(OT) Legislation to Create the Japanese Version of NSC (National Security Council) Passed the Upper House with Overwhelming Majority

on November 27, 2013, the day after the Lower House had passed the equally controversial (or should be) but more hyped State Secrecy Protection Law.

The legislation to create the NSC for Japan has already passed the Lower House, so now it becomes the law of the land.

The voting count in the Upper House? According to NHK (11/27/2013),

• Yes vote: 213

• No vote: 18

There is no opposition to speak of. Nearly everybody in the legislative branch (National Diet) is on board, in both Houses, to give a huge power over foreign affairs and defense to the executive branch (the LDP/Abe administration).

Again, the ostensible reason is that the US wanted Japan to have the NSC like the one that exists in the US, so that confidential information can freely be shared between the US and Japan.

The Japanese government has already passed the national ID law, again with near unanimous vote.

The reason why I am rather cynical about the current hype and hyperventilation over the State Secrecy Protection Law is these two laws - one to create the NSC and the other to assign a unique number to each and every citizen in Japan (with the cute moniker "My Number"). They have passed these two laws already, with hardly a squeak from the media and the citizens.

The words uttered by a Councilor (Upper House member) from the Communist Party on the State Secrecy Protection Law sound great but vain, when the laws that will empower the executive branch out of proportion have been already passed:

(From Mainichi Shinbun 11/27/2013)
「この法案は国会議員をも処罰対象にしている。巨大な行政権力・官僚機構に断固迫ってこそ、国会議員ではないか」

"This legislation even targets the members of the National Diet. Aren't we, as members of the Diet, supposed to fight against the huge power of the executive branch and the bureaucrats?"

Mainichi reports there was a huge applause after he finished speaking.

Let's see. Was there an outrage over the "My Number" legislation and the NSC legislation? Nope. Power grab by the executive branch in these two laws has gone unnoticed, or I should say unrecognized as such, either out of ignorance or out of self-censorship, by the legislators, media, and citizens.

(Is there anyone who retweets my Japanese tweet about the NSC and national ID laws as integral of the State Secrecy Protection Law as power grab by the executive branch? Yes, seven people.)

See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.

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Japan to Stop Using SPEEDI to Decide Whether to Instruct Residents to Take Potassium Iodide Pills

Instead, the decision will be made using the air radiation levels and the water levels inside the nuclear reactors.

In other words, when (if) they do distribute the pills to citizens who may be affected by a nuclear accident, it may be too late. If the last year is any indication, such data will be released several weeks to several months after a nuclear accident happens.

As to the water levels inside the reactors, it's a joke. TEPCO and NISA insisted there was water inside the Reactor Pressure Vessels until mid May.

But no matter, that's what the Nuclear Safety Commission under Dr. Haruki "Detarame" Madarame has decided and is duly reported by NHK.

NHK conveniently omits the now-known fact that the SPEEDI simulation data was there from the beginning. The politicians and the bureaucrats, in their petty turf war, couldn't make any use of it. They even had three sets of simulation from three different entities - the Ministry of Education, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and TEPCO, from the beginning of the accident. Everyone decided to drop the ball all at once.

How did they manage to do that? Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometeus" has an excellent coverage on that (part 1 here, part 2 here).

From NHK News (1/4/2012):

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の事故で、放射性物質の広がりを予測するシステムが機能せず、甲状腺の被ばくを避けるヨウ素剤の取り扱いに混乱が生じたことから、国の原子力安全委員会は、ヨウ素剤の服用を指示するかどうかの判断に予測システムは使わないことを決め、空気中の放射線量など別の指標を導入することになりました。

In the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, the system to forecast the dispersion of radioactive materials didn't function, causing the confusion as to what to do with the potassium iodide pills to avoid radiation exposure in the thyroid. So the Nuclear Safety Commission has decided not to use the system any more to instruct residents to take the pills; instead, the air radiation levels and other indicators will be used.

原子力事故の際、甲状腺の被ばくを避けるヨウ素剤を服用するかどうかは、放射性物質の広がりを予測する「ＳＰＥＥＤＩ」というコンピューターシステムのデータを基に国などが判断し、住民に指示することになっています。

In a nuclear accident, in order to decide whether to take potassium iodide pills to prevent thyroid irradiation, the national government is to use the data from the simulation system to forecast the dispersion of radioactive materials, called SPEEDI, and to instruct the residents.

しかし、福島第一原発の事故ではシステムが機能せず、国や福島県が判断を示さなかったことから、市町村によってはヨウ素剤の取り扱いに混乱が生じました。このため原子力安全委員会の作業部会は、今後も迅速な対応につながるか疑わしいとして、ヨウ素剤の服用を指示するかどうかの判断に予測システムは使わないことを決めました。

However, in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, this system did not function and the national government and the Fukushima prefectural government did not make a decision [on whether to instruct residents to take the pills], causing confusion in the municipalities affected on what to do with the potassium iodide pills. The working group at the Nuclear Safety Commission has determined that it is doubtful that SPEEDI data will be used for a quick response in the future and therefore the SPEEDI system won't be used in determining the need for the administration of the pills.

代わりに、空気中の放射線量や原子炉の水位などのデータの利用を検討しています。さらに、服用の基準についても国際的な動きに合わせて見直し、１歳児の甲状腺の被ばく線量で今の半分の５０ミリシーベルトに引き下げるということです。作業部会では今後、指標についての具体的な数値を検討し、ことし３月までに提言にまとめることにしています。

Instead, the Commission is considering using the data such as the air radiation levels and the water level in the reactor. Further, the levels to instruct the residents to take the pill will be revised based on the prevailing international standards. For 1 year-old, it will be an equivalent dose of 50 millisieverts at the thyroid, which is half of the current level. The working group will further consider the numbers and will make a suggestion to the government by March.

WHO's standard for 1-year old is 10 millisieverts.

(I sent a tweet to NHK Kabun (culture and science), telling them the article is false about SPEEDI. I was surprised when NHK Kabun marked my tweet as "favorite".)

Speaking of potassium iodide, there are tweets from the residents in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture that they just received an envelope from the city that contained potassium iodide pills. They are wondering why, and wondering if Reactor 4 is as safe as TEPCO has said after the water level decrease in the Skimmer Surge Tank.

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US Nuclear Regulatory Commission: It's All About Politics?

If Japan's Madarame's Nuclear Safety Commission is "all about money", the US counterpart, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, seems all about political infighting.

It's Chairman Jaczko (Democratic appointee) vs Commissioner Svinicki (Republican appointee), with a former chairman fanning the infighting.

From Politico (8/16/2011):

NRC infighting goes nuclear

By DARIUS DIXON | 8/16/11 4:20 PM EDT

It's war at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko regularly faces the sharp end of Republican spears for his work to shut down the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, but his biggest clash appears not to be with Capitol Hill but with fellow NRC Commissioner Kristine Svinicki.

Jaczko, a Democrat and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, and Svinicki, a Republican, have sparred over everything from serious issues including safety reviews and agency budgets to minor items like foreign travel requests.

The tension between Jaczko and Svinicki is so thick that the two haven’t addressed one another in months, sources tell POLITICO.

“There’s been a history of punches and counterpunches,” David Lochbaum, director of the Union of Concerned Scientists’s Nuclear Safety Project and a longtime observer of the NRC, said of Jaczko and Svinicki. “I don’t know who started it but at some point it doesn’t matter. It takes two to fight.”

... Dale Klein, a former NRC chairman, said he believed the report presented a tamer version of accounts than what was collected by investigators.

Klein described Jaczko’s behavior as “ruling by intimidation” and by cornering his colleagues on agency issues through the media. When it came to Jaczko’s interactions with Svinicki, he said, “While I was there, he would oftentimes yell at her.”

Before retiring from the NRC, Klein said he gave Jaczko a warning. "I had told him early on, several times, that the title is chairman — not dictator," Klein said.

The latest skirmish came last month after Jaczko went to the National Press Club to announce his plan to have the NRC review recommendations of a special Fukushima task force in 90 days. One problem: The chairman went forward with the proposal without convincing his fellow commissioners to support it, and his announcement was widely seen as a maneuver aimed at painting his colleagues into a corner. (Jaczko told the other commissioners about his plan, but there was little to no negotiation.)

Three commissioners — Svinicki, William Magwood and William Ostendorff — quickly moved to block the 90-day timetable.

For his part, Jaczko struck back last week, writing a memo saying his colleagues have a "preoccupation with process at the expense of nuclear safety policy."

Jaczko’s 90-day proposal was “the classic example of what not to do,” Klein said. “What’s magic about 90 days?

"That’s not the way that you’re going to build a consensus..."

(The article continues.)

Consensus? In nuclear safety?

Then Japan's NSC and NISA should be lauded for their exemplary consensus building over the decades.

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Today's Nuclear Safety Commission Meeting Has a Noisy Audience

(Update) It's unreal. The commission members continue the meeting, totally ignoring the questions from the audience who want Tomari Nuke Plant stopped and inspected properly. At one point, the commission head, Haruki "Detarame" Madarame declared the meeting over.

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It looks like something very unusual is happening. There are a lot of people attending the Nuclear Safety Commission's meeting on August 11 which is open to public, and they are shouting at the commissioners.

The NSC is discussing the nuclear power plant maintenance schedule. Why is it an issue that attract so many people? It's because of one nuclear power plant in Hokkaido that has been "testing" the reactor for over 5 months after the regular maintenance was over.

Even though the "testing" is done on a full, commercial scale, Hokkaido Electric Power who owns the plant, Tomari Nuclear Power Plant, is calling it "testing" so that they can continue to generate power without going through the so-called "stress test".

The NSC meeting today is supposed to endorse the re-start of "commercial" operation of the reactor without the stress test, and that's what people who fill the room are upset about.

But shouting down the commissioners? And apparently the commissioners don't even try to rein in the crowd, as one reporter tweets "guilty conscience, maybe?"

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Another Tokyo University Professor Haruki "Detarame" Madarame Tells Like It Really Is: "It's All About Money, Isn't It?"

The current chair of the Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission is Haruki Madarame, who's been dubbed "Detarame" Haruki in Japan, or "Falsehood, nonsense" Haruki. "Detarame" nicely rhymes with his last name.

He was a professor at Tokyo University before he became the chair of the NSC in April 2010. He gave an interview to a citizens' group back in 2005 on nuclear energy. Far from being "falsehood" or "nonsense", his talk was very frank, and totally made sense.

He quite readily admitted, among other things, that:

• He and his fellow nuclear scientists in Japan didn't quite know what they were doing;

• There is no such thing as safe nuclear technology;

• The nuclear power generation was filthily profitable;

• It's all about money - if someone's unwilling to have a nuclear waste dump in his backyard, tell him you'll pay him twice the amount promised before. If he still says no, tell him you'll pay him 5 times as much, or 10 times as much.

Somewhere down the line, someone will say yes, and that's all that matters. And Madarame saw nothing wrong with that. In fact, he didn't see anything wrong with any of his positions, because that was how it was.

Too bad it had to take the Fukushima nuke accident for the average Japanese to realize not only they'd been served with imperfect and dangerous "clean energy" technology but also that a nuclear expert like Madarame at the nation's top research institute knew quite well about the danger and the nature of the nuclear technology and industry and was openly telling people about it. Laughing, as if it was a funny joke.

Quite a contrast to another Tokyo University professor, Tatsuhiko Kodama, who seems to have inspired many people beyond Japan's border.

Madarame also said in the interview, "Trust us." And trust we did.

Here's the 2005 interview video with English subtitle (EX-SKF/Tokyo Brown Tabby):

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More on the NSC Disclosure of Radiation Survey on Fukushima Children in Late March

(The original post is here.)

Tokyo Brown Tabby found a one-page document (no detailed data) that Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission created on May 12 and last modified on May 13 that simply says:

"Yes, we tested 1,080 children aged 0 to 15, and no one exceeded the threshold of dose equivalent of 100 millisieverts."

According to Tabby, the NSC person said:

"It's not that we withheld this information, but nobody asked us about this already-uploaded-data until a reporter from Tokyo Shinbun did at the press conference on July 4. "

So, I decided to look up three additional documents: the transcript of the press conference on July 4, and the NSC minutes of the meeting on May 12 and the transcript of the press conference on May 12.

First, the transcript of the July 4 press conference. It's in Japanese only, but I can assure you (and you can verify it if you read the language) that there is NO TOKYO SHINBUN reporter asking the question of thyroid radiation of Fukushima children. The NSC person that Tabby talked to did say there was a reporter from Tokyo Shinbun who asked that question.

Conclusion: the NSC edited out the reference from the transcript.

Second, the NSC minutes of May 12 meeting, to see how this information was handled by the Commissioners in the meeting.

The segment where the Commissioners discussed the radiation exposure survey for children in Fukushima reads as if the the survey was done as an exercise to see if SPEEDI simulations had been accurate and if they had indeed predicted the radioactive fallout as would be revealed by the survey. And since no child exceeded 100 millisievert dose equivalent, nothing needed to be done further:

班目委員長: どうもありがとうございました。他に。そうしたらもう１件、ＳＰＥＥＤＩを活用したというか、この結果を活用した例といった方がよろしいのかもしれません。資料第４－３号がございます。これは、事務局の丸山安全調査管理官から、ご説明をよろしくお願いいたします。

Madarame: Thank you very much. Is there anything else [to add]? [Seeing there was none] In that case, here's another example of using SPEEDI, or I should say using the [simulation] results of SPEEDI, as the Reference No. 4-3 [that's the one-page document]. Mr. Maruyama will explain.

○説明者（丸山安全調査管理官） 資料第４－３号に基づきご説明を申し上げます。「福島県における小児甲状腺被ばく調査結果について」ということでございます。平成２３年３月２３日のＳＰＥＥＤＩの試算を踏まえ、原子力安全委員会緊急技術助言組織より、特に、感受性の高い小児への健康影響をより正確に把握するため、屋内退避区域あるいはＳＰＥＥＤＩを用いた試算（３月２３日公表分）で甲状腺の評価線量が高いと評価された地域の小児の甲状腺線量の実測を原子力災害対策本部事務局あてに依頼した。その結果、原子力災害現地対策本部において、いわき市、川俣町、飯舘村において、小児甲状腺被ばく調査を実施した。

Maruyama: Allow me to explain the data, the Reference No.4-3 titled "The survey result of the thyroid gland radiation in children in Fukushima Prefecture". Based on the SPEEDI simulation on March 23, 2011, the NSC advised the Headquarters for the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures [which was set up by the national government] to conduct the actual survey of children in the areas which the SPEEDI simulation showed potentially high levels of dose equivalent radiation on thyroid gland and in "stay indoors" areas. The Headquarters for the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures did the survey accordingly in Iwaki City, Kawamata-machi, and Iitate-mura.

１）対象者数、でございます。３月２６日から２７日、いわき市の保健所で測定数は１３４人。３月２８日から３０日、川俣町公民館６４７人。３月３０日、飯舘村公民館２９９人。合計１，０８０人でございます。注書きに書いてございますが、なお３月２４日に川俣町において測定を行っていますが、バックグラウンドが高かったことから測定結果には含めておりません。

No.1, the subjects. 134 children were surveyed on March 26 and 27 in Iwaki City, 647 children on March 28 to 30 in Kawamata-machi, 299 children on March 30 in Iitate-mura. Total of 1,080 children were tested. It's in the footnote but the survey done in Kawamata-machi on March 24 was excluded because of the high background radiation.

２）測定方法、でございます。「緊急被ばく医療ポケットブック」（平成１７年３月 財団法人原子力安全研究協会）の「頸部甲状腺に沈着した放射線ヨウ素の測定」に基づき、ＮaＩシンチレーション式サーベイメータを用いて実施したということでございます。

No.2, method of measurement. It was done using the NaI scintillation survey meter based on the manual issued by the Nuclear Safety Research Association [which was set up as a government association in 1964] in 2006.

３）結果、でございます。対象者は０歳から１５歳でございます。小児甲状腺被ばく調査を実施した０歳から１５歳までの１，０８０人の小児については、スクリーニングレベル０．２μＳｖ／ｈ（１歳児の甲状腺等価線量として１００ｍＳｖに相当）を超えるものはなかった。以上でございます。

No.3, the result. The subjects were aged zero to 15. Among 1,080 children tested for thyroid gland radiation, there was no one who exceeded the screening level of 0.2 microsievert/hour (dose equivalent of 100 millisieverts at thyroid gland for 1 year old). That's all.

○班目委員長 どうもありがとうございました。それではこれにつきまして、何かご質問、ご意見はございますでしょうか。よろしゅうございますか。これは実は、こういう形で、紙で出すのは初めてかもしれませんけれども、実際には４月の時点で既にこのような調査が行われ、特に問題のある結果は出ていない、ということは公表済みだということでございます。改めて、こういうきちんとした形で発表しておきたいということで、今日の日付になっているというものでございます。よろしゅうございますでしょうか。それでは大変ありがとうございました

Madarame: Thank you very much. Is there any question on this issue? No? About this survey, this may be the first time it was published on paper, but I've been told that it was announced in April that there was such a survey, and there was no problem. But we wanted to publish in a more formal way, so it was published with today's date. Is there any comment or questions? Thank you very much.

So they tested children in Kawamata-machi on March 24, one day after the SPEEDI simulation showed high radiation levels. If they were high levels, they weren't reported as such on March 25. Asahi Shinbun that day said 0.24 microsievert/hour was detected from one boy in Kawamata-machi, and the number was much lower than 2 microsieverts/hour (?), so it was safe, no problem. I have no idea where Asahi came up with the "2 microsieverts/hour" number as the threshold number.

If I remember right, Kawamata-machi had been receiving the evacuees from the areas closer to the plant since March 12. So had Iitate-mura.

Also, Maruyama or Madarame didn't mention 45% of children had the radiation exposure at thyroid gland in the May 12 meeting. That information clearly didn't come out until the Tokyo Shinbun reporter asked on July 4.

Third, the transcript of the May 12 press conference. This one's easy. IT DOES NOT EXIST. The NSC started to publish the transcript of the press conference from May 19. Prior to May 19, there was no transcript, there was no recording of the press conference. How convenient. We would never know whether the Commissioners even mentioned anything about the survey in the press conference, or whether there was any reporter who did ask.

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Radiation at Thyroid Gland Found in 45% of 1,000 Children Tested in Fukushima

(More information in the new post.)

The Nuclear Safety Commission headed by Haruki "Detarame" Madarame disclosed on July 4 that the test conducted in late March had found 45% of 1,080 children tested in Fukushima Prefecture had internal radiation exposure at thyroid gland, according to Tokyo Shinbun.

3 months, that seems to be the amount of time that these government people must feel safe to disclose what they had known all along. After 3 months, people may forget, and/or people will give up because the disclosure is too late.

The NSC says the levels were low, and there was no need for more detailed evaluation.

If you look at the numbers, though, you may wonder how they came to the conclusion. To them, 100 millisieverts per year body dose equivalent for 1 year old (or 0.2 microsievert/hour) was acceptable because the ICRP says so. Since the highest they found was 50 millisieverts per year body dose equivalent, they concluded there was no need for further testing.

From Tokyo Shinbun (7/5/2011):

東京電力福島第一原発の事故で、国の原子力安全委員会は四日、三月下旬に福島県内の第一原発周辺の市町村に住 む子供約千人を対象に行った放射線被ばく調査で、４５％の子供が甲状腺に被ばくしていたことを明らかにした。安全委の加藤重治審議官は「精密検査の必要は ないレベル」と話している。

Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission disclosed on July 4 that the survey done in late March on 1,000 children living near Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant had revealed that 45% of the children were exposed to radiation at the thyroid gland. Commissioner Shigeharu Kato says "The radiation level was not the level that would require more detailed examination."

　調査は国と同県が三月二十六～三十日に、甲状腺被ばくの可能性が高いと予想されたいわき市、川俣町、飯舘村で、ゼロ～十五歳までの千八十人を対象に実施。４５％の子供に被ばくが確認された。

The survey was conducted by the national government and the Fukushima prefectural government from March 26 to 30 in Iwaki City, Kawamata-machi, and Iitate-mura, where the authorities expected the high probability of internal radiation exposure at the thyroid gland. 1,080 children aged zero to 15 were tested, and 45% had the internal radiation exposure.

　安全委によると、最高値は毎時〇・一マイクロシーベルト（一歳児の甲状腺被ばく量に換算すると年五〇ミリシーベルト相当）に上ったが、９９％は毎 時〇・〇四マイクロシーベルト以下。同様の換算で年二〇ミリシーベルトに相当するが、加藤審議官は四日の記者会見で「換算するには（調査の）精度が粗い。 精密測定が必要な子供はいなかった」と述べた。

According to the NSC, the highest dose was 0.1 microsievert/hour (body dose equivalent of 50 millisieverts per year at thyroid gland for 1 year old). For 99% of the children tested, the dose was 0.04 microsievert/hour or less, which is the dose equivalent of 20 millisieverts per year at thyroid gland for 1 year old. However, Commissioner Kato said in the press conference on July 4, "To consider body dose equivalent, the survey was too coarse. There was no child who need further detailed examination."

　 国際放射線防護委員会（ＩＣＲＰ）勧告では、年間一〇〇ミリシーベルトの被ばくで発がんリスクが０・５％高まるとして、同量を緊急時の年間被ばく 限度としている。今回の調査でも一〇〇ミリシーベルトを基準とし、一歳児の甲状腺被ばくの年換算でこれに相当する毎時〇・二マイクロシーベルトを超えた場 合、精密検査をする予定だった。

According to the ICRP recommendation, 100 millisieverts per year will increase the risk of cancer by 0.5%, and that amount is set as the maximum annual exposure limit in a nuclear emergency. In the survey this time, the standard was set at 100 millisieverts, and the detailed examination was to be done if 0.2 microsievert/hour dose was found, which would be the dose equivalent of 100 millisieverts per year at thyroid gland for 1 year old.

　国が国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）に提出した報告書では、千八十人の子供の甲状腺被ばくを調査したことを記しているが、何割の子供が実際に被ばくしていたかは明らかにしていなかった。

The Japanese government submitted the report to the IAEA which mentioned the survey done on 1,080 children for radiation at the thyroid gland, but the government did not disclose what percentage of the children were actually affected.

So the Japanese government was secretly testing the children in Iitate-mura, as it scoffed at the suggestion by IAEA that the radiation level in the village was very high and evacuation should be considered. All back in late March when it could have made a difference.

According to Tokyo Brown Tabby who read the Japanese post and called up the NSC, the NSC says the data was uploaded in May to the NSC website. So far I haven't managed to locate it. The NSC also says they informed the parents. I hope so.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: More on TEPCO's Dumping Operation

"Low radiation" water that TEPCO already started dumping into the ocean (yes, they started dumping 2 hours after the presser that ended around 5:00PM JST 4/4/2011)

From various sources (here, here and here):

11,500 tons of low radiation water comes from:

• The central waste product processing facility (which they just happened to find out had been flooded with water last week): 10,000 tons

• Basement of the turbine buildings for Reactors 5 and 6: 1,150 tons

WAIT A MINUTE. There was 1,500 tons of water in the turbine building basement for Reactors 5 and 6??? And they tell us now?

And here's the level of radiation measured by Iodine-131 (they don't tell us what else is in the water):

• Water from the central waste product processing facility: 6.3 becquerel/cubic centimeter (156 times the limit);

• Water from Reactor 5 turbine room basement: 1.6 becquerel/cubic centimeters (40 times the limit);

• Water from Reactor 6 turbine room basement: 20 becquerel/cubic centimeters (500 times the limit)

It is considered that the radioactive materials in the water at these locations have come from the air.

Contaminated water from Reactor 2, in comparison, looks deadly at "several million becquerel/cubic centimeter", and "10,000 tons of low radioactive water from the above three facilities is equivalent to 10 liters of high radioactive water from Reactor 2" (Asahi).

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency says the action is regrettably necessary to avert an emergency (of running out of space to store high radiation water).

TEPCO (and NISA) rejected the recommendations that were suggested by Nuclear Safety Commission on March 29 and decided to use the turbine building for Reactor 4 as "storage" for contaminated water, until they realized that "the turbine building for Reactor 4 is connected to the turbine building for Reactor 3" (Sankei). Duh.

Nuclear Safety Commission's recommendations included (according to Sankei):

• Dig a storage pond/well;
• Use tankers currently not in use;
• Ask the US military for help.

And a regular assurance from the bureaucrats and TEPCO that it is safe, eat all fish and seaweeds you want.

So move along, nothing to see here. It's getting rarer and rarer to see the Fukushima I Nuke Plant-related news from the top headlines at major newspapers, at least in their web versions of their newspapers.

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