(UPDATED) #Fukushima I NPP: 4700 Bq/L of Tritium Detected from Groundwater Taken from 20-Meter Deep Near Reactor 1/2 Turbine Building

(Updated with information of the depth of the frozen soil wall holes, which is 30 meters)

The water was drawn from the lower permeable layer 20-meter deep, according to Kyodo News (6/24/2014) from an observation hole newly dug in preparation for monitoring the frozen soil impermeable wall that is to surround the reactor/turbine buildings of Reactors 1-4.

Cesium and all-beta (that includes strontium) are below detection levels, but tritium in 4-digit Bq per liter is apparently not what TEPCO has expected (or so they claim).

TEPCO's handout for the press on 6/24/2014 is about the observation hole No.H25J7 between the Reactor 3 turbine building and the Reactor 4 turbine building, whose water sample taken on June 10 was found with 140 Bq/L of tritium:

However, the handout also shows the test results for the sample water drawn from the observation holes for future monitoring of the frozen soil impermeable wall (whose construction has just started around the corner of the Reactor 1 building), Fz-4, Fz-5, and Fz-8.

The water sample drawn from the frozen soil wall observation hole Fz-5 between the Reactor 1 turbine building and the Reactor 2 turbine building on June 4 was found with 4,700 Bq/L of tritium (in red rectangle below):

TEPCO's simplified cross-section drawing:

English labels are by me, but I don't pretend that I understand what they mean by "groundwater pressure for the lower impermeable layer" (green line in the diagram).

Kyodo News says this will likely delay the construction of the frozen soil impermeable wall because an added work of preventing the spread of contamination is necessary when drilling holes for the frozen soil wall. The holes for the frozen soil wall are to be 30-meter deep.

The construction of frozen soil wall is already a challenge of dodging the underground structures (trenches, pipes, and other facilities) that TEPCO doesn't quite know about. No one apparently knows what's underneath the surface, after 40-plus years of plant operation and continuous construction and maintenance of the site. I suppose that problem would be the same whether it is Kajima's frozen soil wall or more traditional wall of sheet piles, as proposed by Kajima's competitors. (Not that it is any consolation.)

But this is hardly a piece of news, hardly anyone cares, as Japan's politicians, mainstream media and alternative media and social media are abuzz and obssessed with "sexist heckling" by a fifty-something LDP male politician in Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly against a 35-year-old assemblywoman whose former life was a pin-up girl for men's magazine and a minor TV "talento (talent, or personality)".

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#Fukushima I NPP: TEPCO Admits Error 7 Months Later, Says All-Beta from Observation Hole Along Embankment Was 10 Million Bq/L, Not 900K Bq/L

(UPDATE) It may not just be about groundwater samples along the embankment. All the high-density all-beta/strontium analyses done at Fukushima I NPP, including the analyses of all-beta/strontium in the RO (reverse osmosis) waste water, may be wrong. Or TEPCO says they "cannot deny the possibility that the analyses were wrong." (from a tweet by @jaikoman who tweets just about every single TEPCO and NRA press conference)

Jiji Tsushin just reported the same thing. The information is from the press conference on February 7, 2014.

For more information about the RO waste water leak of August 2013, go to this link.

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Of that, strontium-90 alone turned out to be 5 million Bq/L. The reason (excuse)? Wrong measurement method used. Or something to that extent that even people who know a lot about nuclide analysis are scratching their heads trying to figure out how that happened.

Yomiuri Shinbun has the best summary of the situation (2/7/2014):

力は６日、福島第一原子力発電所の護岸にある観測用の井戸の一つで、昨年７月５日に採取した地下水から、放射性ストロンチウムが１リットル当たり５００万ベクレル検出されたと発表した。

On February 6, TEPCO announced that 5 million Bq/Liter of radioactive strontium was detected from the groundwater sample taken on June 5 last year from one of the observation wells on the embankment of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant [the embankment is located between the turbine buildings and the plant harbor].

国の放出基準の１６万倍以上で、地下水の過去最高値（１リットル当たり５１００ベクレル）の約１０００倍に上った。東電はこの約半年間、ストロンチウム単独の濃度は「測定結果が誤っている可能性がある」として公表していなかった。

The density is 160,000 times that of the legal limit for release into the ocean, and it is about 1,000 times that of the highest density in the groundwater that had been measured so far (5,100 Bq/L). TEPCO didn't disclose the result of measurement of strontium alone, as the company believed there was a possibility that the result of measurement was wrong.

東電は今回の地下水について、採取直後の昨年７月、ストロンチウムを含む様々な放射性物質の総量（全ベータ）を同９０万ベクレルと発表していた。東電は６日、「高濃度の全ベータは測定上限を超え、軒並み過小評価していた」と説明。この地下水の実際の全ベータは同約１０００万ベクレルとの見方を示した。最近は、高濃度の場合は薄めて分析する方法に変えているという。

As to this particular sample, TEPCO had announced on July last year that the sample had contained 900,000 Bq/L of all-beta including strontium. On February 6, TEPCO explained that they had "underestimated all of the results of high-density all-beta, which [in fact] exceeded the upper limit of measurement." This particular sample may contain about 10 million Bq/L of all-beta, according to TEPCO. The company recently switched to a different method of analysis that uses diluted samples when the density of radioactive materials is high.

So this is the lowdown of the case of strontium more abundant than all-beta, all thanks to the faulty measurement by TEPCO.

Browsing through the documents released by TEPCO, the particular observation hole was No.1-2, which is no longer used as the result of waterglass injection into the soil in the embankment. It is close to where the extremely contaminated water from Reactor 2 turbine building had been found leaking in April 2011 (via the underground electrical trenches).

From TEPCO's document for the press (2/6/2014; English label is by me), the location of No.1-2 observation hole:

TEPCO inserted the newly disclosed 5 million Bq/L for strontium-90 but the number for all-beta remains uncorrected, at 900,000 Bq/L (which TEPCO now says 10 million Bq/L instead):

10,000,000 Bq/L of all-beta, or 10,000 Bq/cubic centimeter of all-beta. That's the same order of magnitude of all-beta in the water that gets contaminated after circulating through the reactors (see my September 2013 post), but the levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in this sample water is too low for this water to be the contaminated water that is currently circulating the reactors.

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#Fukushima I NPP: 2.2 Million Bq/L of All-Beta from Water Sample from an Observation Well Near the Plant Harbor

What's more significant than the number is Fukushima Minyu's interpretation that the contamination may be from the water in the trench(es) that contain extremely highly contaminated water from April/May 2011.

From Fukushima Minyu (1/11/2014):

海側井戸で220万ベクレル検出　第１原発、上昇傾向続く

2.2 million becquerels [per liter] detected from a well near the harbor at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, upward trend continues

東京電力福島第１原発の海側にある観測用井戸の水から高濃度の放射性物質が検出されている問題で、東電は１０日、ストロンチウム９０などベータ線を出す放射性物質の濃度がさらに上昇し、過去最高値の１リットル当たり２２０万ベクレル検出したと発表した。

A large amount of radioactive materials have been detected from observation wells on the ocean side of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. On January 10, TEPCO announced that the density of all-beta including strontium-90 had further increased and the latest measurement was 2.2 million becquerels per liter, the highest recorded so far.

井戸は２号機の東側にあり、海までの距離は約４０メートル。水は９日に採取した。昨年１２月３０日採取分の２１０万ベクレルを上回り、依然として上昇傾向が続いている。

The well is located on the east side of Reactor 2, about 40 meters from the plant harbor. The water sample was collected on January 9. The density was even higher than the sample taken on December 30, 2013 which had 2.1 million becquerels/liter.

この井戸の近くには、２０１１（平成２３）年３月の事故直後に極めて高い濃度の汚染水が漏れた電源ケーブル用の地下道（トレンチ）があり、汚染が地中で拡散しているとみられる。

The well is located near the underground trench for electrical cables where water with extremely high contamination was found leaking right after the March 2011 accident. It is likely that the contamination is spreading into the surrounding soil.

Jiji Tsushin reports the same news but it says "The cause of the high all-beta measurement is unknown."

The level of radioactive cesium in this water was ND (not detected).

How "extremely high" was the contamination of the water that was found leaking from the Reactor 2 turbine building via the trench into the harbor in April 2011?

From TEPCO's press release, 4/5/2011:

• Iodine-131: 5.2 billion Bq/Liter (or 5.2 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-134: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-137: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

The air dose rate measured above the water in April 2011 was over 1 Sievert/Hour (survey meter went overscale).

If this trench water is spreading in the soil, it makes sense that cesium is not detected from the water, as cesium has been bound to the soil.

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#Fukushima I NPP: Radioactive Cesium, All-Beta Detected from Groundwater Sample 25 Meters from the Ground Surface

The groundwater sample from the observation hole dug 25 meters from the ground surface in between the turbine buildings for Reactor 3 and Reactor 4 (No. H25J7) was found with:

• Cesium-134: 1.6 Bq/Liter

• Cesium-137: 2.8 Bq/L

• All-beta: 67 Bq/L

after dirt particles were filtered out.

So far, radioactive materials (cesium, all-beta, tritium) have been detected from groundwater samples from the shallower, upper permeable layer. This is the first detection of radioactive materials from the groundwater below the level of the in-the-ground impermeable wall made of waterglass that is still being built closer to the plant harbor.

TEPCO says (handout for the press, 12/20/2013) they don't know whether that means:

1. The lower permeable layer (25 meters from the ground surface) is contaminated; or

2. Radioactive materials entered the groundwater when the observation hole was dug; or

3. The water from the upper permeable layer somehow entered the lower permeable layer; or

4. The water got contaminated when it was being sampled.

The handout shows the particular location (observation hole No. H25J7) to be close to the turbine buildings of Reactor 3 and Reactor 4:

As far as I'm aware, it is only TV Asahi who covered this news on December 20:

Japanese net citizens on Twitter and message boards who heard about the news (it doesn't look to be many) are all doom and gloom, having already come to the conclusion that the lower permeable layer is contaminated (TEPCO's hypothesis No.1).

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Saving Money Comes First Before the Need to Monitor Groundwater Leak Inside the Harbor in a Hilarious NRA Meeting

What's more pressing at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant is not measuring radiation levels around the SGTS pipe where 25 sieverts/hour radiation source may be inside (to be sure, again, this 25 sieverts/hour was NOT measured but derived by calculation), nor removing the fuel assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pool on the top floor of Reactor 4 (again, not individual "fuel rods" that are inside a fuel assembly), which has the lowest radiation levels of all reactors (except for Reactors 5 and 6, which are in cold shutdown in the true sense of the word).

It is, as late-Masao Yoshida, Fukushima I NPP Plant Manager at the time of the accident, said, what to do with the contaminated water that keeps increasing. Of particular concern (supposedly) of the national government and TEPCO is whether the contaminated groundwater (albeit low contamination of gamma nuclides) is leaking into the plant harbor.

In the embankment between the plant harbor and the turbine buildings for Reactors 1 through 4, workers have been injecting waterglass into the artificial soil there to create impermeable walls in the soil to stop the flow of groundwater into the harbor. Never mind that their very work causes the groundwater to rise and go over the top of the underground impermeable wall, or go somewhere else and find its way to the ocean anyway.

From TEPCO, 12/8/2013 (red lines: silt fences, green lines: soil amendment by waterglass, yellow dots: groundwater monitoring locations):

TEPCO has been frequently monitoring radioactive materials (gamma nuclides such as cesium, all-beta including strontium, and tritium) in the water samples taken from these numerous observation holes in the embankment. However, samples from the seawater in the harbor are taken far less frequently. Nuclear Regulation Authority has been calling for continuous monitoring of seawater for some time, and the topic came up in the third meeting of NRA's ocean monitoring group on December 9, 2013.

But the word that came out of NRA Commissioner Kayoko Nakamura was, "Continuous monitoring system is an expensive purchase..."

From independent journalist Ryuichi Kino, and a togetter on the December 9 NRA meeting on ocean monitoring:

(Kino summarizes the relevant part of the meeting in a dignified way...)

汚染水の漏洩を検知する連続モニタリング装置の設置について、東電は南側放出口と北の放出口に３か所を検討していて、海が荒れているので設置方法に時間かかっているなどと説明。委員から、なぜ開渠内（防潮堤内側の護岸付近）につけないのか理解できないと疑問の声

TEPCO is considering three locations near the south discharge and the north discharge to install continuous monitoring system to detect the leak of contaminated water, and explains it is taking time to install because of the rough ocean. People questioning, why not install inside the open channel (inside the harbor near the embankment)?

この疑問は今に始まったことではない。今年１月に東電が護岸に観測用井戸を掘って地下水を分析したという時に会見で聞くと、港湾内で何点か測っている、海でも測っているので変化はわかる、問題ないという主旨の回答があった。同じ回答を今でもしてる

The question is nothing new. When I asked TEPCO in January this year when they started digging the observation holes along the embankment and analyzed the groundwater samples, TEPCO answered that they were measuring in several locations inside the harbor, and they were measuring in the ocean, too. They could detect the change that way, no problem. That was the answer then, and that is the answer now.

今問題になっているのは護岸からトレンチ由来、あるいは建屋由来の高濃度のものが出ているかどうか。連続監視は高濃度のものが出たらすぐにわかるようにするのが目的なので、近いほうが変化はわかる。けれども東電は港湾の外で測ることに固執。理由がわからない。

What's at issue now is whether the highly radioactive water from the trench [where extremely radioactive water from March/April 2011 from the reactors sits] or from the reactor buildings is leaking from the embankment or not. The purpose of continuous monitoring is to know immediately if highly radioactive water is leaking. To monitor the change, it's better to monitor closer [to the embankment where the leak may be occurring]. But TEPCO insists on monitoring outside the harbor. I don't understand the reason.

規制委の中村佳代子座長「連続モニタリングは高い買い物」。だから選定に時間かかると。はて、どういう意味なのか。高い安いの問題ではなく、委員から出ていた意見は「早く」やること。のんびり半年、１年かけてやるようなものではない

NRA's Kayoko Nakamura says, "Continuous monitoring is an expensive purchase." So it takes time to select [the equipment], she says. Well, what does that mean? It's not the matter of how expensive or how cheap; the opinion of the members is to do it "soon". It is not the thing to be done leisurely over six months or a year.

中村座長は精度が重要ともいう。すでにこれまでの精度にも疑義が出ているのでこれは重要だけど、東電がいったいどこのメーカーや専門家となにを検討しているのか、中身の公表がないので、やっぱり設置が遅れている理由はわからない

Ms. Nakamura also says accuracy [of measurement] is important. It is important, as the accuracy has been questioned before. But no information has been disclosed as to which manufacturer and/or experts TEPCO is consulting with and on what. We still don't know the reason why the installation hasn't been done.

(The same discussion, from the togetter; it reads almost like a farce, a comedy routine, where research experts are at a loss what to do with TEPCO...)

TEPCO says it wants to install continuous monitoring instruments OUTSIDE the plant harbor. From NRA's reference document for the meeting (English labels and comment are mine):

森田：前回も同じこと言ったが。港湾の外につける意味が分からない。5・6放水口は、港湾の中の水を吸い上げているので、外につける意味が（ないんじゃ？）
Morita [from the Fisheries Agency]: As I said before, I don't understand why you want to install [the continuous monitoring system] outside the harbor. The discharge for Reactors 5/6 pumps out the water from inside the harbor, so there is no point in installing it outside.

森田：漏れているのが海渠だと言われているので、そちらにつけるほうが。港湾の外、日々のデータが取れるのか？
Morita: The water is leaking into the open channel, or so it is said. Doesn't it make more sense to install the instrument there? Can you collect daily data outside the harbor?

[To this, TEPCO answers in non-answer by talking about detection limit...]

東電：検出限界値、0.1Bｑ/L。全βを排除するかというのが問題だが、20Bq/Lを目安に。
TEPCO: Detection limit is 0.1Bq/L. The problem is whether to exclude all-beta, but we are aiming at 20Bq/L.

青山委員：全βの連続モニタリングなんて、技術的・機械的に可能なの？(頭を抱える青山委員)
Aoyama [chief researcher from Meteorological Research Institute]: Is it even technically and mechanically possible to continuously monitor all beta? (and Mr. Aoyama buries his head in his hands.)

青山：γ線は、セシウム137？
Aoyama: gamma rays, you mean cesium-137?

東電：監視は、セシウム134・137
TEPCO: Cesium-134 and -137 will be monitored.

青山：いまの東電さんの説明は理解できません、誰が理解できたひとがいたら説明してください
Aoyama: I don't understand TEPCO's explanation. If anyone understands, please explain.

堀口委員：森田委員からもありましたが、私も港湾内に設置しないというのは理解できません。港湾内にないのは奇異に感じる。おそれがあるところをモニターしないと。本末転倒。一番重要なところが抜けている
Horiguchi [National Science Laboratories Environmental Risk Research Center]: Like Mr. Morita, I don't understand either why the monitoring instruments are not going to be installed inside the harbor. Monitoring should be done at the locations where the leak is suspected. We're getting our priorities wrong. The most important thing is not being done.


中村座長：装置を導入購入するには、必ず放射線の専門家の意見を参考にして、高い買い物ですし、と
Commissioner Nakamura: When you purchase the instrument, make sure you consult radiation specialists. It's an expensive purchase, you know...

Well the priority seems to be the cost.

After the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident, they still think of cost as outlay of money to purchase goods and services. They don't consider the social cost of not starting monitoring the water inside the harbor as soon as possible, particularly inside the open channel right outside the embankment.

As it stands, TEPCO plans to start continuous monitoring OUTSIDE the harbor hopefully next spring, maybe fall.

For TEPCO and the national government, time is indeed money - i.e. money saving.

Reference documents (in Japanese) for the meeting: http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/kaiyou_monitoring/20131209.html

Cheerful Commissioner Kayoko Makamura:

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Leak of 300-Tonne RO Waste Water at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Could Kill TEPCO's Groundwater Bypass Plan

I just posted the article that the head of Fukushima's fisheries associations has agreed to the government/TEPCO plan of "groundwater bypass".

However, there are two problems.

First, the drains near the H4 area where the leaking RO (reverse osmosis) waste water tank is located are general-use drains, and they go out to the ocean OUTSIDE the plant port, as I show in the black arrow in the upper right corner in the map below:

So far, the water in the drains have little radioactive materials, and no radioactive materials have been detected in the seawater in the south of the plant, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in the August 21, 2013 meeting.

The second, and far more serious problem, I think, is that the location of the H4 area with at least one leaky tank is JUST TOO CLOSE to the 12 wells that TEPCO has dug for the groundwater bypass plan, to intercept and draw uncontaminated groundwater before it hits the reactor buildings.

Uh oh.

The TEPCO map with annotation, from @Kontan_Bigcat; English labels are by me:

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO Admits Error in Measurement, Says 0.61Bq/Liter of Cesium in Groundwater They Plan to Release into Ocean

0.22 Bq/liter of cesium-134, and 0.39 Bq/liter of cesium-137 to be exact.

The amount is very small, less than 1/100 of the legal limit of radioactive cesium in the water allowed to be released from a nuclear power plant (90 Bq/liter).

But TEPCO has a credibility problem, as the company has been saying that there are no detectable radioactive materials in the groundwater that they've been pumping up (to prevent some of the water from entering the building basements) and are planning to release, with consent from interested parties, into the Pacific Ocean.

What kind of error that TEPCO admitted, you ask? It turns out that the company measured the sample groundwater with very low radioactivity at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant with very high radiation background, instead of at Fukushima II (Daini) with lower background or at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuke Plant in Niigata with no background to worry about.

Who pointed this problem out to TEPCO, who says they didn't have any procedure in place, actually, to measure low-radiation samples at a high-radiation location like Fukushima I?

Nuclear Safety Inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Agency.

The Nuclear Regulatory Agency is the secretariat of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, with many former NISA officials and inspectors. Finally doing some good by pointing out the obvious to an oblivious nuclear plant operator.

From TEPCO's handout for the press in Japanese (6/3/2013; summarized by me):

The germanium semiconductor detectors at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant have been used to detect gamma nuclides in samples with high radioactivity such as contaminated water in the building basements. For samples that require measurement at lower detection levels, the measurement has been done at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.

However, we tested the groundwater stored in the temporary storage tank at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, as part of the procedure in the future in carrying out and managing the groundwater bypass scheme [pump the groundwater, store it in the tank, then release it into the ocean].

We explained the scheme to Nuclear Safety Inspector, and on May 30, Inspector pointed out to us that in measuring samples using germanium semiconductor detectors, background self-shielding effect cannot be ignored.

So, we tested the two germanium semiconductor detectors used at Fukushima I by measuring the background without any sample, then with purified water with no contamination in a 2-liter marinelli container.

After examining the test results, we found that the marinelli container's shielding effect against the background affected the results by several Bq/liter.

We then tested the groundwater sample from April 16, 2013 that had been tested at Fukushima I and had been found with no detectable cesium, at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, and the result was below our target of 1 Bq/liter of radioactive cesium.

TEPCO's emphasis is, naturally, "below the company's target of 1 Bq/liter".

"Happy", the worker who tweeted from Fukushima I for much of the past two years, says:

地下水バイパスのタンクから本来なら検出限界値未満であるはずの汚染が検出されたって事は普通の人はなかなか気付かない事で、もう一つ問題があるんだよね。それは地下水バイパスシステム自体が汚染しちゃったって事。あんな大規模なタンクや配管を除染するのも大変だし…(tweet)

Detection of contamination from the water in the storage tank for groundwater bypass system, where contamination should be below detection level. There is one problem that people don't necessarily notice, and that is the contamination of the groundwater bypass system itself. It would be a huge headache to decontaminate such huge storage tanks and all the pipes.

東電は1べクレル未満なら問題ないって云いそうだけど…。当初、東電は検出されない(されるはずないないって思い込み？)って言ってた汚染が検出される事自体が問題なわけで、汲み上げる地下水が汚染してる可能性があるかもって計画設計してたらタンクも配管も汚染しなかったのに。(tweet)

I think TEPCO may say there is no problem if it is less than 1 Bq/liter, but the problem is the detection of contamination itself when TEPCO initially insisted there was no contamination (or TEPCO's wishful thinking that it would be impossible that there was any contamination?). If they designed the system with the assumption that the groundwater may be contaminated, the tanks and pipes wouldn't have been contaminated.

地下水を汲み上げた直後に汚染除去のフィルターを設置すべきだろうし、もっとシステムを考えるべきだったんだよね。地下水バイパスも突貫工事でやったし、１日でも早く魚連の理解を得て、海洋放出の既成事実を作りたかったんだろうな。(tweet)

There should have been a filter installed to remove radioactive materials from the groundwater after it was pumped up. The whole system should have been better considered. The bypass construction was a rush job. I think TEPCO wanted to obtain the consent from the fishery association as soon as possible and make release of groundwater a fait accompli.

His interview with AP's Yuri Kageyama has been pretty much ignored in Japan, by the way, mostly because it is an English article and partly because, I guess, it is about Fukushima I Nuke Plant which many in Japan simply ignore these days. Everything is sort of OK at the plant, isn't it? No major catastrophe has happened since after March 2011, so decommissioning work must be progressing fine, right?

(I have translated the article into Japanese. If your Japanese friends and acquaintances don't know about the interview, send them the link.)

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TEPCO Admits to 200 to 500 Tonnes of Groundwater Flooding into Bldg Basements Every Day at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant

Here are some numbers from Yomiuri Shinbun article (9/20/2011):

200 to 500 tonnes of groundwater per day to the basements of reactor buildings and turbine buildings of Reactors 1, 2, 3 and 4.

105,000 tonnes of highly contaminated water in the basements at the end of May

90,000 tonnes of this water have been processed by TEPCO up to September 13

102,000 tonnes of highly contaminated water in the basements as of September 13

87,000 tonnes of water added

Of that 87,000 tonnes, estimated 47,000 tonnes were recirculated back into the reactors, leaving 40,000 tonnes of water to have been coming from somewhere.

TEPCO now admits that the rainwater contribution to this amount is only a small portion, and most is from groundwater.

40,000 tonnes divided by 180 days equals is 222 tonnes. Hmmm. Where did that 500 tonnes per day number come from?

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(Now They Tell Us Series) Groundwater Coming into Reactor Bldg and Turbine Bldg Basements at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant

TEPCO finally admits, after confronted with the calculation by Tokyo Shinbun. To no surprise to anyone but TEPCO, the Japanese government, and probably the majority of the Japanese people, the basement walls and floors are likely to have cracked and been damaged during the earthquake.

If this is true, it's good in one sense. Instead of the highly contaminated water in the basements leaking into the groundwater, the groundwater is coming into the basements...

From Tokyo Shinbun (7:06 AM JST 9/20/2011):

福島第一　建屋に地下水大量流入か　収束作業に難題

Large amount of groundwater flowing into the basements at Fukushima I? Obstacle to the work to wind down the accident

東京電力福島第一原発１～４号機の原子炉建屋やタービン建屋地下に、一日数百トンの地下水が流入している可能性のあることが分かった。汚染水処理の 実績などから計算すると、五万トン強まで減っているはずだが、実際には八万トン強も残る。東電も地下水流入の可能性を認めており、地震で建屋地下の壁が損 傷し、流入していることが考えられる。今後の収束作業に影響が出そうだ。

It's been revealed that there is a possibility that several hundred tonnes of groundwater may be flowing into the basements of reactor buildings and turbine buildings in Reactors 1 through 4 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The amount of contaminated water should have decreased by now to slightly over 50,000 tonnes, based on the amount of water processed. However, there are still over 80,000 tonnes of highly contaminated water remaining in the basements. TEPCO has admitted to the possibility of groundwater flowing into the basements, whose walls may have been damaged in the earthquake and are letting in the water. This may affect the future work to wind down the accident.

　建屋からくみ出した汚染水の移送量や原子炉への注入量など東電が公表したデータを本紙が集計したところ、約十万トンあった汚染水は、十三日時点で約五万千六百トンにまで減っているはずだった。

Tokyo Shinbun calculated the hypothetical amount of the remaining contaminated water, based on the data published by TEPCO on the amount of contaminated water transfer and the amount of water injection into the reactors. According to our calculation, about 100,000 tonnes of contaminated water should have been reduced to about 51,600 tonnes by September 13.

　しかし、実測の地下水位から東電が推計した汚染水残量の最新値は約八万千三百トン。移送量などから逆算した値とはほぼ三万トンの開きがある。

However, the latest estimate by TEPCO from the actual water levels in the basements is 81,300 tonnes, leaving 30,000 tonnes or so gap from the calculated amount.

　 東電はこれまで、汚染水がなかなか減らない理由を、雨水の影響と説明してきた。福島第一周辺では、七月以降の三カ月間に三回まとまった雨が降っており、一 部は屋根の損傷部などから建屋に流れ込んだとみられるが、水位の変動は小さく、三万トンの差を説明できるほどではない。

So far, TEPCO has explained that the contaminated water is not decreasing as fast because of the rainwater. Around Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, there have been 3 heavy rainfalls since July. Part of the rain may have entered the buildings through the damaged rooftops. However, the contribution of rainwater to the water in the basements is not big enough to explain the 30,000 tonnes difference.

　建屋のひび割れなどから地下水が流入している可能性は、以前から指摘されていたが、あらためてその可能性が高まった。東電に本紙の計算結果を示すと、「日量百トン単位でわき出ていると思う」との回答があった。

It has been pointed out before that the groundwater may be flowing into the basements through cracks in the basement walls, and now that possibility is even more heightened. We showed the result of our calculation to TEPCO, and they answered "The water may be flowing in in the order of 100 tonnes per day".

地下水流入が事実なら、汚染水処理はさらに膨大な量になるばかりか、原子炉への注水量を絞る必要があるなど、事故収束に向けてさまざまな影響が出ると予想される。

If the groundwater is indeed flowing into the basements, the amount of contaminated water to be treated will be further increased, necessitating the decrease of water being injected into the reactors. The work to wind down the accident may be affected in many ways.

I don't know whether TEPCO means "100 tonnes per day per unit" or "100 tonnes per day per each building" or "100 tonnes per day at the plant".

In the latest announcement on the contaminated water processing on September 14, TEPCO is processing about 1,500 tonnes per day.

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Japan's Ministry of Environment to Allow #Radioactive Ashes to Be Buried in Regular Waste Final Disposal Sites

Here we go. Radioactive Japan (or at least East Japan). Now all radioactive debris and garbage can and will be burned and buried.

The news headlines at various media outlets say "ashes that contain up to 100,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium", but if you read the news carefully, as long as there are "countermeasures" to prevent the leakage of radioactive cesium into the surrounding environment, the Ministry is prepared to allow the ashes with any amount of radioactive materials to be buried in regular waste final disposal facilities.

From NHK News (8/28/2011):

原発事故で放射性物質が付着したがれきや一般ごみを燃やした灰について、環境省は、含まれる放射性セシウムが１キログラム当たり８０００ベクレルを超えるものも、地下水への流出を防ぐ対策をしたうえで、埋め立てができるとする方針をまとめました。

Regarding the ashes after burning the disaster debris and regular household garbage contaminated with radioactive materials, the Ministry of the Environment has decided on a policy that will allow the burial of ashes that exceed 8,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium, as long as there are countermeasures in place to prevent the leakage into the ground water.

これは、２７日開かれた環境省の専門家による会合で示されたものです。放射性物質が付着したがれきの処理について、環境省はこれまで、燃やした灰に含まれる放射性セシウムが１キログラム当たり８０００ベクレル以下であれば埋め立てを認める方針を示していましたが、より濃度が高い灰については一時保管するよう求め、処理方法の検討を続けてきました。

The new policy was revealed during the meeting of experts affiliated with the Ministry of the Environment on August 27. So far, the Ministry's policy has been to allow the ashes with 8,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium and below to be buried, but require the ashes that exceed that level to be stored temporarily while the Ministry decides on the disposal method.

新たな方針では、放射性セシウムが８０００ベクレルを超え１０万ベクレル以下の場合は、放射性セシウムが地下水に流れ出ないよう、灰をセメントで固めたりコンクリートの容器に入れたりしたうえで埋め立てられるとしています。また、１０万ベクレルを超える灰はさらなる対策として屋根やコンクリートの囲いがある処分場に埋め立てるとしています。

Under the new policy, if radioactive cesium in the ashes exceeds 8,000 becquerels/kg but does not exceed 100,000 becquerels/kg, the ashes are allowed to be buried after they are bound with cement or put in a concrete container. If radioactive cesium exceeds 100,000 becquerels, then the ashes should be buried in the disposal facilities with a roof and/or with the concrete shield.

一方、これまでに関東や東北地方で一般ごみを燃やした灰からも、１キログラム当たり８０００ベクレルを超える放射性セシウムが検出されるケースが相次いでいましたが、環境省は一般ごみの焼却灰についてもがれきの処理方針に沿って埋め立てを認めることを決めました。これによって、各自治体は一時保管していた焼却灰の埋め立てを進めることになりますが、処分場周辺の住民の理解を得ることが課題となることも予想されます。

Radioactive cesium exceeding 8,000 becquerels/kg has been detected from the ashes from burning the regular household garbage in Kanto and Tohoku regions. The Ministry of the Environment has decided to apply the same rule as the disaster debris and allow the ashes to be buried. The municipalities will be able to bury the ashes that they have stored temporarily, but it may be difficult to obtain consent from the residents living near the disposal facilities.

The number "100,000 becquerels/kg" is significant in a sense, as the highest level of radioactive cesium found from ashes after burning the household garbage is 95,300 becquerels/kg in Fukushima Prefecture (link in Japanese). The number is high enough to clear the Fukushima garbage ashes, and it is probably high enough to clear garbage ashes from anywhere else.

Besides, as the NHK article states, even if it exceeds 100,000 becquerels/kg, all they need to do is to bury it in a disposal site with a roof or the concrete shield.

This new policy is to be applied to ashes from disaster debris and regular garbage that are radioactive. It's not mentioned in the article but the ashes and slag from the radioactive sewage sludge will be likely to be disposed under the same policy - i.e. burn and bury. (And remember the "mix and match" scheme.)

In the meantime, some garbage incinerators and sludge incinerators at waste processing plants and sewage treatment plants in cities in Kanto have become so radioactive that they have to be shut down. (More later.)

The entire country is to become the nuclear waste disposal site, because of one wrecked nuclear power plant. Talk about socializing the cost.

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#Radioactive Strontium from Groundwater at Fukushima I Nuke Plant for the First Time

Radioactive strontium (strontium-89 and -90) was detected from the sub-drain pits at the Reactor 1 turbine building and the Reactor 2 turbine building. The samples were taken on May 18.

It is the first time that radioactive strontium was detected from the groundwater at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

The sub-drain pits are located outside the turbine buildings to collect groundwater so that the basements don't get flooded.

From TEPCO's press release on June 12, English labels added by me (measurement unit: becquerel/cubic centimeter):

In addition, strontium-89 and -90 were detected from the seawater samples taken on May 16 at 3 locations: at the water intake canals for the Reactors 1 through 4, inside the silt screen for the Reactor 2, and inside the silt screen for the Reactor 3.

From TEPCO's English press release on June 12 (measurement unit: becquerels/liter, or 1000 cubic centimeters):

The amount of strontium-90 in the seawater inside the silt fence for the Reactor 3 was 240 times as high as the legal limit allowed for nuclear plant operations.

Note that the sub-drain water analysis is in becquerels/cubic centimeter, and the seawater analysis is in becquerels/liter (1000 cubic centimeter). Obfuscate, obfuscate. I'll translate the numbers for the sub-drains into liters to compare. (Or if someone can do it for me, I'd much appreciate.)

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