"Trap of Prometheus" Series Part 2 - Resignation of a Researcher (3/4)

(Recap from my previous "Prometheus" post:)

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Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" series is still on-going, and right now it's Part 3 about suppressing the scientific data. It continues to be an excellent article, and it continues to be printed on the "third page" (see my post on the Part 1 of the series).

I just finished reading the Part 2 "Resignation of a Researcher", which has 21 installments. Even though Asahi Shinbun is busy taking down the blog sites that compile all the series articles for convenient reading, they cannot suppress them all, and I read it on this blog.

In it, there is a very curious piece of information about SPEEDI simulation, the NISA and the PM's Office's decision to set the evacuation zone in concentric circles. In short,

• The Ministry of Education had ordered the SPEEDI simulations from the beginning and knew exactly where to send the official to do the actual measurements in Namie-machi, Fukushima;

• Not only the Ministry of Education ordered SPEEDI simulation calculations but also the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered its own SPEEDI simulation calculations with much more accuracy;

• NISA was setting the evacuation zone on March 11 evening based on the simulation;

• NISA stopped their work as soon as the PM's Office, based on no credible information or agreed-on procedure, announced the concentric circle evacuation zones.

Reading the Part 2 of the series, it sure looks as if almost everything bad that happened afterwards could have been prevented if the politicians and bureaucrats on the initial (and crucial) 1st and 2nd days of the nuclear accident had acted to protect the public, which I think is their constitutional duty. Instead, they played games, a turf war as if this was just another ordinary day in Kasumigaseki.
----------------------------------------------------

In the Installment 11, we learned that the Ministry of Education knew exactly where to look for high radiation because it had SPEEDI simulation result, but it didn't bother to tell anyone about the radiation levels when the information would have made the difference. In the Installment 12, we learned that it was a surprise for the Ministry of Education when the PM's Office didn't follow the agreed-upon protocol to use SPEEDI and unilaterally issued an evacuation order in concentric circles.

In the Installment 13, we'll learn how the NISA was on the verge of coming up with the "correct" evacuation map that was not in concentric circles.

研究者の辞表（１３）送られなかった167枚

Resignation of a Researcher (13) 167 simulation maps that were never sent

SPEEDIの予測データはどう流れたのだろうか。（＝上地兼太郎朝日新聞記者）

How was the SPEEDI simulation data shared? (reporting by Kentaro Uechi)


震災から約4時間後の3月11日午後7時3分、国は原子力緊急事態宣言を出す。首相官邸に原子力災害対策本部ができた。

7:03PM on March 11, about 4 hours after the earthquake/tsunami. The national government declared nuclear emergency. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was set up in the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

経済産業省の原子力安全・保安院は、対策本部の事務局を担う一方、同省別館3階に緊急時対応センター（ＥＲＣ）を立ち上げた。他省庁からも人がかき集められた。

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry acted as the secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. But at the same time, it also set up the Emergency Response Center (ERC) on the 3rd floor of the annex building of the Ministry. People from other ministries were also called in.

SPEEDIの予測は本来、文部科学省が原子力安全技術センターを使って1時間ごとに行う。出来た予測図は保安院にも送られるが、保安院は独自の予測も出そうとした。それに向け、同日夜には同センターのオペレーターをＥＲＣに入れた。

SPEEDI simulation is normally done every hour by the Nuclear Safety Technology Center under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Science. The simulation map is sent to NISA. But NISA wanted to do its own simulation, and invited an operator from the Nuclear Safety Technology Center to its ERC.

保安院が独自で行った1回目のSPEEDI予測は午後9時12分に出た。翌12日午前3時半に福島第一原発2号機でベント（排気）をした場合、放射性物質はどう拡散するかという予測だ。放射性物質は南東の太平洋へ飛ぶ結果が出た。

The 1st SPEEDI simulation result by NISA came out at 9:12PM. The simulation was about how radioactive materials would disperse if the vent was done on Reactor 2 of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant at 3AM on March 12. The result showed that radioactive materials would be dispersed southeast over the Pacific Ocean.

12日午前1時12分に2回目の予測。今度は同時刻に1号機のベントを仮定した。これも海へ拡散していた。保安院は16日までに45回173枚の独自予測をはじき出した。

The 2nd simulation result by NISA was out at 1:12AM on March 12. This time, the assumption was the vent of Reactor 1 at 3AM. Again, radioactive materials would disperse over the ocean. By March 16, NISA would create its own 173 maps in 45 simulations.

保安院の予測の特徴は、様々な情報を集めて放射性物質の放出量を推測したことだ。放出量を1ベクレルと仮定した文部科学省に比べ、予測の精度は高かった。

What was unique about NISA's simulations was that they estimated the amount of radioactive materials that would be released, using various data. Unlike the simulations done by the Ministry of Education that used the unit emission (1 becquerels/hr), the accuracy of the NISA simulations was much higher.

官邸の地下には、各省実働部隊が詰めるオペレーションルームがある。保安院は課長補佐以下の職員数人をそこに出していた。保安院から予測図を受け取る専用端末も備（そな）えられていた。

There was an operation room in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence where the working groups from various ministries were stationed. NISA had several officials (assistant manager class) there. The room was equipped with the dedicated terminal to receive the simulation maps from NISA.

官邸5階には首相の管直人ら災害対策本部の中枢が陣取っている。避難区域を決めたのはこの中枢であり、その決定にはSPEEDIの情報を参考にすることになっている。ということは、予測図は専用端末を経て５階まで運ばれていなければならなかった。しかし・・・。

The core members of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters including Prime Minister Naoto Kan remained on the 5th floor of the PM's Official Residence. It was this core members who decided the evacuation zone, and that decision was to be based on the SPEEDI information. Which means the simulation maps should have been received at the terminal [in the basement] and then carried to the 5th floor. But...

オペレーションルームの専用端末に送られたのは１，２回目の予測図だけ。保安院が独自で行ったSPEEDI予測のうち、４３回１６７枚はＥＲＣ内で止まっていた。

Only the 1st and the 2nd simulation maps were sent to the dedicated terminal in the operation room. Of all SPEEDI simulations that NISA did on its own, 167 maps from 43 simulations remained at [NISA's] ERC.

しかもプリントアウトして内閣官房の職員に渡したのは２回目の分だけだった。２回目の予測図はＡ４判で計３枚だが、そのうち何枚を渡したか、渡した後どうなったかも保安院は確認を取っていない。何故（なぜ）こんなことになったのか。

Worse, only the 2nd simulation maps were printed out and handed to an official of the Prime Minister's Office. There were three pages of maps for the 2nd simulation, but NISA does not know how many pages were handed to the official, or what happened to them afterwards. How did this happen?

Stay tuned for the last segment of this appalling saga of bureaucrats and politicians being bureaucrats and politicians (i.e. doing what they knew how, best) in the face of the grave nuclear accident.

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"Trap of Prometheus" Series Part 2 - Resignation of a Researcher (2/4)

(Recap from my previous "Prometheus" post:)

----------------------------------------------------
Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" series is still on-going, and right now it's Part 3 about suppressing the scientific data. It continues to be an excellent article, and it continues to be printed on the "third page" (see my post on the Part 1 of the series).

I just finished reading the Part 2 "Resignation of a Researcher", which has 21 installments. Even though Asahi Shinbun is busy taking down the blog sites that compile all the series articles for convenient reading, they cannot suppress them all, and I read it on this blog.

In it, there is a very curious piece of information about SPEEDI simulation, the NISA and the PM's Office's decision to set the evacuation zone in concentric circles. In short,

• The Ministry of Education had ordered the SPEEDI simulations from the beginning and knew exactly where to send the official to do the actual measurements in Namie-machi, Fukushima;

• Not only the Ministry of Education ordered SPEEDI simulation calculations but also the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered its own SPEEDI simulation calculations with much more accuracy;

• NISA was setting the evacuation zone on March 11 evening based on the simulation;

• NISA stopped their work as soon as the PM's Office, based on no credible information or agreed-on procedure, announced the concentric circle evacuation zones.

Reading the Part 2 of the series, it sure looks as if almost everything bad that happened afterwards could have been prevented if the politicians and bureaucrats on the initial (and crucial) 1st and 2nd days of the nuclear accident had acted to protect the public, which I think is their constitutional duty. Instead, they played games, a turf war as if this was just another ordinary day in Kasumigaseki.
----------------------------------------------------

In the Installment 11, we learned that the Ministry of Education knew exactly where to look for high radiation because it had SPEEDI simulation result, but it didn't bother to tell anyone about the radiation levels when the information would have made the difference. In the next Installment 12 below, we'll see in more detail why the information wasn't shared.

研究者の辞表（１２）いきなり同心円避難

Resignation of a Researcher (12) Suddenly, it was evacuation in concentric circles

3月15日、毎時330マイクロシーベルトの値が出る場所を、なぜピンポイントで指示できたのか。（＝依光隆明朝日新聞記者）

Why was the Ministry of Education able to precisely identify the location that would measure 330 microsieverts/hour radiation on March 15? (reporting by Takaaki Yorimitsu)

東京・霞が関の文部科学省。時に身ぶり手ぶりを交えながら、科学技術・学術政策局次長の渡辺格（いたる）さん（53歳）説明する。「実は、単位放出のSPEEDIを使いました」。

The Ministry of Education and Science in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo. Itaru Watanabe (age 53), Senior Deputy Director-General, Science and Technology Policy Bureau talks with occasional gestures. "In fact, we used SPEEDI in unit emission mode."

SPEEDI（スピーディ）とは、放射能の影響を予測するシステムのことだ。放出された放射性物質がどう広がるのか。風向きや風速、地形を計算し、飛ぶ範囲を予測する。

SPEEDI is a simulation system to forecast the effect of radiation. It considers wind directions, wind speeds and topography and forecasts the dispersion of radioactive materials released.

放射性物質は同心円状には広がらず、汚染エリアは複数の突起を形成する。そのエリアをSPEEDIで予測し、迅速に住民を避難させなければならない。それが原子力防災の基本中の基本とされている。

Radioactive materials do not spread in concentric circles, and the area of contamination would take the shape with multiple protrusions. Forecast the shape of the contaminated area with SPEEDI and evacuate residents as quickly as possible - that is the fundamental principle of nuclear emergency preparedness.

予測の基（もと）になるのは、原発からの放出源情報だ。ところが今回の事故ではそれが入手できなかった。

The forecast would be based on the information from the nuclear plant as to how much radioactive materials are being emitted. That information was not available in this accident.

しかし、そういう事態でも仮の値を入力することで予測ができる。それが、1時間に1ベクレル放出したと仮定する「単位放出」で計算するやり方。渡辺さんはその手法で正確に高汚染地域を把握していた。

However, it is possible to make forecast by entering a formal [as opposed to actual] number. That is the "unit emission", which assumes 1 becquerel/hour emission. Using this method, Watanabe was able to correctly identify the area with high radiation contamination.

渡辺さんが特殊な手法を用いたわけではない。原子力安全委員会が定めた指針では、事故発生直後は放出量を正確に把握することが難しいため、単位放出または事前に設定した値で計算するとある。そうして計算した予測図形をもとに、監視を強化する方位や場所を割り出していく。

It is not that Watanabe used a special method. The guideline set by the Nuclear Safety Commission specifies that the simulation calculation is to be done by unit emission or by the predetermined number because it is difficult to know the precise amount of emission right after the accident. Based on the map thus calculated, the areas and the directions that will need increased monitoring are to be decided.

「単位放出で情報を流す、という点ではマニュアル通りでした。放出量が分からないときに単位放出を各関係者に配るというのがマニュアルになっていましたから」。

"It was exactly according to the manual, to provide information of the unit emission calculation. It was in the manual that the unit emission calculation was to be distributed to parties involved when the actual amount of emission was unknown."

マニュアルによると、配る先は一部の省庁と原子力安全委員会、福島県、そして現地対策本部。「実際に避難範囲を決める場合、SPEEDIを使ったのかどうか は文部科学省では分かりません。避難範囲を決めたのは文科省では無く、原子力対策本部ですから。今回は本来の使い方はされず、いきなり同心円状で避難の指示がなされた」。

According to the manual, the information was to be distributed to several government ministries and agencies, the Nuclear Safety Commission, Fukushima Prefecture, and the local countermeasures headquarters [in Fukushima]. "The Ministry of Education does not know whether the SPEEDI result was used in deciding the evacuation zones. The evacuation zones were decided not by the Ministry of Education but by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. This time, the manual wasn't followed, and the order to evacuate in concentric circles was issued abruptly."

マニュアルでは文科省は情報を出すだけで、それを使って避難指示を出すのは原子力災害対策本部、つまり官邸だ。

According to that manual, the Ministry of Education would provide information, and using that information the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters would issue evacuation orders. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was the Prime Minster's Official Residence.

しかし、首相の管直人も、経済産業大臣の海江田万里も、官房長官の枝野幸男もSPEEDIを知らなかったと主張する。特に海江田と枝野は20日過ぎまで知らなかったと国会答弁している。いったいどうなっていたのか。

However, Prime Minister Kan, Minister of Economy and Industry Banri Kaieda, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano all insist that they didn't know about SPEEDI. In particular, Kaieda and Edano said in the Diet meeting that they didn't know about it until after March 20. What was going on?

(To be continued in the next posts.)

It sure looks like someone (or some people) couldn't resist playing "Sir Humphrey" in what may have been the biggest emergency situation that the country ever faced. And PM Kan, unlike the fictional PM Hacker, didn't care to know how to use the career bureaucrats.

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"Trap of Prometheus" Series Part 2 - Resignation of a Researcher: NISA Was About to Set Evacuation Zone Based on SPEEDI on March 11 Evening (1/4)

Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" series is still on-going, and right now it's Part 3 about suppressing the scientific data. It continues to be an excellent article, and it continues to be printed on the "third page" (see my post on the Part 1 of the series).

I just finished reading the Part 2 "Resignation of a Researcher", which has 21 installments. Even though Asahi Shinbun is busy taking down the blog sites that compile all the series articles for convenient reading, they cannot suppress them all, and I read it on this blog.

In it, there is a very curious piece of information about SPEEDI simulation, the NISA and the PM's Office's decision to set the evacuation zone in concentric circles. In short,

• The Ministry of Education had ordered the SPEEDI simulations from the beginning and knew exactly where to send the official to do the actual measurements in Namie-machi, Fukushima;

• Not only the Ministry of Education ordered SPEEDI simulation calculations but also the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered its own SPEEDI simulation calculations with much more accuracy;

• NISA was setting the evacuation zone on March 11 evening based on the simulation;

• NISA stopped their work as soon as the PM's Office, based on no credible information or agreed-on procedure, announced the concentric circle evacuation zones.

Reading the Part 2 of the series, it sure looks as if almost everything bad that happened afterwards could have been prevented if the politicians and bureaucrats on the initial (and crucial) 1st and 2nd days of the nuclear accident had acted to protect the public, which I think is their constitutional duty. Instead, they played games, a turf war as if this was just another ordinary day in Kasumigaseki.

This post is my quick translation of the Installment 11. Installments 12, 13, and 14 will be in the next 3 posts.

研究者の辞表（１１）ピンポイントの指示

"Resignation of a Researcher" (11) Instruction with pinpoint precision

放射線衛生学の研究者、木村真三（４４）らが福島に入った３月１５日は、朝６時すぎに福島第一原発の２号機が破損、大量の放射性物質が放出されていた。

Shinzo Kimura and others entered Fukushima on March 15. That day, Reactor 2 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant was damaged at around 6AM and a large amount of radioactive materials were being released.

原発から５キロの場所には１１日夜に国の現地対策本部ができていた。しかし１４日夜には２号機の状態を懸念して撤退方針を決める。同日夜から撤退を始め、１５日午後には原発から６０キロ離れた福島県庁に退いた。

At a location 5 kilometers from the plant, the headquarters for nuclear disaster countermeasures was set up by the national government in the evening of March 11. However, in the evening of March 14, they decided to retreat out of fear of the condition of Reactor 2. The retreat started that night, and the headquarters was moved inside the Fukushima prefectural government building, 60 kilometers from the plant, by March 15 afternoon.

撤退組の一人、渡辺眞樹男（５７）は福島県庁に移った後の１５日夜に指示を受けた。「大変な事態になっている。測定に行ってくれ」

Makio Watanabe, one of the officials at the headquarters, received the instruction on March 15 evening at the Fukushima prefectural government building. "The situation is extremely serious. Go measure the radiation."

渡辺は文部科学省茨城原子力安全管理事務所から応援に来ていた。指示された場所は浪江町山間部の３カ所。ピンポイントだった。神奈川北原子力事務所の車 で現地に行き、午後９時ごろ放射線量を測る。数値を見て驚いた。３カ所とも高く、特に赤宇木（あこうぎ）は毎時３３０マイクロシーベルト。

Watanabe had been sent to the headquarters from the Ministry of Education's office for nuclear safety management in Ibaraki. He was instructed to go and measure at 3 locations in the mountainous area in Namie-machi. The instruction was pinpoint, very precise. He drove there, and start measuring the radiation at about 9PM. He was alarmed to see the numbers. All three locations had very high radiation, and Akogi District in Namie-machi measured 330 microsieverts/hour.

「いやもう、信じられなかった」と渡辺は振り返る。すぐ報告しようとしたが、携帯はつながらない。雨模様だったので衛星携帯も使えなかった。急いで川俣町の山木屋まで戻り、公衆電話から報告をした。戻る途中、点々と人家の明かりが見えた。まだ大勢の人が残っていた。

Looking back, Watanabe says "I just couldn't believe it." He wanted to report right away, but his cellphone didn't connect. He couldn't use his satelite phone because it was raining. He hastily drove back to Kawamata-machi, and used the public phone there to report. On the way back to Kawamata-machi, he saw lights in people's houses. There were still many people remaining [in Namie-machi].

「とにかく住民の方々に被曝（ひばく）をしてほしくなかった。線量が高いと報告し、早くこの線量を発表してください、とお願いをしました」

"I just didn't want the residents to get irradiated. I reported that the radiation levels were extremely high, and asked the headquarters please to make the radiation measurements public as soon as possible."

実はこのとき渡辺は防護服を着ていなかった。県庁への撤退が慌ただしかったため、防護服の類は現地本部に放棄していたからだ。

Watanabe wasn't even wearing the protective clothing. Since the retreat to the Fukushima prefectural government building was done so hastily that they left protective gear.

「不思議と自分のことは考えていないですよね。こんな時だからこそやらなきゃいけない、と」

"I didn't think about my safety at that time. I felt I had to do it."

必死の思いで渡辺が伝えた数値は、しかし住民避難に使われはしなかった。文科省は１６日にその数値を発表したが、地区名は伏せたまま。浪江町に知らせる こともなかった。町は危険を認識せず、一帯に残る住民に伝えることもなかった。なにより官房長官は「直ちに人体に影響を与えるような数値ではない」と会見 で述べていた。

However, the numbers that Watanabe had measured at grave danger and reported were never used for evacuation of the residents. The Ministry of Education announced the numbers on March 16 but it didn't say exactly where. The Ministry never notified Namie-machi. Namie-machi didn't know the danger, and so it didn't inform the residents about the danger. More than anything else, the Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] kept saying in the press conference, "They are not the levels that would affect the body immediately."

それにしても、なぜ対策本部は高線量の場所をピンポイントで知っていたのか。渡辺は言う。「ポイントをどなたが決めて指示されたのか、私もいまだに分かりません」

Still, how come the headquarters knew the locations of high radiation with such precision? Watanabe says, "Who decided which point to measure and instructed me? I do not know even this day."

元をたどると、指示は文科の本省だった。根拠に使われたのはＳＰＥＥＤＩ（緊急時迅速放射能影響予測システム）。同省は汚染の概要をつかんでいた。（依光隆明）

The reporter tracked down the source, and it was from the Ministry of Education in Tokyo. The instruction was based on SPEEDI, and the Ministry knew the extend of radiation contamination.

I remember the face of Yukio Edano in the press conferences in the early days of the accident. He was saying "No immediate effect". People were relieved. People even worried for his health, and told him to get some sleep. Then one day in mid April, there was a news clip of him visiting Fukushima (Minami Soma City), with protective clothing and a face mask. People ridiculed him at first, for it seemed to contradict his statement of "no immediate risk".

He knew. And he lied. And people know that now, albeit too late.

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