2004 Study: Two of Brazil's High Background Radiation Areas Have Higher Cancer Mortality

I have been told numerous times that "People in naturally high background radiation areas in the world suffer no ill effect from the high radiation." I just stumbled upon one study in 2004 on such areas in Brazil.

Conclusion of this particular study: Cancer mortality in "Poços de Caldas, and Guarapari is higher than would be expected for their respective reference population", whereas "cancer mortality for the Araxá population is lower than would be expected".

International Congress Series
Volume 1276, Pages 3-468 (February 2005)

High Levels of Natural Radiation and Radon Areas: Radiation Dose and Health Effects, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on High Levels of Natural Radiation and Radon Areas, Osaka, Japan
6–10 September 2004

Edited by T. Sugahara, H. Morishima, M. Sohrabi, Y. Sasaki, I. Hayata and S. Akiba


Pattern of cancer mortality in some Brazilian HBRAs
Pages 110-113
Lene H.S. Veiga, Sérgio Koifman

Abstract

Among residents of Brazilian High Background radiation Areas, there is great concern about radiation-related health effects and there is also a common certitude that cancer incidence is higher in those areas than in other Brazilian areas with normal background radiation. This paper aims to present an overview of Brazilian High Background Radiation Areas and evaluate whether cancer mortality among residents from Poços de Caldas, Araxá, and Guarapari is higher than would be expected when applying mortality rate of their respective States. Results show that cancer mortality from the Brazilian HBRAs, Poços de Caldas, and Guarapari is higher than would be expected for their respective reference population. On the other hand, cancer mortality for the Araxá population is lower than would be expected.

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(UPDATED) Herbal Tea from Miyagi Had 20,290 Bq/Kg of Radioactive Cesium

(UPDATE 4/15/2012)

Additional information from Asahi Shinbun (4/12/2012):

• The company planted the herb outdoors in MAY (not March) last year.

• The president of the company said he tested the tea because TEPCO had told him he wouldn't get compensated unless he produced the result of the radiation test.

• There is another company in southern Miyagi (bordering Fukushima) who makes and sells the similar product.

Browsing the popular online mall in Japan, I see the same powdered tea being sold, and one of the brands says it is made in Ibaraki Prefecture. I think they'd better test that one, too, in case.

===========================================

Jiji Tsushin (4/14/2012):

ヤーコン茶は２万ベクレル＝宮城県

Miyagi Prefecture: 20,000 Bq/kg from the herbal tea

　宮城県蔵王町の業者が製造したヤーコン茶から高濃度の放射性セシウムが検出された問題で、県は１４日、セシウム濃度は国の基準値（１キロ当たり１００ベクレル）の２００倍超の２万２９０ベクレルだったと発表した。

Miyagi Prefecture announced on April 14 that 20,290 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected from the herbal tea produced by a manufacturer in Zao-machi in Miyagi Prefecture, more than 200 times the national safety limit (100 becquerels/kg).

　業者の自主検査では１万７２００ベクレルだった。県によると、出荷済みの１１００セットのうち、同日までに約４０セットが回収された。

It was 17,200 becquerels/kg according to the manufacturer's own testing. By April 14, about 40 sets of 1,100 sets of the tea already shipped had been recalled.

The herbal tea is in the powder form. About 1.5 grams of the tea powder is used to make one cup of tea, making each drink with 30 becquerels of radioactive cesium. Nothing to worry about, the prefectural government says, as if all the radioactive cesium people ingest is from this tea alone.

I suppose the prefectural government doesn't test unless they are told by the national government to test, and the national government probably didn't know about this tea. Just like they (claim they) didn't know about rice hay fed to the cows. Or leaf compost. Or shiitake cultivation substrate. Or crushed stones. Or firewood to smoke bonito. Or ....

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Anti Nuke Protesters Against the Restart of Ooi Nuke Plant in Front of Fukui Pref. Government Bldg, Police Trying to Block Them

Why? Because Yukio Edano is in the building, meeting with the Fukui governor and his officials for the re-start of the plant.

Yasumi Iwakami's IWJ USTREAM (live):

http://www.ustream.tv/channel/iwj-fukui1#utm_campaign=ss-post-backlink&utm_source=8481496&utm_medium=social

Tweets from Japan say they are even blocking the reporters from other parts of Japan, magazines, newspapers, from the press conference.

They also say Edano entered from the back entrance. People are shouting at the stone-faced officials.

Young policemen standing there, guarding the entrance look sad.

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Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano on March 12, 2011: "We Should Consider Evacuation of Tokyo, Ibaraki"

Tokyo Shinbun reports that according to information they obtained through the Japanese equivalent of the FOIA, the Kan administration did talk about wide-area evacuation in the Tokyo Metropolitan areas even before the Atomic Energy Commission's chief handed the worst-case scenario to then-Prime Minister Kan on March 25, 2011.

It was Yukio Edano, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary (and current Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry), who mentioned the wide-area evacuation, while other unnamed ministers were worried about the stock market, in the evening of March 12, 2011 after Reactor 1 blew up.

... Stock market?

From Tokyo Shinbun evening edition (4/13/2012):

東京、茨城の避難検討　福島１号機　水素爆発直後に官邸

Prime Minister's Office was contemplating evacuation of Tokyo and Ibaraki, right after the hydrogen explosion of Fukushima Reactor 1

東京電力福島第一原発１号機の原子炉建屋が水素爆発した昨年三月十二日、首相官邸で開かれた原子力災害対策本部の会合で、福島県だけでなく、東京都や茨城県も含めた広域避難が必要になるかもしれない、と議論していた。十三日、本紙が情報公開請求で得た政府のメモ書きなどから分かった。

On March 12, 2011 when a hydrogen explosion took place in the Reactor 1 building at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, a meeting of the nuclear disaster response headquarters was held in the Prime Minister's Official Residence where a wide-area evacuation including Tokyo and Ibaraki Prefecture was being discussed, this newspaper learned on April 13 from the memo by the government officials obtained via the information disclosure request.

　このメモは、十二日午後十時七分から開かれた第四回会合の発言をまとめたもの。この日は午後三時半ごろに１号機原子炉建屋で水素爆発が起き、３号機でも緊急冷却装置が不安定な動きをみせるなど、深刻な状況が相次いで起きていた。

The memo is the summary of remarks during the 4th meeting that started at 10:07PM on March 12, 2011. That day, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building of Reactor 1, and the emergency cooling system of Reactor 3 was becoming unstable, and the crisis was deepening.

　会合では、玄葉光一郎国家戦略担当相（当時）が「最悪の事態想定を」と求めると、菅直人首相（同）が「チェルノブイリ型（の放射能汚染）はありえるのか」などの懸念を示した。菅氏は福島第一は原子炉の形式が全く異なるとの説明に納得はしたが、とにかく格納容器を守り抜く重要性を強調した。

In the meeting, Koichiro Genba, then-minister in charge of national strategy [and current Minister of Foreign Affairs] wanted to have "the worst-case scenario", to which then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan responded with worries about whether it was possible to have radiation contamination like in the Chernobyl accident. Mr. Kan accepted the explanation that the reactors at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant were of totally different type [from the Chernobyl reactor], but emphasized the importance to secure the Containment Vessels at all cost.

　各閣僚から停電や食品、株式相場への悪影響への懸念が出される中、枝野幸男官房長官（当時）は「広域避難もそろそろ考えるべきだ。東京、茨城も」と発言したという。

Ministers expressed worries over blackouts, [availability of] foods, and negative effect on the stock market. Then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano said, according to the memo, "We have to start thinking about wide-area evacuation. Including Tokyo, and Ibaraki."

　原災本部など震災関連の会合をめぐっては、議事録が作成されていない問題が発覚。批判を受け、政府は先月議事概要を公表した。

It has been recently discovered that the minutes of the meetings related to the March 11, 2011 disaster, including those of the nuclear disaster response headquarters, haven't been created. Responding to the criticism, the government published the summaries of the meetings last month.

　広域避難発言などは議事概要には含まれていなかったが、発言の意図が十分に確認できなかったためとみられる。

[Edano's] remark on the wide-area evacuation was not included in the meeting summary. It was probably because the intent of his remark couldn't be ascertained when the summary was created.

I wish Tokyo Shinbun published the actual memo in its entirety.

So these ministers were having the meeting on the upper floor of the Official Residence, while in the basement the real information was being transmitted: SPEEDI simulations that showed the potential wide-area contamination. Somehow they didn't reach the upper floor, and the ministers forgot to turn on the teleconferencing system on the dedicated line.

The Kan administration on the first few days of the nuclear accident did the full-on propaganda of "everything was under control", as if all people needed to worry about was the earthquake and tsunami devastated Tohoku. The administration even sent out the female minister in charge of consumer affairs to scold those selfish Tokyo residents who were trying to hoard bottled water and food. "Don't buy them, because they are more needed in the disaster areas!"

That was just after Reactor 3 blew up in a spectacular fashion. Then one day later Reactor 4 blew up. And something happened in Reactor 2. The government didn't warn residents in Tohoku and Kanto about the possible radioactive fallout from the explosions, and people were still very trusting of their government. Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano was being praised for his "hard work".

Radioactive plumes from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant reached Tokyo, and 210 becquerels/kg of radioactive iodine was detected from the tap water in Tokyo on March 22. The Tokyo Metropolitan government didn't have enough bottled water to give to the residents with babies and infants.

Ah. Those bad old days. Makes me mad.

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SPEEDI Déjà Vu: J-Alert Failed to Alert on North Korean "Rocket" Launch

or missile or whatever it was that failed to launch as planned. The rocket/missile was launched at 7:40AM on April 13, and it was the event which the Noda administration and the Japanese government had made a big deal out of for the past several days. The event was supposed to showcase Japan's defense alert system.

But Japanese officials learned about the failure not from their expensive defense and disaster alert system called J-Alert but from TV. They couldn't confirm the launch until nearly 40 minutes after the actual launch.

(And they want to do what? Re-start Ooi Nuclear Power Plant?)

From Yomiuri Daily (4/14/2012):

Many upset over missile information delay

Despite thorough measures to prepare for a ballistic missile launch by North Korea, the central government's delay in communicating relevant information on Friday, compared with authorities in the United States and South Korea, has exasperated concerned parties.

In Okinawa Prefecture, which is located below the previously assumed flight path of the missile, people were angry with the central government's response, saying, "What would have happened to us if the missile had exploded over our prefecture?"

===

Missile launched?

In response to breaking news from South Korean media on the missile launch at around 7:55 a.m., reporters at the Defense Ministry in Tokyo rushed to confirm the information.

When asked by reporters, "Was the missile actually launched?" or "Is there a fallen object in the Yellow Sea?", ministry officials only repeated, "We haven't confirmed anything yet."

Meanwhile, CNN and other foreign media were reporting that North Korea had launched the missile but the launch had failed.

Forty-three minutes had already passed when Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka finally announced the missile launch at a press conference.

"[The launch] will have no impact on our country," exclaimed Tanaka. But when reporters tried to ask more questions, defense officials interrupted them, saying, "We're now analyzing the additional information."

To the amusement of reporters, Tanaka was practically yanked from the scene by fellow officials.

The government offices in charge of ensuring public safety looked increasingly frustrated.

A senior official at the National Police Agency said, "We haven't received any precise information."

Later the official said with a frown, "We finally received the [missile] launch information from the Prime Minister's Office shortly after 8:20 a.m."

The NPA was supposed to relay the missile launch information to police across the nation and issue a warning as soon as it received any updates.

Another senior NPA officer said, "Though preventive measures [for the missile launch] were thorough, it took time before an initial response was given."

In response to the media's communication of missile launch information, the Japan Coast Guard issued instructions to deploy airplanes and patrol vessels to determine any possible damage in the nation. But it withdrew the instructions soon after hearing the defense minister's announcement that the missile launch would not have any effect on the country.

A JCC senior official said, "If ocean vessels had been damaged, rescue activities might have been delayed due to the communication delay."

===

Why didn't the J-Alert sound?

At the Okinawa prefectural government office, the Em-Net, a system to convey emergency information from the central government to local governments, blared at 8:04 a.m.

Tension rose in the office at once. But the message from the central government said only "No information [on the missile launch] has been confirmed."

The prefectural government received the information confirming the missile launch at 8:37 a.m., about one hour after the missile launch was first observed.

While no information was provided from J-Alert, the nationwide system to relay emergency information, TV news programs reported that the missile launch had failed.

The prefecture's senior official said, "We're relieved because there was no damage in Okinawa Prefecture."

However, the official cast doubt on the central government's response, questioning, "Why didn't the J-Alert sound?"

Ishigaki Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama complained, "We wanted to have an official announcement from the central government as soon as possible."

"We'd like to request that the central government review why it could not provide the information immediately, even after announcements were made in other countries," Nakayama added.

At the Ishigaki Airport, passengers checking in watched TV news reports on the missile launch shortly before 8 a.m. Noriko Matsubara, a 57-year-old insurance salesperson, said, "I feel a chill up my spine when I imagine the missile might have flown over Ishigaki and exploded over the island."

AFP (link is in Japanese) reports that the US military alerted the Japanese Ministry of Defense 2 minutes after the failed launch, but for whatever reason the Ministry of Defense didn't tell the rest of the government until nearly 40 minutes later.

My wild guess is that the Defense Ministry officials were scrambling to start J-Alert so that they could report the J-Alert result to the Prime Minister's Office, instead of what was told by the US military.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura said they would look into why J-Alert was not used. Maybe the system was not plugged in, just like the teleconferencing system at the Prime Minister's Office when the March 11, 2011 triple disaster happened.

J-Alert looks like this. If you think this is like the nuclear emergency response system with Off-Site Centers and SPEEDI, you are right. That didn't work. Any reason that J-Alert should work? Nope.

Reading the wiki entry on J-Alert, I think this system should have warned people of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident last year. I don't think it did any of that, because not many municipalities have installed the system due to its high cost and malfunctioning.

It looks pretty in the diagram.

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Japan's Reconstruction Agency Official at JETRO Seminar: "we can assure you no more spread of radioactive substance from the plant"

In a prepared statement, Mr. Yoshinori Suematsu, a member of the Parliament, working for the Reconstruction Agency as State Secretary for Reconstruction said to the attendants of the Seminar on Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in the Area Damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquakes at the JETRO IBSC Hall on 23rd March 2012, said the following:

When it comes to the severe accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, you surely know that the nuclear reactors had been well treated and achieved cold shutdown condition at the end of last year. Thus we can assure you no more spread of radioactive substance from the plant.

Emphasis is mine. Did you know that? Surely you know.

(H/T Enformable)

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#Radioactive Japan: Meat Dealer in Kansai Falsifies #Fukushima and Miyagi Beef as Kagoshima Beef; Already Sold and Consumed

There's always the first. Or I should say the first to get caught.

But before finally busted, the meat dealer already sold 1,424 kilograms of beef from Tohoku and northern Kanto, including 750 kilograms of beef from Fukushima.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (4/13/2012):

福島と表示、販売しづらい…鹿児島産牛肉と偽装

A dealer falsified Fukushima beef as "made in Kagoshima", as it is difficult to sell if labeled "made in Fukushima"

福島県産牛肉などの産地表示を偽装して販売したなどとして、農林水産省近畿農政局は１３日、食肉販売業「ＡＭＭＳ」（兵庫県伊丹市）に対し、ＪＡＳ法に基づく表示の改善指示を行った。

The Kinki Regional Agricultural Administration Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries directed the meat dealer "AMMS" (Itami City in Hyogo Prefecture) to improve labeling based on the JAS (Japanese Agricultural Standard) on April 13.

　同省によると、同社側は調査に対し「福島などと表示して販売しづらかった」と話しているという。福島第一原発事故後、福島県産牛肉で産地偽装が明らかになるのは初めて。

According to the Ministry, the dealer says [they falsified the origin because] it was difficult to sell with labels saying "made in Fukushima" and other prefectures. This is the first time since the start of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident that the beef from Fukushima was deliberately mislabeled.

　発表では、同社の福田屋此花店（大阪市）は昨年９月～今年２月、福島県産約７５０キロを含む東北、関東産の牛肉など少なくとも１４２４キロについて、鹿児島県産などに産地を変えて販売したという。匿名の通報を受けて立ち入り調査を行った結果、明らかになった。

According to the press release, the dealer's store 福田屋此花店 in Osaka City sold at least 1,424 kilograms of beef from Tohoku and Kanto regions as "made in Kagoshima" and other prefectures, including 750 kilograms of beef from Fukushima. The Ministry conducted a site check on an anonymous tip.

　ほぼ全量が消費されていたが、いずれも厚生労働省が昨年、放射性セシウムに汚染された稲わらを食べたとして公表した牛には該当せず、国の規制値を上回る放射性セシウムを含む牛肉も見つかっていないという。

Almost all of the beef had been already consumed, but according to the Ministry it was not on the list by the Ministry of Health of beef from the cattle that ate rice hay contaminated with radioactive cesium last year. None of the beef has been found with radioactive cesium exceeding the national safety standard.

No penalty from the supervising Ministry, though, other than "directing the dealer to display proper labels". The press release from the Kinki Regional Agricultural Administration Office on April 13, 2012 basically tells the dealer:

• Please find out why this happened;

• Please label appropriately from now on;

• Please set up a system so that this won't happen again;

• Please educate your employees appropriately from now on;

• Please send us the report of your finding by May 14, 2012.

Why did this happen? Isn't that obvious? The dealer made a killing by buying up beef from Tohoku and Kanto at a depressed price, labeled it as "made in Kagoshima" and sold it at probably a huge premium.

The Kinki Agricultural Admin Office also says the dealer sold 280 kilograms of beef from Miyagi. No further information on the beef that this dealer sold that was of Kanto origin. Probably northern Kanto - Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki.

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TEPCO's Evening Press Conference 4/13/2012: Reactor 4 SFP Temperature: 37.6 Degrees Celsius, Reactor 3 SFP Photos

From TEPCO's regular press conference at 6PM, April 13, 2012.

The heat exchanger for the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool restarted at 4:04PM.

Temperature as of 5PM was 37.6 degrees Celsius on the water surface.

TEPCO took the photos of Reactor 3's Spent Fuel Pool. One of the photos shows the fuel exchanger (upper right):

Photo No.1 (upper left) was taken from the surface of the water. Matsumoto says the fuel racks are underneath the debris. Photos No.2 (upper right), No.3-1 (lower left), No.3-2 (lower right) shows the pool at 7 meters from the surface. Photos No.2, No.3-1 and No.3-2 were taken from the cask space.

Photo No.3-1 shows the fuel rack, and the fuel handles. Photo No.3-2 is a blow-up of No.3-1.

Matsumoto says the pool didn't look damaged as far as the camera could see.

The video was taken, and TEPCO is currently reviewing the video. It will be made public next week.

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(UPDATED: It was Reactor 1 D/W Temp ) TEPCO Press Conference 4/13/2012 11AM: Reactor 4 SFP Temperature Was 49.9 Degrees Celsius as of 3AM, 4/13/2012

UPDATE 2: The heat exchanger of Reactor 4's Spent Fuel Pool restarted, pool temperature 37.6 degrees Celsius. See my latest post. (The post also has the photos of Reactor 3's Spent Fuel Pool, from inside the pool.)


UPDATE: Matsumoto was speaking about the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool, and mentioned the temperature. I took to mean the temperature of the SFP, but it is more likely that Matsumoto suddenly switched back to talking about the temperature of the Reactor 1 dry well. Sorry for the confusion. A lot of viewers apparently thought Matsumoto was talking about the Reactor SFP like I did.

So, it was the Reactor 1 dry well temperature that started to rise noticeably starting 4AM on April 13, 2012.

No word yet on exactly what the temperature is in the Reactor 4 SFP.

==============================

According to Matsumoto, the temperature of the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool started to rise noticeably starting 4AM April 13, 2012.

From 8PM on April 12, 2012 to 3AM on April 13, 2012, the temperature remained 49.9 degrees Celsius, he said.

Matsumoto didn't say what the temperature was at the time of the press conference (11AM on April 13), and none of the reporters asked him about it, with the reporter from Asahi again pressing on the nitrogen injection system.

On checking the TEPCO's handout for the press on April 12, 2012,

• Reactor 4 SFP temperature as of 11AM, 4/12/2012: 28 degrees Celsius

• Reactor 4 SFP heat exchanger stopped at: 2:44PM, 4/12/2012

• Expected rise in temperature: 0.5 degrees Celsius/hour

Oh wait... 21.9 degrees Celsius rise in temperature in 12 hours (from 3PM on April 12 at 28 degrees Celsius to 3AM on April 13 at 49.9 degrees Celsius) is more like 1.825 degrees Celsius per hour. But it is possible that the temperature doesn't rise in a linear fashion.

For some reason, TEPCO's Japanese page that has the handouts does not have the April 12, 2012 handout.

Unless TEPCO's photos and videos were fake the other day, the fuel rods inside the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool are completely submerged under water (6.8 meters deep to the top of the fuel rods according to the diagram).

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Asahi's Weekly Magazine Apologizes (Sort of) for Spreading "Baseless Rumors" on Water in Koriyama City, Fukushima

After one year of spreading the "radiation is no big deal" meme to the general public in Japan, one MSM in Japan (Asahi) is caught by another MSM (Yomiuri) for spreading the "drinking water is highly contaminated" meme which has mostly died down even in the alternative, "sensational" net media.

They are behind the curve.

From the triumphant Yomiuri Shinbun (4/12/2012):

福島県郡山市が、「週刊朝日臨時増刊　朝日ジャーナル」（３月９日発売）の記事について、「水道水から放射性セシウムが検出されたと誤解を与える恐れがある」などとして、週刊朝日を出版する朝日新聞出版（東京都）に文書で抗議していたことが１２日わかった。

It was revealed on April 12 that Koriyama City in Fukushima Prefecture had sent a letter to Asahi Shinbun Publishing (Tokyo) protesting the article that appeared on the weekly magazine "Shukan Asahi Extra - Asahi Journal" March 9, 2012 issue as "misleading, as if radioactive materials had been detected from the drinking water [in the city]".

　記事は同社独自の調査を基に、郡山市の水道水から１キロあたり９５ベクレル、いわき市の水道水から同４８ベクレルの放射性セシウムが検出されたなどとする内容だった。郡山市は、昨年３月の原発事故後に行った市の検査では、同３月２８日を最後に検出されていないとしており、市水道局が「市民や県外へ避難した人々に不安を与え、風評被害を助長する。取材の意図と経緯を確認し、訂正を求める」として、今年３月２９日、内容証明で抗議文を発送した。

The article, based on the magazine's own investigation, says 95 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected from the drinking water in Koriyama City, and 48 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium from the drinking water in Iwaki City. The Koriyama City government says no radioactive cesium has been detected since March 28, 2011 according to the city's tests. The city's water department sent the letter of protest on March 29, 2012 by certified mail, asking for clarification of the intent of the report and how the reporting was done, and demanding correction because the article "would cause fear among city's residents and people who evacuated outside Fukushima, and encourage baseless rumors".

　いわき市も同１６日、週刊朝日側に、水を採取した日時、場所などの説明を求める文書を送った。市水道局の検査では昨年４月４日以降は、セシウム以外の物質も含めて、放射性物質は不検出が続いているという。ただ、週刊朝日が後日、水道水について問題ないとの記事を続報の形で掲載したことから、「市民の誤解も起きないと判断した」として抗議などは行っていないという。

Iwaki City also sent a letter on March 16, asking for the details such as the date the water was collected and the location. According to the tests by the city's water department, radioactive materials have been ND (not detected) since April 4, 2011. However, as Asahi later published the follow-up article saying there was no problem with the drinking water, the city decided not to protest, saying that the chance of city residents misunderstanding the Asahi article was slim.

　週刊朝日編集部の話「記事は簡易測定キットを使用して編集部が実際に測定した結果を報じたものだが、郡山市からの意見は真摯(しんし)に受け止めたい」

The Shukan Asahi's editorial department says, "The article reported the result of our actual measurement using the simplified measurement kit. However, we would like to take the opinion from Koriyama City very seriously."

A simplified measurement kit can be attached to a scintillation survey meter to show becquerels of items tested, like this one from Horiba. Asahi used this Horiba's kit, as you can see here.

I don't know how Asahi did the test so I cannot comment. I do know, from the Horiba's pamphlet, that the detection limit is high (100 becquerels/kg for soil testing and 200 becquerels/kg for rice testing in the background of 0.1 microsievert/hour). The system like this may have worked under the provisional 500 Bq/kg limit to screen out the food contaminated with more than 200 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium.

However, the distrust for the official numbers and MSM in Japan is such that some people are totally willing to believe Asahi's numbers measured using the simple add-on kit and the scintillation survey meter from Horiba instead of the official numbers obtained from the germanium semiconductor detector, and they are accusing the cities for "lying".

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Nitrogen Injection System: Compressor Failure, Backup Injection System Started

Details in the press conference at 9:30AM, April 13 in Fukushima (Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant?), and at 11:00AM at TEPCO's headquarters in Tokyo.

From the tweets by an independent journalist who's on the list to receive TEPCO's emails on the plant situation:

• Drop in the amount of nitrogen gas being injected into Reactors 1, 2, 3 was noted by a TEPCO employee at 1AM, April 13 when he was checking the plant parameters.

• The nitrogen injection system was inspected at 1:30AM. It turned out that the system alarm had gone off at 1:04AM for "compressor failure", and the system had stopped ("nitrogen gas separation system B").

• At 3:10AM, the backup system ("nitrogen gas separation system" on the high ground) was started, and at 3:46AM the nitrogen gas injection restarted.

• There has been no discernible change in the plant parameters, hydrogen density, or the monitoring post data.

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(For Record) #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool Supporting Structure

From TEPCO's handout for the press on July 30, 2011:

The claim by some experts that only the steel posts are propping up the pool is not true.

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Yasumi Iwakami Interviewing Dr. Shuntaro Hida, Who Says "There Is Nowhere to Escape in Japan"

Iwakami, who disclosed his health problems since his tour of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant on Twitter, was interviewing Dr. Shuntaro Hida a while ago (April 12, 2012) which was live on USTREAM.

The part I caught was when Iwakami was asking the doctor about his recent ill health. Iwakami said every time he went to Fukushima he would suffer a dry cough, which would last for a while even after he came back to Tokyo. He didn't think much of that until recently.

Iwakami looked bleary. He asked Dr. Hida what he could do to improve his health, and asked for the doctor's advice to people who remain in Fukushima.

Dr. Hida said something that Hiroaki Koide of Kyoto University has been saying from the beginning of the nuclear disaster. He said, "There is nowhere to escape in Japan, because Japan is too small. Not all people in Fukushima can relocate."

Fukushima's population is about 2 million, or 1.6% of Japanese population (128 million). Surely there is enough space in Japan with rapidly declining population to absorb 2 million residents.

But Dr. Hida meant relocation of residents in the meaningful units - the entire towns and villages, and said there was no space.

That is a rather depressing thought. I don't quite understand, as a city person, why anyone should relocate with the entire town.

Dr. Hida's advice to Iwakami and people in Fukushima, and anyone who feel he/she is affected by radiation, is to lead a healthy life - get up early, eat at regular time, sleep well, enjoying the company of family and friends.

Well, by trying to appear calm in the face of the largest disaster (natural and nuclear), Japanese people as aggregate lost the opportunity to finally wake up from more than two decades of stupor and stagnation. For that majority, all they hope to do is to live like nothing happened. Dr. Hida's advice is quite appropriate in that regard, although it does make sense to strengthen the immune system to fight the effect of radiation.

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#Radioactive Japan: Noda Administration to Encourage Use of Recycled Cement From Disaster Debris in Public Works, Pay For Trips to Miyagi and Iwate

What will they think of next? (Anything but accurately measuring radiation levels and doing something about Fukushima I Nuke Plant, probably.)

From reading the Kyodo News article below, I don't get the feeling that this recycled cement use will be confined to public works in the disaster-affected areas.

From Kyodo News (4/11/2012):

公共事業でがれき処理促進　政府、取り組み強化へ'

Public works to promote disaster debris processing, the administration to push harder

　政府は１１日、東日本大震災の被災地に防潮林や公園をつくったり、道路や港を整備したりする際、がれきのコンクリート片などを優先的に使う方針を固めた。再生セメントの使用を確約した企業に対し、公共事業の競争入札で優遇する仕組みも導入する。被災地以外での広域処理が難航していることを踏まえ、政府として取り組み強化の姿勢を打ち出すのが狙い。野田佳彦首相を議長とする２回目の関係閣僚会議を近く開き、方針を確認する

The government decided on a new plan on April 11 to give priority to using disaster debris including concrete bits when tsunami-control forests and parks are built and roads and ports are repaired [as part of the public works] in the areas affected by the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami. The government will introduce a new competitive bidding scheme for public works that will give preference to companies who will promise the use of recycled cement. As the wide-area disposal of the debris outside the disaster-affected areas is proceeding with difficulties, the government wants to show its commitment [by introducing these plans]. The second meeting of the involved ministers, with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda as the chairman, will be held shortly, and the policy will be confirmed.

So the elected politicians in the National Diet won't matter, not even a Diet committee. The administration simply decides, and starts doing it.

And it is not even the full cabinet meeting of this administration. I believe there are only 4 or 5 ministers, including Prime Minister Noda, who are involved in this meeting.

In case you're wondering what "recycle cement" is, it's the cement that contains ashes from burning the debris. As long as the density of radioactive cesium in the final product is less than 100 bq/kg, the cement is good to use anywhere in Japan. Recycled cement is already being produced, using the ashes from incineration plants. Mix and dilute, that's the strategy.

And to further encourage more municipalities in Japan to accept the disaster debris, Goshi Hosono's Ministry of the Environment will subsidize trips to Miyagi and Iwate for the municipal officials and residents.

Yomiuri Shinbun (4/11/2012) reports that the Ministry of the Environment will cover the cost of:

• hiring buses

• lodging
  

• renting the halls for meetings with the residents

• fees for the lecturers at the meetings
  

The money will come from the current and future taxpayers, many of whom do not want to have disaster debris brought to their cities and towns. Ultimate insult.

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City in Tochigi Wants Disaster Debris, So It Can Upgrade Disposal Site on the Government Money

Kanuma City, located just west of Utsunomiya City (prefectural capital of Tochigi), wants to help people in the disaster-affected Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures by accepting the ashes resulting from the burning of the disaster debris elsewhere.

If you read the news by Shimotsuke Shinbun (local Tochigi newspaper), it seems the city is correctly seeing the wide-area disposal of the small amount of disaster debris (less than 20% of total) as an excellent opportunity to have the national government foot the bill for upgrading the waste management facilities and doing the badly needed deferred maintenance.

By no means Kanuma is unique among the cities who have expressed eagerness to accept disaster debris over the concerns of the local residents and residents downwind/downstream.

To the city's request for financial support, the Ministry of the Environment said "yes".

From Shimotsuke Shinbun (4/12/2012):

東日本大震災で発生した岩手、宮城両県のがれきの広域処理で、焼却灰の受け入れを表明している佐藤信鹿沼市長らは11日、環境省を訪れ、がれきの放射性物質検査や最終処分場の施設修繕に対する財政支援を国に要望した。高山智司環境政務官が応対。同市によると、検査強化で新たに生じる費用については国が負担するとの回答があったという。

Kanuma City has expressed interest in accepting the ashes from burning the disaster debris in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures that was generated by the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami. The mayor of the city Shin Sato and his men visited the Ministry of the Environment on April 11 and requested the financial assistance from the national government for testing radioactive materials on the debris and repair the facilities at its final disposal site [where the ashes will be buried]. They were met by Satoshi Takayama, Parliamentary Secretary of the Environment [No.3 position]. According to the city, [Takayama] answered that the national government would pay for the additional cost incurred by more rigorous testing.

　焼却灰を受け入れる予定の一般廃棄物最終処分場「鹿沼フェニックス」（鹿沼市磯町）は１９９３年に埋め立てを始め、約19年が経過。施設が老朽化し、機器類の故障が出ているという。

"Kanuma Phoenix" (Iso-machi, Kanuma City), the city's final disposal landfill for regular [non-industrial] waste where the ashes are to be buried, started operation 19 years ago in 1993. The facilities have deteriorated, and equipments break down often.

　同市は、同処分場で現在行っている放射性物質検査の回数や対象個所を増やす方針で、約３５００万円の費用が掛かると試算。埋め立て地の擁壁やポンプ類の修繕などで計約２２００万円の負担を見込んでいる。

The city plans to increase the number of testing for radioactive materials and the number of locations to be tested on the landfill, and it estimates the cost to be 35 million yen [US$433K]. It also estimates the repair cost for the retaining walls and pumps at the landfill at 22 million yen [US$272K].

The total budget of Kanuma City for the fiscal 2011 was 39.7 billion yen (US$490 million). As with many cities in Japan, Kanuma City's tax revenue covers less than 40% of the city's spending. Upgrading and repairing the disposal site is part of the discretionary spending.

By the way, this is the same city that fed elementary school children with local beef last October as a PR stunt to prove how safe their beef was.

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Fairewinds' Gundersen: "Reactor 3's Spent Fuel Pool Worse Off"

ENENEWS has the link to the podcast, for those who are interested.

ENENEWS post: http://enenews.com/gundersen-3-fuel-pool-worse-4-mechanically-rubble-pool-rubble-gotten-audio

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520 Bq/kg of Cesium in Spinach in Fukushima City, Cesium Is From Polyethylene Covering

News like this may be part of the reason of Professor Hayakawa's hostility toward farmers in Fukushima.

Where did this cesium come from? Water? Air? Soil?

Answer: None of the above. It came from a polyethylene sheet covering to keep the crop warm.

What is wrong with the sheet? It is the same polyethylene sheet that was in use when the reactors blew up in Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in March last year.

Why did the farmer continue to use the contaminated sheet? No one knows. Probably because no one told him not to use.

The spinach in question has already been sold, and probably consumed.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (4/11/2012):

福島県は１１日、福島市の露地栽培のホウレンソウから、国の食品規制値（１キロ・グラムあたり１００ベクレル）を超える放射性セシウムが検出されたと発表した。

Fukushima Prefecture announced on April 11 that radioactive cesium exceeding the national safety limit (100 becquerels/kg ) was detected from spinach grown in Fukushima City.

　ホウレンソウは福島市内の直売所に出荷されており、県は回収を呼びかけるとともに、福島市に対し、出荷自粛を要請した。

The spinach is sold at the direct sales depots in the city. The prefectural government is recalling it, and has asked Fukushima City to voluntarily halt shipment.

　県によると、福島市の農家で６日に収穫されたホウレンソウから１キロ・グラム当たり５２０ベクレルの放射性セシウムが検出された。ホウレンソウは３月２６日～４月６日に、計２１キロ・グラムが農産物販売所に出荷された。

According to the prefectural government, 520 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected from spinach harvested on April 6 at a farm in Fukushima City. The total 21 kilograms of the spinach from this farm were shipped to the farm produce sales depots between March 26 to April 6.

　ホウレンソウ栽培で使う保温用ポリフィルムは、昨年３月の原発事故以降同じものが使用されており、１キロ・グラム当たり３１万ベクレルと高濃度の放射性セシウムが検出された。県は保温材から放射性物質が付着した可能性が高いとみている。

Spinach growers use polyethylene sheet to keep the crop warm. The farm had been using the same sheet ever since the nuclear accident in March last year. 310,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected from the sheet. According to the prefectural government, it is highly likely that radioactive materials on the sheet were transferred to the spinach.

Last year, spinach from Fukushima in March and April regularly tested with thousands of becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium, in addition to radioactive iodine. A quick browse at Fukushima Prefecture's site on agricultural products found 34,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium in spinach.

NHK, on the same news, says the prefectural government is doing an emergency check on about 500 farms that produce spinach using the polyethylene sheet.

By now, you know this lack of thinking is not confined to farmers in Fukushima. Remember the subsidiary of Chiba JA (ag producer co-op) "recycling" the dirt attached to the plastic sheet used for greenhouses? The dirt was found with 58,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium, but the dirt had been already sold to a tree nursery. I wonder what happened to the dirt.

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Yasumi Iwakami Tweets About His Recent Health Problems After His Visit to #Fukushima I Nuke Plant in February

(and boy he received some nasty tweets in response...)

Yasumi Iwakami is arguably one of the best known independent journalists in Japan covering the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, particularly among net users. I happened on Iwakami's live netcast of TEPCO press conferences on his USTREAM channel very early on in the crisis, and have followed him and his reporting since.

He was one of the independent journalists allowed inside the plant compound in February this year on the second plant tour for the press (first one was in November last year). And ever since, he seems to have been plagued with one health discomfort after another. He tweeted about them on April 10, and someone compiled a "togetter" - a string of tweets.

First, the translation of Iwakami's 15 tweets as they appear on the togetter, with Iwakami's express permission to translate:

ご心配を皆さんにおかけしているので、中間報告をしておきます。これまでの経過をかいつまんで言いますと、2月20日、福一入構取材の翌々日から、腹痛と 下痢、その後、発熱にも見舞われ、虫垂炎との診断を受けました。５日間の絶食療法のあと、回復。虫垂炎は、一過性の病気かと思いましたが…

As I've been having you worried, I thought I'd give you a progress report. First, to tell you about what has happened so far: on February 20, two days after reporting from Fukushima I Nuke Plant, abdominal pain and diarrhea. Then I started to have fever, and was finally diagnosed as having appendicitis. After 5-day fasting treatment, I recovered. And I thought appendicitis was a transitory (one-time) illness. But then...

その後も、整腸剤を飲み続けているにもかかわらず、下痢が続き、時々、発熱。今週末も、この一ヶ月半で四回目の発熱でダウン。三月中から体調の異変を医師に相談、腫瘍マーカー、大腸ファイバーの検査をすることに。その検査結果の説明を、昨日の夕方、主治医から受けました。

My diarrhea continued even though I continued to take medicine to control intestinal function, and I had occasional fever. This weekend, I was knocked down by the 4th fever in a month and a half. I consulted my doctor about my poor physical health in March, and we decided to test for tumor markers and do the colonoscopy. Yesterday evening, my doctor explained to me the result of the tests.

大腸ファイバーで発見されたポリープの生検の結果は、悪性ではなく良性。「腺腫」の第三段階。このポリープと下痢は別物で、医師の診断は過敏性腸症候群。 原因は「ストレス」との診たて。今日ものどが痛み、熱が出ているが、これは風邪。なぜこんなに頻繁にひくのか、と問うと…

The biopsy of the polyp found in the colonoscopy turned out be benign, not malignant. It was "adenoma", so it was the third stage [there are 5 stages]. This polyp and diarrhea were not related, according to my doctor, and his diagnosis was "irritable bowel syndrome". The cause was "stress". I had a sore throat and fever that day, but that was a common cold, according to the doctor. When I asked him why I was having a cold this often...

原因は「免疫力の低下」。そのそもそもの原因は、またまた「ストレス」との診断。何でもかんでもストレス、という説明は納得がいかない。ストレスフルな生 活はこれまでもずっと続けてきた。一時的に体調を崩すことがあっても、こんなに連続して崩れっぱなしという経験はない、と言うと…

His answer was "weakened immune system". What caused it? "Stress", he said. I wasn't convinced with his explanation that everything was caused by stress. I have had a stressful life all this time. So I told him that I had never had a string of ill health like this before, though I did fall ill occasionally.

主治医いわく、「ストレス耐性には、閾値がある。あるレベルを超えると耐えきれなくなる」と。気になるのは、やはり、福一入構取材で浴びた放射線の影響。この点に関して、私の主治医は徹頭徹尾、否定的だった。

My doctor said, "There is a threshold to stress tolerance. Once people cross that threshold they succumb to stress." It was the effect of radiation I had been exposed to by entering and reporting from Fukushima I Nuke Plant that concerned me. But my doctor had been totally negative on that.

主治医いわく、「放射線の影響はあなたの体調不良とは一切関係ない。被曝によって影響が出るのは甲状腺だけ。これは医学的に証明済み」。何度もそう言われてきた。で、昨日の検査結果の説明の際、こう言われた。「腫瘍マーカーの結果、甲状腺に異常が出ています。細密検査が必要です」と。

He had said to me repeatedly, "Effect of radiation has nothing to do with your ill health. It's only the thyroid that is affected by radiation exposure, and that has been medically proven." Then, when he explained the test results to me yesterday, he said, "According to the result of the test for tumor markers, there is an abnormality in the thyroid. You need a more thorough examination."

甲状腺 意表を突かれて言葉が出ない。そこ 甲状腺以外の腫瘍マーカー検査項目はすべて正常値。甲状腺の検査項目、サイログロブリンだけが基準値を若干オーバー。「放射線の影響が出るのは甲状腺だけ」と断言していた主治医との間で、気まずい空気が。

Thyroid? I was speechless at this unexpected announcement. Other tumor markers were all normal. For markers for thyroid, thyroglobulin was slightly above the reference value. We felt awkward; he was the one who had declared to me that it was only the thyroid that would be affected by radiation exposure.

検査機関から返されてきた検査報告書にも、「甲状腺炎や甲状腺腫の可能性もありますので、甲状腺の画像検査をお受けください」と書かれている。つまり、こ れは被曝の影響ということだろうか？ その問いには主治医は直接答えず、「数値も、若干のオーバーですから、深刻に考えずに」と。

The test report from the lab stated, "Since there is a possibility that it is thyroiditis or goiter, please have [ultrasonic echo] diagnostics done on the thyroid". Did this mean it was the result of radiation exposure? My doctor didn't answer my question directly, but said, "The number is only slightly above the reference range, so don't take it too seriously."

私としても、福一入構取材で浴びた放射線との因果関係を強調したいわけではない。むしろ影響などない、と考えたい。影響があっては困るし、だいたい、自分 だけが具合悪くなるなんてこと、あるものか、と心のどこかで思ってきた。福島へまたこれから何度も取材に行きたいと思ってきた。しかし…

It's not that I want to emphasize the causal relationship between [my ill health] and the radiation exposure from reporting from Fukushima I Nuke Plant. I'd rather think there is no effect. I don't want that effect. Somehow I'd always thought it would not be possible that I would get sick. I wanted to visit Fukushima again and again and report. But...

現時点では、私の体調不良の原因はストレスおよび免疫力の低下、放射線被曝との因果関係は「わからない」「不明」ということ。それが、医師の診断。「百人 百話」の取材を通じて、福島の方々から、鼻血、下痢、発熱、倦怠感、皮膚炎、動悸など、数々の体調不良を訴える声を聞いてきた。

For now, the reasons for my ill health are stress and weakened immune system. Whether that has anything to do with radiation exposure is "unknown", or "not clear", and that is the diagnosis of my doctor. Through my report of "100 stories from 100 people", I have heard about many instances of ill health from people in Fukushima: nosebleed, diarrhea, fever, fatigue, dermatitis, heart palpitation, etc.

初めて、体調不良を訴える福島の方々の、心細い気持ちを本当に理解できた気がした。いったい原因は何か、体調の改善のために、いったいどうしたらいいのか、という思い。

I think I finally understand the helpless feeling these Fukushima people must have when they tell me about their ill health. What is the cause? What can we do to improve the condition?

断っておくが、私のかかりつけの主治医はよい方である。親切だし、説明も明晰である。放射線被曝の影響を小さく見積もるのも、それが現代医学の体系を学ん だ成果であって、個人的な偏見ではない（はず）。「50歳を過ぎたら、体力がガクッと落ちるもんですよ」というのも、真実に違いない。

To be fair, my doctor is a good doctor. He is kind, and he explains things clearly. He underestimates the effect of radiation exposure, but that is the result of having been trained in the modern medicine and not his personal prejudice (I think). It must be true when he says, "If you go past 50 years of age, your physical strength suddenly collapses".

さて、ではこれからどうするか。原因が何であれ（加齢も疲労もストレスも放射線被曝も全部加わっているかもしれないが）、被曝してしまった放射線を今さら取りのぞけるものでもない（東電の線量計では、僕の浴びたのは74マイクロシーベルト）。

Well then, what should I do? Whatever the cause (aging, fatigue, stress, radiation exposure all combined, maybe), it's not that I could remove the radiation that I've already been exposed to. (According to the dosimeter from TEPCO, my exposure was 74 microsieverts.)

結局、できることは、自身の免疫力を上げることしかない。ストレスを減らすこと、休養と睡眠を充分にとること、食養生をすること（これが難しい）。検査も 怠らないようにしよう。地道に養生することだ。主治医には「カラオケで歌でも歌ってください」と言われた。まあ、それもありだろう。

In the end, all I can do is to strengthen my immune system. Reduce stress, enough rest and sleep, and eat healthy food (this is difficult). I'll make sure I get tested regularly. Patiently nursing myself back to good health is what I should do. My doctor said to me, "Go to karaoke and sing." Well, that too.

たまたまなのだが、明日は午後2時から、大石又七さんにインタビューの予定。第五福竜丸の元乗組員で、被曝者の方である。そして明後日は、「核の傷」完成を記念して、肥田舜太郎氏に取材。広島で被曝された医師であることは、皆さん、ご存知の通り。

It so happens that I will interview Mr. Matashichi Oishi at 2PM tomorrow. He is a former crew member of Daigo Fukuryu-Maru, who was irradiated [near Bikini Atoll]. And the day after tomorrow, I will interview Shuntaro Hida, on the completion of "Nuclear Scar" (核の傷, movie). As you know, he is a medical doctor who was exposed to radiation in Hiroshima.

To this togetter, there are many, many comments ridiculing and taunting Iwakami. Just one or two example would suffice to get the gist of them:

Oh I see. He hasn't gotten enough victims of radiation, so he's claiming he's one of them.

He brought it on himself. Looking at these comments here, it's so apparent how much Mr. Iwakami is hated, what sinful things he has done...

I don't know where this vitriol is coming from. As with other prominent journalists and researchers, experts on Fukushima, I don't agree with Iwakami 100% on many issues, but without doubt he is one of the most dedicated journalists tirelessly covering the plight of people in Fukushima, incompetent handling of the accident and the aftermath by TEPCO and the government.

I think Hayakawa got it right when he said this is a war, that there are two very distinctive groups of people in Japan whose take of the nuclear accident and outlook on life after the radiation contamination are so vastly different that there is no ground for compromise.

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American Nuclear Society Report on Fukushima: "Human Error, Flaws in Governance and Oversight Contributed to the Severity of the Accident"

From the website of American Nuclear Society:

The American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima

On Friday, March 11, 2011, one of the largest earthquakes in the recorded history of the world occurred on the east coast of northern Japan. This earthquake also generated a major tsunami, causing nearly 20,000 deaths. Electricity, gas and water supplies, telecommunications, and railway service were all severely disrupted and in many cases completely shut down. These disruptions severely affected the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, causing a loss of all on-site and off-site power and a release of radioactive materials from the reactors.

The leadership of the American Nuclear Society commissioned the American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima to provide a clear and concise explanation of what happened during the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and offer recommendations based on lessons learned from their study of the event. The American Nuclear Society, a professional organization of 11,600 nuclear science and technology professionals, has a strong tradition of advancing nuclear safety, and the Special Committee on Fukushima was organized to further its members' interests in this important professional obligation.

The release of this report is the culmination of a nearly year-long effort by Special Committee members to analyze a range of factors related to what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. The report was officially released at a press conference held on March 8 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. ANS Executive Director Robert Fine made opening remarks and introductions. Drs. Dale Klein and Mike Corradini, the Special Committee co-chairs, lead the discussion of the report and the Q&A session. Special Committee members Paul Dickman -- who also served as study director -- and Jacopo Buongiorno, lead for regulatory issues, also appeared on the discussion panel. The press conference is available via webcast at the following link: Press Conference Webcast

Here's the report: http://fukushima.ans.org/report/Fukushima_report.pdf
From the Executive Summary:

The Committee found that no aspect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident indicates a priori that the level of safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States is unacceptable. Indeed, the Committee agrees with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that the current level of safety provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the U.S. public. However, the Committee believes that elements of the accident that relate to observed vulnerabilities in the ability of NPPs to respond to such an extreme natural event must be examined with care. As importantly, the Committee believes that in responding to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, human error and flaws in governance and regulatory oversight contributed to the severity of the accident. These errors and human factors must be understood and addressed before substantively modifying technology.

Exactly. And they are exactly what the Japanese government is trying its best to ignore in deciding to re-start nuclear power plants in Japan.

In comparison, Japan's Atomic Energy Society was finally persuaded by the members who attended the annual spring conference in March this year to compile its report on the accident by June.

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Tokyo Metropolitan Government Is Now the Largest Shareholder of TEPCO

Yomiuri Shinbun (4/11/2012) reports:

　東京電力の株主として従来第３位だった東京都が、筆頭株主になったことが分かった。

It has been revealed that the Tokyo Metropolitan government, who was the third largest shareholder of TEPCO, is now the largest shareholder.

これまで筆頭株主だった第一生命保険と２位株主だった日本生命保険がそれぞれ３月末までに東電株の一部を売却したためだ。東京都は、東電がビルや工場など大口向け電気料金を値上げしたことに反発し、６月末の株主総会で株主提案権を行使すると主張しており、東電と東京都の対立の行方が注目される。

The largest shareholder Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company and the second largest shareholder Nippon Life Insurance Company both sold part of its TEPCO holdings by the end of March [end of the fiscal 2011]. The Tokyo Metropolitan government is not happy that TEPCO has raised electricity charges for large business customers, and has said it will exercise the shareholder's right to propose in the shareholders' meeting at the end of June, adding to increasingly confrontational situation between TEPCO and the Tokyo Metropolitan government.

　昨年９月末時点では、東電の株主構成は〈１〉第一生命（３・４２％）〈２〉日本生命（３・２９％）〈３〉東京都（２・６６％）の順だった。

At the end of September last year, the top three shareholders of TEPCO were: Dai-ichi Life Insurance (3.42%), Nippon Life Insurance (3.29%) and Tokyo Metropolitan government (2.66%).

　第一生命と日本生命は、東電の株価が著しく下落する中で、株の売却を進めた。

Dai-ichi Life and Nippon Life proceeded to sell the shares as the share price of TEPCO significantly dropped.

　東京都は、猪瀬直樹副知事が大口向け料金値上げに反発し、東電に徹底したコスト削減を求めている。猪瀬氏は３月の都議会で「株主提案権を行使して、株主総会の場で東京都の意見、提案を表明していく」と述べた。

Within the Tokyo Metropolitan government, Vice Governor Naoki Inose is particularly displeased with the rate hike for big businesses, and is demanding further cost cut from TEPCO. Mr. Inose said during the March Assembly, "We will exercise the shareholder's right to suggest, and express the opinion and make suggestions as the Tokyo Metropolitan government in the shareholders' meeting."

Well, confrontation goes only so far, I'm afraid. As the readers of this blog know, the Iwate disaster debris burning project of Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara benefits TEPCO's subsidiary Tokyo Rinkai Recycle Power Company as it has been "selected" as the only company able to burn the flammable debris in a quantity specified in the bidding document (100 tonnes/day minimum).

Tokyo burns Iwate's debris which is less contaminated than Miyagi's at a dedicated industrial waste incinerator at the TEPCO subsidiary, and burns more contaminated Miyagi's debris at incineration plants that usually only burn household garbage and are situated in the middle of the residential areas. Make sense, doesn't it?

For this government to criticize TEPCO is like "the pot calling kettle black" to say it in English; to say it in Japanese, in literal translation, "eye mucus laughing at snot".

The Tokyo Metropolitan government is also said to be loaded with TEPCO's corporate bonds. The bonds issued by power companies are the debt secured by the company assets. TEPCO has 5 trillion yen (US$62 billion) in debt outstanding. A tiny drop in a bucket, though, compared to what the Japanese national government owes (depending on the statistics, anything from 600 trillion yen just counting the long-dated national bonds to over 1,000 trillion (or 1 quadrillion) yen counting in the debt by prefectures and municipalities, short-dated notes and debt secured by the government).

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