Showing posts with label Tatsuhiko Kodama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tatsuhiko Kodama. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

City-Wide Decontamination in Minami Soma, Fukushima, Price Tag 40 Billion Yen (US$525 Million)

And the contract to "decontaminate" the entire city is soon to be awarded to one joint venture headed by one of the largest construction companies in Japan by the city's decon committee headed by Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University.

Something doesn't sit very well with me.

The annual budget of Minami Soma City for the fiscal 2011 year (that ends on March 31) is total 50 billion yen, with the main budget of 28 billion yen, the supplementary budgets of 13 billion yen, and budget for government corporations 9 billion. Of the main budget, only 9 billion yen is from the city tax, and the national and prefectural subsidies (allocated according to the population) and the proceeds from municipal bond sales.

40 billion yen decontamination project is expected to last for 2 years, to be paid for over three years starting 2011 fiscal year. The amount of money for the next two years would eat up more than half of the main budget, but the city is not paying any of that any way. The cost will be borne by the national government, who will bill TEPCO, who then will bill the national government, who will then tax the citizens.

Endless money for big businesses and the well-connected small businesses and politicians who can facilitate the joint ventures.

From Asahi Shinbun (2/2/2012):

東京電力福島第一原発の事故に伴う除染で、福島県南相馬市は、市内の生活圏全域を400億円でゼネコンに一括して発注することを決めた。市は業者選定に向けた手続きに入っており、近く一つの共同企業体(JV)に決定し、2013年度までの約2年間の除染を発注する。県内の自治体のうち、個別地区ではなく全域を対象にした除染の発注手続きに至ったのは初めて。

Minami Soma City in Fukushima Prefecture has decided to award a contract worth 40 billion yen to decontaminate the entire city's living space to one general contractor. The city has started the process to select the contractor, and will soon decide on one joint venture (JV) to award the 2-year contract to decontaminate the city. Of all the municipalities in Fukushima, this is the first case of a city-wide decontamination project instead of decontamination by districts within a city.

 原発事故の警戒区域と計画的避難区域は国が直轄で除染する。それ以外の年間被曝(ひばく)線量が1ミリシーベルトを超える場所は市町村が行い、国が費用を負担する仕組みで、今回の発注はその地域が対象。戸建てや集合住宅、病院、工場、店舗など約4万6千棟の除染で、面積は1433ヘクタールにのぼる。総延長約1千キロの道路や、住宅や建物の奥20メートル分の森林も含む。

The "no-entry zone" and "planned evacuation zone" decontamination will be done by the national government. Outside these zones, municipalities will carry out decontamination of the locations that will exceed annual radiation exposure of 1 millisievert, and the cost will be borne by the national government. The contract will cover the area outside those zones in Minami Soma. 46,000 buildings including single-family residences, apartments, hospitals, factories and shops will be decontaminated in the areas of 1,433 hectares. Also included in the project will be 1,000 kilometers of roads, and forests within 20 meters from residences and buildings.

 国が示している除染の単価は、敷地面積400平方メートルの戸建て住宅で壁の洗浄をしない場合、60万円が目安で、それ以上の広さは1平方メートルあたり1500円で換算。道路は両側に側溝がある場合、長さ1キロあたり240万円としている。

The unit cost as specified by the national government for decontaminating a single-family residence with the lot size of 400 square meters without washing the walls is 600,000 yen [US$7882]. For larger houses, the cost is calculated at 1,500 yen [US$20] per square meter. For roads, 2.4 million [US$31,500] yen per 1 kilometer if there are drains on both sides of the roads.

 南相馬市はこうした単価を積み上げ、放射線量を測るモニタリングの費用などを含めて総額400億円とはじき出した。11年度に22億円、12年度に196億円、13年度に182億円をあてる予定。市の11年度一般会計当初予算は約277億円で、それぞれ市の予算規模に匹敵する額の発注になる。

Minami Soma City has calculated the total cost to be 40 billion yen, including the radiation monitoring cost. It will allocate 2.2 billion yen from the fiscal 2011 budget, 19.6 billion yen for the fiscal 2012, and 18.2 billion from the fiscal 2013. The fiscal 2011 regular initial budget was 27.7 billion yen. The amounts in the next two fiscal years would be almost equivalent to the city's budget.

 市は、技術提案を審査する「指名型プロポーザル方式」で業者を選ぶことにし、ゼネコン26社を指名して昨年12月に受け付けを開始。市内の建設・塗装業者らでつくる協同組合を作業に加えることを条件にした。

The city adopted the system to ask specific companies to submit proposals, and already asked 26 general contractors to submit proposals in December last year. One of the condition of the proposals is to include the local cooperative made up of construction firms and painting firms in the decontamination projects.

 1月27日の期限までに、大手、準大手ゼネコンの6JVが提案を市に出した。児玉龍彦・東京大教授が委員長を務める市の除染推進委員会が内容を評価し、近く1JVを選ぶ。2月中にも除染を始めたい考えだ。

By the January 27 deadline, 6 joint ventures with top-tier and 2nd-tier general contractors as the heads of the ventures submitted their proposals to the city. The city's decontamination promotion committee headed by Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University will evaluate the proposals and select one joint venture. The city wants decontamination to start in February.

 1JVへの一括発注について、南相馬市の羽山時夫・除染対策室長は「早急に除染を進めるため、技術や安全管理の面などで大手の業者が適当と考えた。同じ業者が2年間継続することで作業の進め方に柔軟性が出るうえ、作業員の確保も容易になる利点がある」と説明する。

As to selecting only one joint venture, the official in charge of decontamination in Minami Soma City explains, "In order to quickly proceed on decontamination, we think it is appropriate to select a large contractor for their technology and safety control. By having the same contractor for two years, the decontamination can be carried out in a flexible way and it will be easier to secure workers."

Big, national general contractors are indeed preferred over the local contractors when it comes to "recover and rebuild" Fukushima and other disaster-affected Tohoku because of supposed expertise and lower cost over the long run. I doubt that even they have accumulated enough "expertise" in "decontamination" since March 11, 2011, but it doesn't quite matter anyway.

What counts is having a big, national construction company well-connected with the national government come into town and hire subcontractors from the local, small contractors well-connected with the city politicians. Just like good old times in the bubbly days in the 1980s. From building nuclear power plants to city-wide decontamination, there is nothing that big, Japanese general contractors cannot do, given enough money.

And for selling nuclear reactors or melting furnaces and incinerators to process radioactive disaster debris, count on Hitachi. Or selling nuclear reactors or or leasing gamma cameras or selling household appliances for the temporary housing for the evacuees, count on Toshiba.

Teaming up with big businesses is a very familiar territory for any municipal government. The only odd thing about Minami Soma's decon business is that the committee to select the JV is headed by Professor Kodama, whose angry speech in the Diet criticizing the lack of response by the national government to the radiation contamination did trigger a response from the government.

Probably it wasn't quite a response that the professor was anticipating.

Just a friendly reminder of what the "decontamination" as defined by the Ministry of the Environment is: "It is like a cleaning job of stubborn dirt or stains", using scrubbing brushes, deck brushes, pressure washers, screw drivers, gloves, rubber boots, bags, rakes .... Oh and masks are optional.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

"Plutonium Brothers" and "Role of Specialists" Videos Now in German

Thank you, Viola.

"Plutonium Brothers" in German:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0A2nbcOlgaI&feature=channel_video_title

"Role of Specialists - Professor Kodama vs Professor Yamashita" in German:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A90_4mg8yFc&feature=channel_video_title

****************************
In case you missed them, you can view the English version on this blog. Both are with the captioned video and the full transcript:

Three Plutonium Brothers of Japan: "They Are So Safe You Can Drink It" (Updated with Transcript)

(Updated with Captioned Video) The Role of Specialists: Dr. Kodama vs Dr. Yamashita

Thursday, August 11, 2011

(Updated with Captioned Video) The Role of Specialists: Dr. Kodama vs Dr. Yamashita

(Now Tokyo Brown Tabby has managed to put in the caption. Thank you readers for helping the cat in figuring out the downloader. 8/13/2011)

One is a scientist, the other like a politician. One has things to say, the other has things to un-say.

Tokyo Brown Tabby will put the caption as soon as Tabby figures out the captioning software glitch (anyone know of a good software compatible with the latest Youtube? Tabby's software (freeware) apparently cannot deal with the change). But in the meantime, you can view how these two specialists talk, how they look. That alone seems to speak volume on what they are.


First, Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo, in a recent TV appearance:

From the viewpoint of specialists in genome science, like I am, we should not modify our conclusions in the face of the reality. Specialists should tell the truth as it is, no matter how difficult it is.

You know, ordinary Japanese people are not stupid. From what I've seen, they take things seriously and think them through. So, specialists should tell them the truth and discuss things based on the truth. Only then, specialists will be trusted by the public and risks can be avoided. If the public know the risks, such as the removal of radioactive cesium, they will be determined to solve the problems no matter how much effort it may take. No matter how hard the food inspection may be, they will be determined to pull together and...

MC: "carry it through."

That's right. So, the primary responsibility of specialists, specialists in medicine like us, is to tell the public what health damages could potentially occur. It a specialist assumes from the beginning, "If I say this here, it will cause problems there", he/she is a politician, not a specialist.

Responsibility of specialists manifested itself when the tsunami hit the Tohoku region. In Ishinomaki-City, specialists in disaster prevention were devastated when their disaster prevention measures had failed in the tsunami. But at the same time, they were delighted that children, whom they had taught, as part of the disaster prevention program, "When tsunami comes, run. Look around, help each other, and run to the higher ground at all cost", survived. They felt they had fulfilled their obligation as true specialists.

This incident has reinforced my belief on the role of specialists: if there is a real danger, inform the public that it's really dangerous, and tell them we will pull through together.

What people want from specialists is not the word of compromise that politicians are good at. They want specialists to call danger a danger...

MC: "...as it is."

I think the fundamental reason why the Atomic Energy Society of Japan [nuclear specialists] and Japan's nuclear policy have failed is because specialists have abandoned their pride and dignity as specialists. Because they've become politicians, or businessmen, by not telling the truth to the public. Without the self-examination of this fact, I don't think the rebirth of the University of Tokyo, or of Japanese scientists, would happen.

Next, Dr. Shunichi Yamashita, whom some Japanese have started to call Dr. Shunichi "Damashita" Yamashita - Yamashita "who tricked", Vice President of Fukushima Medical University. Get ready for an outrageous remark after another...

...at the lecture by Radiation Health Risk Advisor of Fukushima.

"Now that the national government has decided the safety exposure limit to be 20 millisieverts per year, we, as Japanese citizens, have an obligation to follow the government's decision."

Can the safety limit of 20mSv/yr really protect our children? After the lecture, we went to him to confirm that point.

"You should think of 20mSv/yr as a provisional level."

[In the lecture] You said you didn't know [about the health risk under 100mSv/yr]. Does it mean you cannot say it's safe, either?

"Of course I can't. That's why we are discussing where to draw the line in that gray zone."

You mean you're telling the people of Fukushima to put up with it?

"If they don't, they'll have to evacuate. Where would you evacuate them?... " [implying "Would you be willing to be responsible for evacuating the residents of Fukushima?" Clearly he wouldn't.]

After all, we couldn't hear the words of confirmation that he would guarantee the safety of children.

Friday, August 5, 2011

Summary (Part 1) of Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama's Interview with Daisuke Tsuda on August 5

Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University, whose fiery remark at the Health and Labor committee in the Lower House of Japan's Diet has inspired many people in Japan and in the world, spoke with independent journalist Daisuke Tsuda in his office at the university on August 5. The interview was set up by Shukan Gendai, a popular weekly magazine in Japan with extensive coverage of the Fukushima nuclear accident and the resultant radiation contamination throughout Japan.

Professor Kodama, in person, is very much relaxed and soft-spoken, as you can see in the video at the end of the post. Self-deprecating, and a patient teacher, from the way he describes the radiation issues as he sees them.

Part 1 of the summary below covers the first 10 minutes or so of the highly informational interview, which lasted for 66 minutes. It is is not the literal translation. I will post the rest as I finish. The first quick pass, and subject to later revision (when I notice egregious mistakes).

About people's reaction to his speech in the Diet committee:

"I was surprised at the strong reaction people seem to have had to my speech. I'm called as witness to the committee often, usually about food safety or children's playground safety. I didn't think much of it on that day. But then my son told me "Something strange is happening." Many people sent me emails, twitter, facebook messages, with encouragements, concerns and criticisms. I am very grateful for the feedback.

"In an academic world, we make progress when different people contribute from different angles. But suddenly it feels like I'm caught up in a big turbulence. Some of you may have mistaken me as a "good person" (laugh) but I'm just a regular person. My friends say my "freshness date" is about 2 weeks (laugh). They say I have about a week left to say what I want."

How scientists communicate with the lay public regarding radiation:

"Scientists talk based on certain assumptions. But when the assumptions are wrong, then everything based on those assumptions is wrong.

"A good example is the standard for radiation safety. To assess the radiation safety we use "microsieverts". Such and such microsieverts/hr is detected, so it's safe/dangerous, and the argument goes on for ever over the number. But what we have now cannot be understood by this number alone. The 5 microsieverts/hour radiation detected [on March 15 in Ibaraki]. What's more significant than this high number is that it was detected 100 kilometers from the plant. An enormous amount of radiation was released. The average may be 5 microsieverts/hr, but in one spot it could be 500 microsieverts/hr, in another 0.5 microsievert/hr. That's how I see the problem.

"Ministry of Education and Science decided on the radiation level for children based on the time they spend in schools. But children are exposed to radiation in their homes. The radiation level for food was decided, as if there were a few food items that were radioactive. But we may have radioactive materials in almost all food. Unexpected concentration of radioactive materials may happen. The fundamental nature of the problem has changed. But mainstream scientists and the government don't seem to notice the change, and continue to apply the old standard of radiation protection, which is to take care of a radiation "spot". Now, what we have is two dimensional or three dimensional space filled with radiation.

"Also, at our Radioisotope Center, we treat different isotopes differently. But when you talk radiation in "microsieverts", you bundle everything together, as if different radionuclides were the same. As I said in the committee, thorotrast goes to liver. Iodine goes to thyroid, and cesium goes to urinary bladder. There is no point in considering them together."

USTREAM archive: http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/16442790







Video streaming by Ustream

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama in Shukan Gendai Interview

(UPDATE August 5: Summary Part 1 is up.)

Watching Professor Kodama. He's explaining that chronic low-level radiation may cause chronic inflammation that leads to cancer.

He is very soft spoken in person. Warm smiles. He explains scientific/technical issues for lay people well.

Toward the end:

"What we need now is forecast, simulation, not academic studies. We need to protect mothers and children first."

"Do what we each can, instead of argument for the sake of argument. Contribute by doing what you can do best. It doesn't need to be about nuclear power or radiation. Play with children if you are good at playing with children. Even if that doesn't directly related to solving radiation problem or contamination problem, in a roundabout way I'm sure it will lead to a better solution."

Or something like that... So I will do what I'm good at these past 4 months; I will view the entire recorded video tomorrow and report back to you to share my findings.

(UPDATE August 5: Summary Part 1 is up.)

Just In: Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama on Live Interview on the Net, 3PM on August 5 on USTREAM

That's Japan Standard Time.

3PM on August 5 in Japan is:

11PM on August 4 in the US (Pacific)
2AM on August 5 in the US (East)
7AM on August 5 in the UK
8AM on August 5 in Germany
4PM on August 5 in Australia

Shukan Gendai, a Japanese weekly magazine with excellent original reporting on the Fukushima disaster, is hosting an interview of Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University with journalist Daisuke Tsuda, who has been visiting and reporting on the disaster affected areas in Tohoku.

The talk, according to Shukan Gendai, will focus on what Professor Kodama couldn't cover in the testimony in the Diet committee, radiation contamination, and what needs to be done now.

It will be broadcast live on USTREAM:

URL:http://www.ustream.tv/channel/gendai-biz

You can send your questions and opinions via Twitter to Gendai:

@gendai_biz
#gendaitv

Sunday, July 31, 2011

Professor Kodama's Speech in Four Languages (Japanese, English, French, German)

Professor Kodama's testimony in Japan's Lower House committee is now available in 4 languages, thanks to the readers of this blog.

To recap, Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama is the head of the Radioisotope Center at the University of Tokyo. On July 27, he appeared as a witness to give testimony to the Committee on Welfare and Labor in Japan's Lower House in the Diet on the government's response so far to the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident and the resultant radiation contamination.

Please share his passionate speech in:

Japanese with English subtitle in video:

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/07/video-with-english-caption-professor.html

English (in text in 3 parts):

http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/07/professor-tatsuhiko-kodama-of-tokyo.html
http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/07/part-2-professor-tatsuhiko-kodama-of.html
http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2011/07/part-3-professor-tatsuhiko-kodama-of.html

French (in text in 3 parts, by Helios):

http://bistrobarblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/politiciens-du-japon-que-faites-vous-13.html
http://bistrobarblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/politiciens-du-japon-que-faites-vous-23.html
http://bistrobarblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/politiciens-du-japon-que-faites-vous-33.html

German (subtitle in video, by Viola):

Part 1: http://youtu.be/PDOBKu8P-DE
Part 2: http://youtu.be/XefmvjI7Mk4

Friday, July 29, 2011

Video with English Caption: Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University Tells the Politicians: "What Are You Doing?"

(If you don't see the caption, click on the "cc" on the player menu bar to turn on the caption.)

Please share the videos with your non-Japanese-speaking friends.

Original written posts are here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

There are also French translation and German translation (video subtitle), thanks to the readers of this blog.

Captioned Video Part 1 of 2



Captioned Video Part 2 of 2



(h/t Tokyo Brown Tabby for captioning)

(Part 3) Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University Tells the Politicians: "What Are You Doing?"

(Part 1, Part 2; there are also the video in 2 parts with English subtitle, French text translation, and the video in 2 parts with German subtitle. Go to this post for the links.)

Testimony by Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University continues. He goes back to Minami Soma City where his Radioisotope Center has been helping to decontaminate.

We at the Radioisotope Center of Tokyo University have been helping to decontaminate Minami-Soma City, sending about 4 people at a time and doing decontamination work for the length of 700km per week.

Again, what's happening to Minami-Soma clearly shows that 20 or 30 kilometer radius [from the nuke plant] doesn't make any sense at all. You have to measure in more detail like measuring each nursery school.

Right now, from the 20 to 30 kilometer radius area, 1,700 school children are put on the buses to go to school. Actually in Minami-Soma, the center of the city is located near the ocean, and 70% of the schools have relatively low level of radiation. Yet, children are forced to get on the school buses to go all the way to schools near Iitate-mura [where radiation is higher], spending 1 million yen everyday for the busing.

I strongly demand that this situation be terminated as soon as possible.

What's most problematic is the government's policy that they will compensate the residents for the moving cost only if their areas are designated as official evacuation zones. In a recent committee held at the House of Councilors [Upper House], President Shimizu of TEPCO and Mr. Kaieda, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry answered that way. I ask you to separate the two immediately - compensation criteria issue and children's safety issue.

I strongly ask you to do whatever you can to protect the children.

Another thing is, what I strongly feel when I'm doing the decontamination work in Fukushima is that emergency decontamination and permanent decontamination should be dealt with separately.

We've been doing a lot of emergency decontamination work. For example, if you look at this diagram, you will notice that the bottom of this slide is where small children put their hands on. Every time the rain streams down the slide, more radioactive materials accumulate. There can be a difference in radiation level between the right side and the left side. If such difference occurs and if the average radiation of the slide is 1 microsievert, then one side can measure as high as 10 microsieverts. We should do more emergency decontamination work in such places.

The ground right under the roof gutter is also where children frequently put their hands on. If you use high pressure washer you can reduce the radiation level from 2 microsieverts to 0.5 microsievert.

However, it is extremely difficult to lower the level to less than 0.5microsievert, because everything is contaminated. Buildings, trees, whole areas. You can lower radiation dose of one place, but very difficult to do that for the whole area.

Then, how much will it cost when you seriously do the decontamination work? In case of "Itai-Itai Disease" caused by cadmium poisoning, to decontaminate half of cadmium-contaminated area of roughly 3,000 hectare, the government has spent 800 billion yen so far.

How much money will be needed if we have to decontaminate the area 1,000 times as big?

Finally, Professor Kodama has 4 demands, although probably due to the time constraint he was able to elaborate only three:

So, I'd like to make four urgent requests.

First, I request that the Japanese government, as a national policy, innovate the way to measure radiation of food, soil, and water, through using the Japan's state-of-the-art technology such as semiconductor imaging detectors. This is absolutely within Japan's current technological capability.

Second, I request that the government enact a new law as soon as possible in order to reduce children's radiation exposure. Right now, what I'm doing is all illegal.
The current "Radiation Damage Prevention Law" specifies the amount of radiation and the types of radionuclides that each institution can handle. Now Tokyo University is mobilizing its workforce in its twenty-seven Radioisotope Centers to help decontaminate Minami-Soma City, but many of the centers don't have a permission to handle cesium. It's illegal to transport it by cars. However, we cannot leave highly radioactive materials to mothers and teachers there, so we put them all in drums and bring them back to Tokyo. To receive them is illegal. Everything is illegal.

The Diet is to blame for leaving such situations as they are. There are many institutions in Japan, such as Radioisotope Centers at national universities, which have germanium detectors and other state-of-the-art detectors. But how can we, as the nation, protect our children if these institutions' hands are tied? This is the result of the gross negligence by the Diet.

Third, I request that the government as a national policy mobilize technological power of the private sector in order to decontaminate the soil. There are many companies with expertise of radiation decontamination; chemical companies such as Toray and Kurita, decontamination companies such as Chiyoda Technol and Atox, and
construction companies such as Takenaka Corporation. Please mobilize their power to create a decontamination research center in Fukushima as soon as possible.

It will take tens of trillions of yen to do the decontamination work. I'm gravely concerned that it might become public works project involving concessions. [In other words, business as usual in Japan where only the businesses and politicians benefit.]

We don't have the luxury to spare a single second considering the financial condition of the Japanese government. We must figure out how we really do the decontamination work.

What on earth is the Diet doing, when 70,000 people are forced out of their homes and wandering?

That's all. Thank you.


(h/t Tokyo Brown Tabby for translating Part 3.)

Thursday, July 28, 2011

(Part 2) Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University Tells the Politicians: "What Are You Doing?"

(Here's Part 1, in case you missed. And Part 3. There are also the video in 2 parts with English subtitle, French text translation, and the video in 2 parts with German subtitle. Go to this post for the links.)

Part 2 of Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama's testimony on July 27 to the Committee on Welfare and Labor in Japan's Lower House in the Diet.

Professor Kodama is the head of the Radioisotope Center at the University of Tokyo.

Professor Kodama's anger is now directed toward the government's non-action to protect people, especially children and young mothers, from internal radiation exposure. His specialty is internal medicine using radioisotope, so he says he has done the intense research on internal radiation:

I have been in charge of antibody drugs at the Cabinet Office since Mr. Obuchi was the prime minister [1998-]. We put radioisotopes to antibody drugs to treat cancer. In other words, my job is to inject radioisotopes into human bodies, so my utmost concern is the internal radiation exposure and that is what I have been studying intensely.

The biggest problem of internal radiation is cancer. How does cancer happen? Because radiation cuts DNA strands. As you know, DNA is in a double helix. When it is in a double helix it is extremely stable. However, when a cell divides, the double helix becomes single strands, doubles and becomes 4 strands. This stage is the most vulnerable.

Therefore, the fetuses and small children, with cells that rapidly divide, are most susceptible to radiation danger. Even for adults, there are cells that rapidly divide such as hair, blood cells and intestinal epitheria, and they can be damaged by radiation.

Let me give you an example of what we know about internal radiation.

One genetic mutation does not cause cancer. After the initial hit by radiation, it needs a different trigger for a cell to mutate into a cancer cell, which is called "driver mutation" or "passenger mutation". (For details please refer to the attached document about the cases in Chernobyl and cesium.)

Alpha radiation is most famous. I was startled when I learned of a professor at Tokyo University who said it was safe to drink plutonium.

Alpha radiation is the most dangerous radiation. It causes thorotrast liver damage, as we, liver specialists, know very well.

Internal radiation is referred to as such-and-such millisieverts, but it is utterly meaningless. Iodine-131 goes to thyroid gland, and thorotrast goes to liver, and cesium goes to urothelium and urinary bladder. Whole body scan is utterly meaningless unless you look at these parts in the body where radiation accumulates.

Thorotrast was a contrast medium used in Germany since 1890. It was used in Japan since 1930, but it was found that 25 to 30% of people developed liver cancer 20 to 30 years later.

Why does it take so long before cancer develops? Thorotrast is an alpha-radiation nuclide. Alpha radiation injures nearby cells, and the DNA that is harmed most is P53. We now know, thanks to genome science, the entire sequence of human DNA. However, there are 3 million locations on the DNA that are different from person to person. So today, it doesn't make sense at all to proceed as if all humans are the same. The basic principle should be the "personal life medicine" when we look at internal radiation - which DNA is damaged, and what kind of change is taking place.

In case of thorotrast, it is proven that P53 is damaged in the first stage, and it takes 20 to 30 years for the 2nd, 3rd mutations to occur, causing liver cancer and leukemia.

About iodine-131. As you know, iodine accumulates in thyroid gland, and that is most noticeable during the formative phase of thyroid gland, i.e. in small children.

However, when the first researcher in Ukraine was saying in 1991 "There are an increasing number of thyroid cancer", researchers in Japan and the US were publishing articles in Nature magazine saying "There is no causal relationship between the radiation and thyroid cancer." Why did they say that? Because there was no data prior to 1986, there was no statistical significance.

The statistical significance was finally noted 20 years later. Why? Because the peak that started in 1986 disappeared. So even without the data prior to 1986, the occurrence of thyroid cancer and radiation exposure from Chernobyl had the causal relationship. Epidemiological proof is very difficult. It is impossible to prove until all the cases are done.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of "protecting our children" a completely different approach is required.

Dr. Shoji Fukushima from a national institution called Japan Bioassay Research Center, which researches health effects of chemical compounds, has been studying diseases involving urinary tract since the Chernobyl accident.

Dr. Fukushima and doctors in Ukraine studied parts of bladders removed during more than 500 cases of prostatic hypertrophy surgery. They found out that in the highly contaminated area where 6Bq/liter was detected in urine, there was a high frequency of mutation of p53 though 6Bq may sound minuscule.

They also noticed many cases of proliferative precancerous conditions, which we assume was due to the activation of p38 MAP kinase and the signal called "NF-kappa B," leading inevitably to proliferative cystitis, with carcinoma in situ occurring with considerable frequency.

Knowing this, I was astounded to hear the report that 2 to 13Bq/liter [of radioactive cesium] was detected from the breast milk of seven mothers in Fukushima.

(to be continued in Part 3.)

When radioactive materials were detected from the breast milk, what did the government and government researchers say? "No need to worry. No immediate effect on health of the babies."

Professor Kodama is saying that by the time we have proof that there is a causal relationship between internal radiation exposure (however small) and cancer, it may be too late.

Thorotrast is a suspension containing the radioactive particles of thorium dioxide.

Again, here's the video (the same one as in Part 1).


Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University Tells the Politicians: "What Are You Doing?" (Part 1)

(Part 2, Part 3; there are also the video in 2 parts with English subtitle, French text translation, and the video in 2 parts with German subtitle. Go to this post for the links.)

Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama is the head of the Radioisotope Center at the University of Tokyo. On July 27, he appeared as a witness to give testimony to the Committee on Welfare and Labor in Japan's Lower House in the Diet.

Remember Professor Kosako, also from the University of Tokyo, who resigned in protest as special advisor to the prime minister over the 20 millisievert/year radiation limit for school children? There are more gutsy researchers at Todai (Tokyo University) - the supreme school for the "establishment" - than I thought. Professor Kodama literally shouted at the politicians in the committee, "What the hell are you doing?"

He was of course referring to the pathetic response by the national government in dealing with the nuclear crisis, particularly when it comes to protecting children.

Even if you don't understand the language, take a look and listen. He sounds sincere, and his voice is literally shaking with anger.



(The original video that was embedded in this post was removed at Youtube. Too many views for TPTB, maybe. It was approaching 300K views. This one is missing the first few minutes, and starts when he talks about 5 microsieverts/hour in Tokai-mura.)

Aside from his anger, he also gave some very interesting and disturbing information, which I try to summarize below:

He starts out with the radiation fallout in Tokyo:

"We detected 5 microsieverts/hour radiation in Tokai-mura in Ibaraki Prefecture about 9AM on March 15, and notified the Ministry of Education and Science as the "Article 10 notification" [as specified in the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Law]. Later, the radiation exceeding 0.5 microsievert/hour was detected in Tokyo. Then on March 22 it rained in Tokyo, and with the rain came 0.2 microsievert/hour radiation, and this I believe is the reason for the elevated radiation level to this day.

"Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano said at that time, "There is no immediate effect on health". I actually thought this was going to be a big, big problem."

It was indeed in the news that 5 microsieverts/hour radiation was detected at Tokai-mura in Ibaraki Prefecture on March 15 morning, but hardly anyone, other than nuclear experts like him, connected that news with the elevated radiation level in Tokyo. The residents of Tokyo didn't even know about it. What happened in the morning of March 15? Well, Reactor 4 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant had a "big noise" which blew out the roof at 6AM, and Reactor 2 had an explosion in the Suppression Pool at 6:14AM. Or it could be from the Reactor 3 explosion in the previous day, at 11:01AM on March 14.

The professor goes on to explain his concern at that time:

"Why was I concerned? Because the current radiation injury prevention method is based on dealing with a small amount of radioactive materials that emit very high radiation. In this case, the total amount of radioactive materials is not much of an issue. What matters is how high the radiation is.

"However, in the case of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, 5 microsieverts within 100-kilometer radius [he is referring to Tokai-mura], 0.5 microsievert within 200-kilometer radius [referring to Tokyo area], and the radiation extended far beyond, even to teas in Ashigara and Shizuoka, as everybody now knows."

So, instead of a small amount of highly radioactive materials in a confined area, what we have is a huge amount of radioactive materials spread wide.

He continues:

"When we research the radiation injury/sickness, we look at the total amount of radioactive materials. But there is no definite report from TEPCO or the Japanese government as to exactly how much radioactive materials have been released from Fukushima.

"So, using our knowledge base at the Radioisotope Center, we calculated. Based on the thermal output, it is 29.6 times the amount released by the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In uranium equivalent, it is 20 Hiroshima bombs.

"What is more frightening is that whereas the radiation from a nuclear bomb will decrease to one-thousandth in one year, the radiation from a nuclear power plant will only decrease to one-tenth.

"In other words, we should recognize from the start that just like Chernobyl, Fukushima I Nuke Plant has released radioactive materials equivalent in the amount to tens of nuclear bombs, and the resulting contamination is far worse than the contamination by a nuclear bomb."

So what's the implication of the huge amount of radioactive materials released and dispersed wide? It's much harder to predict the behavior of the particles, as they behave in a non-linear manner:

"When a vast amount of radioactive materials is released, they are in particles. Dispersion of particles is non-linear, and it's one of the most difficult calculations in the fluid dynamics. The nuclear fuel is like sands buried in synthetic resin, but once the fuel melts down, a large amount of super-fine particles is released.

"What happens then? The problem like the contaminated rice hay happens. The pattern of contamination does not follow concentric circles. It depends on the weather. It also depends on where the particles landed - on the material that absorbs water, for example."

His Radioisotope Center has been helping Minami Soma City, and he describes the situation in the city in details concerning the radioactive rice hay:

"We at the Radioisotope Center have been helping Minami Soma City in the decontamination effort. We've done seven decontaminations so far. When we went to Minami Soma for the first time, there was only one geiger counter. On March 19 when the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries supposedly issued the notice [on the cattle feed], food, water, and gasoline were about to be depleted in the city. The mayor of Minami Soma made a plea for help on the Internet, which was widely viewed.

"In that kind of situation, no one would look at a piece of paper from the Ministry, no one would know. Farmers didn't know that rice hay was in danger. Still, they bought the feed from abroad, paying hundreds of thousands of yen, and started to feed the cows with the same groundwater that they drank.

"So, what should we do now? We have to guarantee that the thorough radiation measurement is done in the contaminated area. As I said before, there was only one geiger counter in Minami Soma City when we went there in May. In fact, there were 20 personal survey meters provided by the US military. But no one at the city's Board of Education could understand the English manual until we went there and told them how to use them. That's how it is there.

"As to the food inspection, there are more advanced survey meters than germanium counters, such as semiconductor detectors. Why doesn't the Japanese government spend money in supporting [the development of these advanced detectors?]?

"After 3 months, the government has done no such thing, and I am shaking with anger."


(... to be continued in Part 2.)