TEPCO Tells Governor of Niigata That They Can Delay Deploying Filtered Vent at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP for 18 Hours in Case of a Severe Accident

A strange song and dance continues between TEPCO and Governor of Niigata Hirohiko Izumida.

Mr. Izumida is considered to be one of the champions for people who are against nuclear power plants in Japan for his combative stance against TEPCO with his remarks like "Which is more important, profit or people's lives?" to a president of a (nominally) for-profit enterprise.

He is also insisting that TEPCO NOT use the filtered vent to be installed at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant unless he gives the express permission to do so in case of a severe accident like the one that hit Fukushima I NPP.

Why? Because the filtered vent cannot eliminate the volatile radioactive materials like noble gas and iodine-131. Izumida doesn't want the vent to take place while the residents in the surrounding areas evacuate.

So TEPCO came up with an assurance that they would do the vent in 18 hours after the start of a severe accident.

To refresh our memory, Reactor 1 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant suffered a core melt by the early morning of March 12, 2011. The earthquake that triggered the scram of the reactor core was 2:46PM on March 11, 2011.

If that's what Izumida wants - wait for 18 hours to do the vent in a severe accident, I guess he is willing to own a severe accident and its consequences at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP.

From Sankei Shinbun (2/12/2014; part):

東京電力は、柏崎刈羽原子力発電所（新潟県柏崎市、刈羽村）で過酷事故が起きた場合、事故発生から最短で１８時間後に原子炉格納容器内の蒸気を、事故対策用のフィルター付きベント（排気）設備を通して外部へ排出するとの試算を公表した。

TEPCO announced the result of simulation that the vent would be done in 18 hours at the earliest using the filtered vent facilities in order to release the steam inside the Containment Vessel in case of a severe accident at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (in Kashiwazaki City and Kariwa-mura in Niigata Prefecture).

県が開催した原発の専門家でつくる「技術委員会」で示した。試算では、原発施設の原子炉を冷却する設備がすべて使えなくなり、消防車でも炉心注水に失敗するという最悪の事態を想定した。

TEPCO announced the result in the technology committee made up of nuclear experts and organized by the Niigata prefectural government. The simulation was based on the worst case scenario whereby all the reactor cooling mechanisms failed, including water injection into the reactor core using fire engines.

東電が具体的な時間を示したことについて泉田裕彦知事は１２日の記者会見で、「想定通り１８時間はベントしないで済むのかどうかも含めて、技術的に検討する必要がある」と述べた。

During the press conference on February 12, Governor Hirohiko Izumida commented on the specific timeframe TEPCO indicated. "We need to do the technical evaluation, including whether the vent could really be delayed for 18 hours as assumed by TEPCO."

東電は、ベント設備は格納容器内の蒸気に含まれる粒子状の放射性物質を千分の１に減少させるが、気体状の放射性物質は除去できない、としている。

According to TEPCO, the filtered vent facilities reduce particulate radioactive materials in the steam inside the Containment Vessel to one-thousands, but they cannot remove volatile radioactive materials.

While I do not think much of Governor Izumida's insistence on approving the vent in case of a severe accident, he is probably doing more to help Yamanashi Prefecture to dig itself out of the heavy snow than the national government or other local government.

Niigata is famous for the extremely heavy snow fall it routinely gets during winter, and it is extremely well-equipped to deal with such snow fall. According to Niigata Nippo newspaper, Izumida has already sent four officials to assess the situation in Yamanashi to plan a rescue operation including sending snow-plowing specialists in Niigata.

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US NRC Will Delay Filtered Vent Plan and Study Options, Final Rulemaking by March 2017

Let's kick the can...

It looks the cost-benefit ("performance-based") analysis argument by the Congressional Republicans in the House Energy and Commerce Committee won.

To recap the Committee's letter to the NRC chairwoman:

"With respect to these [safety] enhancements, we have particular concern about the potential requirement to install "filtered vents" for certain boiling water reactors which we understand to be significant, capital-intensive structures. As instructed by the Commission, the NRC staff has proposed four potential options but urged the Commission to choose "Option 3." Under this option, the Commission would issue an order requiring the installation of fintered vents rather than pursuing a performance-based process."

Now, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will "study options" and won't make the final rule till March 2017. The Commission's thinking as you can read in the article below take the House Energy and Commerce Committee's thinking extremely seriously.

From Power News (3/21/2013; links are in the original, emphasis is mine):

NRC Delays Action on Vent Plan, Directs Staff to Study Options

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on Tuesday delayed approving a recommendation made by technical staff that calls for upgrades or replacements of "hardened" venting systems at the nation's 31 Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactors (BWRs), giving staff a year instead to assess other options and produce a "technical evaluation" on the proposal.

The NRC commissioners directed staff to follow a two-track approach for further improvements to systems for safely venting pressure during potential accidents at the reactors, in response to the Fukushima accident in March 2011. It gave the staff 60 days to finalize a March 2012 order, which will require vents to handle elevated pressures, temperatures, and radiation from a damaged reactor. The order will also ensure plant personnel can operate vents safely under these accident conditions.

It also gave the staff a year to produce a technical evaluation to support rulemaking on filtering, gathering more public input as it completes its analysis. Directing the staff to consider both the use of a filter to be placed on the vent, as well as a more performance-based approach using existing systems to achieve a similar reduction in radioactive release during an accident, the commission said the draft rule and final rule must be ready by March 2017.

A vent generally refers to a pipe connected to the primary containment of a nuclear power plant and leading to the plant’s exhaust stack. It is designed to allow gases inside the containment to be removed. “The major problem at Fukushima was getting the containment vents open,” said Doug True, president of ERIN Engineering and Research told Nuclear Insight last fall. “Significant delays in the decision to open the vents, combined with the Japanese decision-making process and difficulties in opening the vent valves, delayed the venting action, which in turn led to hydrogen explosions.”

The NRC's decision was widely viewed as a victory for the nuclear industry. The NRC has estimated that filtered vents could cost up to $15 million, but other estimates put costs of equipment at $30 million or more.

But media reports accusing the nuclear energy industry of opposing the installation of filtered vents on Mark I and II BWRs are incorrect, say Jason Zorn, assistant general counsel, and Steven Kraft, senior technical advisor at the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI ). The issue is a technical one. "In the extremely unlikely event that an accident progresses to the point of the fuel melting through the reactor vessel onto the containment floor, it is imperative that water be injected into containment to cool the fuel debris on the floor," they say. "If not, radiation releases will occur from numerous locations in the containment building and bypass the vent. If the vent is bypassed, it doesn’t help if there is a filter on the vent, because it, too, will be bypassed."

Filtering strategies based on the individual plant evaluations could result in the installation of a vent filter, "if that’s what makes sense for a given plant," they said.

Sources: POWERnews, NRC, Nuclear Insight, NEI

“Significant delays in the decision to open the vents, combined with the Japanese decision-making process and difficulties in opening the vent valves, delayed the venting action, which in turn led to hydrogen explosions"?

The vents couldn't be opened for a long time because there was no power. There are experts and engineers who have proposed that instead of delay in venting leading to hydrogen explosion, venting may actually have caused hydrogen explosions in Reactors 1 and 3 because of the peculiar structure of the exhausts stacks and power loss. Instead of leaving via the exhaust stack, vented hydrogen gas came back inside the reactor building, they say.

Water under the bridge at this point, except that inaccurate understanding of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident is being used as excuse.

"Performance-based" cost saving instead of "Defense in Depth", without properly defining "cost".

======================

Defense in depth, in NRC's own words:

An approach to designing and operating nuclear facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that release radiation or hazardous materials. The key is creating multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied upon. Defense-in-depth includes the use of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency response measures. For further information, see Speech No. S-04-009 (PDF), "The Very Best-Laid Plans (the NRC's Defense-in Depth Philosophy)."

I thought venting is an emergency response measure...

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US House Energy & Commerce Committee Opposes NRC's Requirement of Filtered Vents in BWRs in the US, Says #Fukushima Accident Cannot Happen in the US

Republican members of the US House Energy and Commerce Committee has sent an open letter dated January 15, 2013 and addressed to Chairwoman Allison MacFarlane of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, demanding that NRC answer their concern that NRC's attempt to further regulate the nuclear industry after the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident may be stifling and unnecessary for the health of the industry.

They seem to be saying, correctly I suppose, the US is not Japan.

From their letter (PDF; emphasis is mine):

(Page 2)

"In particular, concerns were raised about the agency's departure from rigorous technical and cost-benefit analysis. Yet as the Commission readies itself to take additional actions concerning "Tier One" recommendations (post-Fukushima items of highest priority), it appears that the NRC may be discarding the disciplined processes that for years have ensured that reactor safety is rooted in performance-based regulation, appropriately recognizing each nuclear plant is different. It also appears that the Commission is considering some issues on an independent basis without considering how those issues impact other matters currently pending before the Commission and previous NRC actions that are already being implemented by the industry. This suggests the Commission views the cumulative impact[s] of its actions as merely a cursory scheduling challenge, and ignores the serious risk that piecemeal consideration of related issues may yield unintended consequences."

Right below this passage, the letter quotes NRC Commissioner William Magwood and the official report of the Fukushima accident investigation commission set up by the Japanese National Diet (out of context, in my opinion) that say the accident was "made uniquely in Japan".

And what exactly is their beef that isn't justifiable with the traditional "cost-benefit analysis"?

Filtered vents.

(Page 4)

"With respect to these [safety] enhancements, we have particular concern about the potential requirement to install "filtered vents" for certain boiling water reactors which we understand to be significant, capital-intensive structures. As instructed by the Commission, the NRC staff has proposed four potential options but urged the Commission to choose "Option 3." Under this option, the Commission would issue an order requiring the installation of fintered vents rather than pursuing a performance-based process."

It is apparently of no concern to these Representatives (or should I say representatives of the US nuclear industry) that it was the dry vents from the reactors at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, not so much the explosions, that contaminated much of Tohoku and Kanto.

Instead, their concern is over cost, and adequacy of protection, as the letter quote yet another NRC Commissioner insisting on a "fully developed justification", and says:

We strongly agree and observe that the "fully developed justification" Commissioner Ostendorff referenced remains absent. To move forward on a poorly justified, precedent-setting proposal like Option 3 would be a disturbing erosion of the NRC's historically disciplined standard of adequate protection.

Their "performance-based process" seems to mean that as long as there is no accident there is no need for "costly" filtered vents. Their cost calculation doesn't seem to include the public and social cost in case of an accident, because an accident is not supposed to happen.

How's that thinking different from Japan's before the Fukushima accident?

Later in the letter, the argument is made that the closure of a nuclear power plant would result in power shortages and a huge loss of local employment.

It is the same old argument that has been made everywhere in Japan. So, what's different in the US?

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