#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO to Pour Cement-Clay Mix on the Ocean Floor Just Off Water Intake Canals, Will Survey Radioactivity in Fish Nearby

From Asahi Shinbun (1/30/2012):

東京電力は２月から、福島第一原発１～６号機の取水口付近の海底に、粘土を混ぜたセメントを流し込む。汚染された地下水が敷地から海に流れ出るのを防ぐ遮水壁を作る工事の際に、海底にたまった高濃度の放射性セシウムが舞い上がるのを防ぐのが目的だ。

Starting February, TEPCO will pour cement mixed with clay on the ocean floor near the water intake canals for Reactors 1 thorugh 6 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. It is to prevent radioactive cesium that exists in high concentration on the ocean floor when the company builds watertight bulkheads to prevent contaminated groundwater from the plant from leaking into the ocean.

　２号機の取水口付近からは、これまでに国の基準が定める年間放出量の２万倍にあたる推定４７００テラベクレル（テラは１兆倍）が流れ出した。周辺の海を昨年１１月に調べたところ、海底の土１キロからセシウムが最大１６０万ベクレル検出された。

4700 terabecquerels of radioactive cesium leaked near the water intake canal for Reactor 2, which was 20,000 times the national standard for allowed oceanic discharge per year. The survey of the ocean around the plant last November found maximum 1.6 million becquerels/kg [wet] of radioactive cesium from the ocean soil.

　東電によると、セメントは約７ヘクタールにわたって厚さ６０センチほど流し込む。粘土と混ぜるため、固まることはないという。遮水壁の工事では鋼材を海底に打ち込むことから、海底のセシウムが舞い上がって拡散するのを心配する声が地元漁協などから寄せられていたという。

According to TEPCO, the cement mix will be poured over 7-hectare area, to the thickness of about 60 centimeters. TEPCO says the mix won't solidify because the cement will be mixed with clay. In building the bulkheads, steel beams will be driven into the ocean floor. The local fishermen's cooperatives have expressed concern over the dispersion of radioactive cesium deposited on the ocean floor due to the construction work.

I don't quite understand the part about the cement-clay mix not solidifying.

On a separate but related news, TEPCO has announced that it will work with the local fishermen's associations to study the effect of radioactive materials on fish by having the fishermen fish near the plant and measure radioactivity in fish.

More than 10 months have passed since the accident. (Where has the national government been?)

Also from Asahi Shinbun (1/28/2012):

東京電力は２７日、福島第一原発から半径２０キロ圏内の警戒区域の海域で、２～４月に魚介類のモニタリング調査を行うことを明らかにした。放射性物質による汚染の有無などを調べる。

On January 27, TEPCO revealed that it would conduct the monitoring survey of marine life within the 20 kilometer radius from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant from February till April. The survey is to study the contamination of marine life by radioactive materials.

　この日、東電の担当者が福島県漁業協同組合連合会の組合長会議に出席し、協力を要請。野崎哲会長は会議後、「我々としても区域内の魚の様子を知りたいので協力する」と話した。

TEPCO attended the meeting of the Fukushima Prefecture Fishermen's Cooperative Association and asked for their cooperation. The president of the association said after the meeting, "We want to know the condition of the fish in the area, so we will cooperate."

　これまで国や県などが海水と海底の泥の放射線量を定期的に測っている地点の中から、線量が高い所と低い所数カ所ずつを選び、月４回調査。結果を公表するという。

They will pick several locations that have been found with high radiation and with low radiation in the regular surveys of seawater and the ocean soil by the national and prefectural governments. The survey will be done 4 times a month, and the results will be published.

Unlike farmers in Fukushima who went ahead and decided to grow their crops as normal after the worst nuclear accident had happened near them, no matter how little information they may have had regarding the accident and resultant contamination, fishermen in Fukushima have decided not to fish, no matter how little information they may have had.

Fukushima farmers will continue to grow crops this year on their highly contaminated soil, hoping for good luck of either radioactive cesium, strontium not getting absorbed into their crops or their crops not being subject to testing while relying on the guilty feeling of the majority of consumers who believe in "Support Fukushima by eating" and on distributors who can cleverly disguise Fukushima produce as something else. As far as I know, Fukushima fishermen will continue to abstain from fishing in their ocean.

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Earthquake Map of Japan in the 1st Month of 2012

(You can't even see Japan in the first map.)

From the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention website, "Hypocenter map".

Last 30 days:

Last 7 days:
Last 24 hours:

A lot of Magnitude 4 quakes, and a good number of Magnitude 5 quakes. M5 is moving to the central Japan, right near Mt. Fuji. Numerous small, shallow quakes in western Japan.

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Israel Requests Japan to Stop Buying Iranian Oil

From Nikkei Shinbun quoting Kyodo News (1/30/2012):

【エルサレム＝共同】イスラエルを訪問した山根隆治外務副大臣は29日、エルサレムでリーベルマン外相らと会談した。イスラエル側はイランからの原油輸入停止を要請。山根氏は日本のイラン産原油輸入量は過去５年間で約40％減っており、今後も削減に努めると説明、理解を求めた。

(Jerusalem, Kyodo News) Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ryuji Yamane who is visiting Israel met on January 29 with Israel's Foreign Minister Lieberman in Jerusalem. Israel requested Japan to stop importing crude oil from Iran. Yamane explained that the amount of crude oil Japan imports from Iran has decreased by 40% in 5 years and that Japan will continue its effort to reduce the amount, and asked for Israel's understanding.

　山根氏がエルサレムで記者団に明らかにした。イスラエルは、核開発を進めるイランを最大の脅威と位置付けている。...

Yamane disclosed the Israel's request to the press in Jerusalem. Israel considers Iran as its greatest threat, as Iran develops its nuclear program.

What Japan reduces will simply go to China, India, and Russia. Canada's oil and gas will probably also go to China. Japan will be left dry, and cold, as a mini ice age hits...

Isn't it ironic that Japan is part of the economic embargo against Iran by the US and the EU, while it suffered the same by FDR in the run-up to the World War II?

No wonder the population of Japan is set to decrease by whopping 30% by 2060.

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Same Old Excuse from Goshi Hosono for Hiding the "Worst-Case Scenario": "We Were Afraid of a Panic in Tokyo"

Goshi Hosono, current Minister of the Environment and Minister in charge of the nuclear accident, was a special assistant to then-Prime Minister Kan when the March 11 triple whammy of earthquake/tsunami/nuke accident hit Japan last year.

He's already famously said that the small group of top officials in the Kan administration knew it was a core meltdown at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant right after the accident, but they "just didn't feel like announcing it".

Now, about the "worst-case scenario" from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency that the administration officials received on March 25 and which the administration declared it "didn't exist" after reading it, Hosono has this to say:

From Kyodo News (1/29/2012):

最悪シナリオ閲覧「数人」に限定 「混乱恐れて」と細野氏

The worst-case scenario perusal restricted to only "a handful", as "we were afraid of a panic", says Mr. Hosono

　細野原発事故担当相は２９日までに、共同通信のインタビューに応じ、最近まで公開しなかった福島第１原発事故の「最悪シナリオ」に関し、情報漏えいによる混乱を恐れて当時の菅首相はじめ閲覧を「数人」に限った経緯を明らかにした。「当時公開していたら、東京から人がいなくなった可能性があった。そうなれば事故対応は危うかった」と言明。事故対応を優先した結果、一部しか情報共有を図らなかったと説明した。

Minister in charge of the nuclear accident Hosono allowed an interview with Kyodo News by January 29, and explained that how the "worst-case scenario", whose existence was hidden until recently, was shown only to a handful of officials including then-Prime Minister Kan for the fear of a panic if the information were to leak. He said, "If the scenario had been made public, people might have fled Tokyo. Then it would have been difficult to respond to the accident". He explained that the information was shared among only a small group of people because the response to the accident was the first priority.

Ummm. Mr. Hosono, the nuclear power plant is in Fukushima Prefecture, not Tokyo. Ordinary residents of Tokyo did not, and do not, have any role in coming up with measures to deal with the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident. You did, and so did the administration that you were part of.

It's one thing not to have disclosed the information, but it is totally another to have simply sat on it and done nothing to prepare for the worst case or to properly instruct citizens, in particular residents of Tokyo Metropolitan areas, to take precaution.

Instead, the administration that Goshi Hosono was part of launched the safety campaign for the citizens and attacked people who were telling the truth (in retrospect) about the situation in Fukushima I Nuke Plant. The administration sent radiation "experts" from Nagasaki University to Iitate-mura who told the villagers it was totally safe to play outside, eat vegetables and drink water from the well. It laughed off the IAEA survey of radiation contamination in the village, saying it had its own standard to decide the danger levels, only to order the evacuation of the entire village 11 days later on April 11, 2011.

Goshi Hosono is doubling down on his already tarnished reputation by pressing the disaster debris contaminated with radioactive materials to municipalities all over Japan, totally oblivious to the fact that there is this thing called the Internet, and the citizens now know much more about the contaminated disaster debris than the government officials who can only talk in terms of "emotion" - let's help out people of Tohoku! - while some people in Tohoku itself are wondering why the debris has to be shipped outside, instead of building the plants inside the prefectures to process the debris.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: 17 Minor Leaks In Pipes and Valves Found in 2 Days, Freezing Temperature Blamed

All are minor, says TEPCO, ranging from tens of liters to several tonnes, and the water leaked is either pure water, filtered water (river water), or the treated water. None found the way to the ocean, or so TEPCO says.

3 leaks were discovered on January 28, followed by 14 additional leaks on January 29, according to TEPCO. The lowest temperature at the plant on January 29 was -8 degrees Celsius (17.6 degrees Fahrenheit).

TEPCO's Matsumoto says the company will hurry up the insulation work, and hopes to finish it by spring.

Ummm, the frost will be over by spring, won't it?

Looking at TEPCO's press release, the leaks are mostly at the flanges. Some of the leaks from the reverse osmosis system have been found with high beta radiation.

Locations of the 14 leaks discovered on January 29, 2012:

Details of the leaks discovered on January 29, 2012:

The worker who tweets from Fukushima I Nuke Plant was talking about the leak on Twitter last night, and he said that the suggestion of insulation and heaters when the hoses were installed last summer was turned down, because of budget concern.

TEPCO's modus operandi since March 11, 2011 in English: "lock the stable door after the horse has bolted".

In Japanese: 泥棒を捕らえて縄をなう (Catch the thief and then start making the rope to bind him.)

Some photos from TEPCO on the leaky flanges covered with plastic (to prevent further leaking), with blue tarps lying around:

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UC Davis Researcher: Sea Water Can Corrode Nuclear Fuel, Forming Uranium Compounds That Could Travel Long Distance

From UC Davis News and Information (1/26/2012; emphasis is mine):

Japan used seawater to cool nuclear fuel at the stricken Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant after the tsunami in March 2011 -- and that was probably the best action to take at the time, says Professor Alexandra Navrotsky of the University of California, Davis.

But Navrotsky and others have since discovered a new way in which seawater can corrode nuclear fuel, forming uranium compounds that could potentially travel long distances, either in solution or as very small particles. The research team published its work Jan. 23 in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

“This is a phenomenon that has not been considered before,” said Alexandra Navrotsky, distinguished professor of ceramic, earth and environmental materials chemistry. “We don’t know how much this will increase the rate of corrosion, but it is something that will have to be considered in future.”

Japan used seawater to avoid a much more serious accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant, and Navrotsky said, to her knowledge, there is no evidence of long-distance uranium contamination from the plant.

Uranium in nuclear fuel rods is in a chemical form that is “pretty insoluble” in water, Navrotsky said, unless the uranium is oxidized to uranium-VI — a process that can be facilitated when radiation converts water into peroxide, a powerful oxidizing agent.

Peter Burns, professor of civil engineering and geological sciences at the University of Notre Dame and a co-author of the new paper, had previously made spherical uranium peroxide clusters, rather like carbon “buckyballs,” that can dissolve or exist as solids.

In the new paper, the researchers show that in the presence of alkali metal ions such as sodium — for example, in seawater — these clusters are stable enough to persist in solution or as small particles even when the oxidizing agent is removed.

In other words, these clusters could form on the surface of a fuel rod exposed to seawater and then be transported away, surviving in the environment for months or years before reverting to more common forms of uranium, without peroxide, and settling to the bottom of the ocean. There is no data yet on how fast these uranium peroxide clusters will break down in the environment, Navrotsky said.

Navrotsky and Burns worked with the following co-authors: postdoctoral researcher Christopher Armstrong and project scientist Tatiana Shvareva, UC Davis; May Nyman, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, N.M.; and Ginger Sigmon, University of Notre Dame. The U.S. Department of Energy supported the project.

Professor Navrotsky says as far as she knows there is no evidence of long-distance uranium contamination from Fukushima I Nuke Plant. I don't think the Japanese government is specifically looking for uranium anywhere outside the plant. They are not even looking for strontium. That doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

The abstract of the paper at PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America):

Uranyl peroxide enhanced nuclear fuel corrosion in seawater

Christopher R. Armstrong, May Nyman, Tatiana Shvareva, Ginger E. Sigmon, Peter C. Burns, and Alexandra Navrotsky

Abstract

The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident brought together compromised irradiated fuel and large amounts of seawater in a high radiation field. Based on newly acquired thermochemical data for a series of uranyl peroxide compounds containing charge-balancing alkali cations, here we show that nanoscale cage clusters containing as many as 60 uranyl ions, bonded through peroxide and hydroxide bridges, are likely to form in solution or as precipitates under such conditions. These species will enhance the corrosion of the damaged fuel and, being thermodynamically stable and kinetically persistent in the absence of peroxide, they can potentially transport uranium over long distances.

(H/T anon reader, gr81)

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Tokyo Metropolitan Government Stores Radioactive Fly Ashes in Plastic Bags Under Blue Tarp and Sand Bags in a Landfill in Tokyo Bay

Fly ashes from the municipal garbage incineration plant in Edogawa-ku, eastern-most Special Ward of Tokyo, contained radioactive cesium exceeding the standard set by the national government for "safe" and normal burial in a regular landfill (8,000 becquerels/kg). So the Tokyo Metropolitan government said it would put them in a secure, temporary storage until the national government firmly decides what to do with such ashes.

The photographs below show how the Tokyo Metropolitan government securely stores those ashes on the metropolitan landfill in Tokyo Bay.

Photo 1 shows the flexible container bags full of radioactive fly ashes on a platform of bentonite clay. I don't see any rubber liner below or above the clay.

Then, the dirt is piled on top of the bags, which is then covered with plastic tarps. They put sand bags on top to hold down the tarps, as you see in Photo 2.

Clearly the governor of Tokyo is not thinking about typhoons with heavy rain and wind, or tsunami, or liquefaction from an earthquake. This is a landfill in Tokyo Bay. Sand bags may empty, and blue tarps degrade, but there's no worrying the 82-year-old governor.

On checking the Disaster Prevention Information page of the Tokyo Municipal government, I find that there is NO MENTION of tsunami in the Tokyo proper; all they talk about is a danger of tsunami on the outlying islands in the event of the much expected Tokai earthquake. There is no hazard map for liquefaction either. Again, this is a landfill in Tokyo Bay.

From the document issued by the Clean Association of Tokyo 23 (union of municipal waste management in Tokyo's 23 Special Wards) on January 25, 2012:

Photo 1:
Photo 2:

(H/T @tautautau1976; if you read Japanese, he and @tsunamiwaste on Twitter are great sources of information about disaster debris issues in Japan.)

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Now They Tell Us: Detection of High-Level Cesium-134 in Nagasaki City in April 2011

Toshihiro Takatsuji, associate professor at Nagasaki University announced the result of his measurement of radioactive cesium in the air at an international symposium, and said a high level of cesium-134 (11,300 becquerels/kg) was detected from the dust collected in the filter paper in early April last year in Nagasaki City, 1,000 kilometers away from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

It took him 9 months to reveal what he had known in April last year. Not bad, I guess, considering there are many others who still hold back information that they obtained in March and April last year while they eagerly wait for the acceptance of their papers at international peer-review journals. Some information could have made a big difference in how people responded to the nuclear crisis if it had been revealed in a timely manner.

But maybe not in this case, as I cannot compare this number with any other number. How about the measurement of air filter papers in Fukushima or Tokyo during the same time period? How about the measurement in Nagasaki prior to the nuclear accident? What are we comparing this Nagasaki number to?

Chugoku Shinbun (1/26/2012):

福島第１原発から約千キロ離れた長崎市の大気観測所の吸引調査で、事故１カ月後に高い数値の放射性物質が確認されていたことが分かった。広島市南区の広島 大広仁会館で２５日にあった同大原爆放射線医科学研究所（原医研）の国際シンポジウムで長崎大の高辻俊宏准教授が報告した。

It has been revealed that the suction survey at an atmospheric observatory in Nagasaki City, about 1000 kilomters from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, showed a high level of radioactive materials one month after the nuclear accident. Toshihiro Takatsuji, associate professor at Nagasaki University reported at an international symposium by Hiroshima University Research Institute of Radiation Biology and Medicine (RIRBM) held on January 25 at Hiroshima University in Hiroshima City.

　高辻准教授は事故後、１週間ごとに装置で吸引した空気や吸引口のろ紙の付着物のセシウムの量を調査。２０１１年３月２３日から７月２７日までの結果を報告した。

Professor Takatsuji measured the amount of radioactive cesium in the air captured by the air suction apparatus and on the filter paper at the suction entrance every week after the nuclear accident. He reported the results from March 23 to July 27, 2011.

　４月６日からの週が特に高く、ろ紙に付着したちりなどのセシウム１３４の濃度は福島県飯舘村の土壌に相当する１キロ当たり１万１３００ベクレルだった。

The week beginning on April 6 registered the highest level of radioactive cesium. The density of cesium-134 on the dust caught by the filter paper was 11,300 becquerels/kg, equivalent to the level seen in the soil in Iitate-mura in Fukushima Prefecture.

　高辻准教授は米海洋大気局のデータから、４月６日は日本列島の南側を半円を描くように風が東北から九州に達していたと指摘。福島からの放射性物質と推測した。

Professor Takatsuji pointed out that on April 6, 2011, the wind reached from Tohoku to Kyushu (where Nagasaki is located) in an arc sweeping the Pacific side of Japan, according to the data from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). He deemed the radioactive cesium to be of Fukushima origin.

　高辻准教授は「大気中の数値は低くても、空調機のフィルターなどには放射性物質が集積し高くなる可能性がある」と指摘した。 　シンポジウムは２６日もある。

The professor said, "Even if the amount in the atmosphere is low, it is possible that radioactive materials accumulate in the air filters." The symposium will continue on January 26.

11,300 becquerels/kg of cesium-134. No information about cesium-137, if it was detected at all in the air or on the filter paper.

I dispute the reference to Iitate-mura, though. From what I have read, the density of radioactive cesium in Iitate-mura's soil is much higher (50,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium).

As an aside, Professor Takatsuji has been featured in a popular weekly Shukan Gendai magazine (as transcribed in this blog) in which, with Shinzo Kimura he assures the readers that the effect of radiation won't manifest in genes in the next generation, so the fear of expecting mothers in Fukushima is overblown.

But even the two admit that by continuing to live in the areas with elevated radiation levels the gene mutation which normally happens after 10 generations or more may happen within a few generation.

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Kevin Maher: "US government was privately terrified over the unfolding crisis" over Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident

Kevin Maher was the director of the State Department's Office of Japan Affairs in Japan when he was abruptly dismissed over his alleged remarks about "lazy Okinawans" one day before the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster. He continued to work at the US embassy after the disaster, and wrote a book titled "The Japan That Can't Decide".

In his interview with AFP, he says:

The "US government was privately terrified over the unfolding crisis" at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

After the operation to drop water on the reactors from a SDF helicopter, "the US government called in the Japanese ambassador and said, look, you have to take this stuff seriously. We don't know what's going to happen".

From AFP (1/26/2012; emphasis is mine):

US ex-diplomat pulls no punches on Japan

By Shaun Tandon (AFP)

WASHINGTON — US diplomats typically are unfailingly polite and reverential towards their countries of expertise and, upon retirement, go away quietly into research or business. Not so with Kevin Maher.

Since he was unceremoniously removed from his position last year, the veteran US diplomat on Japan has gone on the offensive with biting criticism on issues from Tokyo's political paralysis to the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

To his own surprise, he has found an eager audience. A book he wrote in Japanese, "The Japan That Can't Decide," has sold more than 100,000 copies and for weeks topped the country's best-seller list for non-fiction paperbacks.

Maher's main thesis is that Japan -- which has had six new prime ministers since 2006 -- has been crippled by a failure of its politicians to accept responsibility and, hence, to make hard decisions.

Maher pointed to the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which was devastated by the March 11 tsunami, and dismissed the government's declaration last month that it had stabilized the leaking reactors.

"It's not stable," Maher said recently at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "Tokyo is safe, but Fukushima Daiichi is in really bad shape."

The State Department sacked Maher as its Japan desk chief just a day before the historic 9.0-magnitude earthquake but he stayed on for another month to coordinate the US disaster response.

Maher said that the US government was privately terrified over the unfolding crisis. He accused Japan's then prime minister, Naoto Kan, of evading responsibility and trying to pass the problem over to the plant's operator, the Tokyo Electric Power Co.

"I remember sitting on a task force many a time thinking, 'Who the hell is in control in Japan?' The government's not doing anything. Kan made one trip and flew up and got in the way and came back," Maher said.

Maher said that he watched in horror as he saw television footage of a sole helicopter dropping water on the stricken plant.

"Is that the best Japan can do?" Maher said. "Frankly what happened is the US government called in the Japanese ambassador and said, look, you have to take this stuff seriously. We don't know what's going to happen."

Maher said that the United States was even looking at whether it would have to evacuate some 100,000 Americans, although it soon became clear that Tokyo was not in harm's way.

Maher's earlier strident critiques led to his downfall. While in office, he spoke to students about Okinawa -- home to half of the 47,000 US troops in Japan -- and accused local leaders of playing on mainland Japanese guilt to "extort" concessions. Japanese media accounts of his remarks stirred outrage.

Maher, 57, who has worked on Japan for three decades and has a Japanese wife, called the controversy "water under the bridge" and said he was making a good living as a consultant.

Nonetheless, he criticized the two officials he said were behind his dismissal -- then deputy secretary of state Jim Steinberg and Ambassador to Japan John Roos.

"They just wanted to get this out of the press and decided that the best thing was not to address whether these press reports were actually true or not but just to remove me from my position," Maher said.

Despite his criticism, Maher -- like current US officials -- sees bright spots in Japan's latest prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, who is pushing forward controversial plans to raise taxes and join talks on a US-backed trade pact.

Maher said he has received little backlash over his book. He believed he won over potentially hostile readers with a message that Japan worked well in the past and needed to return to its traditions.

"We used to have an image back in the '80s, if a Japanese corporation had a problem, you were worried that the chairman would go to commit seppuku," he said, referring to ritual suicide.

"He would take responsibility even if it was not a mistake that he made. But now it's reversed in Japan," he said.

Maher said he was surprised when he visited Okinawa to promote his book.

"There were four demonstrators. When I was consul general in Okinawa, I could always get 40."

Copyright © 2012 AFP. All rights reserved.

Maher's alleged criticism of Okinawans is actually shared by many in Japan, probably even by Okinawans themselves. But in the "tatemae" (facade) society you are obliged to just look at the superficial meaning of things, live and die by it.

Dropping a bucket of water at a time from a sole SDF helicopter was a brilliant idea concocted by the Kan administration to, of all things, impress the US. From Maher's account, it sure did impress the US, even if it was not the way Kan had hoped.

In the early days of the nuclear crisis, the Kan administration steadfastly declined (while superficially "considering") the offers for help in dealing with the nuclear accident from foreign governments, particularly from the US and Russia. Other than the "face" issue I still don't know the reason. That Japan is somehow different and superior, I guess. It is different, for sure. I remember the politicians talking about "sovereignty" as the reason for "sending the offer for help to the appropriate government committee to discuss whether it is feasible to accept the offer and if so how" - i.e. declining help.

His praise of Yoshihiko Noda is not surprising coming from a US official, as the prime minister is doing everything in his power to please what the US is allegedly demanding. Too bad there's this thing called the Internet and the Japanese are seeing him for what he is - a stooge. His administration most certainly welcomes Twitter's decision to censor tweets that are deemed "illegal" by any government.

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#Fukushima Governor May Do "Free Healthcare For Fukushima Children" Using the Fund Set Aside for Decon and Health Surveys

After rejection by the national government of the scheme that Fukushima Prefecture has been pushing - free medical care for children under 18 who live in Fukushima Prefecture, the governor of Fukushima says he may do that on his own, using the fund given to Fukushima for decontamination and health survey of the residents.

That begs an obvious question, as asked by Professor Hayakawa, among others:

"If Fukushima Prefecture is so dangerous that they have to provide free medical care, shouldn't the children in Fukushima evacuate from Fukushima, instead of remaining there?"

From NHK News (1/28/2012):

福島県の佐藤知事は、２８日、平野復興担当大臣と会談し、福島県が要望していた１８歳以下の医療費の無料化について実施が困難だと伝えられたのに対し、「県も自治体も期待していたため、極めて残念だ」と不快感を示したうえで「それでも子どもを生み育てやすい福島県をつくらないといけないので県として前向きに検討したい」と述べ、県が独自に１８歳以下の医療費の無料化を実施したい考えを示しました。佐藤知事は、会談のあとで取材に応じ、無料化のための財源には、これまでに除染や健康調査のための費用として国が７８０億円を拠出した「福島県民健康管理基金」を利用したいという考えを示しました。

Governor Sato of Fukushima Prefecture met on January 28 with Minister in charge of recovery Hirano. On being informed that the request from Fukushima Prefecture to make medical care for children under 18 free would be very difficult to accept, Governor Sato expressed his dissatisfaction by saying "That is highly regrettable because both the prefectural government and municipalities in Fukushima were looking forward to the scheme". He further commented that the Fukushima prefectural government would work toward launching the scheme on its own to make Fukushima a place where people raise their children at ease. Governor Sato talked to the press after the meeting, and indicated that the likely source of the free medical care scheme would be the "fund for the health management of Fukushima residents" which has 78 billion yen [US$1 billion] that the national government contributed for decontamination and the health surveys in Fukushima.

The cost of the free medical care for children in Fukushima was estimated to be 10 billion yen when the idea was first floated by the governor.

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NY Chefs Learn about Japanese Cuisine, and CM by the Japanese Government Promoting Food in East Japan

This gotta be the scheme hatched by the Japanese government, to have a sympathetic French chef conduct a workshop in New York.

The Japanese people, like many Asians and for that matter Europeans (and New Yorkers themselves), seem to think everything revolves around New York when it comes to anything American.

Of all things, the workshop was about how to prepare raw fish for sushi...

Anyway, here's NHK World (1/27/2012):

NY chefs learn about Japanese cuisine

Chefs at high-end restaurants in New York have taken part in a workshop to learn about traditional Japanese cuisine.

New York-based French chef Daniel Boulud organized the workshop. He led a group of chefs last July to cook meals for survivors in the tsunami-ravaged city of Kamaishi.

About 40 chefs took part in Thursday's workshop.
A sushi chef explained traditional ways to prepare raw fish.

Boulud said Japan is striving to restore trust in food safety, and he believes that Japanese ingredients are safe.

New York City has more than 1,400 Japanese restaurants. Some of these businesses were affected by the safety concerns about Japanese food after the disaster.

Friday, January 27, 2012 15:41 +0900 (JST)

NHK World has a video of the news at the link. Watching the video, it was indeed the scheme hatched by the Japanese government.

Here's another video promoting produce from disaster-affected East Japan (Kanto, Tohoku), targeting the Japanese using a popular group TOKIO. Translated and captioned by Tokyo Brown Tabby who did it probably in rage (as Tabby tries to pick safe food):

(From TBT's Youtube description; emphasis is mine)

This TV commercial clip (15 seconds) and its longer full version are sponsored by Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and have been on-air intermittently since early June, 2011. (A month after that, the problem of contaminated beef started to emerge).

The full 30-second version can be viewed here: http://syokuryo.jp/news-commercial/2011/06/tvcm-1.html

According to the official webpage for this CM campaign, the food that appear in the full 30-second version is as follows: rice ball using rice from Miyagi, asparagus from Fukushima, cucumber from Fukushima with "miso" from Miyagi, tomato from Ibaraki, apple from Aomori, watermelon from Gunma, milk from Iwate, peach from Yamanashi, BBQ using beef from Yamagata and onion from Chiba, and raw skipjack "sashimi" from Chiba.

These 5 men are a popular idol group called TOKIO.

The list of food items used reads like a horror story for those who closely follow the radioactivity measurement results by the prefectural governments.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Full of Untrained, Migrant Workers, TEPCO Says Subcontractors Are Supposed to Train Them

Tokyo Shinbun is a regional newspaper covering Kanto region of Japan. It has been reporting on the Fukushima accident and resultant radiation contamination in a more honest and comprehensive manner than any national newspaper. (Their only shortcoming is that their links don't seem to last for more than a week.)

Their best coverage on the subject, though, is not available digitally but only in the printed version of the newspaper. But no worry, as there is always someone who transcribes the article and post it on the net for anyone to see.

In the 2nd half of the January 27 article, Tokyo Shinbun details what kind of workers are currently working at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant: migrant workers young (in their 20's) and not so young (in their 60's), untrained, $100 a day. Some of them cannot even read and write.

From Tokyo Shinbun (1/27/2012):

(The first half of the article is asbout Mr. Osumi, the first worker to die in May last year after the plant "recovery" work started. About him and his Thai wife, please read my post from July 11, 2011.)

■低賃金

Low wages

大角さんの死因と被曝の関係は不明だが、事故収束現場の労働者にとって最も懸念されるのは被曝だ。その線量限度は昨年十二月十六日、通常時の「一年で五〇ミリシーベルト」「五年で一〇〇ミリシーベルト」に戻された。野田首相の「事故収束」宣言を受けての措置だ。

The relationship between the cause of Mr. Osumi's death and radiation exposure is unknown. However, it is still the radiation exposure that is most worrisome for the workers who work at Fukushima I Nuke Plant to wind down the accident. The radiation exposure limit was lowered back to the normal "maximum 50 millisieverts per year" and "100 millisieverts in 5 years" on December 16 last year. It was done on the declaration of "the end of the accident" by Prime Minister Noda that day.

限度量は事故直後、特例として二五〇ミリシーベルトへと一気に引き上げられた。厚生労働省は当時、国際基準での重大事故時の被曝限度が五〇〇ミリシーベルトであることなどを根拠に挙げたが、狙いは延べ作業時間や作業員数の増加による事故処理の迅速化だった。

The radiation exposure limit was raised to 250 millisieverts per year right after the accident, as a special measure. The Ministry of Health and Labor argued that the number was based on the international standard for a severe accident which was 500 millisieverts. But the real purpose was to increase the number of hours that can be put in by the workers and to increase the number of workers to promptly wind down the accident.

それが「事故収束」をアピールしたい首相の思惑もあって、通常時の基準に戻された。

However, as the prime minister wanted to appeal "the end of the accident", the limit was lowered back to the normal limit.

東電によれば、労働者の被曝線量は事故直後には二五〇ミリシーベルトを越えるケースもあったが、四月以降は一〇〇ミリシーベルト以内で推移しているという。

According to TEPCO, the radiation exposure levels of workers exceeded [annualized?] 250 millisieverts in some cases right after the accident, but since April it has been within 100 millisieverts.

ただ、現場の声は安全管理への不安で溢れている。下請け労働者の一人はこう語った。

However, the workers voice concerns over the safety management. One of the subcontract workers told the newspaper:

「今、現場の七割は全国からの出稼ぎ労働者らで、大半が原発作業の初心者。賃金は日給で八千円から一万三千円ほど。年齢層は就職難の二十代と他の現場を『卒業』した六十代が多い」

"Right now, 70% of workers at the plant are migrant contract workers from all over Japan. Most of them have never worked at nuke plants before. The pay is 8000 yen to 13,000 yen [US$104 to $170] per day. Most of them are either in their 20s who are finding it difficult to land on any job, or in their 60s who have "graduated" from the previous jobs."

安全管理については「原発で働く前に受けなくてはならない『管理区域入域前教育』は儀式のようなもの。テキストに書いてある想定と非常事態の現場が一致しない。字の読めない受講者もいたが、最後のペーパーテストは誰かが代わりに書き込んでいた」と話す。

As to the safety management, he said, "Before you start working at a nuclear power plant, you have to go through the "training before entering radiation control area". But in reality the training is ceremonial. The assumptions in the textbook do not match the real job site in an emergency situation. There were some who could not read, but someone else filled in the test for them at the end of the training."


■休む場所で　毎時１２マイクロシーベルト

12 microsieverts/hour in the rest area

「その後、現場に出るが、放射線量が高いところで線量を測りつつ、作業員に警告、指示する放射線管理員の数が足りない。収束の現場だから作業員が多すぎる。そのせいもあり、危険な場所でもマスクを脱いだり、一服している作業員もいる。内部被曝が心配だ」

"Then the workers start working at the site. But there are not enough radiation control personnel who measure radiation levels in the high-radiation locations, and warn and instruct the workers. There are too many workers because the nature of the work is to wind down the accident. There are workers who take off their masks or who smoke even in the dangerous [high radiation] locations. I'm worried for their internal radiation exposures."

弁当を食べたり、喫煙する場所でも、毎時十二マイクロシーベルトの放射線量がるという。「作業員同士では線量の話はしない。しても仕方がないからね」

In the rest area where the workers eat lunch and smoke, the radiation level is 12 microsieverts/hour. "Among workers, we don't talk about radiation levels. There's no point."

この作業員は「今は全国から作業員をかき集めているが、夏には足りなくなると業者の親方たちは皆、言っている」と漏らした。地元の建設業者もそのことを認める。

The worker divulged to us, "For now, they've managed to get workers from all over Japan. But there won't be enough workers by summer, all bosses at the employment agencies say so." Local construction companies also admit [to the scarcity of workers by summer.]

「長年、福島原発に携わってきた地元業者は現在、第一原発には行かない。危ないし、原発以外にも仮設住宅建設などの仕事があるからだ。全国の原発を渡り歩く職人たちも福島第一は避けている。賃金が特別良いわけでもないのに、わざわざ高い線量を限界まで浴びて、他で作業する機会を失いたくないからだ。素人中心で作業をしているが、早晩、人材供給も途切れてくるだろう」

"Local contractors who have been involved in the work at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant do not work there any more. It's dangerous, and there are jobs other than at the nuke plant, such as construction of temporary housing. The professional migrant workers who hop from one nuclear plant to another all over Japan avoid Fukushima I Nuke Plant. The pay is not particularly good, so what is the point of getting high radiation to the max allowed and losing the opportunity to work in other nuclear plants? So, it's mostly amateurs who work at the plant right now. Sooner or later, the supply of workers will dry up."

東電の広報担当者は下請け作業員の労働環境や賃金水準について「元請け企業が適切な指導をしていると思う」と説明する。作業員の確保については「現時点で作業員の数に支障は出ていない。今後も作業状況に応じ必要な人員を確保していく」と強調する。

As to the working conditions and wage levels of the subcontract workers, TEPCO's PR person explains, "We believe the subcontracting companies are providing appropriate guidance." As to securing the workers, he emphasizes that "there is no problem at this point in sourcing enough workers. We will secure necessary workers depending on how the work progresses."

しかし、原発労働者の健康問題に取り組む飯田勝泰・東京労働安全衛生センター事務局長は「労働者たちは危険な環境で働かされている。賃金水準はダウンし不払いも起きている。人員確保が難しい状況になりつつある」と指摘する。

However, Katsuyasu Iida, Director General of Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center who have been dealing with the health problems of nuclear workers, points out, "Workers are made to work in a dangerous environment. The wage levels are going down, and there are cases of non-payment. It is getting harder to secure the workers."

さらに東電だけでは安全管理は徹底されないとし、国に対してもこう求めた。「下請け労働者を含めた管理体制を作る必要がある。労働環境、労働条件を徹底的に守っていかなければ、いつ終わるかわからない事故収束作業に対応できない」

He also says the safety management cannot be fully enforced by TEPCO alone, and demands the national government to step in. "They need to come up with the management system that include the subcontract workers. Unless they secure the [safe] work environment and work conditions, they cannot deal with the restoration work that may continue for a long while."

※ デスクメモ　福島第一原発での作業員は命懸けだ。それを一日八千円の報酬でこなしている労働者たちがいる。東電に籍のある「お抱え議員」は年収一千万円以上。原子力ムラの天下り役員たちも未だに健在だ。脱原発とは単なるエネルギー問題ではない。こうした「不条理」を放置するのか否かという問いでもある。

Memo from the desk [at Tokyo Shinbun]: Workers at Fukushima I Nuke Plant are risking their lives. Some are doing it for 8000 yen per day. A councilman who also happens to work for TEPCO earns more than 10 million yen [US$130,000] per year. Executives who "descended from heaven" to cushy jobs in the "nuclear energy village" are alive and well. To move away from nuclear power generation is not just about energy issues. It is to question whether we will continue to ignore such "absurdity".

Well said. Everybody in the nuclear industry in Japan knew that the industry depended (still does) on migrant workers who were (still are) hired on the cheap thorough layer after layer of subcontracting companies. Thanks to the Fukushima I Nuclear Plant accident, now the general public know that. But there are plenty of those who are still comfortable with the nuclear power generated by the nuclear power plants maintained at the expense of such workers and see nothing wrong with it.

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Two Ways to Sell Contaminated Fukushima Rice: Sell Direct, and Discount for Wholesalers

No matter what the governments (national, prefectural) or the agricultural co-op (JA) in Fukushima say about the "safe" rice from Fukushima through vigorous testing, there are just too many ways that Fukushima rice that are contaminated with radioactive cesium can slip through and reach the consumers, without the consumers knowing that they are contaminated to a degree that they may not be comfortable eating it.

One way to sell directly to consumers, like in this case in Fukushima: "Mochi" rice (sticky rice used to make "mochi") containing 1110 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium had been sold at a farm stand in Date City, Fukushima.

From Jiji Tsushin (1/27/2012):

福島県は２７日、同県伊達市の農家が生産したもち米から国の暫定規制値（１キロ当たり５００ベクレル）を超える放射性セシウムが検出されたと発表した。濃度は１１１０ベクレル。県によると、この農家のもち米のうち５７．５キロが昨年１１月上旬までに市内の直売所で販売された。直売所は回収を呼び掛けている。

The Fukushima prefectural government announced on January 27 that radioactive cesium exceeding the provisional safety limit (500 becquerels/kg) was detected from "mochi" rice produced by a farmer in Date City in Fukushima Prefecture. The density was 1110 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium. According to the prefectural government, 57.5 kilograms of this rice had already been sold by the first half of November 2011 at a direct sales depot in the city. The direct sales depot is calling for the return of the rice.

Return? Most likely the rice has been already eaten as "mochi".

I totally fail to sympathize with the farmer who sold the rice at the direct sales depot. By 2011 fall, it should have been obvious, even to people in Date City, that their houses, farmlands were heavily contaminated. The city was measuring the radiation levels in the city and finding "hot spots" everywhere.

Another way is being practiced by the Fukushima JA: Reduce the wholesale price so that the distributors can get a fat margin, thus incentive for the wholesalers to push Fukushima rice. I'm sure they will be glad to oblige, because they mix and match with other rice from other parts of Japan anyway.

Also from Jiji Tsushin (1/27/2012):

ＪＡ全農福島（福島市）は２０１１年県産米の一部銘柄について、卸業者への売り渡し価格（相対取引価格）を引き下げる方向で調整を始めた。複数の業者筋が２７日明らかにした。早ければ３０日にも実施の方向。東京電力福島第１原発事故を受けた風評被害で販売が低迷する中、価格引き下げによる消費喚起が狙いとみられる。

The Fukushima Branch of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Association (JA) has been coordinating with the wholesalers to lower the wholesale price of some brands of rice produced in Fukushima in 2011. A multiple wholesalers disclosed the news [to reporters] on January 27. The new price will be effective as soon as January 30. As the sales has slumped due to the baseless rumors after the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, the Fukushima JA may be aiming at stimulating the sales by lowering the wholesale price.

　県中央部に当たる中通りコシヒカリ（６０キロ当たり）、海沿い中心の浜通りコシヒカリ（同）はいずれも１５００円引き下げ、それぞれ１万３８００円、１万３７００円に、同県産ひとめぼれ（同）は５００円下げ、１万３５００円とする案が有力。会津産コシヒカリは据え置く方向。

The wholesale price of "Koshihikari" from Nakadori (central Fukushima) and from Hamadori (coastal Fukushima) will be lowered by 1500 yen to be 13,800 yen and 13,700 yen per 60-kilogram bag respectively. "Hitomebore" brand produced in Fukushima will be lowered by 500 yen to 13,500 yen per 60-kilogram bag. The price for "Koshihikari" produced in Aizu region (western Fukushima) will not change.

I do not think it is likely that the wholesalers will pass on the savings to the retailers, if the past is any indication.

There are just too many channels through which the rice will leave Fukushima, as the Fukushima JA handles only 23% of rice produced in Fukushima anyway.

By the way, the Fukushima JA has decided on the rice growing policy in Fukushima for 2012 crop. The only areas that they say they will disallow the planting of rice are the areas that produced rice that exceeded 500 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium. Everywhere else, even in those areas that were unlucky to be found with rice that had radioactive cesium between 100 and 500 becquerels/kg, the JA will allow the rice growing after "thorough decontamination" of the soil.

Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha.

We know what "decontamination" they are talking about, don't we? The rice farmers in Fukushima who grew rice last year (almost all of them) tilled their contaminated land before planting last year, mixing up the radioactive cesium, strontium and whatever other nuclides that landed with the then-clean soil underneath. Most likely they did the autumn tilling before the snowfall last year already. Most locations weren't even tested for radioactive materials in soil.

How do you decontaminate such land? It certainly won't be accomplished by thinly scraping the soil surface. Remove the top 30 centimeters? No that won't be enough, because rain may have driven radioactive materials further down. Top 1 meter then? The productive part of the soil will be gone.

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"Decontamination" Defined by Ministry of the Environment Is Nothing But a General, Thorough Cleaning by Hand

according to Sankei Shinbun, who has been unabashedly pro-nuclear energy and in favor of dispersing radioactive materials throughout Japan via the disaster debris to share in the "pain".

The paper has an article about the meeting between the Ministry of the Education officials and the heads of the municipalities within the 20-kilometer radius "no entry zone" where the heads of the municipalities received the information from the Ministry about their lot - whether they can return after the decontamination work by the national government or not.

But that isn't the interesting part of the article.

At the end of the article, there is a separate section that the newspaper writes about what "decontamination" is, according to the Ministry of the Education:

除染　「がんこな汚れを落とす掃除のようなもの」（環境省幹部）で、基本は人手に頼ってスコップやタワシなどで行わ れる。環境省が昨年末に公表したガイドラインによると、落ち葉など容易に除去できるものは手作業で取り除く。屋根であれば高圧洗浄機で洗い流し、玄関など コンクリート部分であればタワシやブラシでこする。放射性物質が染み込んだ草地や土壌は、スコップやショベルカーなどで表面をはぎ取る。放射能を浴びない ように防護服を着るなど作業時の服装に注意しなければならない。

Decontamination: "It is like a cleaning job of stubborn dirt or stains" (Ministry of the Environment senior officials). Basically, it relies on manpower, using hand tools like shovels and scrubbing-brushes. According to the guideline published at the end of last year by the Ministry of the Environment, what can be easily removed, such as dead leaves, is to be removed by hand. The roofs are to be washed down by high-pressure washers, and the concrete surface such as the entrance of a house is to be scrubbed by scrubbing-brushes and deck brushes. As for the grassland and the soil where radioactive materials have penetrated, the surface is to be removed using shovels or diggers. Workers must pay attention not to get exposed to radioactivity by wearing the protective gear.

It looks as long as you follow these procedures the Ministry will call it "decontamination" and the job is done by the book. The subcontractors get paid by the general contractors, who get paid by the Ministry.

If you believed what Goshi Hosono, Minister of the Environment, said about decontaminating Fukushima - "Japan is not the Soviet Union, we have advanced technology to deal with radiation contamination, and we can do what others may have failed", sorry. There is nothing high-tech about any of these methods, and they don't even work.

From what's been tweeted by a villager in Iitate-mura, Fukushima Prefecture, the thorough "decontamination" job by hand by the Self Defense Force using screw drivers scraping dirt and dead leaves achieved nothing. It's back to square one:

除染その後１：自衛隊の方が苦労して除染して下さった役場の石畳のその後、直後（１２／２０）の線量は１．５７μＳＶ／ｈ、１２月２９日は２．８７μＳＶ／ｈ、今日（１／１０）は３．２６μＳＶ／ｈ。だから無駄だと言ったのです。石畳の隙間には落ち葉が挟まっていました。

After decontamination (part 1): About the stone pavement in front of the village office that the Self Defense Force kindly took trouble to decontaminate for us. Right after the decontamination work on December 20, the radiation level was 1.57 microsievert/hour. On December 29 it was 2.87 microsieverts/hour. On January 10, it was 3.26 microsieverts/hour. I told you so, it's no use. The gaps between the stones are filled with dead leaves [again].

He is not angry that the radiation didn't go down. He is angry that the government needlessly exposed these young SDF soldiers who are from the bases inside Fukushima to high levels of radiation.

So far, two workers doing exactly what the Ministry of the Environment defines as "decontamination" have died in Date City and Hirono-machi in Fukushima Prefecture. The deaths have nothing to do with radiation, the government tells us, without giving any further details about the cause of their deaths.

If the government ever measured the density of radioactive materials in the soil and dead leaves that it made these workers and the SDF soldiers remove by hand in places like Iitate-mura and Date City, it hasn't bothered telling us.

By the way, Sankei Shinbun categorizes articles related to the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident and the radiation contamination problems with the label "Radiation Leak". At least Yomiuri and Asahi use "Nuke Plant Accident" as their label.

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Tokyo University Seismologists: 70% Chance Within 4 Years That M7 Earthquake Hits Tokyo Region

70% chance within 4 years, 98% within 30 years. It's all about statistics.

The Insurance Journal carried an AP story about the study done by the researchers at Tokyo University on a potential M7 earthquake in Kanto region within 4 years.

After forking out the record payout after the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami, the insurance industry worldwide may be very interested in knowing more about such a study coming from a premier university well-aligned with the national government in Japan.

People in the Tokyo region (metropolitan areas and Kanto) don't seem to care. It's like "What's new?"

From The Insurance Journal citing AP (1/25/2012):

Study: Major Earthquake Could Hit Tokyo Within Years

By Mari Yamaguchi (AP)

A new study is warning that the Tokyo region has a 70 percent chance of being hit directly by a powerful magnitude-7 earthquake within four years.

The study by University of Tokyo seismologists bases the estimate on an increase in earthquake activity in the Tokyo region since last year’s March 11 disaster, when a magnitude-9 quake and subsequent tsunami about 140 miles (230 kilometers) northeast of the capital left nearly 20,000 people dead or missing.

The group at the university’s earthquake research institute said the number of moderate quakes in the capital region measuring magnitude 3 or bigger surged to 343 in the six-month period after the March quake, up from 47 in the previous six months.

Based on a theory that the probability of bigger earthquakes rises in proportion to an increase in smaller quakes, the team calculated a 98 percent likelihood of a magnitude 6.7 to 7.2 earthquake striking Tokyo over the next 30 years.

Stated differently, “When we ask when a probability of such a quake reaches 70 percent, then we get a 70 percent chance over the next four years,” said Shinichi Sakai, a seismologist on the team.

A separate government study estimates that the chance of a magnitude-7 quake striking Tokyo is 70 percent over the next 30 years.

Sakai said the two studies use different methods to calculate earthquake likelihood. While the university study factored in the recent increase in moderate seismic activity, the government estimate only looked the pattern of magnitude 6.7-7.2 quakes over the past 150 years. Since no quake that big has occurred in the Tokyo area since March, there is no change in the government estimate, Sakai said.

Japan is one of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world. Tokyo’s last major quake was the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake that killed 140,000 people.

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(Video) What Happened to Chernobyl Children 7 Years after the Accident (from a Japanese TV program in 1993)

When it was someone else's problem (Chernobyl), Japan was telling the truth about the effect of radiation, particularly on children.

Tokyo Brown Tabby's translation and captioning of a TV program from 1993:

Ironically, the female newscaster has morphed into one of the strongest proponents (even today) of nuclear power generation. The journalist on the right has remained a journalist; he was seen investigating and reporting from the high-radiation areas in Fukushima, right after Reactor 1 blew up at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

Tabby's description of the Youtube video:

This video is from a Japanese evening news program broadcasted on Nihon TV, seven years after the Chernobyl accident (around 1993).

I hope the families in Fukushima who still hesitate to voluntarily evacuate their children will watch this and change their minds.

The original video is at: http://youtu.be/tWWICnIQE9k

German version is at 007bratsche's channel: http://youtu.be/_9F9M1Sq7KI
French version is at kna60's channel: http://youtu.be/oWvQT6ei8C0

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Japan's PM Noda: It Is "Regrettable" That There Is No Minutes of Meetings of Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

None of the meetings of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters has the minutes.

No record whatsoever of how decisions were made by a handful of politicians surrounding then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan (people like Yukio Edano, Banri Kaieda, and Goshi Hosono) and high-level bureaucrats at the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Ministry of Education and Science, government experts in the Nuclear Safety Commission or the Atomic Energy Commission, and last but not least, TEPCO. We won't know who else was there, because they say they did not keep any record.

The excuse by the NISA was that they were too busy dealing with the crisis.

Well, they sure didn't act like they were dealing with crisis at that time. They were telling us everything was under control, and the Fukushima accident was only a Level 4 accident on INES event scale.

(My ranting is longer than the article.)

From Jiji Tsushin (1/26/2012):

野田佳彦首相は２６日午後の衆院本会議で、政府の原子力災害対策本部の議事録が作成されていなかった問題について「東京電力福島第１原発事故発生後の緊急事態において、昨年３月１１日から２３回にわたる議事内容が文書で随時記録されていなかったことは事実であり、誠に遺憾だ」と述べた。自民党の細田博之元幹事長への答弁。

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda commented during the Lower House session in the afternoon of January 26 on the minutes of the meetings of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters that was set up by the cabinet. He answered the question from a LDP politician and said "In the emergency situation after the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, it is a fact that there is no minutes of the 23 meetings since March 11 last year, and it is regrettable."

Decisions that they made in the meetings include (in no chronological order and on top of my head, may not be accurate but we'll never know because there is no minutes):

• Setting evacuation zones in concentric circles, as if Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant was an atomic bomb.

• (Kan) going to Fukushima I Nuke Plant less than a day after the nuclear accident because Kan thought of himself as "nuclear expert".
  

• Ignoring the nuclear emergency protocol which specifically said "Use SPEEDI".

• Introducing the "rolling blackout" to scare people into not abandoning nuclear power plants despite the horrendous accident.

• Raising the annual radiation exposure limit for the Fuku-I workers to 250 millisieverts from 50 millisieverts max per year.

• Raising the radiation exposure limit for school children in schools in Fukushima to 20 millisieverts per year.

• Creating the provisional safety standards for food and water.

• Ordering sample tests for food items out of Fukushima, which resulted in 99.9% of vegetables being sold without any testing.

• Sending nuclear experts to Fukushima to tell people everything was OK.

• Sending government-affiliated nuclear experts to TV stations to downplay the accident (remember the "Plutonium Brothers"?).

• Devising a campaign attacking journalists who wrote something "bad" about Fukushima or Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident.

• Devising a campaign to promote the idea that tasty food was safe food; performance by politicians and by celebrities eating freshly picked Fukushima vegetables.

• Dumping the contaminated water from the plant into the Pacific Ocean without telling the countries that might be affected.
  

The list is endless.

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1143 Children (Over 30%) of 3765 Tested for Thyroid Abnormalities in Fukushima Had Lumps or Cysts (Updated)

(UPDATE: The document issued by the Fukushima Prefecture's expert committee is here (PDF, in Japanese).

Total number of children tested: 3765
No. of children found with lumps [nodules] 5.1 millimeter or larger: 26
No. of children found with lumps [nodules] less than 5.1 millimeter: 56
No. of children found with cysts 20.1 millimeter or larger: 0
No. of children found with cyst less than 20.1 millimeter: 1086
No. of children with no lumps [nodules], cysts: 2622

There are children who have both lump [nodule] and cyst.

============================================


Waaaiiit a minute...

I was looking for more information on the post I wrote about the lumps on the thyroid 5.1 millimeters or bigger in diameter found in 0.7% or 26 children out of 3765 children tested in Fukushima Prefecture. I was specifically looking for information on the number of children who had any lump at all.

I've just found it in an unlikely place: Fukushima Minpo, local Fukushima newspaper. I thought they would obfuscate, but they have the details. The article looks like it is a part of a longer article; it is possible it is abbreviated from the article in the print version of the newspaper.

It turns out,

Total number of children tested: 3765
No. of children found with lumps 5.1 millimeters and larger: 26 (0.7% of total)
No. of children found with lumps smaller than 5.1 millimeters: 1117 (29.7% of total)

1143 children, or 30.4% of children tested, were found with lumps of varying sizes.

From Fukushima Minpo (1/25/2012):

検討委員会では、浪江、飯舘両町村、川俣町山木屋地区の１８歳以下を対象にした甲状腺検査の結果が報告された。３７６５人のうち、「直ちに二次検査を要する」と判断された県民はいなかった。

At the expert commission, the result of the thyroid test was reported. The test was done on the children below the age of 18 in Namie-machi, Iitate-mura, and Yamakiya District of Kawamata-machi [all planned evacuation zone]. Of 3765 children, there was no one who was deemed necessary to immediately go through further testing.

直径５・１ミリ以上のしこりなどが確認され、二次検査の対象となったのは２６人（０・７％）だったが、検討委座長の山下俊一福島医大副学長は「原発事故に伴う悪性の変化はみられない」と説明している。二次検査が不要の３７３９人（９９・３％）のうち、１１１７人（２９・７％）は５・０ミリ以下のしこりなどが確認されたが、県は「良性」と判断している。

26 children (0.7%) have been found with lumps with 5.1 millimeters or larger in diameter, and will go through further testing [at some time]. However, Shunichi Yamashita, the head of the commission and the vice president of Fukushima Medical University explains, "There is no malignant change due to the nuclear plant accident". Of 3739 children who will not need further testing (99.3% of children tested), 1117 children (29.7%) have been found with lumps 5.0 millimeters or less in diameter. But the prefectural government has decided they are "benign".

甲状腺検査は県民健康管理調査の一環で、浪江、飯舘両町村、川俣町山木屋地区で先行して行われた。他の地域では順次、実施している。

The thyroid testing is part of the Fukushima residents health management survey, and was carried out in Namie, Iitate-mura, and Yamakiya District of Kawamata-machi first. For the other areas, it has been on-going.

It decidedly does not look totally OK to me, and the explanation by the Fukushima officials sounds suspect.

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OT: "Egoist" by Falco

(Speaking of an egoist...) One of my favorite songs.

Die ganze Welt dreht sich um mich,
denn ich bin nur ein Egoist.

Der Mensch, der mir an naechsten ist
bin ich, ich bin ein Egoist.

and of course this one:

Drah di ned um, oh oh oh - schau, schau,
der Kommissar geht um! oh oh oh

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WSJ Runs a Hagiography of Naoto Kan, Former PM of Japan Who Presided (Unfortunately) Over the Fukushima Nuke Accident

A political "rags to riches" story, says Wall Street Journal writer Toko Sekiguchi.

The article is totally uncritical, glossing over everything that happened under Kan's watch since March 11, 2011, and is written in a simple English to match the simplistic content that doesn't read like a Wall Street Journal at all.

What's the occasion anyway for this hagiography? Kan is attending the Davos meeting, annual confab of the world's rich and powerful in Davos, Switzerland, and is saying "No More Nuke Plants". Oh isn't that great.

"I'm pouring most of my time and energy into promoting renewable energy, and I'm having a great time"

From Wall Street Journal (1/25/2012):

Japan's Former Premier Takes Antinuclear Campaign to Davos

By TOKO SEKIGUCHI

TOKYO—Former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan returns to the world stage this week, part of a campaign to reinvent himself as a global antinuclear activist nearly a year after he oversaw his government's widely criticized handling of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

"I would like to tell the world that we should aim for a society that can function without nuclear energy," he said in a recent interview with The Wall Street Journal, previewing his speech scheduled for Thursday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Mr. Kan was last in the spotlight in August, when he tendered his resignation as prime minister barely a year after taking office, and just over five months after the March 11 tsunami triggered the Fukushima meltdowns. He was forced out by the parliamentary opposition and by critics inside his own ruling party, who blasted his handling of the accident and, more generally, his strong-willed, improvisational style of governing.

Japan runs through prime ministers so quickly—Mr. Kan is one of six men to have held the title in the past five years—that former ones rarely wield influence domestically or internationally. But Mr. Kan is betting he can break the mold, by reverting to his prelegislative career as a civic activist. Before entering Parliament in 1980, he worked as an advocate for affordable housing for Tokyo's long-suffering salarymen.

"People tell me that I've gone back to my roots," he said in the interview, his first with a non-Japanese news organization since leaving office. "I'm pouring most of my time and energy into promoting renewable energy, and I'm having a great time," he added.

Mr. Kan has been traveling the world. On a recent trip to Spain and Germany, his alternative-energy inspection tour included visiting solar-energy control centers. As he talked of energy-efficient building codes and described a visit to a Japanese biomass community project, flipping through PowerPoint printouts, the 65-year-old Mr. Kan flashed a youthful smile—an expression he rarely showed during his tumultuous administration.

While his successor, Yoshihiko Noda, is pushing to restart closed reactors in Japan and to promote Japanese nuclear-reactor exports to countries such as Vietnam and Turkey, Mr. Kan is now pursuing an alternative-energy agenda, hoping to use his connections to make headway. "I think we should aim to create a world in which people do not need to depend on nuclear energy, and it would be ideal if Japan can become a model country for the world," he said.

In some ways, it is a likely end to what had been an unlikely career. In a political rags-to-riches tale, Mr. Kan won his first national election on his fourth grass-roots campaign bid as a member of the smallest opposition party at the time. But the issues raised then by a leftist activist-turned-politician of a miniparty went unheeded as Japan made the transition from its breakneck postwar growth to the bubble economy, protected by an iron triangle of big business, the nation's bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled continuously since 1955.

"We used to talk about defeating the LDP, to eliminate the bureaucrat-led, special-interest politics," said Jiro Yamaguchi, a Hokkaido University political- science professor and longtime friend of Mr. Kan. "It sounded like a dream back then. No way did I think that he'd be premier one day."

Early in his career, Mr. Kan developed an interest in renewable energies, and he still proudly shows a fading picture of himself as a young, long-haired legislator visiting a Colorado wind farm. He discussed wind power during a parliamentary session in 1982, drawing a rebuke from the then-minister of science and technology, who, according to the legislative transcript, chided him: "Don't use it as a reason to reject nuclear power; don't get too excited or carried away."

Mr. Kan recalled that exchange with bemusement, saying nuclear power wasn't even part of that discussion. He said the official's reflexive response demonstrated the ruling government's obsession with the technology. At the time, Japan was still recovering from the oil crises of the 1970s, and nuclear power was emerging as the alternative to foreign oil.

As Mr. Kan rose to power, he came to embrace the national consensus that Japan should ramp up its use of nuclear energy.

Mr. Kan said that as a young politician, he believed atomic power was only a transitional energy source. But " as our party grew in size, many of us began to see nuclear power as a safe power that should be more aggressively utilized," he said.

By the time his Democratic Party of Japan wrested control from the LDP in a historic 2009 victory, the new government had adopted the LDP's pronuclear policy, promising to build 14 new nuclear reactors by 2030. Nuclear power was repackaged as clean energy, becoming the centerpiece of the DPJ's plan to cut carbon emissions by 25%, in relation to Japan's 1990 output levels, by 2020.

March 11 changed that. Mr. Kan had to make gut-wrenching decisions, including rejecting a request from Fukushima operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. to pull workers back from the increasingly dangerous reactors. "It was the first time since World War II that a Japanese leader was asking people to risk their lives," he said.

In his mind, he said, he simulated an worst-case evacuation scenario that included the 35 million people in the Tokyo metropolitan area. "Not only would we lose up to half of our land, but spread radiation to the rest of the world," he said. "Our existence as a sovereign nation was at stake."

"Just when he reached the peak, an accident that questioned his very core erupted," said veteran lawmaker Satsuki Eda, a Kan ally for three decades.

Four months after the accident, Mr. Kan used the bully pulpit of the premiership to declare that he was revising Japan's energy policy, aiming eventually to rid the country of all its nuclear-power plants. He called the technology's risks impossible to contain. The announcement surprised his own cabinet ministers, who were notified of the decision only hours beforehand, and shocked a political system in which consensus-building skill is prized.

Even onetime close allies within the ruling party questioned Mr. Kan's competence in handling the accident and his response—blaming his impetuous style for aggravating the costly chaos. "Mr. Kan is a skillful politician when on the offensive, forcefully breaking through and overcoming barriers—but crisis management and day-to-day communication with the public is not an offensive skill," said Yukio Edano, Mr. Kan's chief spokesman during the height of the crisis, told reporters last month.

Mr. Kan remains unapologetic: "A large part of people's criticism against me was that I acted spontaneously or just off the top of my head. But for me, that's a positive thing. If you're not inspired, you can't act."

Now, unfettered by the burdens of office, he has more freedom to act. "He's finally back to his normal self," said Mr. Eda.

Write to Toko Sekiguchi at toko.sekiguchi@dowjones.com

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