Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (5/7): No Impression That TEPCO President Shimizu Wanted to Withdraw Workers from #Fukushima I NPP

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4 from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――14日夜から東電の撤退問題が浮上する

---The issue of TEPCO withdrawing from the plant surfaced in the evening of March 14, 2011.

「撤退問題の議論は３つの段階を経たように思う。海江田経産相が伊藤哲朗・危機管理監（当時）と安井正也・保安院付（当時）と私を呼んで、東電が全員撤退を考えていると伝えた。私は免震重要棟があるのでまだ頑張れるはずだ。いったん撤退してしまうと二度と戻れなくなり、１号から６号まですべての原子炉と燃料プールが危機にさらされると、撤退に反対した」

"I believe there were three stages of discussions regarding the withdrawal. Minister of Economy Kaieda called Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Tetsuro Ito, NISA's Masaya Yasui and me and told us that TEPCO was considering complete withdrawal [from the plant]. I told them I was against the withdrawal. They could hang on in the Anti-Seismic Building. Once they withdrew they wouldn't be able to come back, and all reactors and spent fuel pools would be in danger."

「その後、政治家だけの相談があり、首相を起こして御前会議となった。撤退は許さないが結論で、清水正孝社長（当時）を呼ぶことになった」

"Afterwards, politicians met by themselves. Then we woke up the prime minister and held a meeting in front of him. The conclusion was that we wouldn't allow withdrawal, and that we would call TEPCO's President Masataka Shimizu [to the Prime Minister's Official Residence]."

■「清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった

"I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer."

「清水社長は一人で総理執務室に入ってきた。清水社長が即座に『撤退は考えていない』と話したので、私は『聞いていたのと話が違う』と思った。清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった。なにか誤解があったのかもしれない。ただ経営者としてこのままでは部下が死ぬ可能性があると思ったとき、ほかに手だてはないかと考えていたとしてもおかしくはない

"President Shimizu came into the Prime Minister's Office all by himself. He immediately said he was not thinking of withdrawal. I thought, 'That's not what I was told.' I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer on the spot. There may have been some misunderstanding. But it was possible that he was thinking of some other way when he, as the president, thought his men could die."

班目氏の行動（３月14日）
9:53 原子力災害対策本部の会合（この後、首相応接室を退去し官邸５階の小部屋などに滞在、呼び出しに応じ応接室へ）
11:01 首相応接室のテレビで３号機水素爆発を確認
11:40 官房長官記者会見に同席
13:40ころ 東電から福島第１で働く人の線量限度引き上げの要望、国際基準などを関係者に説明
16:15 吉田所長と電話で話し、２号機逃し安全弁の開放を急ぐよう助言
18:00ころ 20～30ｋｍ圏内の屋内退避を首相に助言、福山副官房長官室で米国へ提供する情報の整理
21:03 官房長官記者会見に同席

Dr. Madarame on March 14, 2011:
9:53AM Meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (afterwards he stayed in a room on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence, and went to the drawing room when called)
11:01AM Saw Reactor 3 hydrogen explosion on TV in the PM drawing room
11:40AM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference
1:40PM Explained to people involved about TEPCO's request [?} to raise the dose limit for workers at Fukushima I NPP and international standards
4:15PM Spoke with Plant Manager Yoshida on the phone, advised him to open the Reactor 2's [steam] relief safety valve as soon as possible
6:00PM Advised Prime Minister to designate areas between 20 and 30 kilometers radii as sheltering indoors, compiled information to be provided to the US
9:03PM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference

Two things here that I didn't know - that Mr. Kan was asleep, and that Mr. Shimizu came to the PM Official Residence alone. The latter was rather surprising, as I remember Mr. Shimizu at that time being portrayed as ineffective, weak and timid, who could never be able to stand in front of politicians - let alone the irascible PM Kan.

Mr. Naoto Kan continues to take crecit for "stopping" TEPCO from "withdrawing".

The National Diet Independent Commission's conclusion in June 2012 was different. The Commission acknowledged that TEPCO didn't consider a complete withdrawal from the plant and that PM's Office did not stop TEPCO from "withdrawing". (See my post on June 9, 2012.)

TEPCO did not intend to "withdraw" (撤退 tettai); instead it wanted to "take shelter" (退避 taihi) from extremely high radiation after the Reactor 3 explosion. But for Messrs Kan and Kaieda, who weren't trained in law and had no experience as bureaucrats at top ministries, the distinction was too subtle.

From my June 9, 2012 post:

Both Mr. Kan and Mr. Kaieda also said they thought it was an "all-out" withdrawal, because Mr. Shimizu didn't use the word "partial". Shimizu said he was surprised that the administration understood his carefully chosen word "temporary shelter" - "taihi" as "all-out withdrawal" - "tettai".

The Diet commission's conclusion was that it was a case of miscommunication. TEPCO's Shimizu thought he was telling these officials that he wanted his workers to temporarily take shelter in a less irradiated location while keeping the core people at the plant. Messrs Kan and Kaieda thought "taihi" and "tettai" were the same thing and decided Shimizu was announcing an all-out withdrawal from the plant. It seems Mr. Shimizu's mistake was he thought he was talking to high-ranking bureaucrats with whom he had dealt before the accident. Unlike many politicians neither Mr. Kan nor Mr. Kaieda had been trained in law (Kan was an applied physics major, Kaieda political science) or through elite bureaucracy. (Mr. Edano would have understood Mr. Shimizu perfectly, but Mr. Edano says he never spoke with Mr. Shimizu.)

TEPCO workers and workers from affiliate companies (Hitachi, Toshiba, Kandenko, etc. and their subcontractors) remained at the plant as the radiation levels were several hundred millisieverts/hour and at one point exceeding 1 sievert/hour (see the AP article from 3/16/2011 at the link), with only 2 meals per day and sleeping on the floor as the government refused to provide workers with better food and other provisions. And the world hailed them as heroes as "Fukushima 50".

Mr. Edano, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary, is a lawyer.

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#Fukushima I NPP: Painstakingly Slow Cleanup, One Vehicle at a Time

After almost three years since the start of the nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, cleanup efforts continue extremely slowly (and probably manually by human workers). Here are some before-and-after photos taken by TEPCO, but most of them are close-ups. You do not get much sense of how the plant has been de-cluttered overall (if at all).

The area photographed is between the ocean side of the turbine buildings and the embankment along the plant harbor. Radiation levels remain high here. Hoses and pipes that transport water run amid the debris.

From TEPCO's photos and videos library, 1/30/2014 (more photos at the link):

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

TEPCO had a chance to clear the site in March 2011, when large SDF tanks fitted with "dozer armour" (plate to push out debris) were sent to the plant. (See my March 20, 2011 post.) But the tanks were never used. Why? Because TEPCO had already had workers lay electric cables over the debris in their haste to restore the power to the plant, and they couldn't remove the debris without damaging the cables.

(Sigh.)

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(OT) Tokyo Gubernatorial Race: Guess Who's Leading the Pack

Yoichi Masuzoe (TV personality, former Minister of Health), supported by the Liberal Democratic Party and Komei Party (ruling coalition in the national government): audience in 10s.

Morihiro Hosokawa (former prime minister), supported by former Prime Minister Junichi Koizumi (LDP), Democratic Party of Japan, Social Democrats: audience in 1,000s.

Toshio Tamogami (former Chief of Staff of the Self Defense Air Force), unofficially supported by Shintaro Ishihara: audience in 100s.

Kenji Utsunomiya (attorney - labor law) supported by Japanese Communist Party: audience in 100s - 1000s.

You would think Hosokawa is leading the race, and you would be dead wrong, if so-called opinion polls by the Japanese media are to be believed.

Here's one from anti-nuclear Tokyo Shinbun:

Masuzoe: 25.8%
Hosokawa: 13.3%
Utsunomiya: 6.9%
Tamogami: 6.4%
Undecided: 50%

The Japanese media has already selected Masuzoe as the winner for reasons only known to themselves, no matter how seemingly unpopular he is with Tokyo residents.

Prime Minister Abe and Komei Party President Yamaguchi are going to join Masuzoe on Sunday February 2nd and give speeches in support of Masuzoe. The ostensible reason is to keep Masuzoe and his staff alert, not counting on the "huge lead" he already has. Sponichi (one of the tabloids) reports the likely venue will be the middle of Ginza in Tokyo, where both Masuzoe and Hosokawa with Koizumi are scheduled to speak.

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(OT) Echo of Past World Wars from Davos, as Chinese Professional Channels "Iojima" and Japan's Prime Minister Channels Evans-Pritchard

in comparing the current Sino-Japan relationship to the British-German relationship right before the World War I.

Disconcerting remarks that seem to have freaked out many who attended the events (two separate events at Davos - confab of the rich and the powerful in the world), but there is hardly a peep about them in Japan. I don't think either remarks were reported by the Japanese media.

First, about the incredible Chinese professional, from Business Insider's Henry Blodget, who was at a dinner at Davos where he heard the following (1/22/2014; emphasis is mine):

I went to one of those fancy private dinners last night in Davos, Switzerland.

Like most of the events here at the 2014 World Economic Forum, the dinner was conducted under what are known as "Chatham House Rules," which means that I can't tell you who was there.

I can tell you what was said, though. And one thing that was said rattled a lot of people at the table.

During the dinner, the hosts passed a microphone around the table and asked guests to speak briefly about something that they thought would interest the group.

One of the guests, an influential Chinese professional, talked about the simmering conflict between China and Japan over a group of tiny islands in the Pacific.

China and Japan, you may recall, each claim ownership of these islands, which are little more than a handful of uninhabited rocks between Japan and Taiwan. Recently, the Japan-China tension around the islands has increased, and has led many analysts, including Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group, to worry aloud about the potential for a military conflict.

The Chinese professional at dinner last night did not seem so much worried about a military conflict as convinced that one was inevitable. And not because of any strategic value of the islands themselves (they're basically worthless), but because China and Japan increasingly hate each other.

The Chinese professional mentioned the islands in the context of the recent visit by Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine where Japanese killed in Japan's many military conflicts over the centuries are memorialized — including the Japanese leaders responsible for the attacks and atrocities Japan perpetrated in World War 2. A modern-day Japanese leader visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is highly controversial, because it is viewed by Japan's former (and current) enemies as an act of honoring war criminals.

That's certainly the way the Chinese professional at the dinner viewed it.

He used the words "honoring war criminals," to describe Abe's visit to the shrine. And, with contained but obvious anger, he declared this decision "crazy."

He then explained that the general sense in China is that China and Japan have never really settled their World War 2 conflict. Japan and America settled their conflict, he explained, and as a result, the fighting stopped. But China and Japan have never really put the war behind them.

The Chinese professional acknowledged that if China asserted control over the disputed islands by attacking Japan, America would have to stand with Japan. And he acknowledged that China did not want to provoke America.

But then he said that many in China believe that China can accomplish its goals — smacking down Japan, demonstrating its military superiority in the region, and establishing full control over the symbolic islands — with a surgical invasion.

In other words, by sending troops onto the islands and planting the flag.

The Chinese professional suggested that this limited strike could be effected without provoking a broader conflict. The strike would have great symbolic value, demonstrating to China, Japan, and the rest of the world who was boss. But it would not be so egregious a move that it would force America and Japan to respond militarily and thus lead to a major war.

Well, when the Chinese professional finished speaking, there was stunned silence around the table.

The assembled CEOs, investors, executives, and journalists stared quietly at the Chinese professional. Then one of them, a businessman, reached for the microphone.

"Do you realize that this is absolutely crazy?" the businessman asked.

"Do you realize that this is how wars start?"

"Do you realize that those islands are worthless pieces of rock... and you're seriously suggesting that they're worth provoking a global military conflict over?"

The Chinese professional said that, yes, he realized that. But then, with conviction that further startled everyone, he said that the islands' value was symbolic and that their symbolism was extremely important.

Challenged again, the Chinese professional distanced himself from his earlier remarks, saying that he might be "sensationalizing" the issue and that he, personally, was not in favor of a war with Japan. But he still seemed certain that one was deserved.

I'm far from an expert on the Japan-China conflict, and I'll leave the analyses of this situation to those who are. All I can tell you is that a respected, smart, and influential Chinese professional suggested at dinner last night that a surgical invasion by China of the disputed islands is justified and would finally settle the Japan-China conflict without triggering a broader war. And that suggestion freaked out everyone in the room.

Japan's prime minister is equally incredible when he suggested to Financial Times' Gideon Rachman that he, too, sees a Sino-Japan conflict as "conceivable" and is quite nonchalant about it.

From Gideon Rachman's blog at FT (1/22/2014; part, emphasis is mine):

Here at Davos, I’ve just had the opportunity to moderate a discussion between the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and a group of international journalists. I asked Mr Abe whether a war between China and Japan was “conceivable”.

Interestingly, he did not take the chance to say that any such conflict was out of the question. In fact, Mr Abe explicitly compared the tensions between China and Japan now to the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the years before the first world war, remarking that it was a “similar situation”.

The comparison, he explained, lies in the fact that Britain and Germany – like China and Japan – had a strong trading relationship. But in 1914, this had not prevented strategic tensions leading to the outbreak of conflict.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at UK's Telegraph said this in November last year:

...Today's escalating spat has echoes of the Agadir crisis in 1911, the stand-off between Wilhelmine Germany and the Franco-British Entente in the final years before the First World War.

In case you have forgotten, Kaiser Wilhelm sent the warship Panther to Morocco in 1911 to prevent French annexation. The Kaiser picked his moment well. The French were violating earlier accords.

Yet his real purpose was to probe and weaken Britain's entente with France (not a formal alliance) by picking on an issue where London had little natural sympathy for French actions.

The Agadir Crisis backfired against the Kaiser. The Entente did not break. But that is hardly a reassuring episode. The chain of events that followed were catastrophic.

France felt emboldened by British backing, with ripple effects through the Franco-Russian alliance. Russia then felt more able to push its luck when the Serbian crisis hit in 1914. Agadir fed an overwhelming sense of fury in Germany, a feeling that Britain had become an enemy.

America is now having to walk the same sort of tightrope that Britain had to walk – and walked badly – from Agadir to Sarajevo. One misjudgement by either side in the East China Sea could change our world entirely. If you are not concerned, perhaps you should be.

As I said above, very, very few in Japan are concerned. They either do not take Mr. Abe seriously, or they put much faith in the sanity of the Chinese leadership.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 4 SFP Fuel Assembly Removal: 14% Done (220/1533)

From TEPCO's page dedicated to the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool fuel removal operation:

Breakdown of transferred assemblies as of January 27, 2014:

Spent fuel: 198 assemblies/1,331 assemblies

Unirradiated (New) fuel: 22 assemblies/ 202 assemblies

Number of times of cask transportation: 10 times

So they have been removing used fuel assemblies except for the 22 new ones that they removed in the very first removal operation.

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The Obama Administration Demands Japan to Return 300kg of Weapon-Grade Plutonium the US Sent During Cold War Era

First it was the "disappointment" expressed by Ambassador Caroline Kennedy representing the United States Government that spooked Japanese. It was over the Yasukuni Shrine visit by the prime minister of Japan.

Then it was the United States Government's official stance as expressed also by Ambassador Kennedy that she and her government oppose a particular traditional way of fishing dolphins and whales in Japan. It delighted non-Japanese, pleased some Japanese, angered some more, puzzled many who wondered aloud, "Isn't there a more pressing issue between the US and Japan than a method of fishing?"

Now comes this, tad more relevant and contemporary than both from the US government, perhaps.

From Business Standard, quoting Kyodo News (1/27/2014):

US presses Japan to hand back 300 kg of plutonium

Japan's key ally the US has been pressing the country to return more than 300 kg of mostly weapon-grade plutonium that it exported to Japan for research purposes during the Cold War era, media reported.

The plutonium that is stored at a fast critical assembly in Tokaimura in Japan's Ibaraki prefecture could be used to produce 40-50 nuclear weapons, reported Japan's Kyodo News, citing unnamed Japanese and US government officials, according to Xinhua.

Japan has strongly resisted the demand raised by US President Barack Obama's administration, but it finally gave in to repeated demands, Kyodo said.

The two countries since last year have been seriously discussing the issue as the US plans to reach an accord with Japan at the third nuclear security summit in March in the Netherlands, according to the report.

The fast critical assembly belonging to the Japan Atomic Energy Agency is the country's only critical assembly designed to study characteristics of fast reactors.

The Japanese ministry of education, culture, sports, science and technology and other researchers have argued that the plutonium in question is needed for research and vital for producing good data, said Kyodo.

At present, Japan has another estimated 44 tonnes of plutonium, but its quality is not on par with the plutonium used for research purposes, Kyodo quoted a Japanese expert as saying.

In East Asia, China possesses nuclear weapons. So does North Korea, who has restarted its gas-graphite reactor for plutonium production. Instead of doing something about them and their programs first, the Obama administration has been demanding the return of weapon-grade plutonium that the US sent to Japan as part of "Atoms for Peace" initiatives.

The original Kyodo News in Japanese says that "the Obama administration considers 'nuclear security' important". If that's the case, why has that administration who considers 'nuclear security' important allowed the detailed information (such as the amount of plutonium, number of nuclear bombs that could be made) to leak to the media?

Why now? Something doesn't add up. I wonder if the existence in Japan of 300 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium has served as some kind of deterrent against an aggressive nation or two. Now the cover is blown.

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(OT) This Year's Flu Is Deadly...

I have been in bed for the entire week because of it. Still recovering. Hope to get back writing about things nuclear and Japanese in a few days.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 3 Water Leak from MSIV Room: It's Most Likely the Water from Inside the Pressure Vessel

This is today's update on the water leak from the MSIV (Main Steam Isolation Valve) Room of Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. (Previous posts on the subject are here and here.)

TEPCO says they did the nuclide analysis of the water sample that the robot collected. The temperature and the levels of contamination indicate it is the water that comes out of the Pressure Vessel/Containment Vessel.

TEPCO's way of saying it is that "the water is not the one that goes into the reactor."

However, the levels of contamination of this water is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than the highly contaminated water in the reactor building basements, which seems to me to indicate that this leaking water is diverted out of the Pressure Vessel it comes in full contact with the corium (wherever it is - part at the bottom of the PV, part buried into the concrete floor of the Containment Vessel).

From TEPCO's alert for the press, 1/19/2014:

【漏えい水の放射能分析結果：採取日１月19日】
・セシウム134 ：7.0×10^2 Bq/cm3
・セシウム137 ：1.7×10^3 Bq/cm3
・コバルト60　 ：2.5×10^1 Bq/cm3
・全ベータ ：2.4×10^4 Bq/cm3

Nuclide analysis of the leaked water: sample taken on 1/19/2014

• Cesium-134: 7.0×10^2 Bq/cm3 (700 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cesium-137: 1.7×10^3 Bq/cm3 (1,700 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cobalt-60: 2.5×10^1 Bq/cm3 (25 Bq/cm3)
  

• All-beta: 2.4×10^4 Bq/cm3 (24,000 Bq/cm3)

【漏えい水の温度測定結果：１月19日午後５時頃測定
約20℃

※漏えい確認箇所における雰囲気温度は約７℃（１月19日午前10時頃測定)
原子炉に注水している水の温度は約７℃（１月19日午後５時頃測定

Temperature of the leaked water: measured at 5PM on 1/19/2014

• About 20 degrees Celsius

*Atmospheric temperature at the location of the leak: 7 degrees Celsius (measured at 10AM, 1/19/2014)
Temperature of the water being injected: 7 degrees Celsius (measured at 5PM, 1/19/2014)

【原子炉に注水している水の至近の放射能分析結果：採取日平成25年12月10日】
・セシウム134 ：検出限界値未満
・セシウム137 ：検出限界値未満
・コバルト60　 ：検出限界値未満
・全ベータ ：2.8 Bq/cm3

Latest nuclide analysis of water being injected into reactors: sample taken on 12/10/2013

• Cesium-134: below detection level
  

• Cesium-137: below detection level

• Cobalt-60: below detection level
  

• All-beta: 2.8 Bq/cm3

当該漏えい水は、原子炉に注水している水に比べて放射能濃度が高く、水温も高いことから、原子炉に注水している水の直接漏えいによるものではないと考えています。引き続き、漏えい原因等について調査を実施してまいります。

The leaked water is higher in density of radioactive materials than the water being injected into the reactors. The temperature of the water is also higher. Therefore we believe this is not the leak of water that is being injected into the reactor. We will continue to investigate the cause of the leak.

TEPCO's alert has a link to the latest nuclide analysis of water samples taken at different stages of contaminated water treatment (published on 1/17/2014).

According to that analysis, the highly contaminated water that sits in the reactor building basement (supposedly after having come to full contact with the corium) has:

• Cesium-134: 1.0×10^4 Bq/cm3 (10,000 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cesium-137: 2.5×10^4 Bq/cm3 (25,000 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cobalt-60: 1.4 Bq/cm3 (after treatment with SARRY)
  

• All-beta: 2.3×10^4 Bq/cm3 (23,000 Bq/cm3, before RO treatment)

While the Japanese media continues to not see much significance of this leak, the workers who have been tweeting from Fukushima I NPP from the beginning of the accident seem to worry. The issue here is NOT whether this water is currently leaking into the surrounding environment. The issue is whether the MSIV and/or its ancillary systems failed in the March 2011 accident.

"Sunny" (from tweets here and here) fears the worst, that the MSIV itself is broken:

MSIV・主蒸気隔離弁　原子力発電所の原子炉建屋とタービン建屋を繋ぐ主蒸気配管にある非常に大きなバルブ。これが閉じると言う事は炉心でとんでもないことが起きていることである。逆に言えば、そんなときに閉じないと困る。それが、そこからも水が漏れている。つまり、閉じていないか壊れたか。

MSIV (Main Steam Isolation Valve) is a huge valve attached to the main steam pipe that connects the reactor building and the turbine building. When this valve closes, it means there is some extraordinary incident happening in the reactor core. Conversely, one might say that it would be a problem if this valve did not close in such an incident. Now, the water is leaking from there [from the MSIV]. In other words, the valve was not shut, or it broke.

炉心がスクラムするような状態でMSIVが閉まらないか壊れたか漏洩するか、これがどんなに恐ろしいこ事か。再稼働どころか、スリーマイルアイランド後のPWRのように対策の為世界中の炉心を止める必要性がある。いや、もっと恐ろしいのは事態の重大さをどれだけの人が受け止めているか。

The reactor core is scrummed, but the MSIV doesn't close or it breaks and [the coolant=water] leaks. Do you know how terrifying this is? Instead of talking about restarting [the nuclear power plants in Japan], we would need to stop all reactors in the world to deal with the problem, just like [when we stopped] PWRs after the Three Mile Island accident. Wait, what is more terrifying is, how many people are aware that this could be a serious problem?

Someone expressed his surprise to "Sunny" that TEPCO announced the incident at all, if this was such a serious incident. (People in Japan also love to say "TEPCO lies.") "Sunny"'s answer was:

この事象がそうなら世界中の全事業者とメーカーに情報共有するレベル

If this incident is what it is [the MSIV didn't close or broke in a severe emergency that necessitated the scrum], it should be shared with all nuclear plant operators and nuclear manufacturers in the entire world.

"Happy" hopes it is not the MSIV itself but ancillary pipe(s) that broke:

ＭＳＩＶ室は、主蒸気隔離弁だけじゃなく他系統や細い配管も沢山あって炉内に直結している配管も多いんだ。室内を詳しく調べ原因を掴まないとダメなんだけど、かなり困難な作業になると思う。線量が高くて人が作業するのも難しいし、室内は機器や配管が多く狭いし複雑で、ロボット作業も困難なんだ。

In the MSIV Room, other than the Main Steam Isolation Valve there are other systems and many small pipes, many of which connects directly to the reactor. We need to closely investigate inside the room to find out the cause [of the leak], but I'm afraid it will be a rather difficult task. The radiation level is high for workers to work inside, and it would be difficult for robots to navigate because of numerous pieces of equipment and pipes in a narrow space.

"Sunny" says he sure hopes it is a minor pipe that broke.

So was it a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) because of either the failure of the MSIV or the ancillary system that is not supposed to fail, in addition to the water boiling off by the decay heat?

But as Happy says, the radiation levels are particularly high near the area of the leak (amounting to Sieverts/hour), and how TEPCO is going to "further investigate", as reported by happy-go-lucky media like NHK, is unknown.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 3: Water Leak from MSIV Room Could Be a Huge Problem for Nuclear Reactor Safety

(UPDATE 1/19/2014) New post with nuclide analysis result.

===================

This is a follow-up on yesterday's post.

TEPCO released the video which was being taken by the robot on the first floor of Reactor 3 and which was being monitored by a TEPCO employee who noticed the water.

The flow looks significant and fast.

From TEPCO's photos and video library, 1/18/2014:

Location of the MSIV Room:

Radiation levels on the 1st floor of Reactor 3, from yesterday's post:

The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) is one of the two most important safety systems in a nuclear reactor (the other one being the control rod drive mechanism). It seals off the water/steam from the Pressure Vessel in case of an emergency (like a big earthquake). This MSIV system is not supposed to fail.

If the MSIV of Reactor 3 was damaged during the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami (either one) and the water has been leaking ever since, the safety standard for nuclear reactors around the world may be impacted, says one nuclear researcher that I follow on Twitter.

(Oh wait... Does it mean then that part of the reason why the water (coolant) inside the Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel dried up was because it was leaking through the damaged MSIV?)

To get a feel for the size of the MSIV, here's a photo and a video from one of the top manufacturers, Flowserve:

The 1st floor of Reactor 3 is where the human workers ventured in in June 2011 for the first time since the start of the accident on March 11, 2011 and took the smear samples from the floor. The result of the analysis of the smear samples, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

The location of the floor drain funnel is near the equipment hatch shield plug that was found slightly open, through which highly radioactive steam/water had been leaking. (TEPCO finally admitted the shield plug had been open on April 19, 2012, more than one full year after the start of the accident.)

Packbot was sent on November 18/19, 2011 to clean the hatch rail with what looked like a white towel. The result of the analysis of what the towel caught, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

(Now I think about it, the towel Packbot was using was soaking-wet, and even on the next day after the cleaning the guide rails were very wet. I have assumed the water on the guide rails was from inside the Containment Vessel, but is it possible that it has been coming from the MSIV Room?)

From @BB45_Colorado, one of the nuclear researchers that I follow:

主蒸気隔離弁;近傍からの漏洩が発災直後からのものなら、主蒸気隔離弁は、地震や内部異常加圧に耐えられなかった事になります。BWRの安全設計の心臓部でこれは極めてまずいです。場合によっては、世界中のBWRの安全審査がひっくり返ります

If the leak from (or from near) the Main Steam Isolation Valve is from the start of the accident, that means the MSIV couldn't withstand the earthquake and/or internal abnormal pressurization. This is bad in the heart of the BWR safety design. It could affect the safety reviews worldwide.

Browsing the articles by the mainstream media in Japan (eg. Yomiuri, Mainichi/Kyodo) on this incident, it seems to me that they don't know what MSIV is or its importance.

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(Just In from TEPCO Nuclear) Water Leak Near MSIV Room on 1st Floor of Reactor 3 Found by Worker Monitoring Live Images Taken by Robot

(UPDATE 1/18/2014) Video, additional information in the new post. The water is flowing fast.

========================

No images, videos, details yet.

From TEPCO's email alert for the press in Japanese (1/18/2014):

福島第一原子力発電所３号機原子炉建屋１階主蒸気隔離弁室近傍における水漏れについて

Water leak found near the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor of Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant

本日（１月18日）午後２時40分頃、３号機原子炉建屋瓦礫撤去用ロボットのカメラ画像を確認していた当社社員が、３号機原子炉建屋１階北東エリアの主蒸気隔離弁室の扉付近から、水が、当該扉近傍に設置されている床ドレンファンネル（排水口）に幅約30cmで流れ込んでいることを発見しました。

Today (January 18) at around 2:40PM, our employee who was monitoring the images taken by the camera mounted on the robot for removing the debris from the Reactor 3 building found the water running, at 30cm wide, from near the door to the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room located in the northeast area of the 1st floor of Reactor 3 into the floor drain funnel near the door.

当該漏えい水は、原子炉建屋最地下階の床ドレンサンプへつながる床ドレンファンネルへ流入しており、原子炉建屋外への流出はありません。

This water is flowing into the floor drain funnel that connects to the floor drain sump in the basement of the reactor building, and there is no leak from the reactor building to outside.

なお、モニタリングポスト指示値の有意な変動、およびプラントパラメータ（原子炉注水流量、原子炉圧力容器底部温度、格納容器内温度等）の異常は確認されておりません。

There is no statistically significant change observed at the monitoring posts and in the plant parameters (amount of water injected into the reactors, temperatures at the bottom of reactor pressure vessels, temperatures inside the containment vessels, etc.).

現在、漏えい状況および原因等を調査しております。

We are currently investigating the situation of the leak and the cause of the leak.

当該漏えい箇所の雰囲気線量は約30mSv/hです。

The ambient air dose rate near the leak is about 30 millisieverts/hour.

Reactor 3 first floor radiation levels (from my 7/23/2013 post):

Compared to other reactors that had explosive events (Reactor 2 did not have hydrogen explosions like Reactors 1 and 3, but some kind of event did seem to happen in the Suppression Chamber), Reactor 3's radiation levels are markedly higher.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 4 SFP Fuel Assembly Removal: 10% Done

From TEPCO's page dedicated to the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool fuel removal operation:

Breakdown of transferred assemblies:

• Spent fuel: 132 assemblies/1,331 assemblies

• Unirradiated (New) fuel: 22 assemblies/ 202 assemblies

So far, no news of major or minor hiccups whatsoever, and the world hasn't ended yet.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (4/7): The Worst Case Would Be "High-Pressure Melt Through", Politicians Thought Recriticality Was Nuclear Explosion

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

■「食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"We were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."


――12日午後に１号機で爆発が起きたとき、どう思ったのか。

--What did you think when an explosion happened in Reactor 1 in the afternoon of March 12, 2011?

「映像を見た瞬間に水素爆発だと思った。その時の記憶はあいまいだが、下村健一・内閣審議官（当時）の書いたものよると、私は『建屋に水素が漏れて、建屋には水素があるので爆発した』と淡々と説明したとされている。多分、事実だろう」

"I thought it was a hydrogen explosion the moment I saw the image. I don't remember clearly, but according to what Kenichi Shimomura, who was a cabinet counselor at that time, wrote, I calmly explained that "hydrogen leaked into the building, and since there is hydrogen (sic) [probably "oxygen"] in the building an explosion happened." I think it is probably true."

「この爆発を機に、首相は私の言うことを信用しなくなった。『安全委員会にはほかに専門家はいないのか』と問われたので、『久木田豊委員長代理（当時）も詳しい』と答えると、『すぐに呼べ』と言われたので、久木田さんに来てもらい、私はオフィスに戻った」

"From this explosion on, Prime Minister stopped believing me. He asked me if there were other experts at the Nuclear Safety Commission. I answered that Acting Chairman Yutaka Kukita was also knowledgeable. He told me to "call him here immediately". So I had Mr. Kukita come, and I returned to my office."


――１号機の爆発のあった時間帯は、海水注入の議論をしていたころでもある。

--Around the time of the Reactor 1 explosion, the debate was ongoing on seawater injection [into the reactors].

「（海水注入の議論の中で）『再臨界の可能性はあるか』と首相から問われたら、『可能性はある』と答えたとしてもおかしくない。私には尋ねられた記憶がない」

"In discussing the seawater injection, it would not be odd if I had been asked by Prime Minister whether there was a possibility of recriticality and I had answered there was a possibility. I have no memory of being asked."

「実は水素爆発の前の時点から、海江田万里・経産相（当時）が議長になって海水注入の問題点を総理応接室（官邸５階）で話し合っていた。塩が析出し腐食も問題になるので長期間は無理だが、いまは炉心を冷やすことを何より優先し海水を入れろと私は主張していた。首相が海水注入を止めるよう言うはずはないと思う。海水注入中断の問題は、国会事故調査委員会などが指摘するように東電の武黒一郎フェローの勝手な判断が介在していたように思う。いずれにしても、吉田昌郎所長（当時）の判断で注入の中断はなかった」

"Even before the hydrogen explosion, Minister of Economy Banri Kaieda was chairing a meeting in the PM Reception Room (on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence), and we were talking about the potential problems of seawater injection. I insisted that seawater be injected as cooling the reactor core was the first priority, even though it was not a long-term solution because of salt deposition and corrosion problem. I don't think Prime Minister would order a halt in seawater injection. The issue of halting the seawater injection arose, as pointed out in the National Diet accident investigation commission, from an arbitrary decision by TEPCO's Fellow Ichiro Takekuro. In any way, there was no halt thanks to Plant Manager Masao Yoshida."

「後に福山哲郎・官房副長官（当時）はじめ、政治家の人たちの著書を読んで気がついたのだが、みなさん再臨界イコール核爆発だと思っていたらしい。再臨界が仮に起きても核爆発とは違うことは、ＪＣＯ事故などからも明らかだ。食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"I realized later when I read books by politicians including Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama (then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) that everyone had thought recriticality meant nuclear explosion. It is obvious from accidents like the JCO accident that even if criticality happens that's different from nuclear explosion. But we were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."

――その日は深夜に自宅に戻るが、すぐにまた官邸に呼ばれる。

--You went home late that night, but was called back soon to the PM Official Residence.

「ほとんど寝ていない。ただ13日になると、いろいろな専門家から見解を聞く余裕が出てきた。とくに久木田さんとの意見交換は貴重で、その時点で最も怖いのは高圧溶融物放出（ＨＭＴ=High-pressure Melt Through）という現象だと意見が一致していた。これは溶融燃料によって圧力容器の壁が溶けて薄くなった末、圧力容器内と格納容器の圧力差によって燃料が容器を突き破って外に飛び出す現象だ。格納容器の壁まで貫通してしまう恐れがある」

"I hardly slept. But on March 13, I began to have more time [or "peace of mind"] to listen to other experts. Discussion with Dr. Kukita was particularly valuable, and we both agreed that the most frightening possibility at that time was the phenomenon called "High-pressure Melt Through" (HMT). HMT happens when the melted fuel melts the Pressure Vessel wall thin, and the melted fuel gets ejected through the Pressure Vessel due to the difference in pressure between the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. It is possible that the melted fuel could pierce through the wall of the Containment Vessel."

「14日の３号機の水素爆発の後、２号機の逃がし安全弁を急いで開くように助言したのは、２号機でＨＭＴが起きるのを心配して、圧力容器と格納容器の圧力を均一化した方がよいと考えたからだ。吉田所長はまずベントの準備を整えてからと主張していた。安全弁を開くと圧力容器内の水が水蒸気となって格納容器に流れ出し、燃料が空だきになる恐れがあるので、注水の備えがないと安全弁を開けない。難しい判断だ」

"After the hydrogen explosion of Reactor 3 on March 14, I advised that the relief safety valve of Reactor 2 should be opened quickly. I was worried that HMT might happen in Reactor 2, so I thought it would be prudent to equalize the pressure in the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. Plant Manager Yoshida insisted that preparation for the vent be done first. If the relief safety valve is opened, the water inside the Pressure Vessel becomes water vapor and flows into the Containment Vessel, leaving the fuel heated without water. So you cannot open the relief safety valve without preparation to inject water. It is a difficult decision."

――そう考えると、原子炉の底部から溶融燃料が落ちたのは不幸中の幸いと言えるか。

--In that sense, it was lucky that the melted fuel dropped from the bottom of the reactor.

「そうとも言える」

"You could say so."

班目氏の行動（３月13日）
3:40ころ 自宅で原子力安全委事務局からの電話
5:00ころ 官邸へ（官邸到着前に安全委オフィスで他の安全委員らと意見交換）
この間、３号機の高圧注水系停止などの事態が進む
10:04 原子力災害対策本部の会議
13:55 安全委オフィスに戻り、官邸の状況を説明
14:35 官邸へ
この間、保安院の安井氏らも加わって、３号機の水素爆発の可能性を議論
15:30 官房長官記者会見に同席（これ以降、数回）
21:35 原子力災害対策本部の会議
久木田委員長代理と最悪のシナリオを議論。政治家にメルトスルー後のコンクリート反応を説明

Dr. Madarame on March 13, 2011:
3:40AM received call at his home from the secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission
5:00AM went to the PM Official Residence (after speaking with other commissioners at the Nuclear Safety Commission office)
The situation at the plant grew more serious as Reactor 3's high-pressure core injection system stopped.
10:04AM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
1:55PM went back to the Nuclear Safety Commission office, and explained the situation at the PM Official Residence
2:35PM went back to the PM Official Residence
Discussed the possibility of a hydrogen explosion in Reactor 3 with others including Mr. Yasui from NISA
3:30PM accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] in the press conference (would do a few more times later)
9:35PM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
Discussed the worst case scenario [high-pressure melt through] with Deputy Chairman Kukita of Nuclear Safety Commission. Explained the core-concrete reaction after the melt through to the politicians

It is interesting to note that, according to Dr. Madarame's March 13, 2011 schedule, he was debating with another nuclear expert (Kukita) about the worst case of "high-pressure melt through", in which the melted core (corium) will eject from the Pressure Vessel at a high speed, possibly piercing through the Containment Vessel, while telling the politicians a more "benign" core-concrete reaction scenario.

If HMT had happened in Reactor 2, as Dr. Madarame and Dr. Kukita feared, it may have been an immediate evacuation from the plant. The worst case that PM Kan says he received (but decided to sit on it for months and deny the existence of the report) may have come true then.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (3/7): He Knew It Was a Core Melt by Early Morning of March 12, 2011, Didn't Know TEPCO Hadn't Done the Vent

(Part 4 available now)

==============

and says his explanation that there would be no hydrogen explosion is technically correct.

(Continued from Part 1 and Part 2, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――事態が当初の見込みよりはるかに深刻だと気づいたのはいつごろか。

--When did you realize that the situation was much graver than the initial assessment?

「深夜を過ぎたころに１号機の格納容器の圧力があがっていると聞いたときに、これは変だと思った。ひょっとしたら、直流電源が止まっていたのかと疑った。それにしても１号機は非常用復水器（ＩＣ）によって自然循環で冷やせるので（電源喪失には）強いはずなのに、とも思った。その後、電源車のケーブルがつながらないとか、ケーブルがいくらあっても足りないとか耳にしたとき、配電盤も水没して、ポンプなどひとつひとつに電源をつなぎ込んでいるのかと推測した。現場で何が起き、どうしようとしているのかが（官邸にまで）伝わっていなかった。人間の心理は極端から極端に振れる。私は非常に絶望的な気持ちになっていた」

"I knew something was wrong when I was told that the pressure of the Reactor 1 Containment Vessel was rising, past midnight [of March 11, 2011]. Maybe the DC power stopped, I thought. Still, Reactor 1 could be cooled by the isolation condenser (IC) even in the loss of power situation. Later, I heard the cables from the power supply cars couldn't be connected, or that they needed more cables than available; I speculated that the switchboard was under water, and they were trying to supply power to individual pumps. We (at the Prime Minister's Official Residence) were not aware of what was going on at the plant and what they were trying to do. Human psychology goes from extreme to extreme. I started to feel extremely desperate."

■「安心したことが間違いだった」

"It was a mistake [PM Kan] to feel relieved"

――前夜に進言したベントは明け方になっても実行されていなかった。

--The vent you suggested the night before wasn't carried out by the next morning.

「前夜とはベントをする意味が大きく変わっていた。このころになると、炉心が溶けて（水蒸気やガスで）格納容器の圧力が高まっていると推測できた。格納容器を（破損から）守るためにベントが必要になっていた」

"The purpose of the vent had vastly changed from the previous night. By that time [morning of March 12, 2011], it could be assumed [I assumed] that the reactor core melted, and the pressure inside the Containment Vessel was rising (because of water vapor and gas). The vent was necessary in order to protect the Containment Vessel (from damage)."

――早朝になって、避難指示の区域を10キロ圏に広げている。

--In the early morning [of March 12, 2011] you expanded the evacuation zone to areas within 10-kilometer radius.

「炉心が溶けているとすると、３キロでは足りないと思った」

"I thought 3-kilometer radius was not enough if the reactor core melted."

――それほど悲観的に事態をみていたのなら、早朝にヘリコプターで現場に向かう菅直人首相（当時）に同行し、機内で「水素爆発はない」と話したのはなぜか。

--If your assessment of the situation was that pessimistic, why did you accompany (then) Prime Minister Naoto Kan in the early morning on a helicopter and told him "there would be no hydrogen explosion"?

「首相から炉心が露出したらどうなるか問われた。水素ができると答えると、爆発が起きるのかと問い返された。そこで格納容器の中は窒素で置換されていて（酸素はないので）爆発は起きませんと答えた。この説明は誤りではない。菅元首相は著書で、私の言葉を聞いて安心したのが『大間違いだった』と書いているが、私の説明に誤りはない。そこで（首相が）安心したことが間違いだった」

"Prime Minister asked me what would happen if the reactor core was exposed. I answered hydrogen would be generated. He then asked me if that would lead to an explosion. So I answered there would be no explosion because the Containment Vessel was filled with nitrogen (and there was no oxygen). My explanation is not wrong. Former Prime Minister Kan writes in his book that it was a "big mistake" to feel relieved by my words, but my explanation is not wrong. It was a mistake (for Prime Minister Kan) to feel relieved."

「ヘリに乗る直前に、これからベントを行うとの連絡を聞いていたように思う。現地に着くまでにベントは実施されるものだと思っていた」

"I think I heard, right before we boarded the helicopter, that they were about to do the vent. So I thought the vent would have been done by the time we arrive at the plant."

――とすると、ベント直後の発電所に降り立つことになるが、ヘリに乗った人たちは防護服を着ていなかった。

--If what you say is true, then you would have landed on the plant right after the vent. But no one on board the helicopter was wearing the protective clothing."

「防護服のことなど考えもしなかった」

"I didn't even think about the protective clothing."

――ヘリから降りた菅首相は「なぜベントを早くやらないのだ」と東京電力の武藤栄・副社長（当時）をいきなり怒鳴りつけたとされている。首相はベントが実行されていないことを知っていた。

--It is said that Prime Minister Kan, on getting off the helicopter, shouted at (then) TEPCO Vice President Sakae Muto, "Why aren't you doing the vent?" So the prime minister knew that the vent hadn't been done.

「首相と武藤さんとの会話を聞いていないが、首相はどこかで（ベントの未実施を）知らされていたのだろう。私は免震重要棟の会議室で知らされた。首相がベントのことを強く言ったのは、機内で私がベントの必要性を強調したせいかもしれない」

"I didn't hear the conversation between the prime minister and Mr. Muto, but I suppose the prime minister must have been told about (the vent not being done yet). I was told in the conference room of the Anti-Seismic Building [at the plant]. The prime minister may have used strong words about the vent because I emphasized to him the importance of the vent when we were on board.

Dr. Madarame's schedule on March 12, 2011, from Part 2:

0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

The vent, which was made extremely difficult because there was no power at the plant, was further delayed because of Kan's hastily arranged trip in the early morning of March 12, 2011. The hydrogen explosion was not from inside the Containment Vessel as Dr. Madarame had feared but in the building, either on the 4th floor or the 5th floor (operating floor), with the evidence suggesting the 4th floor, when the hydrogen gas was finally vented but came back into the building instead of going to the exhaust stack.

In other words, the vent may have caused the explosion after all (that was the conclusion of none other than NISA in December 2011). If the vent had been successfully carried out by the time Mr. Kan and Dr. Madarame arrived at the plant, they may have been just in time to witness the Reactor 1 explosion firsthand.

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Tokyo Gubernatorial Race Descending into a Whole Lot of Mess

Farce, you may say.

Titbits from the candidates and their supporters, from Sankei Shinbun (1/14/2014) and Nikkei Shinbun (1/15/2014):

1. Who is more like the "leader"? The one who's not running.

Morihiro Hosokawa, after meeting with ex-LDP PM Koizumi and declaring his candidacy on his birthday:

原発問題は知事として非常にやりがいのある仕事だ

"To deal with nuclear power plant issues is a very worthwhile job for me as a governor."

Junichiro Koizumi, after meeting with ex-PM Hosokawa and being asked why he was supporting Hosokawa:

東京が原発なしでやっていける姿を見せれば、必ず国を変えることができる

"If Tokyo shows it can survive [and prosper] without nuclear power plants, it can definitely change the whole nation."

For Mr. Koizumi (pictured right), January 14 was not Hosokawa's birthday, but the day, in the old lunar calendar (December 14), when 47 samurais took revenge on behalf of their lord who in their minds suffered injustice. Lunar December 14 is not January 14, but that's how Koizumi felt anyway.

Koizumi projects a future vision, while Hosokawa doesn't. The former lasted 5 years as the prime minister, the latter 9 months. Oh well.

2. Who is "anti-nuclear"? Just about everybody now (except for the ex-Chief of Staff of the Air Self Defense Force).

Yoichi Masuzoe and LDP backing him are scrambling to make the nuclear power issue a non-issue in the election. Masuzoe, who has been pro-nuclear, now says:

"I have always been saying zero nuke plant."

meaning he is all for gradually lessen the dependency on nuclear power. Prime Minister Abe chimes in from Ethiopia that he is hoping that the debate will be well-balanced, not just about the nuclear issue. As Mr. Koizumi remains popular and influential within LDP, the Abe administration officials are very reluctant to accuse Koizumi of "treason".


3. Anti-nuclear candidate Kenji Utsunomiya and his supporters in disarray (already)

Clearly, Mr. Utsunomiya and his political backers (Japanese Communist Party and Social Democratic Party) didn't expect the entry of Morihiro Hosokawa in the race with the backing from Junichiro Koizumi, who has been quite vocal in his anti-nuclear message of late.

Social Democrats are trying to back out from supporting him, saying the anti-nuclear faction should rally behind Hosokawa. Social Dems bet too early, I suppose.

Mr. Utsunomiya himself is accusing Mr. Koizumi for forcing a single-issue campaign.

Some people ask, "What about yourself, Mr. Utsunomiya?"


4. Who is for 2020 Tokyo Olympic? Everyone.

Yoichi Masuzoe:

五輪という大きな目標があれば全力で東京を改造することができる

With a big target like Olympics, we can truly transform Tokyo.

Morihiro Hosokawa:

五輪の一部を東北に

Part of the Olympics should be held in Tohoku

Kenji Utsunomiya:

環境に配慮した簡素な五輪

Simple, and environmentally-friendly Olympics

The official start of the election campaign is on January 23, and the election will be held on February 9.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (2/7): "I Didn't Know What Was Going On in the Room, I Couldn't Call for Help Because My Cellphone Didn't Work in the Basement"

Part 1, Part 3, Part 4
========================

(Continued from Part 1, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

「海岸近くにある冷却系施設が津波で壊れているはずだから、（炉心で発生する）熱の捨て場がない。熱を捨てるには炉心に水をぶち込んで、水蒸気の形で熱を空気中に出すしかない。熱の捨て場を確保する目的で、ベント（排気）をしてくださいと進言した。この時点では炉心が溶け始めているとは思っていなかった」

"I assumed that the cooling system near the ocean had been damaged by the tsunami; there was no place to dump the heat (generated in the reactor core). To remove the heat, the only way was to pour water in the reactor core, and release the heat into the air in the form of water vapor. So I suggested that the vent be done in order to secure the space to remove the heat. At that point, I didn't think that the reactor core would start melting."

「また周辺住民の避難に関して、私が3キロ圏の避難を進言したことになっている。ここは記憶があいまいなのだが、国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）の予防的措置範囲（ＰＡＺ＝Precautionary Action Zone）が３～５キロだと承知しているので、３キロではどうかと問われれば、それでよい、国際的な考え方からも予防的に避難させるべきだと答えたに違いない。すでに福島県が２キロ圏内の避難を指示していることもおそらくそのときに聞いたはずだ」

"About evacuating the residents in the surrounding areas, it is supposed to be me who suggested the evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius. My memory on this is blurry, but I knew the IAEA's Precautionary Action Zone to be between 3 to 5-kilometer radius. So if I had been asked whether the 3-kilometer radius was OK, I must have answered that it was OK, and by the international standard the residents needed to be evacuated as a precaution. I must also have heard at the same time that Fukushima Prefecture had already instructed the residents within the 2-kilometer radius to evacuate."

「後から振り返れば、私はこのとき部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった。原発事故の際には保安院の緊急時対応センター（ＥＲＣ、経済産業省別館）で指揮がとられることになっていた。ＥＲＣでは指揮がとられていて、私は政治家の人たちに解説をすればよいのだと思っていた。ただ矢継ぎ早の質問に対し、私は何の資料も原発の図面すらなく、ただ記憶だけで答えていた。11日の夕方には原子力安全委員がオフィスに集まり始めていたが、官邸地下の危機管理センターからは携帯電話がかけられず、助けを得られなかった」

"In retrospect, I didn't know what was going on in the room. In a nuclear accident, NISA's Emergency Response Center (ERC, in the Ministry of Economy Annex building) was to be the command center. I assumed the ERC was doing the job, and I was there at the Prime Minister's Official Residence to explain things to the politicians. But I was answering a barrage of questions from my memory, without any reference material, not even a blueprint of the plant [reactors]. Commissioners [of Nuclear Safety Commission] started to gather in the office in the evening of March 11, but I couldn't make a call on my cellphone from the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence to get their help."

班目氏の行動（３月12日）
0:55 １号機格納容器の圧力上昇の情報 電源車到着するが、電源復旧できず、電源盤損傷の疑いを抱く
3:00ころ ２号機の隔離時冷却系（ＲＣＩＣ）運転の情報を確認（危険なのは１号機と判断）
5:00ころ 首相の現地視察への同行依頼を受ける
5:44 10ｋｍ圏内の避難指示
6:14 菅首相に同行しヘリで官邸を発つ（機内で首相に水素爆発の説明）
7:11 福島第１原発へ到着（到着後、ベント未実施を知る）
8:04 福島第１原発を出発
10:47 官邸に帰着し安全委オフィスに徒歩で戻る
12:08 原子力災害対策本部の会議（11:35呼び出し受ける）
13:00ころ 福島県選出国会議員への説明（13:30ころ以降は首相応接室に滞在）
15:18 １号機のベント成功の情報。その後、海水注入の問題点を議論
15:50ころ １号機で白煙発生の情報
17:00ころ テレビで１号機爆発を確認、水素爆発と直感。その後、菅首相の求めで久木田委員長代理を推薦
19:30ころ 安全委オフィスに戻る
22:05 原子力災害対策本部の会議(再び官邸）
24:00過ぎ 帰宅

Dr. Madarame on March 12, 2011
0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

His cellphone didn't work in the sub-basement... I don't know if it ever occurred to Dr. Madarame to go outside and make a phone call. Is he trying to tell us there was no landline telephone available at the Crisis Management Center?

NISA was indeed doing the job at the Emergency Response Center that day. They had their own computer simulation done on the spread of radioactive materials and drawing up the evacuation plan that was based on the simulation. It was NOT the stupendous concentric circles like Mr. Edano and Mr. Kan came up with on their own.

But what did NISA do? Or rather, what did Director-General of NISA do, who was at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and was in the position to tell the irascible Prime Minister Naoto Kan that his organization was getting a better handle on the situation and in fact coming up with the evacuation plan? Director-General Terasaka was shouted at and scolded by Kan, and he went home, never to return to the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the duration of the initial crisis. (He was the one whose excuse was "because I was liberal arts major.")

NISA's Deputy Director-General, after his boss left the building, had to deal with Prime Minister Naoto Kan, which he apparently did very poorly. He was a science major, but in electrical engineering.

Dr. Madarame in the book published in December 2012 (pages 39, 40):

15条通報を受け、午後5時40分頃、官邸に向かいました。到着すると、まず官邸五階の総理執務室に通されました。
「助けて下さい」
私を出迎えた保安院のナンバー２である平岡英治次長がそう懇願しました。いったい何事かと思いました。だいたい、本来この場にいるのは保安院トップの寺坂信昭院長のはずです。ところが、姿が見えない。

After receiving the Article 15 notice [ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2], I headed for the Prime Minister's Official Residence around 5:40PM [on March 11, 2011]. When I arrived there, I was led to the Prime Minister's Office on the 5th floor.

"Please help me."

Eiji Hiraoka, Deputy Director-General of NISA pleaded with me. I wondered, what was going on? To begin with, it should be the Director-General of NISA, Nobuaki Terasaka who should be there. But he was nowhere to be seen.

後で聞いたのですが、菅さんに原発の状況を聞かれたのに、寺坂さんはまともに質問に答えられなかったようです。それを厳しく叱責されたため、官邸を辞した後でした。その後、私は官邸内で寺坂さんにお目にかかった記憶はありません。

I heard it later that Mr. Terasaka couldn't answer the questions from Mr. Kan regarding the nuclear power plant. He was severely scolded, and left the building. I don't remember ever seeing Mr. Terasaka inside the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

寺坂さんは、経産省の事務官です。大学では経済を専攻し、経済はともかく、原子力はずぶの素人でした。ところが、どうしたことか、技術に精通しているべき保安院の院長に就いていました。寺坂院長が答えられなかったので、次は平岡次長が菅さんに詰問されました。平岡次長は技官ですが大学では電気を勉強していて、原子力には詳しくない。

Mr. Terasaka is an administrative official at Ministry of Economy. He majored in economics in college. He may know economics, but when it comes to nuclear energy he was a rank amateur. But for whatever reason he was the director-general of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, who should possess intimate knowledge of the [nuclear] technology. Since Director-General Terasaka couldn't answer, Deputy Director-General Hiraoka was grilled by Mr. Kan. Deputy Director-General Hiraoka is a technical official, but his major in college was electrical engineering and he didn't know much about nuclear energy.

日本の不運か、菅さんの悲運か、こんな時に、適任者が適切なポストにいない、とはまさに痛恨の極みです。平岡次長の「助けて」は、そういう理由だったのでしょう。

Was it Japan's misfortune? Was it Mr. Kan's ill fate? In the time like this, a qualified person wasn't in the appropriate position. A cry for help from Deputy Director-General Hiraoka could be understood in this context.

Or someone who could shout back at Mr. Kan and tell him to shut up.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (1/7): "#Fukushima I NPP Wasn't Much of a Topic in March 11, 2011 Meeting Despite Station Blackout and Emergency Core Cooling Failure"

Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
================

Dr. Haruki Madarame was the chairman of the now-defunct Nuclear Safety Commission at the time of the start of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. He became instantly infamous and reviled in Japan when it was reported that he had reassured then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in the morning of March 12, 2011 that there would be no explosion. A few hours later, the Reactor 1 building blew up in a hydrogen explosion.

Nikkei Shinbun interviewed Dr. Madarame recently, who was as candid as he had been in the past few times he had spoken about his role in the early days of the nuclear accident, readily admitting his errors. (In his testimony to the Diet Commission that investigated the Fukushima I NPP accident in February 2012, Dr. Madarame said he didn't remember the 1st week of the accident, as he was so tired from lack of sleep.)

Nikkei's article from the interview is very informative but also quite long, so it will be in 7 installments.

In the first installment below, Dr. Madarame paints a picture of the Kan administration and himself not knowing what was going on and not knowing what to do.

As is quite usual in the Japanese media, no other media even writes about this Nikkei article.

From Nikkei Shinbun (1/10/2014):

班目氏、３年目の証言　「あり得た、フクシマ最悪の筋書き」
編集委員　滝　順一

Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima"
by Junichi Taki, editorial board member

東日本大震災で起きた福島第１原子力発電所の事故当時、原子力安全委員長だった班目春樹氏（東京大学名誉教授）。原発事故時には政府に技術的助言を与える立場にあったが、的確な助言ができなかったとして非難を浴びた。2012年夏に退任して以来、表舞台に出ることはほとんどなかった同氏がこのほど日本経済新聞の取材に応じた。

Dr. Haruki Madarame (professor emeritus at Tokyo University) was the chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission when the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident happened after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. He was in a position to give technical advice to the national government, but he was later criticized as not having been able to give accurate advice. He has maintained a low public profile since he retired as the chairman in the summer of 2012, but Nikkei Shinbun spoke to him recently.

その中で班目氏は、溶融核燃料が格納容器の外に飛び出る最悪の事態を一時想定したことを明らかにした。また現在の原子力防災の体制については、福島の教訓を十分にくみ取っていないとも指摘。首相の近くにいて事故対応にあたった班目氏の証言や分析は今後の原子力行政を考える上で参考になりうる。当時を振り返りながら、弁明も含めて重い口を開いた。

In our interview, Dr. Madarame revealed that he had at one time assumed the worst case scenario whereby the melted fuel would be ejected from the containment vessel. He also pointed out that the current nuclear disaster countermeasures do not fully reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. We believe the testimony and analysis by Dr. Madarame, who was close at hand by the prime minister and advising him in dealing with the accident, could be useful in thinking about the future nuclear policy. He opened up reluctantly, looking back at those early days of the accident and sometimes defending himself.


■「部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった」

"I wasn't sure what was going on in the room."


――東日本大震災の発災時にはどこにいたか。
-- Where were you when the Great East Japan Earthquake hit?

「（３月11日の）２時46分には原子力安全委員会（霞が関の中央合同庁舎４号館）のオフィスにいた。1時間ほど過ぎたころ、原子力災害対策特別措置法に基づく10条通報（全交流電源喪失）があり、やがて15条通報（非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能）もきた。原子力災害対策本部が立ち上がるはずだが、連絡がなかなか来ないので、行って待っていようと考え、首相官邸へ行った」

"At 2:46PM (on March 11, 2011), I was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission (in the Central Government Building No.4 in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo). One hour later, the Article 10 notice (station blackout) based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness came in. Then the Article 15 notice (emergency core cooling system failure). The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters should now be established, but there was no message [from the Prime Minister's Official Residence]. So I thought I'd go there and wait."

「15条通報の文書には、原子炉への注水ができず炉内水位が見えないので、念のため通報するとあった。このことから私は、直流電源（蓄電池）は生き残ったと思い込んでいた。水位計は壊れていて水位が読めないのだなと楽観的に考えていた。直流電源は少なくとも８時間、おそらく半日くらいは十分にもつだろうから、早く電源車などを確保して直流電源を維持すればよいと考えていた」

"The Article 15 notice said the notice was by way of precaution, as it was impossible to inject water into the reactor and the water level inside the reactor couldn't be measured. So I [erroneously] got it in my head that the DC power (storage batteries) was still available, and that the water level couldn't be measured because the water gauge was broken. The DC power would last at least 8 hours, probably half a day easily, so I thought we would just need to keep the DC power by securing power supply cars.

「19時ころに原災本部の会議が開かれたが、このときは地震と津波の対策協議が主で、原発はそれほど大きな話題にはならなかったと記憶している。私に発言の機会はなかった」

"Around 7PM, a meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was held. But as far as I remember, the topic of the meeting was mostly about dealing with the earthquake and tsunami, and the nuclear power plant was not discussed much. I didn't have an opportunity to speak [I wasn't asked for an opinion]."

「その後いったんオフィスに戻ったが、官邸から呼ばれ、21時ころに官邸地下の危機管理センターの横にある中二階の小さな会議室に初めて入った。政治家の人たちが大変心配していて、これからどうなると尋ねられた。部屋には原子力安全・保安院の平岡英治次長（当時）らがいたが、質問に答えられなかったのだと思う」

"I went back to my office after the meeting, but then I was called back to the Prime Minister's Official Residence and at about 9PM went into the small conference room in the mezzanine floor next to the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the first time. Politicians in the room were very worried, and they asked me what would happen next. People from Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, including Deputy Director-General Eiji Hiraoka, were in the room, but none of them seemed to have been able to answer the questions."


班目氏の行動（３月11日）
14:46 地震発生（原子力安全委員会オフィスに在席）
15:42 10条通報（１～５号機の全交流電源喪失）
16:00 安全委臨時会議を開催し緊急技術助言組織を立ち上げる。臨機応変の対応を宣言
16:45 15条通報（１、２号機の非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能、直流電源喪失の連絡はなかった）
17:40ころ 首相官邸へ。電源車の調達を知り、是認
19:03 原子力災害対策本部開催（発言機会なし、20:00ころいったん安全委オフィスに戻る）
21:00ころ 官邸へ。３ｋｍ圏内避難指示、炉心損傷を防ぐため注水とベント（排気）を助言

Dr. Madarame on March 11, 2011:
2:46PM Earthquake (he was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission)
3:42PM Article 10 notice (station blackout of Reactors 1 through 5)
4:00PM Held emergency meeting of the Nuclear Safety Commission and set up the emergency technical advisory. Declared that his organization would take such steps as the occasion demanded.
4:45PM Article 15 notice (ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2, but there was no mention of loss of DC power)
5:40PM Went to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Approved of the procurement of power supply cars
7:03PM Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (no opportunity to speak, returned to his office around 8PM)
9:00PM Went back to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Advised on evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius from the plant and on water injection and vent to prevent core damage

(To be continued to Part 2)

So Dr. Madarame wasn't asked for his opinion, and he didn't volunteer any.

It took two hours and 18 minutes after the Article 15 notice to set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and when it was finally set up, they didn't even talk about the nuclear emergency.

Banri Kaieda, who was Minister of Economy at that time, said in May 2012 that then-PM Naoto Kan couldn't decide whether to declare a nuclear emergency without knowing the legal basis in detail. And there was no one who would shout back at Mr. Kan.

Misfortune of Japan for having the wrong people at the very wrong time.

Was the Fukushima nuclear accident preventable? Dr. Madarame seems to think so. Stay tuned for the next installment of the interview.

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Update on Anti-Nuclear Former PM Tag Team for Tokyo Governorship: Anti-Nuclear, Pro-Casino?

(UPDATE) To the dismay of many, yet another former prime minister has declared his support for Hosokawa. Mr. Naoto Kan, who was the prime minister presiding over the unfolding nuclear disaster in March 2011, is urging Tokyo residents who are anti-nuclear to vote for Mr. Hosokawa.

=====================

Anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa is about to officially declare his candidacy in the gubernatorial race in Tokyo, with the support from another anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (see my previous post from 1/8/2014). But what little has been leaked about his policies as the governor of the most populous prefecture in Japan is not so simplistic.

While I could find nothing concrete about his energy policy beyond the "beyond nuclear" slogan, I found a few hints that may indicate Hosokawa's thinking.

Hosokawa's words, as reported by his close associates, according to Tokyo Shinbun (1/12/2014):

「カジノを容認したら女性の支持は離れるだろうか」
"If I allowed casinos, would women stop supporting me?"

「五輪は東京だけが独り占めしていいのか。被災地が置き去りにならないか」
"Should Tokyo monopolize the Olympics? Should the disaster-affected areas be left behind?"

「都知事選には日本の命運がかかっている。勝ち負けは関係ない。世論を喚起できればそれでいいんだ」
"The Tokyo gubernatorial race will determine Japan's destiny. It doesn't matter if I win or lose. All I want to do is to galvanize the public opinion."

I believe Hosokawa means "the public opinion toward 'beyond nuclear'," whatever the phrase means.

I have a feeling that LDP and the Abe administration, supporting the candidacy of Yoichi Masuzoe, won't be very disappointed even if their candidate loses to Hosokawa in the election, if Hosokawa is for bringing the casino (Las Vegas Sand and MGM are eagerly waiting, saying Macao wouldn't even come close to Tokyo in potential) to Tokyo Bay. If Hosokawa is hinting at moving some Olympics venues to the disaster-affected Fukushima to help spread the economic benefit of having the Olympics in Tokyo in 2020, great for LDP.

"Beyond nuclear"? As long as it remains a slogan, without any actionable steps toward it, LDP will tolerate.

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#Fukushima I NPP: 2.2 Million Bq/L of All-Beta from Water Sample from an Observation Well Near the Plant Harbor

What's more significant than the number is Fukushima Minyu's interpretation that the contamination may be from the water in the trench(es) that contain extremely highly contaminated water from April/May 2011.

From Fukushima Minyu (1/11/2014):

海側井戸で220万ベクレル検出　第１原発、上昇傾向続く

2.2 million becquerels [per liter] detected from a well near the harbor at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, upward trend continues

東京電力福島第１原発の海側にある観測用井戸の水から高濃度の放射性物質が検出されている問題で、東電は１０日、ストロンチウム９０などベータ線を出す放射性物質の濃度がさらに上昇し、過去最高値の１リットル当たり２２０万ベクレル検出したと発表した。

A large amount of radioactive materials have been detected from observation wells on the ocean side of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. On January 10, TEPCO announced that the density of all-beta including strontium-90 had further increased and the latest measurement was 2.2 million becquerels per liter, the highest recorded so far.

井戸は２号機の東側にあり、海までの距離は約４０メートル。水は９日に採取した。昨年１２月３０日採取分の２１０万ベクレルを上回り、依然として上昇傾向が続いている。

The well is located on the east side of Reactor 2, about 40 meters from the plant harbor. The water sample was collected on January 9. The density was even higher than the sample taken on December 30, 2013 which had 2.1 million becquerels/liter.

この井戸の近くには、２０１１（平成２３）年３月の事故直後に極めて高い濃度の汚染水が漏れた電源ケーブル用の地下道（トレンチ）があり、汚染が地中で拡散しているとみられる。

The well is located near the underground trench for electrical cables where water with extremely high contamination was found leaking right after the March 2011 accident. It is likely that the contamination is spreading into the surrounding soil.

Jiji Tsushin reports the same news but it says "The cause of the high all-beta measurement is unknown."

The level of radioactive cesium in this water was ND (not detected).

How "extremely high" was the contamination of the water that was found leaking from the Reactor 2 turbine building via the trench into the harbor in April 2011?

From TEPCO's press release, 4/5/2011:

• Iodine-131: 5.2 billion Bq/Liter (or 5.2 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-134: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-137: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

The air dose rate measured above the water in April 2011 was over 1 Sievert/Hour (survey meter went overscale).

If this trench water is spreading in the soil, it makes sense that cesium is not detected from the water, as cesium has been bound to the soil.

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JAEA to Recreate a Core Melt to Better Understand #Fukushima I NPP Accident

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) of Monju fame (most recently with free video playback software download that infected the PC in the central control room at Monju) will conduct an experiment that creates a small-scale core melt (commonly referred to as "meltdown").

Let's see. JAEA had a fire at Monju, which they hid. They dropped the fuel handling machine in the reactor. There were so many irregularities that Nuclear Regulation Authority was recommending shutting down the organization, when the pro-nuclear Abe administration came in and pledged to continue fuel recycle using Monju operated by JAEA.

(I would be much more comfortable if it weren't JAEA who will be doing the experiment.)

From Yomiuri Shinbun (1/8/2014):

炉心溶融を実験で再現…原子力機構、事故対策へ

JAEA to recreate core melt in an experiment, [result] to be utilized in dealing with Fukushima I NPP accident

日本原子力研究開発機構は、東日本大震災の際に東京電力福島第一原子力発電所で起きた炉心溶融（メルトダウン）を再現する小規模実験を、新年度に行う。

Japan Atomic Energy Agency will conduct a small-scale experiment in the new fiscal year (that starts April 1, 2014) that will recreate a core melt that happened at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant after the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami.

事故の際、核燃料の過熱や溶融がいつごろ、どのように進んだのかは、これまで限られたデータを基にコンピューター計算で推定されただけで、不明な点が多い。実際の核燃料を冷却水のない「空だき」で過熱させる実験により、機構は「事故で起きた現象を明らかにして、今後の原発の事故対策に役立てたい」と話している。

So far, the progression of core melt has only been simulated by computer models based on limited data, and there is much that are still unknown. By using an actual fuel rod and overheat it without coolant [water], JAEA hopes to "better understand what actually happened in the accident and utilize the knowledge gained from the experiment in dealing with the accident."

実験は、茨城県東海村にある原子炉安全性研究炉で行う。研究炉の中心部にステンレス製のカプセル（長さ１・２メートル）を入れ、ミニ燃料棒（同３０センチ）１本を水に触れないようにして収める。カプセルの周囲の核燃料から飛んでくる中性子によって、ミニ燃料棒の中のウランも核分裂し、２０００度以上の高温になって溶ける。

The experiment will be carried out in JAEA's Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) in Tokai-mura in Ibaraki Prefecture. A stainless steel capsule (1.2 meter long) will be inserted in the center of the reactor, and a miniature fuel rod (30 centimeters long) will be placed in the capsule without touching water. Uranium in the miniature fuel rod will undergo nuclear fission as it is being hit by neutrons emitted from the nuclear fuels surround the capsule, causing the temperature to rise above 2,000 degrees Celsius and causing the fuel rod to melt. [See the diagram by Yomiuri. English labels are by me.]

機構によると、実際の原発で使う長さ約４・５メートルの燃料棒の束に比べて少量で、核分裂はすぐに止まり、溶けて数分後には冷えて固まるという。固まった燃料は分析した後、他の核燃料と同様に、敷地内のプールで冷やして保管する。

According to JAEA, since [the fuel rod to be used] is much smaller than 4.5 meter-long fuel rods used in a real nuclear power plant, nuclear fission will stop shortly, and the melted fuel will cool and solidify in a few minutes. The solidified fuel will be analyzed, and then stored in the pool on the premises with other nuclear fuels.

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(OT) No, #Fukushima I NPP Did Not Cause High Radiation Reading on California Beach, Experts and Officials Say

But yes, the beach was "contaminated" with naturally occurring thorium and radium.

From Half Moon Bay Review (1/8/2014):

Experts say beach radiation unrelated to Fukushima

...The amateur video went viral, drawing more than half a million views to date, and spurring government inspectors to conduct their own surveys.

After watching the clip, El Granada electrical engineer Steven Weiss grabbed his own radiation measurement equipment to test the radiation reports for himself.

On Monday, Weiss carried a Geiger counter in each hand for a second survey of Surfer's Beach. As he descended to the waterline, the readings on his gadgets climbed. He tested various spots: the side of the bluffs and the white sand closest to the waterline, both registering levels that were high but not suspiciously so as far as he was concerned. But when he placed the sensors down near a line of black silt along the back of the beach, the meters on both his gadgets spiked. The counters registered about 415 counts per minute. A cpm of 30 is considered the baseline for radioactivity typically found in the air.

“It's not normal. I've never seen 400 cpm when I just wave my Geiger around.” he said. “There has to be something radioactive for it to do that.”

Weiss is no amateur; for 40 years he has made a living designing Geiger counters, most recently for International Medcom Inc. After he verified the hotspot, he took a sample of the dark sediment and sent it to his company's main offices in Sebastopol for analysis.

International Medcom CEO Dan Sythe later put the dirt sample in a spectrum analyzer to view the radioactive “signature” of the particles, the photon energy associated with each isotope. What he found was different from cesium-137, the fissile material used in the Fukushima reactors. He would know – since the 2011 meltdown, Sythe has visited Japan nine times to help map the cesium fallout.

Instead he was seeing radium and thorium, naturally occurring radioactive elements.

...

Nonetheless, the presence and concentration of natural thorium and radium at Surfer’s Beach left experts puzzled. Both elements are actually common at beaches. In fact, a 2008 study by the Journal of the Serbian Chemical Society found similar concentrations at Southern California beaches.

Sythe offered a couple possible explanations. A vein of thorium could be spilling out from the nearby coastal bluffs, he suggested. Alternatively, he heard mention of an old oil pipe running nearby the beach. Oil pipelines had a tendency to collect heavy radioactive minerals, he said.

Peterson thought the minerals could be just washing up with the salt water from the shores. The radioactive materials all were just past the high tide line, so it made sense that would be where the minerals would build up, he said.

“The conditions that are out on the beach could be the same conditions that have been out there for millennia,” he said.

Update: Tests by government health inspectors have found no connection between the elevated radiation levels at Coastside beaches and the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, according to a statement by the California Public Health Department released late on Tuesday evening. An analysis by county and state officials found the radiation was the result of naturally occurring minerals, a conclusion similar to reports by independent experts.

(Full article at the link)

But the net media who went there to prove the source of radiation was the wrecked nuclear plant halfway across the globe is undeterred:

...Working to relieve concerns that the high radiation readings indicated fallout from Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had finally reached the United States, electrical engineer Steve Weiss, a radiological expert who has worked on Geiger counters for 40 years, examined the same beach as the man in the video, and presented even worse results.

Weiss found levels well in excess of 1,400% of what acceptable amounts should be.

“It’s not normal. I’ve never seen 400 cpm when I just wave my Geiger around,” Weiss told the Review. “There has to be something radioactive for it to do that.”

After a spectrum analysis of the dirt on the cove, the paper later discovered the isotopes to be naturally occurring thorium and radium, and not cesium-137, the fissile material employed at the Fukushima reactor. This led many to scrap the notion that radiation from the damaged nuclear plant in Japan was the cause of the high readings. We, however, were not convinced, and set out on a mission to conduct radiation measurements up and down the coast.

And on they went, armed with a pocket geiger counter ("Inspector" brand, it looks).

Unless you find cesium-134 in addition to cesium-137, you can't tell whether cesium-137 is from Fukushima or from the atmospheric nuclear testing that the US has done so many times. And without analysis by a gamma-ray spectrometer to see the distinct peaks for nuclides and knowledge to read them, well...

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