(OT) (UPDATED) 27-Centimeter Deep Snow in Tokyo on Gubernatorial Election Day

(UPDATE-4) As soon as voting ended at 8PM, February 9, 2014, "Mr. Yoichi Masuzoe has secured victory" splashed across major news outlets. The sleaze won.

(UPDATE-3) As of 4PM, the voting rate remains well below the previous election, at 24.54%, 11% lower than the previous election, according to Yomiuri Shinbun.

(UPDATE-2) NHK reports that the absentee votes were also 7% less than the last time.

(UPDATE) As of noon on February 9, 2014, the voting rate is 7.86% (men 9.03%, women 6.73%), according to the official Tokyo Metropolitan Election Commission. The same time in the last gubernatorial election, the voting rate was 17.62%.

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That's the heaviest snowfall for Tokyo in 20 years, says Asahi Shinbun (2/9/2014).

So much so that someone took out his pair of ski to coast on slushy snow in central Ginza (photo taken by Nikken Shinbun's photographer):

I hear that there is a strict set of rules in Japan's Public Election Law regarding the Internet-based campaign which was hastily complied in 2012. For example, you cannot use the candidate's name (supposedly full name) you support in your tweet on the election day to urge your followers to vote for him.

The turnout will probably be low, benefiting the candidate backed by LDP/Komei/labor union, despite his money scandal (250 million yen, as opposed to ex-Governor Inose's puny 50 million), domestic violence allegations from several of his many wives and girlfriends, non-payment of child alimony to one of his children out of wedlock, lies about taking care of his aging mother, etc., etc., and the latest scandal of bribing the voters in Tokyo with 2020 Tokyo Olympic badges (not for sale).

If he wins, I have a sense that there may be another Tokyo gubernatorial election in the not-to-distant future. Possibly in less than one year.

As for me, I liked many of the policies (120 of them in fact) by this young entrepreneur candidate, including the one about abolishing the minimum wage:

and I would have voted for the former prime minister wearing the green down jacket below, for his strong, fact-based conviction that Tokyo should move beyond nuclear as one of the largest consumers of electricity in Japan, in order to grow and prosper (but he's not the one who's running):

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(OT) Let It Snow, Let It Snow, Let It Snow...

From photos posted on Twitter in Japan on February 8, 2014:

Yokohama, Kanagawa (by @Tomynyo)

Akihabara, Tokyo, gubernatorial candidate Toshio Tamogami:

Shibuya, Tokyo, gubernatorial candidate Kazuma Ieiri (left, with a young man from Niigata, says Ieiri):

Ginza, Tokyo, gubernatorial candidate Morihiro Hosokawa and former PM Junichiro Koizumi (one in green down jacket):

Somewhere in Japan, S/M "Snowman" (by @kakikukekocham)

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(OT) NHK Commissioner Says Emperor is "Living God" for the Japanese to Worship and Die For, and Abe Administration OK with Her Personal Opinions

NHK, a (forced) "public-supported" television/radio in Japan, has mostly toed the line of whoever at the top of the political hierarchy in Japan. Still, I thought it was over the top when the new chairman of the NHK Commission expressed his personal conviction and belief in a very public way (press conference and testimony in the National Diet) that Japan didn't commit war crimes, that any military anywhere in the world has had so-called "comfort women" (not again...).

Then I was flabbergasted when I heard about another recently appointed Commissioner who adores the Emperor of Japan as "living god" to whom the Japanese should sacrifice their very lives to preserve "the state of things where the Emperor is the ethical, spiritual, political center uniting people" (that is what 国体 kokutai is, as used in Japan before and during the World War II), and who praises a ultra-right wing yakuza who shot himself in the Asahi Shinbun building in 1993 after praying to the Emperor.

(Time Magazine has an article summarizing the way it is now at NHK under the Abe administration.)

Who's this Commissioner? Ms. Michiko Hasegawa, 67-year-old professor emeritus at Saitama University. She is a Tokyo University graduate (elite), an outspoken proponent of the way we were, so to speak, when women stayed home while their men earned the living, when the government started the war in the name of the Emperor and people went to war to kill and get killed. Ms. Hasegawa was born in March 1946, about 7 months after the imperial Japan surrendered unconditionally.

But what appalled me was not NHK Chairman nor Commissioner Hasegawa. Instead of at least cautioning the Commissioners for their views that are not widely shared by the population, Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Abe Administration said he had no comments on the private views of the Commissioners of the public broadcaster under effective control of the government.

From J-Cast News (2/5/2014), comments from Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga during the Diet session on NHK Commissioner Hasegawa:

「その（長谷川氏について報道されている）部分については承知していなかったが、我が国を代表する哲学者、評論家として活躍している。文化にも精通している。そういう中で政府として国会に提出して一部野党の同意もいただいて決定した。それ以上でもそれ以下でもない」

"I wasn't aware of the particular remarks (of Ms. Hasegawa that are being reported), but she is one of the most prominent philosophers and critics who represent Japan. She is thoroughly versed in cultures. That's why our government submitted her name [as a candidate for NHK Commissioner] to the National Diet, and it was approved with the votes from some opposition parties. Nothing more, nothing less."

「いちいち、経営委員の言動について政府がコメントすることは差し控えたい」

"I'll withhold my comment as the government official on every single word and deed of the Commissioners."

I guess Mr. Suga and his boss Prime Minister Abe have no right to comment anyway. Both of them gave three "banzai" to the bewildered and clearly annoyed emperor and empress on April 28 "Restoration of Sovereignty Day" last year. I wonder how the government celebrates that day.

And all this while NHK pressures commentators who appear on their programs not to talk about nuclear power, particularly about anti-nuclear movement after the Fukushima nuclear accident, during the Tokyo gubernatorial election campaign, which is ending on February 8.

Private broadcasters are no better, with Asahi TV blurring the faces of former prime ministers (Hosokawa and Koizumi) as they spoke to an enormous crowd in Tokyo in their campaigning for the governorship (for Hosokawa) and switching right back to the LDP/Komei candidate, showing full face.

Both the national government and national media have also been busy repeating again and again that the Tokyo governor race is not so much about anti-nuclear (or beyond-nuclear) but much more about jobs, Olympics, welfare, your (small) lives. In fact, nuclear issues shouldn't be in the gubernatorial race anyway, they say, because Tokyo does not have nuclear power plants. Supporters of Mr. Kenji Utsunomiya, left-leaning attorney who is anti-nuclear and backed by Social Democrats and Communist Party, take advantage of this government/media characterization to attack the anti-nuclear former PM duo instead of attacking the other two right-leaning candidates (Masuzoe, Tamogami).

It is snowing heavily in Tokyo on Saturday February 8. If this snow deters many voters on February 9, Mr. Yoichi Masuzoe, backed by LDP/Komei and particularly by Prime Minister Abe, will probably win handily, thanks to organized votes from Komei Party and labor unions who support Masuzoe this time instead of their usual support for left/liberal candidates.

And thanks to NHK and the rest of the media, and fragmented anti-nuclear people.

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#Fukushima I NPP: TEPCO Admits Error 7 Months Later, Says All-Beta from Observation Hole Along Embankment Was 10 Million Bq/L, Not 900K Bq/L

(UPDATE) It may not just be about groundwater samples along the embankment. All the high-density all-beta/strontium analyses done at Fukushima I NPP, including the analyses of all-beta/strontium in the RO (reverse osmosis) waste water, may be wrong. Or TEPCO says they "cannot deny the possibility that the analyses were wrong." (from a tweet by @jaikoman who tweets just about every single TEPCO and NRA press conference)

Jiji Tsushin just reported the same thing. The information is from the press conference on February 7, 2014.

For more information about the RO waste water leak of August 2013, go to this link.

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Of that, strontium-90 alone turned out to be 5 million Bq/L. The reason (excuse)? Wrong measurement method used. Or something to that extent that even people who know a lot about nuclide analysis are scratching their heads trying to figure out how that happened.

Yomiuri Shinbun has the best summary of the situation (2/7/2014):

力は６日、福島第一原子力発電所の護岸にある観測用の井戸の一つで、昨年７月５日に採取した地下水から、放射性ストロンチウムが１リットル当たり５００万ベクレル検出されたと発表した。

On February 6, TEPCO announced that 5 million Bq/Liter of radioactive strontium was detected from the groundwater sample taken on June 5 last year from one of the observation wells on the embankment of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant [the embankment is located between the turbine buildings and the plant harbor].

国の放出基準の１６万倍以上で、地下水の過去最高値（１リットル当たり５１００ベクレル）の約１０００倍に上った。東電はこの約半年間、ストロンチウム単独の濃度は「測定結果が誤っている可能性がある」として公表していなかった。

The density is 160,000 times that of the legal limit for release into the ocean, and it is about 1,000 times that of the highest density in the groundwater that had been measured so far (5,100 Bq/L). TEPCO didn't disclose the result of measurement of strontium alone, as the company believed there was a possibility that the result of measurement was wrong.

東電は今回の地下水について、採取直後の昨年７月、ストロンチウムを含む様々な放射性物質の総量（全ベータ）を同９０万ベクレルと発表していた。東電は６日、「高濃度の全ベータは測定上限を超え、軒並み過小評価していた」と説明。この地下水の実際の全ベータは同約１０００万ベクレルとの見方を示した。最近は、高濃度の場合は薄めて分析する方法に変えているという。

As to this particular sample, TEPCO had announced on July last year that the sample had contained 900,000 Bq/L of all-beta including strontium. On February 6, TEPCO explained that they had "underestimated all of the results of high-density all-beta, which [in fact] exceeded the upper limit of measurement." This particular sample may contain about 10 million Bq/L of all-beta, according to TEPCO. The company recently switched to a different method of analysis that uses diluted samples when the density of radioactive materials is high.

So this is the lowdown of the case of strontium more abundant than all-beta, all thanks to the faulty measurement by TEPCO.

Browsing through the documents released by TEPCO, the particular observation hole was No.1-2, which is no longer used as the result of waterglass injection into the soil in the embankment. It is close to where the extremely contaminated water from Reactor 2 turbine building had been found leaking in April 2011 (via the underground electrical trenches).

From TEPCO's document for the press (2/6/2014; English label is by me), the location of No.1-2 observation hole:

TEPCO inserted the newly disclosed 5 million Bq/L for strontium-90 but the number for all-beta remains uncorrected, at 900,000 Bq/L (which TEPCO now says 10 million Bq/L instead):

10,000,000 Bq/L of all-beta, or 10,000 Bq/cubic centimeter of all-beta. That's the same order of magnitude of all-beta in the water that gets contaminated after circulating through the reactors (see my September 2013 post), but the levels of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in this sample water is too low for this water to be the contaminated water that is currently circulating the reactors.

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#Fukushima I NPP Groundwater Bypass Plan: TEPCO/METI Prepare for Release of "Uncontaminated" Groundwater into Ocean

The word "uncontaminated" in the title above is in quotation marks, because there may be radionuclides left in the groundwater to be released, particularly tritium, even though it is the water drawn from the wells placed on the west side of the reactor buildings - i.e. before the groundwater enters the reactor buildings and gets contaminated.

From Jiji Tsushin (2/3/2014), after the regular press conference by TEPCO:

地下水放出へ運用目標＝トリチウム１５００ベクレル未満－福島第１

Fukushima I NPP targets set for releasing groundwater into the ocean, tritium less than 1500 Bq/L

東京電力は３日、福島第１原発で汚染される前の地下水を海に放出する計画について、放射性物質の濃度を定めた運用目標を策定した。セシウム１３４、同１３７は１リットル当たり１ベクレル未満、ストロンチウム９０などベータ線を出す放射性物質は同５ベクレル未満、トリチウムは同１５００ベクレル未満とした。

On February 3, TEPCO announced the operating targets for densities of radioactive materials in groundwater to be relased into the ocean. The groundwater is drawn before it enters the reactor buildings and gets contaminated. The targets for cesium-134 and cesium-137 will be less than 1 Bq/L each, all-beta less than 5 Bq/L, and tritium less than 1,500 Bq/L.

放出計画は汚染水抑制策の一環。海に流せる法定の基準に比べ、運用目標は濃度を４分の１以下にした。地元漁業者に説明し、放出計画への理解を求める。

The groundwater release is part of the plan to reduce contaminated water. The densities of radioactive materials are less than 1/4 of the legal limits for release into the ocean. TEPCO will talk with the local fishermen to obtain their understanding of [consent to] the release.

基準を上回った場合は放出を中止して浄化し、基準値未満にして再開する。ベータ線を出す放射性物質は、目標よりさらに低い同１ベクレル未満になるまで浄化する方針。

If the densities are above the operating targets, the release will be suspended and the water will be purified before the release resumes. For beta nuclides, TEPCO plans to purify until the density is less than 1 Bq/L, lower than the operating target.

And here's METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)'s effort in persuading the fishermen.

From Kyodo News (2/3/2014):

地下水バイパス稼働に理解求める　経産副大臣、全漁連に

Vice Minister of Economy asks National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations for understanding of the start of groundwater bypass

経済産業省の赤羽一嘉副大臣は３日、全国漁業協同組合連合会に対し、東京電力福島第１原発の汚染水対策として、地下水をくみ上げて海に放出する地下水バイパスの稼働への理解を求めた。

Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Kazuyoshi Akaba asked National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations for understanding of the start of groundwater bypass, which is part of dealing with the contaminated water at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The groundwater bypass will draw groundwater and release the water into the ocean.

経産省側は、漁業者の懸念を取り除くため、くみ上げた地下水を放出する際、放射性物質の濃度について、現行基準より厳しい運用基準を適用する考えを明らかにした。

[Vice Minister Akaba said] METI will apply the operating standards that are stricter than the existing standards in radioactive material density in the groundwater that will be drawn, in order to mitigate concerns from fishermen.

原子炉建屋に流れ込む地下水は、汚染水増加の原因となっている。地下水バイパスは汚染される前に地下水をくみ上げるが、漁業関係者を中心に、風評被害などへの懸念が強く、運用できない状況が続いている。

The groundwater that leaks into the reactor building is one of the causes for increase in contaminated water. According to the groundwater bypass scheme, the water will be drawn before it gets contaminated. However, concerns for baseless rumors remain strong particularly among fishermen, which has prevented the scheme from being implemented.

I wonder how TEPCO is going to "purify" the water to less than 1Bq/L. My guess is dilution, particularly if it is tritium which cannot be effectively removed on a large scale.

But it probably doesn't matter, as one day later Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry says METI has already obtained "a certain level of understanding" from the fisheries co-op.

From Jiji Tsushin (2/4/2014):

全漁連から一定の理解＝福島第１原発の地下水対策－茂木経産相

Minister of Economy Motegi says a certain level of understanding from the fisheries co-op in dealing with the groundwater at Fukushima I NPP

茂木敏充経済産業相は４日の閣議後記者会見で、東京電力福島第１原発の汚染水対策である「地下水バイパス」計画について、全国漁業協同組合連合会（ＪＦ全漁連）から「必要性については一定の理解を得ている」との認識を示した。赤羽一嘉経産副大臣が３日、全漁連の岸宏会長に計画の概要を説明し、理解を求めていた。

In the press conference after the cabinet meeting on February 4, 2014, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshimitsu Motegi said [the ministry] has obtained "a certain level of understanding as to the necessity" of the groundwater bypass plan from the National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Association in dealing with the contaminated water at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. Vice Minister Kazuyoshi Akaba had met with Hiroshi Kishi, Chairman of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Association on February 3 to explain the outline of the plan and ask for understanding.

So the National Federation of Fisheries C-op Association will bear down on the Fukushima Federation of Fisheries Co-op Association, who will then bear down on the local Fisheries Co-ops in cities like Iwaki. The local Co-Ops will bear down on individual fishermen, who will probably need little persuasion, as they are eager to resume fishing.

TEPCO/METI plan to release groundwater seems to be back on track, as if the ground contamination in the very area where the wells were dug for the groundwater drawing had never happened in August 2013.

Right near where the wells are, there are huge tanks, mostly riveted together and meant to last for no more than 5 years, that contain highly radioactive (mostly beta nuclides, not gamma) waste water after reverse osmosis (desalination) treatment. Several of the tanks in the area were found to have leaked this waste water although no one knows exactly how much waste water leaked or how it leaked, and the leak may be slowly finding its way towards the wells. The elevated levels of tritium have already been measured, although they are well below the operating target of 1500 Bq/L.

Locations of the wells for drawing groundwater for the groundwater bypass scheme, and the sample water analysis (from TEPCO, 1/30/2014): the highest contamination of tritium recorded was 1,000 Bq/L from No.12 well on 12/24/2013.

Latest measurement of contamination levels in the H4 tank area, located southeast of the wells (from TEPCO, 2/6/2014):

For more on the "RO Waste Water Leak of August 2013", click here.

Nuclear Regulation Authority is yet to approve the operating targets, so all is not yet clear for TEPCO/METI. It is muddled as ever as to who is in charge of regulating TEPCO on the Fukushima I NPP accident cleanup efforts. It is supposed to be NRA, but it is increasingly tied up with the evaluation of nuclear power plants under the new guidelines in preparation for the restart. It looks METI is there (as it has always been there) to give the plant operators like TEPCO a way out, a bypass around the regulators.

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(OT) Strange Logic of Some "Beyond Nuclear" Supporters on Tokyo Gubernatorial Election

I have to say these must be the same people who participated in the fluffy "beyond nuclear" demonstrations (more like entertainment festivals) in Tokyo starting in the early summer of 2011, as the Fukushima I NPP nuclear accident was very, very far from being "stabilized" and reports of high levels of radiation contamination in sewer sludge and ashes from garbage incineration were beginning to pour in.

What strange logic? When some supporters of the anti-nuclear candidates start to say things like:

If the combined votes for Mr. Utsunomiya (liberal attorney) and Mr. Hosokawa (former prime minister) exceed the votes for Mr. Masuzoe (TV personality and former Minister of Health, backed by LDP/Komei), we will win!

it seems to me tantamount to either delusion or concession of defeat.

If the combined votes for the two exceed those for Masuzoe, that means it will be Masuzoe who will win, not their candidates. They must mean a "symbolic" win, not the real one.

Meanwhile, 10 or so influential "intellectuals" (文化人) - novelists, journalists - who are mostly in support of Mr. Hosokawa held a press conference yesterday urging the two anti-nuclear candidates to somehow "join efforts" to beat Mr. Masuzoe.

At this point in the election, I don't think there is any legal way for either candidates to drop out, or collaborate with the promise of a prominent position in the administration after the election.

Younger supporters of Mr. Utsunomiya have been rather busy dissing Mr. Hosokawa and Mr. Koizumi in the past few days, often bringing up the money "scandal" of Mr. Hosokawa from 20 years ago which even the very person who had instigated the "scandal" admits it was all made up.

Another "smear" point by Mr. Utsunomiya's supporters is that people in Tokyo don't care about nuclear power. All they care about is "welfare and healthcare", they say, citing the opinion polls. Their candidate does address those issues in details, they say.

What's missing in those details is how he would pay for them, but that's apparently of no concern to the supporters.

The winner of the election looks clear to me for now, unless the turnout is much, much bigger than the normal election. Even then, splitting the votes between the two supposedly anti-nuclear candidates will likely to result in the win for the LDP/Komei backed (i.e. backed by huge organized votes) candidate.

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(OT) US Stock Market Welcomes New Fed Chief Janet Yellen with Thunderous...Thud

Dow -326, Nasdaq -106, S&P500 -40.

10-year Treasury is up, gold is up, crude is down.

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Tokyo Gubernatorial Candidate and Former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa: "Polar Bears, Seals Dying Because of #Fukushima..."

He also says there was an explosion at the end of December in Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant that proves there was a meltdown, citing Russian news.

I wonder whether anyone is advising Mr. Hosokawa on the Fukushima I NPP nuclear accident at all (or Mr. Hosokawa's news source is just 2ch when it comes to the nuclear accident).

Mr. Hosokawa on a net-based TV on January 22, 2014 (about 18 minutes into the video):

「数日前に私は見たんですけども、ロシアの国防軍が出した極秘資料というものが出てきてね。 それを見たんですが、福島でこないだ暮れに、１２月３１日だったかな、爆発があったという小さな記事が出ましたね。 その数日前から実は水蒸気が上がっていて『何かおかしい』という話があったのを私も確かに覚えているんですけども。 あれは完全にメルトダウンを起こしているということを、いろいろ分析をしていて。 （ロシアが。）それでアメリカはヨウ素を１５０００袋だっかな、既に２月の始めに配るという手筈を始めたということとかですね、それから、いま北極海とかいろんなところでシロクマ、アザラシ、その他の生物の大量死が続出していると、これはまさにその福島の影響であるということとか。いろんなものが出てきているわけです。これはまあ凄い話だと思いましたね。」

"I saw it a couple of days ago, but there was this confidential document issued by Russian National Defense Force. I saw it in there that in Fukushima [I NPP], on December 31 I believe, there was an explosion. I certainly remember, too, that "something was wrong" as the steam had been rising for several days prior. So the （Russian) analysis was that it suffered a complete meltdown. And so the United States arranged for 15,000 bags of potassium iodide to be distributed in early February. Also, polar bears, seals and other animals are dying in large numbers in the Arctic Ocean and other places and it is precisely due to the Fukushima accident. Many pieces of information like these. I thought they were terrible stories.

"Terrible stories" (凄い話) could also be translated as "terrific/fantastic stories". It was fantastic to watch the interviewers simply take what Hosokawa said as if they were incontrovertible "facts".

But in the reality-based world, steam has been seen rising on and off from Reactor 3 at least since July last year; it had probably been there ever since the March 14, 2011 hydrogen explosion that destroyed the operating floor and severely damaged the floors below but became visible only after enough debris had been removed. (See my post on 12/29/2013.)

As to the "explosion" on December 31, 2013, even the ex-ambassador to Switzerland who has been raising numerous alarms about the Fukushima accident, real or imagined, confirms it was just an earthquake (actually two earthquakes, he says) in Ibaraki Prefecture that day.

The "confidential Russian document" that the Ambassador links also has a mention of "radioactive snow" in several states in the US. That is so 2011/2012 winter in Japan, when people freaked out measuring naturally occurring short-life radionuclides in the snow (and rain, for that matter) - bithmus-214 and lead-214 - by using personal survey meters to get only the radiation levels or misreading the peaks of bithmus-214 for cesium-134/137 and lead-214 for iodine-131.

And "meltdown"? Mr. Hosokawa must know that meltdown (core melt) already happened in March 2011 in Reactor 1, Reactor 2 and Reactor 3.

I have no idea where Mr. Hosokawa came up with "15,000 bags" of potassium iodide pills, but it must be the "news" that the US Department of Health and Human Services solicited a bid for 1.4 million potassium iodide pills in December 2013. But the order is most likely part of the on-going program of stocking potassium iodide in preparation for nuclear emergencies. (This is an archive page of HSS announcing 1.7 million doses of liquid potassium iodide in 2005.)

As to the polar bears and seals and a host of other living things (including fish, starfish, etc.), they had been dying of mysterious diseases way before the Fukushima I NPP accident. In 2012, CNN reported that the cause of death of seal pups on the east coast of the US was "a new strain of avian flu" that jumped species. The most recent "scare" story was this one quoting the abstract of a paper presented by University of Alaska researchers, in which the researchers say they tested to see if cesium-134 and cesium-137 were present in the tissue samples. For some unknown reason, in Japan this morphed into "cesium-134 was detected, and therefore the seals were dying of Fukushima radiation!"

If Mr. Hosokawa's anti-nuclear stance is based on the fantastic stories (凄い話) like these, no wonder LDP and the Abe administration are comfortable letting the anti-nuclear ("beyond nuclear") issue be emphasized by the Hosokawa camp in the Tokyo gubernatorial race.

Quote a contrast to Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, who talks numbers and detailed facts about nuclear power and why he is against it now. Alas, he's not running for the governorship.

No matter. The Japanese media, from the NHK (increasingly government mouthpiece) on down, completely ignores the Hosokawa-Koizumi team anyway. The election is on Sunday, February 9, 2014.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (5/7): No Impression That TEPCO President Shimizu Wanted to Withdraw Workers from #Fukushima I NPP

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4 from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――14日夜から東電の撤退問題が浮上する

---The issue of TEPCO withdrawing from the plant surfaced in the evening of March 14, 2011.

「撤退問題の議論は３つの段階を経たように思う。海江田経産相が伊藤哲朗・危機管理監（当時）と安井正也・保安院付（当時）と私を呼んで、東電が全員撤退を考えていると伝えた。私は免震重要棟があるのでまだ頑張れるはずだ。いったん撤退してしまうと二度と戻れなくなり、１号から６号まですべての原子炉と燃料プールが危機にさらされると、撤退に反対した」

"I believe there were three stages of discussions regarding the withdrawal. Minister of Economy Kaieda called Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Tetsuro Ito, NISA's Masaya Yasui and me and told us that TEPCO was considering complete withdrawal [from the plant]. I told them I was against the withdrawal. They could hang on in the Anti-Seismic Building. Once they withdrew they wouldn't be able to come back, and all reactors and spent fuel pools would be in danger."

「その後、政治家だけの相談があり、首相を起こして御前会議となった。撤退は許さないが結論で、清水正孝社長（当時）を呼ぶことになった」

"Afterwards, politicians met by themselves. Then we woke up the prime minister and held a meeting in front of him. The conclusion was that we wouldn't allow withdrawal, and that we would call TEPCO's President Masataka Shimizu [to the Prime Minister's Official Residence]."

■「清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった

"I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer."

「清水社長は一人で総理執務室に入ってきた。清水社長が即座に『撤退は考えていない』と話したので、私は『聞いていたのと話が違う』と思った。清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった。なにか誤解があったのかもしれない。ただ経営者としてこのままでは部下が死ぬ可能性があると思ったとき、ほかに手だてはないかと考えていたとしてもおかしくはない

"President Shimizu came into the Prime Minister's Office all by himself. He immediately said he was not thinking of withdrawal. I thought, 'That's not what I was told.' I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer on the spot. There may have been some misunderstanding. But it was possible that he was thinking of some other way when he, as the president, thought his men could die."

班目氏の行動（３月14日）
9:53 原子力災害対策本部の会合（この後、首相応接室を退去し官邸５階の小部屋などに滞在、呼び出しに応じ応接室へ）
11:01 首相応接室のテレビで３号機水素爆発を確認
11:40 官房長官記者会見に同席
13:40ころ 東電から福島第１で働く人の線量限度引き上げの要望、国際基準などを関係者に説明
16:15 吉田所長と電話で話し、２号機逃し安全弁の開放を急ぐよう助言
18:00ころ 20～30ｋｍ圏内の屋内退避を首相に助言、福山副官房長官室で米国へ提供する情報の整理
21:03 官房長官記者会見に同席

Dr. Madarame on March 14, 2011:
9:53AM Meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (afterwards he stayed in a room on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence, and went to the drawing room when called)
11:01AM Saw Reactor 3 hydrogen explosion on TV in the PM drawing room
11:40AM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference
1:40PM Explained to people involved about TEPCO's request [?} to raise the dose limit for workers at Fukushima I NPP and international standards
4:15PM Spoke with Plant Manager Yoshida on the phone, advised him to open the Reactor 2's [steam] relief safety valve as soon as possible
6:00PM Advised Prime Minister to designate areas between 20 and 30 kilometers radii as sheltering indoors, compiled information to be provided to the US
9:03PM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference

Two things here that I didn't know - that Mr. Kan was asleep, and that Mr. Shimizu came to the PM Official Residence alone. The latter was rather surprising, as I remember Mr. Shimizu at that time being portrayed as ineffective, weak and timid, who could never be able to stand in front of politicians - let alone the irascible PM Kan.

Mr. Naoto Kan continues to take crecit for "stopping" TEPCO from "withdrawing".

The National Diet Independent Commission's conclusion in June 2012 was different. The Commission acknowledged that TEPCO didn't consider a complete withdrawal from the plant and that PM's Office did not stop TEPCO from "withdrawing". (See my post on June 9, 2012.)

TEPCO did not intend to "withdraw" (撤退 tettai); instead it wanted to "take shelter" (退避 taihi) from extremely high radiation after the Reactor 3 explosion. But for Messrs Kan and Kaieda, who weren't trained in law and had no experience as bureaucrats at top ministries, the distinction was too subtle.

From my June 9, 2012 post:

Both Mr. Kan and Mr. Kaieda also said they thought it was an "all-out" withdrawal, because Mr. Shimizu didn't use the word "partial". Shimizu said he was surprised that the administration understood his carefully chosen word "temporary shelter" - "taihi" as "all-out withdrawal" - "tettai".

The Diet commission's conclusion was that it was a case of miscommunication. TEPCO's Shimizu thought he was telling these officials that he wanted his workers to temporarily take shelter in a less irradiated location while keeping the core people at the plant. Messrs Kan and Kaieda thought "taihi" and "tettai" were the same thing and decided Shimizu was announcing an all-out withdrawal from the plant. It seems Mr. Shimizu's mistake was he thought he was talking to high-ranking bureaucrats with whom he had dealt before the accident. Unlike many politicians neither Mr. Kan nor Mr. Kaieda had been trained in law (Kan was an applied physics major, Kaieda political science) or through elite bureaucracy. (Mr. Edano would have understood Mr. Shimizu perfectly, but Mr. Edano says he never spoke with Mr. Shimizu.)

TEPCO workers and workers from affiliate companies (Hitachi, Toshiba, Kandenko, etc. and their subcontractors) remained at the plant as the radiation levels were several hundred millisieverts/hour and at one point exceeding 1 sievert/hour (see the AP article from 3/16/2011 at the link), with only 2 meals per day and sleeping on the floor as the government refused to provide workers with better food and other provisions. And the world hailed them as heroes as "Fukushima 50".

Mr. Edano, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary, is a lawyer.

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#Fukushima I NPP: Painstakingly Slow Cleanup, One Vehicle at a Time

After almost three years since the start of the nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, cleanup efforts continue extremely slowly (and probably manually by human workers). Here are some before-and-after photos taken by TEPCO, but most of them are close-ups. You do not get much sense of how the plant has been de-cluttered overall (if at all).

The area photographed is between the ocean side of the turbine buildings and the embankment along the plant harbor. Radiation levels remain high here. Hoses and pipes that transport water run amid the debris.

From TEPCO's photos and videos library, 1/30/2014 (more photos at the link):

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

Before:

After:

TEPCO had a chance to clear the site in March 2011, when large SDF tanks fitted with "dozer armour" (plate to push out debris) were sent to the plant. (See my March 20, 2011 post.) But the tanks were never used. Why? Because TEPCO had already had workers lay electric cables over the debris in their haste to restore the power to the plant, and they couldn't remove the debris without damaging the cables.

(Sigh.)

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(OT) Tokyo Gubernatorial Race: Guess Who's Leading the Pack

Yoichi Masuzoe (TV personality, former Minister of Health), supported by the Liberal Democratic Party and Komei Party (ruling coalition in the national government): audience in 10s.

Morihiro Hosokawa (former prime minister), supported by former Prime Minister Junichi Koizumi (LDP), Democratic Party of Japan, Social Democrats: audience in 1,000s.

Toshio Tamogami (former Chief of Staff of the Self Defense Air Force), unofficially supported by Shintaro Ishihara: audience in 100s.

Kenji Utsunomiya (attorney - labor law) supported by Japanese Communist Party: audience in 100s - 1000s.

You would think Hosokawa is leading the race, and you would be dead wrong, if so-called opinion polls by the Japanese media are to be believed.

Here's one from anti-nuclear Tokyo Shinbun:

Masuzoe: 25.8%
Hosokawa: 13.3%
Utsunomiya: 6.9%
Tamogami: 6.4%
Undecided: 50%

The Japanese media has already selected Masuzoe as the winner for reasons only known to themselves, no matter how seemingly unpopular he is with Tokyo residents.

Prime Minister Abe and Komei Party President Yamaguchi are going to join Masuzoe on Sunday February 2nd and give speeches in support of Masuzoe. The ostensible reason is to keep Masuzoe and his staff alert, not counting on the "huge lead" he already has. Sponichi (one of the tabloids) reports the likely venue will be the middle of Ginza in Tokyo, where both Masuzoe and Hosokawa with Koizumi are scheduled to speak.

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(OT) Echo of Past World Wars from Davos, as Chinese Professional Channels "Iojima" and Japan's Prime Minister Channels Evans-Pritchard

in comparing the current Sino-Japan relationship to the British-German relationship right before the World War I.

Disconcerting remarks that seem to have freaked out many who attended the events (two separate events at Davos - confab of the rich and the powerful in the world), but there is hardly a peep about them in Japan. I don't think either remarks were reported by the Japanese media.

First, about the incredible Chinese professional, from Business Insider's Henry Blodget, who was at a dinner at Davos where he heard the following (1/22/2014; emphasis is mine):

I went to one of those fancy private dinners last night in Davos, Switzerland.

Like most of the events here at the 2014 World Economic Forum, the dinner was conducted under what are known as "Chatham House Rules," which means that I can't tell you who was there.

I can tell you what was said, though. And one thing that was said rattled a lot of people at the table.

During the dinner, the hosts passed a microphone around the table and asked guests to speak briefly about something that they thought would interest the group.

One of the guests, an influential Chinese professional, talked about the simmering conflict between China and Japan over a group of tiny islands in the Pacific.

China and Japan, you may recall, each claim ownership of these islands, which are little more than a handful of uninhabited rocks between Japan and Taiwan. Recently, the Japan-China tension around the islands has increased, and has led many analysts, including Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group, to worry aloud about the potential for a military conflict.

The Chinese professional at dinner last night did not seem so much worried about a military conflict as convinced that one was inevitable. And not because of any strategic value of the islands themselves (they're basically worthless), but because China and Japan increasingly hate each other.

The Chinese professional mentioned the islands in the context of the recent visit by Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine where Japanese killed in Japan's many military conflicts over the centuries are memorialized — including the Japanese leaders responsible for the attacks and atrocities Japan perpetrated in World War 2. A modern-day Japanese leader visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is highly controversial, because it is viewed by Japan's former (and current) enemies as an act of honoring war criminals.

That's certainly the way the Chinese professional at the dinner viewed it.

He used the words "honoring war criminals," to describe Abe's visit to the shrine. And, with contained but obvious anger, he declared this decision "crazy."

He then explained that the general sense in China is that China and Japan have never really settled their World War 2 conflict. Japan and America settled their conflict, he explained, and as a result, the fighting stopped. But China and Japan have never really put the war behind them.

The Chinese professional acknowledged that if China asserted control over the disputed islands by attacking Japan, America would have to stand with Japan. And he acknowledged that China did not want to provoke America.

But then he said that many in China believe that China can accomplish its goals — smacking down Japan, demonstrating its military superiority in the region, and establishing full control over the symbolic islands — with a surgical invasion.

In other words, by sending troops onto the islands and planting the flag.

The Chinese professional suggested that this limited strike could be effected without provoking a broader conflict. The strike would have great symbolic value, demonstrating to China, Japan, and the rest of the world who was boss. But it would not be so egregious a move that it would force America and Japan to respond militarily and thus lead to a major war.

Well, when the Chinese professional finished speaking, there was stunned silence around the table.

The assembled CEOs, investors, executives, and journalists stared quietly at the Chinese professional. Then one of them, a businessman, reached for the microphone.

"Do you realize that this is absolutely crazy?" the businessman asked.

"Do you realize that this is how wars start?"

"Do you realize that those islands are worthless pieces of rock... and you're seriously suggesting that they're worth provoking a global military conflict over?"

The Chinese professional said that, yes, he realized that. But then, with conviction that further startled everyone, he said that the islands' value was symbolic and that their symbolism was extremely important.

Challenged again, the Chinese professional distanced himself from his earlier remarks, saying that he might be "sensationalizing" the issue and that he, personally, was not in favor of a war with Japan. But he still seemed certain that one was deserved.

I'm far from an expert on the Japan-China conflict, and I'll leave the analyses of this situation to those who are. All I can tell you is that a respected, smart, and influential Chinese professional suggested at dinner last night that a surgical invasion by China of the disputed islands is justified and would finally settle the Japan-China conflict without triggering a broader war. And that suggestion freaked out everyone in the room.

Japan's prime minister is equally incredible when he suggested to Financial Times' Gideon Rachman that he, too, sees a Sino-Japan conflict as "conceivable" and is quite nonchalant about it.

From Gideon Rachman's blog at FT (1/22/2014; part, emphasis is mine):

Here at Davos, I’ve just had the opportunity to moderate a discussion between the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and a group of international journalists. I asked Mr Abe whether a war between China and Japan was “conceivable”.

Interestingly, he did not take the chance to say that any such conflict was out of the question. In fact, Mr Abe explicitly compared the tensions between China and Japan now to the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the years before the first world war, remarking that it was a “similar situation”.

The comparison, he explained, lies in the fact that Britain and Germany – like China and Japan – had a strong trading relationship. But in 1914, this had not prevented strategic tensions leading to the outbreak of conflict.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at UK's Telegraph said this in November last year:

...Today's escalating spat has echoes of the Agadir crisis in 1911, the stand-off between Wilhelmine Germany and the Franco-British Entente in the final years before the First World War.

In case you have forgotten, Kaiser Wilhelm sent the warship Panther to Morocco in 1911 to prevent French annexation. The Kaiser picked his moment well. The French were violating earlier accords.

Yet his real purpose was to probe and weaken Britain's entente with France (not a formal alliance) by picking on an issue where London had little natural sympathy for French actions.

The Agadir Crisis backfired against the Kaiser. The Entente did not break. But that is hardly a reassuring episode. The chain of events that followed were catastrophic.

France felt emboldened by British backing, with ripple effects through the Franco-Russian alliance. Russia then felt more able to push its luck when the Serbian crisis hit in 1914. Agadir fed an overwhelming sense of fury in Germany, a feeling that Britain had become an enemy.

America is now having to walk the same sort of tightrope that Britain had to walk – and walked badly – from Agadir to Sarajevo. One misjudgement by either side in the East China Sea could change our world entirely. If you are not concerned, perhaps you should be.

As I said above, very, very few in Japan are concerned. They either do not take Mr. Abe seriously, or they put much faith in the sanity of the Chinese leadership.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 4 SFP Fuel Assembly Removal: 14% Done (220/1533)

From TEPCO's page dedicated to the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool fuel removal operation:

Breakdown of transferred assemblies as of January 27, 2014:

Spent fuel: 198 assemblies/1,331 assemblies

Unirradiated (New) fuel: 22 assemblies/ 202 assemblies

Number of times of cask transportation: 10 times

So they have been removing used fuel assemblies except for the 22 new ones that they removed in the very first removal operation.

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The Obama Administration Demands Japan to Return 300kg of Weapon-Grade Plutonium the US Sent During Cold War Era

First it was the "disappointment" expressed by Ambassador Caroline Kennedy representing the United States Government that spooked Japanese. It was over the Yasukuni Shrine visit by the prime minister of Japan.

Then it was the United States Government's official stance as expressed also by Ambassador Kennedy that she and her government oppose a particular traditional way of fishing dolphins and whales in Japan. It delighted non-Japanese, pleased some Japanese, angered some more, puzzled many who wondered aloud, "Isn't there a more pressing issue between the US and Japan than a method of fishing?"

Now comes this, tad more relevant and contemporary than both from the US government, perhaps.

From Business Standard, quoting Kyodo News (1/27/2014):

US presses Japan to hand back 300 kg of plutonium

Japan's key ally the US has been pressing the country to return more than 300 kg of mostly weapon-grade plutonium that it exported to Japan for research purposes during the Cold War era, media reported.

The plutonium that is stored at a fast critical assembly in Tokaimura in Japan's Ibaraki prefecture could be used to produce 40-50 nuclear weapons, reported Japan's Kyodo News, citing unnamed Japanese and US government officials, according to Xinhua.

Japan has strongly resisted the demand raised by US President Barack Obama's administration, but it finally gave in to repeated demands, Kyodo said.

The two countries since last year have been seriously discussing the issue as the US plans to reach an accord with Japan at the third nuclear security summit in March in the Netherlands, according to the report.

The fast critical assembly belonging to the Japan Atomic Energy Agency is the country's only critical assembly designed to study characteristics of fast reactors.

The Japanese ministry of education, culture, sports, science and technology and other researchers have argued that the plutonium in question is needed for research and vital for producing good data, said Kyodo.

At present, Japan has another estimated 44 tonnes of plutonium, but its quality is not on par with the plutonium used for research purposes, Kyodo quoted a Japanese expert as saying.

In East Asia, China possesses nuclear weapons. So does North Korea, who has restarted its gas-graphite reactor for plutonium production. Instead of doing something about them and their programs first, the Obama administration has been demanding the return of weapon-grade plutonium that the US sent to Japan as part of "Atoms for Peace" initiatives.

The original Kyodo News in Japanese says that "the Obama administration considers 'nuclear security' important". If that's the case, why has that administration who considers 'nuclear security' important allowed the detailed information (such as the amount of plutonium, number of nuclear bombs that could be made) to leak to the media?

Why now? Something doesn't add up. I wonder if the existence in Japan of 300 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium has served as some kind of deterrent against an aggressive nation or two. Now the cover is blown.

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(OT) This Year's Flu Is Deadly...

I have been in bed for the entire week because of it. Still recovering. Hope to get back writing about things nuclear and Japanese in a few days.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 3 Water Leak from MSIV Room: It's Most Likely the Water from Inside the Pressure Vessel

This is today's update on the water leak from the MSIV (Main Steam Isolation Valve) Room of Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. (Previous posts on the subject are here and here.)

TEPCO says they did the nuclide analysis of the water sample that the robot collected. The temperature and the levels of contamination indicate it is the water that comes out of the Pressure Vessel/Containment Vessel.

TEPCO's way of saying it is that "the water is not the one that goes into the reactor."

However, the levels of contamination of this water is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than the highly contaminated water in the reactor building basements, which seems to me to indicate that this leaking water is diverted out of the Pressure Vessel it comes in full contact with the corium (wherever it is - part at the bottom of the PV, part buried into the concrete floor of the Containment Vessel).

From TEPCO's alert for the press, 1/19/2014:

【漏えい水の放射能分析結果：採取日１月19日】
・セシウム134 ：7.0×10^2 Bq/cm3
・セシウム137 ：1.7×10^3 Bq/cm3
・コバルト60　 ：2.5×10^1 Bq/cm3
・全ベータ ：2.4×10^4 Bq/cm3

Nuclide analysis of the leaked water: sample taken on 1/19/2014

• Cesium-134: 7.0×10^2 Bq/cm3 (700 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cesium-137: 1.7×10^3 Bq/cm3 (1,700 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cobalt-60: 2.5×10^1 Bq/cm3 (25 Bq/cm3)
  

• All-beta: 2.4×10^4 Bq/cm3 (24,000 Bq/cm3)

【漏えい水の温度測定結果：１月19日午後５時頃測定
約20℃

※漏えい確認箇所における雰囲気温度は約７℃（１月19日午前10時頃測定)
原子炉に注水している水の温度は約７℃（１月19日午後５時頃測定

Temperature of the leaked water: measured at 5PM on 1/19/2014

• About 20 degrees Celsius

*Atmospheric temperature at the location of the leak: 7 degrees Celsius (measured at 10AM, 1/19/2014)
Temperature of the water being injected: 7 degrees Celsius (measured at 5PM, 1/19/2014)

【原子炉に注水している水の至近の放射能分析結果：採取日平成25年12月10日】
・セシウム134 ：検出限界値未満
・セシウム137 ：検出限界値未満
・コバルト60　 ：検出限界値未満
・全ベータ ：2.8 Bq/cm3

Latest nuclide analysis of water being injected into reactors: sample taken on 12/10/2013

• Cesium-134: below detection level
  

• Cesium-137: below detection level

• Cobalt-60: below detection level
  

• All-beta: 2.8 Bq/cm3

当該漏えい水は、原子炉に注水している水に比べて放射能濃度が高く、水温も高いことから、原子炉に注水している水の直接漏えいによるものではないと考えています。引き続き、漏えい原因等について調査を実施してまいります。

The leaked water is higher in density of radioactive materials than the water being injected into the reactors. The temperature of the water is also higher. Therefore we believe this is not the leak of water that is being injected into the reactor. We will continue to investigate the cause of the leak.

TEPCO's alert has a link to the latest nuclide analysis of water samples taken at different stages of contaminated water treatment (published on 1/17/2014).

According to that analysis, the highly contaminated water that sits in the reactor building basement (supposedly after having come to full contact with the corium) has:

• Cesium-134: 1.0×10^4 Bq/cm3 (10,000 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cesium-137: 2.5×10^4 Bq/cm3 (25,000 Bq/cm3)
  

• Cobalt-60: 1.4 Bq/cm3 (after treatment with SARRY)
  

• All-beta: 2.3×10^4 Bq/cm3 (23,000 Bq/cm3, before RO treatment)

While the Japanese media continues to not see much significance of this leak, the workers who have been tweeting from Fukushima I NPP from the beginning of the accident seem to worry. The issue here is NOT whether this water is currently leaking into the surrounding environment. The issue is whether the MSIV and/or its ancillary systems failed in the March 2011 accident.

"Sunny" (from tweets here and here) fears the worst, that the MSIV itself is broken:

MSIV・主蒸気隔離弁　原子力発電所の原子炉建屋とタービン建屋を繋ぐ主蒸気配管にある非常に大きなバルブ。これが閉じると言う事は炉心でとんでもないことが起きていることである。逆に言えば、そんなときに閉じないと困る。それが、そこからも水が漏れている。つまり、閉じていないか壊れたか。

MSIV (Main Steam Isolation Valve) is a huge valve attached to the main steam pipe that connects the reactor building and the turbine building. When this valve closes, it means there is some extraordinary incident happening in the reactor core. Conversely, one might say that it would be a problem if this valve did not close in such an incident. Now, the water is leaking from there [from the MSIV]. In other words, the valve was not shut, or it broke.

炉心がスクラムするような状態でMSIVが閉まらないか壊れたか漏洩するか、これがどんなに恐ろしいこ事か。再稼働どころか、スリーマイルアイランド後のPWRのように対策の為世界中の炉心を止める必要性がある。いや、もっと恐ろしいのは事態の重大さをどれだけの人が受け止めているか。

The reactor core is scrummed, but the MSIV doesn't close or it breaks and [the coolant=water] leaks. Do you know how terrifying this is? Instead of talking about restarting [the nuclear power plants in Japan], we would need to stop all reactors in the world to deal with the problem, just like [when we stopped] PWRs after the Three Mile Island accident. Wait, what is more terrifying is, how many people are aware that this could be a serious problem?

Someone expressed his surprise to "Sunny" that TEPCO announced the incident at all, if this was such a serious incident. (People in Japan also love to say "TEPCO lies.") "Sunny"'s answer was:

この事象がそうなら世界中の全事業者とメーカーに情報共有するレベル

If this incident is what it is [the MSIV didn't close or broke in a severe emergency that necessitated the scrum], it should be shared with all nuclear plant operators and nuclear manufacturers in the entire world.

"Happy" hopes it is not the MSIV itself but ancillary pipe(s) that broke:

ＭＳＩＶ室は、主蒸気隔離弁だけじゃなく他系統や細い配管も沢山あって炉内に直結している配管も多いんだ。室内を詳しく調べ原因を掴まないとダメなんだけど、かなり困難な作業になると思う。線量が高くて人が作業するのも難しいし、室内は機器や配管が多く狭いし複雑で、ロボット作業も困難なんだ。

In the MSIV Room, other than the Main Steam Isolation Valve there are other systems and many small pipes, many of which connects directly to the reactor. We need to closely investigate inside the room to find out the cause [of the leak], but I'm afraid it will be a rather difficult task. The radiation level is high for workers to work inside, and it would be difficult for robots to navigate because of numerous pieces of equipment and pipes in a narrow space.

"Sunny" says he sure hopes it is a minor pipe that broke.

So was it a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) because of either the failure of the MSIV or the ancillary system that is not supposed to fail, in addition to the water boiling off by the decay heat?

But as Happy says, the radiation levels are particularly high near the area of the leak (amounting to Sieverts/hour), and how TEPCO is going to "further investigate", as reported by happy-go-lucky media like NHK, is unknown.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 3: Water Leak from MSIV Room Could Be a Huge Problem for Nuclear Reactor Safety

(UPDATE 1/19/2014) New post with nuclide analysis result.

===================

This is a follow-up on yesterday's post.

TEPCO released the video which was being taken by the robot on the first floor of Reactor 3 and which was being monitored by a TEPCO employee who noticed the water.

The flow looks significant and fast.

From TEPCO's photos and video library, 1/18/2014:

Location of the MSIV Room:

Radiation levels on the 1st floor of Reactor 3, from yesterday's post:

The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) is one of the two most important safety systems in a nuclear reactor (the other one being the control rod drive mechanism). It seals off the water/steam from the Pressure Vessel in case of an emergency (like a big earthquake). This MSIV system is not supposed to fail.

If the MSIV of Reactor 3 was damaged during the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami (either one) and the water has been leaking ever since, the safety standard for nuclear reactors around the world may be impacted, says one nuclear researcher that I follow on Twitter.

(Oh wait... Does it mean then that part of the reason why the water (coolant) inside the Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel dried up was because it was leaking through the damaged MSIV?)

To get a feel for the size of the MSIV, here's a photo and a video from one of the top manufacturers, Flowserve:

The 1st floor of Reactor 3 is where the human workers ventured in in June 2011 for the first time since the start of the accident on March 11, 2011 and took the smear samples from the floor. The result of the analysis of the smear samples, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

The location of the floor drain funnel is near the equipment hatch shield plug that was found slightly open, through which highly radioactive steam/water had been leaking. (TEPCO finally admitted the shield plug had been open on April 19, 2012, more than one full year after the start of the accident.)

Packbot was sent on November 18/19, 2011 to clean the hatch rail with what looked like a white towel. The result of the analysis of what the towel caught, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

(Now I think about it, the towel Packbot was using was soaking-wet, and even on the next day after the cleaning the guide rails were very wet. I have assumed the water on the guide rails was from inside the Containment Vessel, but is it possible that it has been coming from the MSIV Room?)

From @BB45_Colorado, one of the nuclear researchers that I follow:

主蒸気隔離弁;近傍からの漏洩が発災直後からのものなら、主蒸気隔離弁は、地震や内部異常加圧に耐えられなかった事になります。BWRの安全設計の心臓部でこれは極めてまずいです。場合によっては、世界中のBWRの安全審査がひっくり返ります

If the leak from (or from near) the Main Steam Isolation Valve is from the start of the accident, that means the MSIV couldn't withstand the earthquake and/or internal abnormal pressurization. This is bad in the heart of the BWR safety design. It could affect the safety reviews worldwide.

Browsing the articles by the mainstream media in Japan (eg. Yomiuri, Mainichi/Kyodo) on this incident, it seems to me that they don't know what MSIV is or its importance.

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(Just In from TEPCO Nuclear) Water Leak Near MSIV Room on 1st Floor of Reactor 3 Found by Worker Monitoring Live Images Taken by Robot

(UPDATE 1/18/2014) Video, additional information in the new post. The water is flowing fast.

========================

No images, videos, details yet.

From TEPCO's email alert for the press in Japanese (1/18/2014):

福島第一原子力発電所３号機原子炉建屋１階主蒸気隔離弁室近傍における水漏れについて

Water leak found near the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor of Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant

本日（１月18日）午後２時40分頃、３号機原子炉建屋瓦礫撤去用ロボットのカメラ画像を確認していた当社社員が、３号機原子炉建屋１階北東エリアの主蒸気隔離弁室の扉付近から、水が、当該扉近傍に設置されている床ドレンファンネル（排水口）に幅約30cmで流れ込んでいることを発見しました。

Today (January 18) at around 2:40PM, our employee who was monitoring the images taken by the camera mounted on the robot for removing the debris from the Reactor 3 building found the water running, at 30cm wide, from near the door to the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room located in the northeast area of the 1st floor of Reactor 3 into the floor drain funnel near the door.

当該漏えい水は、原子炉建屋最地下階の床ドレンサンプへつながる床ドレンファンネルへ流入しており、原子炉建屋外への流出はありません。

This water is flowing into the floor drain funnel that connects to the floor drain sump in the basement of the reactor building, and there is no leak from the reactor building to outside.

なお、モニタリングポスト指示値の有意な変動、およびプラントパラメータ（原子炉注水流量、原子炉圧力容器底部温度、格納容器内温度等）の異常は確認されておりません。

There is no statistically significant change observed at the monitoring posts and in the plant parameters (amount of water injected into the reactors, temperatures at the bottom of reactor pressure vessels, temperatures inside the containment vessels, etc.).

現在、漏えい状況および原因等を調査しております。

We are currently investigating the situation of the leak and the cause of the leak.

当該漏えい箇所の雰囲気線量は約30mSv/hです。

The ambient air dose rate near the leak is about 30 millisieverts/hour.

Reactor 3 first floor radiation levels (from my 7/23/2013 post):

Compared to other reactors that had explosive events (Reactor 2 did not have hydrogen explosions like Reactors 1 and 3, but some kind of event did seem to happen in the Suppression Chamber), Reactor 3's radiation levels are markedly higher.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 4 SFP Fuel Assembly Removal: 10% Done

From TEPCO's page dedicated to the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool fuel removal operation:

Breakdown of transferred assemblies:

• Spent fuel: 132 assemblies/1,331 assemblies

• Unirradiated (New) fuel: 22 assemblies/ 202 assemblies

So far, no news of major or minor hiccups whatsoever, and the world hasn't ended yet.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (4/7): The Worst Case Would Be "High-Pressure Melt Through", Politicians Thought Recriticality Was Nuclear Explosion

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

■「食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"We were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."


――12日午後に１号機で爆発が起きたとき、どう思ったのか。

--What did you think when an explosion happened in Reactor 1 in the afternoon of March 12, 2011?

「映像を見た瞬間に水素爆発だと思った。その時の記憶はあいまいだが、下村健一・内閣審議官（当時）の書いたものよると、私は『建屋に水素が漏れて、建屋には水素があるので爆発した』と淡々と説明したとされている。多分、事実だろう」

"I thought it was a hydrogen explosion the moment I saw the image. I don't remember clearly, but according to what Kenichi Shimomura, who was a cabinet counselor at that time, wrote, I calmly explained that "hydrogen leaked into the building, and since there is hydrogen (sic) [probably "oxygen"] in the building an explosion happened." I think it is probably true."

「この爆発を機に、首相は私の言うことを信用しなくなった。『安全委員会にはほかに専門家はいないのか』と問われたので、『久木田豊委員長代理（当時）も詳しい』と答えると、『すぐに呼べ』と言われたので、久木田さんに来てもらい、私はオフィスに戻った」

"From this explosion on, Prime Minister stopped believing me. He asked me if there were other experts at the Nuclear Safety Commission. I answered that Acting Chairman Yutaka Kukita was also knowledgeable. He told me to "call him here immediately". So I had Mr. Kukita come, and I returned to my office."


――１号機の爆発のあった時間帯は、海水注入の議論をしていたころでもある。

--Around the time of the Reactor 1 explosion, the debate was ongoing on seawater injection [into the reactors].

「（海水注入の議論の中で）『再臨界の可能性はあるか』と首相から問われたら、『可能性はある』と答えたとしてもおかしくない。私には尋ねられた記憶がない」

"In discussing the seawater injection, it would not be odd if I had been asked by Prime Minister whether there was a possibility of recriticality and I had answered there was a possibility. I have no memory of being asked."

「実は水素爆発の前の時点から、海江田万里・経産相（当時）が議長になって海水注入の問題点を総理応接室（官邸５階）で話し合っていた。塩が析出し腐食も問題になるので長期間は無理だが、いまは炉心を冷やすことを何より優先し海水を入れろと私は主張していた。首相が海水注入を止めるよう言うはずはないと思う。海水注入中断の問題は、国会事故調査委員会などが指摘するように東電の武黒一郎フェローの勝手な判断が介在していたように思う。いずれにしても、吉田昌郎所長（当時）の判断で注入の中断はなかった」

"Even before the hydrogen explosion, Minister of Economy Banri Kaieda was chairing a meeting in the PM Reception Room (on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence), and we were talking about the potential problems of seawater injection. I insisted that seawater be injected as cooling the reactor core was the first priority, even though it was not a long-term solution because of salt deposition and corrosion problem. I don't think Prime Minister would order a halt in seawater injection. The issue of halting the seawater injection arose, as pointed out in the National Diet accident investigation commission, from an arbitrary decision by TEPCO's Fellow Ichiro Takekuro. In any way, there was no halt thanks to Plant Manager Masao Yoshida."

「後に福山哲郎・官房副長官（当時）はじめ、政治家の人たちの著書を読んで気がついたのだが、みなさん再臨界イコール核爆発だと思っていたらしい。再臨界が仮に起きても核爆発とは違うことは、ＪＣＯ事故などからも明らかだ。食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"I realized later when I read books by politicians including Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama (then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) that everyone had thought recriticality meant nuclear explosion. It is obvious from accidents like the JCO accident that even if criticality happens that's different from nuclear explosion. But we were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."

――その日は深夜に自宅に戻るが、すぐにまた官邸に呼ばれる。

--You went home late that night, but was called back soon to the PM Official Residence.

「ほとんど寝ていない。ただ13日になると、いろいろな専門家から見解を聞く余裕が出てきた。とくに久木田さんとの意見交換は貴重で、その時点で最も怖いのは高圧溶融物放出（ＨＭＴ=High-pressure Melt Through）という現象だと意見が一致していた。これは溶融燃料によって圧力容器の壁が溶けて薄くなった末、圧力容器内と格納容器の圧力差によって燃料が容器を突き破って外に飛び出す現象だ。格納容器の壁まで貫通してしまう恐れがある」

"I hardly slept. But on March 13, I began to have more time [or "peace of mind"] to listen to other experts. Discussion with Dr. Kukita was particularly valuable, and we both agreed that the most frightening possibility at that time was the phenomenon called "High-pressure Melt Through" (HMT). HMT happens when the melted fuel melts the Pressure Vessel wall thin, and the melted fuel gets ejected through the Pressure Vessel due to the difference in pressure between the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. It is possible that the melted fuel could pierce through the wall of the Containment Vessel."

「14日の３号機の水素爆発の後、２号機の逃がし安全弁を急いで開くように助言したのは、２号機でＨＭＴが起きるのを心配して、圧力容器と格納容器の圧力を均一化した方がよいと考えたからだ。吉田所長はまずベントの準備を整えてからと主張していた。安全弁を開くと圧力容器内の水が水蒸気となって格納容器に流れ出し、燃料が空だきになる恐れがあるので、注水の備えがないと安全弁を開けない。難しい判断だ」

"After the hydrogen explosion of Reactor 3 on March 14, I advised that the relief safety valve of Reactor 2 should be opened quickly. I was worried that HMT might happen in Reactor 2, so I thought it would be prudent to equalize the pressure in the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. Plant Manager Yoshida insisted that preparation for the vent be done first. If the relief safety valve is opened, the water inside the Pressure Vessel becomes water vapor and flows into the Containment Vessel, leaving the fuel heated without water. So you cannot open the relief safety valve without preparation to inject water. It is a difficult decision."

――そう考えると、原子炉の底部から溶融燃料が落ちたのは不幸中の幸いと言えるか。

--In that sense, it was lucky that the melted fuel dropped from the bottom of the reactor.

「そうとも言える」

"You could say so."

班目氏の行動（３月13日）
3:40ころ 自宅で原子力安全委事務局からの電話
5:00ころ 官邸へ（官邸到着前に安全委オフィスで他の安全委員らと意見交換）
この間、３号機の高圧注水系停止などの事態が進む
10:04 原子力災害対策本部の会議
13:55 安全委オフィスに戻り、官邸の状況を説明
14:35 官邸へ
この間、保安院の安井氏らも加わって、３号機の水素爆発の可能性を議論
15:30 官房長官記者会見に同席（これ以降、数回）
21:35 原子力災害対策本部の会議
久木田委員長代理と最悪のシナリオを議論。政治家にメルトスルー後のコンクリート反応を説明

Dr. Madarame on March 13, 2011:
3:40AM received call at his home from the secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission
5:00AM went to the PM Official Residence (after speaking with other commissioners at the Nuclear Safety Commission office)
The situation at the plant grew more serious as Reactor 3's high-pressure core injection system stopped.
10:04AM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
1:55PM went back to the Nuclear Safety Commission office, and explained the situation at the PM Official Residence
2:35PM went back to the PM Official Residence
Discussed the possibility of a hydrogen explosion in Reactor 3 with others including Mr. Yasui from NISA
3:30PM accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] in the press conference (would do a few more times later)
9:35PM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
Discussed the worst case scenario [high-pressure melt through] with Deputy Chairman Kukita of Nuclear Safety Commission. Explained the core-concrete reaction after the melt through to the politicians

It is interesting to note that, according to Dr. Madarame's March 13, 2011 schedule, he was debating with another nuclear expert (Kukita) about the worst case of "high-pressure melt through", in which the melted core (corium) will eject from the Pressure Vessel at a high speed, possibly piercing through the Containment Vessel, while telling the politicians a more "benign" core-concrete reaction scenario.

If HMT had happened in Reactor 2, as Dr. Madarame and Dr. Kukita feared, it may have been an immediate evacuation from the plant. The worst case that PM Kan says he received (but decided to sit on it for months and deny the existence of the report) may have come true then.

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