accident is stupid."

Jiji says Ishihara was referring to nuclear power plants, but I'm not so sure. He may have meant nuclear power plants, but given his ultra-hawkish stance on security issues he may have also meant nuclear technologies in general, including nuclear weapon making.

Here's Ishihara, flanked by the governors of Ibaraki and Gunma, telling TEPCO managers and workers at Fukushima I Nuke Plant "You're doing the great job that only Japanese can do, with meticulous attention to detail", (according to the same Jiji article).

From TEPCO's Photos and Videos page on October 24, 2012:

Ishihara looks good for his age.

After witnessing the devastation from the two atomic bombs dropped, there were many people in power in Japan who wanted to have such powerful weapons themselves. Maybe it had a similar impression on then-13-year-old Ishihara.

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Nikkei: "Obama Administration Expressed Grave Concern Over Japan's "No-Nuke by 2030(s)" Policy, Japan Dutifully Scrapped It" (and Nikkei Scrapped the Article 5 Days Later)

Japanese media has been saying for some time that it was the US government who pressured the Noda administration to drop the "zero nuke by 2030" (which morphed into "zero nuke sometime in 2030s) from its new nuclear and environmental policy decision. Tokyo Shinbun reported it a while ago, and now Nikkei Shinbun just reported it with more details. There is no news reported in the US on the matter.

The difference of the Nikkei Shinbun's article is that it names names: President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

It's hard for me to believe that this president has time for trivial matters like actually governing the affairs inside and outside the US in the election year (he must be very busy right now preparing for the big "debate"), but that's what Nikkei Shinbun wants us to believe. The article also mentions Secretary of State Clinton pressuring the Noda administration officials by strongly indicating it was the wish of President Obama and the US Congress that Japan scrap that silly nuclear energy policy.

And then, one added twist: the Nikkei article has disappeared.

The particular article was published on September 25. Nikkei is one of the better ones in retaining the links to the articles, but not in this case. It was still on Nikkei's site as of yesterday, I bookmarked it to write about it later. When I clicked on the link this morning, it was gone.

However, thanks to this blogger, the article was preserved just the way I read it yesterday.

So, here's Nikkei article that has disappeared (9/25/2012; emphasis is mine):

米、原発継続要請は「大統領の意向」

The US request that Japan continue nuclear power plant is "the President's idea"

2012/9/25 0:12

野田政権がエネルギー・環境戦略で掲げた「2030年代に原発ゼロ」の政府方針を巡り、米政府が「オバマ大統領の意向」として強力に見直しを求めていたことがわかった。核不拡散・平和利用に向けた日米協力の枠組みが崩壊しかねないとの懸念が背景。結局閣議決定を見送ったが、あいまいな決着の火だねは今後もくすぶりそうだ。

It has been revealed that the United States government was strongly urging [the Japanese government] to reconsider its policy of "zero nukes in 2030s" which was part of the energy and environmental strategy of the Noda administration, as "President Obama wishes it". [The US objection] was based on the fear that the framework of Japan-US cooperation for non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy might collapse [under the new policy]. [The Noda administration] eventually shelved the cabinet decision, but this ambiguous resolution may cause further trouble in the future.

複数の当局関係者によると野田政権が８月以降、原発ゼロの明文化に動く過程で米側は日本政府に対し、「国家最高指導者レベルでの協議の結果だ」としてゼロ方針を再考するよう要請。オバマ大統領以下、政権の総意との見解を伝えた。

According to the multiple government sources, as the Noda administration was moving in August toward explicitly putting down "zero nuke" in the official document, the US strongly requested that Japan reconsider the "zero nuke" policy, saying the request was "the result of discussion at the highest level of the government", indicating it was the Obama administration's consensus, from the president on down.

９月８日にはロシア・ウラジオストクでのアジア太平洋経済協力会議（ＡＰＥＣ）首脳会議で野田佳彦首相がクリントン国務長官と会談。ここでも大統領を代理する形で同国務長官が懸念を表明した。表面上はあからさまな批判を控える一方、大統領と米議会を前面に押し出し日本への圧力を強めた。

On September 8, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda met with the US Secretary of State Clinton during the APEC meeting in Vladivostok in Russia. Here again, representing the US president, Secretary Clinton expressed concern. While avoiding the overt criticism of the Noda administration's policy, she further pressured Japan by stressing that it was President Obama and the US Congress who were concerned.

日本政府は12日、長島昭久首相補佐官らを米に緊急派遣し、日本の対応に業を煮やすホワイトハウス高官らと直接協議。戦略を参考文書扱いとし、米側の視点からは路線転換を見送ったと読めるようにする「玉虫色の決着」（日本当局）で決定的な対立を回避した。

The Noda administration sent its officials, including Special Advisor to Prime Minister Akihisa Nagashima, to the US on an urgent mission to directly discuss matters with the high-ranking White House officials who were frustrated with the Japanese response. By treating the new strategy as only a reference material, the Noda administration averted the confrontation with the US with the "equivocal" resolution (according to the Japanese government source) which allowed the US to interpret the Japanese action as shelving the zero nuke policy.

米政府は、日本の脱原発への方針転換で「米のエネルギー戦略が直接的な打撃を被る懸念が高まった」（エネルギー省元副長官のマーチン氏）とみている。日本の原発政策はオバマ政権の核不拡散や地球温暖化防止に向けた環境政策とも密接な関係にあるためだ。

(According to Former Deputy Energy Secretary Martin,) the US government thinks that "The US energy strategy would be more likely to suffer a direct damage" because of the Japan's policy change toward zero nuclear energy. It is because the Japanese nuclear policy is closely linked also to the nuclear non-proliferation and environmental policies aimed at preventing the global warming under the Obama administration.

日米は1988年発効した原子力協定で、青森県六ケ所村での核燃料サイクル施設ならば米の事前同意なく再処理を認める包括方式で合意。日本は核兵器を持たず、プルトニウムの平和利用を担保する最重要の役割を担っている。

In the Atomic Energy Agreement effective as of 1988, Japan and the US agreed to a blanket statement that as long as it is at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, reprocessing of the nuclear fuel is allowed without prior consent from the US. Japan's most important role [in the agreement] is to secure the peaceful use of plutonium without possessing nuclear weapons.

現行の日米協定の期限が切れる18年に向け、早ければ来年にも非公式な事前協議に着手する必要がある。なお猶予があるとはいえ日本が原発政策を不明瞭な形で放置すれば米が再処理許可の更新などに難色を示す恐れもある。「協定改定の先行きが読めなくなった」（日本政府関係者）との声が出ている。

The current Japan-US agreement will expire in 2018, and the government will need to start preliminary, unofficial discussions [with the US] as early as next year. There is some time before the expiration of the agreement, but if Japan leaves its nuclear policy in vague terms the US may object to renewal of permission for nuclear fuel reprocessing. Some (in the Japanese government) say "We are not sure any more what will happen to the renewal of the agreement."

（ワシントン＝矢沢俊樹）

Never mind that Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, after 19 years of building the facility, is still incomplete, and its operation remains a "trial run".

The US presidential election is on November 6. Why was the Noda administration in such a hurry to have its long-term nuclear policy shot down by the US administration which may or may not be there in a month? My personal conclusion is that Prime Minister Noda wanted to ditch the policy but needed the pretext of "gaiatsu" (external pressure).

And why did Nikkei pull the article?

On the separate news, the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan has just said it will abandon the effort to draw up the Nuclear Energy General Principles. With the establishment of the government's new energy and environmental strategy which left out "zero nuke" policy, the Principles will be decided upon, from now on, by the ministers in charge in a given administration.

Japanese politicians deciding the Principles. (How much more oxymoronic can you get?)

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Japanese Government's Energy Policy (Reliance on Nuclear Power in 2030) May Go the "Fourth Way", Not Even Presented to the Citizens in Opinion Surveys

What a joke. Totally predictable but joke nonetheless.

Remember my post about nearly 90,000 public comments from the Japanese citizens and residents about the future energy policy of the Japanese government, where nearly 90% want "zero nuclear"? Also remember the so-called experts in big-name universities whose expertise is in polling and sampling stressing the "quality" over "quantity"? There were three choices that people could comment on: 0% reliance on nuclear power by 2030, 15% reliance, or 25% reliance.

Now, drum rolls please. Here comes your national government under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda declaring that the government may opt for the "fourth way".

From FNN News (via Yahoo Japan, meaning the link won't last; 8/27/2012):

原発依存度など、将来のエネルギー比率の3つの選択肢について、政府は、いずれの選択肢も採用しない、新たな案も検討していることが明らかになった。

Regarding the 3 alternatives [presented in the national public comment solicitation] on the reliance on nuclear power, it has been revealed that the national government is considering a new alternative, without adopting any of the existing three alternatives.

政府は、2030年の原発依存度について、「ゼロ」、「15%」、「20～25%」の3つの選択肢を示してきたが、意見聴取会、討論型世論調査、パブリックコメントなどで、「なぜ2030年なのか」など、疑問の声が寄せられていた。

The government has presented the three alternatives regarding the reliance on nuclear power in 2030: "zero", "15%", "20 to 25%". However, there have been those who question "Why 2030?" in the townhall meetings, focus group discussions, and public comments.

こうした意見を受け、政府は、今回はいずれの選択肢も採用せず、原発や再生エネルギーなど、エネルギーごとに、それぞれ目標を設定するという、新たな案も検討しているという。

On receiving such opinions, the government may be considering not adopting any of the alternatives, but come up with a new plan to set different targets for different energy sources such as nuclear and renewable energy.

政府のエネルギー・環境会議は、現在2回目となる世論調査の検証会合を行っているが、専門家などから「熟慮が不十分」など、さまざま意見が出されている。

The government's Energy and Environment Committee is currently having the second meeting to analyze the public opinion survey, but the experts in the committee have expressed opinions including "[public opinions] lack deep consideration".

General public lacking "deep consideration". That's a new one from the arm-chair experts.

You think you've been playing football. And all of a sudden the game changes, literally, and now you find yourself playing ice hockey. Why, you ask? Because the government can. All it needs to do is to declare the game change.

According to some on Twitter, Prime Minister Noda, who appeared on an NHK news program on Monday night in Japan, said something to this extent: "The opinions expressed in the public comments are biased, and cannot be taken seriously.　I would like to listen to the silent majority [who do not submit public comments]."

I remember the general sentiment in Japan when he became the prime minister last year succeeding highly unpopular Naoto Kan - "It can't go any worse, can it?"

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#Antinuclear Japan: Nearly 90% of Public Comments on National Energy Policy Are "Zero Nuke"

That's the number from analyzing 7,000 comments from the public on the national energy policy. 80,000 more to go.

The committee members who have been analyzing the public comments have already started to stress the importance of "quality" over the "quantity".

From Mainichi Shinbun (8/22/2012):

パブリックコメント:原発ゼロ支持９割　７０００件分析

Support for "No nuclear plants" 90% of the 7000 public comments analyzed so far

政府は２２日、新たなエネルギー政策の策定に向けて実施したパブリックコメント（意見公募）の意見の約９割が原発ゼロを支持しているとの分析結果を明らかにした。

On August 22, the national government disclosed the result of the analysis on the public comments that it received regarding the formulation of a new national energy policy, and said that about 90% of the comments supported "zero nuclear power plant".

　同日の「国民的議論に関する検証会合」で報告した。

It was reported in the committee to analyze the national [citizens'] debate.

　寄せられた８万９１２４件のうち約７０００件を分析したところ、「ただちに原発ゼロ」が８１．０％、「段階的にゼロ」が８．６％だった。原発容認と支持は合わせて約４％にとどまった。残りの約８万件も集計が終わり次第、公表する。

7,000 comments out of 89,124 comments have been analyzed so far. 81.0% favor "zero nuke plants immediately", 8.6% favor "zero nuke plants over time". Only 4% favor or support nuclear power plants.

　委員からは「数値の解釈より、質的な分析、考え方の筋道を重視すべきではないか」「（７、８月）２カ月の国民的議論では（短すぎて）熟議できない」などの意見が出た。

Commissioners expressed their opinions, such as "We should pay more attention to qualitative analysis and thought process, rather than the numbers", and "National debate for two months (in July and August) is just (too short to) discuss [the policy] fully".

　検証会合は次回以降、パブリックコメントや討論型世論調査などに寄せられた意見をどう活用するのかを協議する。検証結果は政府のエネルギー・環境会議に報告。将来的な原発依存度を示す「エネルギー・環境戦略」作りに反映させることを目指す。

In the next meetings, the committee will consider how to utilize the opinions from the public comments and opinion surveys in a form of public discussions using focus groups. The result of the analysis will be reported to the Energy and Environment Committee of the national government. The aim is to reflect [these opinions] on the "Energy and Environment Strategy", which will decide the future reliance on the nuclear power plants.

If the commissioners actually said that, it is quite laughable. If they think that the public thought about nuclear power plants and nuclear power generation only in July and August this year, they must be from a different planet.

Besides, these commissioners are supposed to be the experts in the field of statistics. What do they care about "qualitative" aspects?　Looking at the list of commissioners, they are professors at prominent universities in Japan whose fields are law, political science, political economics, media, communications. I see. They must know how to massage the messages then, and that's "qualitative".

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Just In on Kyodo News: Over 80,000 Public Comments on Government Policy on Reliance on Nuclear Energy in 2030, Government Announced

It is just a headline at Kyodo News for now.

This is unprecedented in Japan. I've never seen such a high number of public comments on any issue. People are taking the system of public comments on government policies literally and seriously and flooded the government with more than 80,000 comments (letters, faxes, email messages, online forms) stating what they think of the three choices offered by the Noda administration on the future reliance on nuclear energy in 2030. The deadline to submit the comments were midnight on Sunday August 12, and as of August 11 the number was still 50,000.

The public comment system is meant to serve as a "token" democracy at best by soliciting comments from citizens on government policies.

The three choices of nuclear reliance were 30% (same as pre-Fukushima reliance on nuclear energy), 15%, or 0% of electricity to be generated by the nuclear power plants by 2030. It is pretty clear where the administration wanted to steer the opinions - 15%. Big mistake. Opinion polls indicate 0% is the most popular choice.

All those token (or sham) town hall meetings in select cities throughout Japan by the government (Goshi Hosono, as the minister in charge of nuclear accident, I think) but actually planned and carried out by one of the largest PR agencies in Japan (Hakuhodo) for the sum of 50,000,000 yen (US$640,000) did nothing to appease net citizens.

The government bureaucrats and experts with close ties to the government have said in the past that while the government may not pay any attention to the protests on the streets, it does care about the public comments which by law they cannot easily ignore. We'll see what the tenor of the comments are, soon enough.

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