Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (5/7): No Impression That TEPCO President Shimizu Wanted to Withdraw Workers from #Fukushima I NPP

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4 from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――14日夜から東電の撤退問題が浮上する

---The issue of TEPCO withdrawing from the plant surfaced in the evening of March 14, 2011.

「撤退問題の議論は３つの段階を経たように思う。海江田経産相が伊藤哲朗・危機管理監（当時）と安井正也・保安院付（当時）と私を呼んで、東電が全員撤退を考えていると伝えた。私は免震重要棟があるのでまだ頑張れるはずだ。いったん撤退してしまうと二度と戻れなくなり、１号から６号まですべての原子炉と燃料プールが危機にさらされると、撤退に反対した」

"I believe there were three stages of discussions regarding the withdrawal. Minister of Economy Kaieda called Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Tetsuro Ito, NISA's Masaya Yasui and me and told us that TEPCO was considering complete withdrawal [from the plant]. I told them I was against the withdrawal. They could hang on in the Anti-Seismic Building. Once they withdrew they wouldn't be able to come back, and all reactors and spent fuel pools would be in danger."

「その後、政治家だけの相談があり、首相を起こして御前会議となった。撤退は許さないが結論で、清水正孝社長（当時）を呼ぶことになった」

"Afterwards, politicians met by themselves. Then we woke up the prime minister and held a meeting in front of him. The conclusion was that we wouldn't allow withdrawal, and that we would call TEPCO's President Masataka Shimizu [to the Prime Minister's Official Residence]."

■「清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった

"I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer."

「清水社長は一人で総理執務室に入ってきた。清水社長が即座に『撤退は考えていない』と話したので、私は『聞いていたのと話が違う』と思った。清水社長がその場でごまかそうとしたとの印象はまったくなかった。なにか誤解があったのかもしれない。ただ経営者としてこのままでは部下が死ぬ可能性があると思ったとき、ほかに手だてはないかと考えていたとしてもおかしくはない

"President Shimizu came into the Prime Minister's Office all by himself. He immediately said he was not thinking of withdrawal. I thought, 'That's not what I was told.' I didn't get the impression at all that President Shimizu was trying to make an evasive answer on the spot. There may have been some misunderstanding. But it was possible that he was thinking of some other way when he, as the president, thought his men could die."

班目氏の行動（３月14日）
9:53 原子力災害対策本部の会合（この後、首相応接室を退去し官邸５階の小部屋などに滞在、呼び出しに応じ応接室へ）
11:01 首相応接室のテレビで３号機水素爆発を確認
11:40 官房長官記者会見に同席
13:40ころ 東電から福島第１で働く人の線量限度引き上げの要望、国際基準などを関係者に説明
16:15 吉田所長と電話で話し、２号機逃し安全弁の開放を急ぐよう助言
18:00ころ 20～30ｋｍ圏内の屋内退避を首相に助言、福山副官房長官室で米国へ提供する情報の整理
21:03 官房長官記者会見に同席

Dr. Madarame on March 14, 2011:
9:53AM Meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (afterwards he stayed in a room on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence, and went to the drawing room when called)
11:01AM Saw Reactor 3 hydrogen explosion on TV in the PM drawing room
11:40AM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference
1:40PM Explained to people involved about TEPCO's request [?} to raise the dose limit for workers at Fukushima I NPP and international standards
4:15PM Spoke with Plant Manager Yoshida on the phone, advised him to open the Reactor 2's [steam] relief safety valve as soon as possible
6:00PM Advised Prime Minister to designate areas between 20 and 30 kilometers radii as sheltering indoors, compiled information to be provided to the US
9:03PM Accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary in press conference

Two things here that I didn't know - that Mr. Kan was asleep, and that Mr. Shimizu came to the PM Official Residence alone. The latter was rather surprising, as I remember Mr. Shimizu at that time being portrayed as ineffective, weak and timid, who could never be able to stand in front of politicians - let alone the irascible PM Kan.

Mr. Naoto Kan continues to take crecit for "stopping" TEPCO from "withdrawing".

The National Diet Independent Commission's conclusion in June 2012 was different. The Commission acknowledged that TEPCO didn't consider a complete withdrawal from the plant and that PM's Office did not stop TEPCO from "withdrawing". (See my post on June 9, 2012.)

TEPCO did not intend to "withdraw" (撤退 tettai); instead it wanted to "take shelter" (退避 taihi) from extremely high radiation after the Reactor 3 explosion. But for Messrs Kan and Kaieda, who weren't trained in law and had no experience as bureaucrats at top ministries, the distinction was too subtle.

From my June 9, 2012 post:

Both Mr. Kan and Mr. Kaieda also said they thought it was an "all-out" withdrawal, because Mr. Shimizu didn't use the word "partial". Shimizu said he was surprised that the administration understood his carefully chosen word "temporary shelter" - "taihi" as "all-out withdrawal" - "tettai".

The Diet commission's conclusion was that it was a case of miscommunication. TEPCO's Shimizu thought he was telling these officials that he wanted his workers to temporarily take shelter in a less irradiated location while keeping the core people at the plant. Messrs Kan and Kaieda thought "taihi" and "tettai" were the same thing and decided Shimizu was announcing an all-out withdrawal from the plant. It seems Mr. Shimizu's mistake was he thought he was talking to high-ranking bureaucrats with whom he had dealt before the accident. Unlike many politicians neither Mr. Kan nor Mr. Kaieda had been trained in law (Kan was an applied physics major, Kaieda political science) or through elite bureaucracy. (Mr. Edano would have understood Mr. Shimizu perfectly, but Mr. Edano says he never spoke with Mr. Shimizu.)

TEPCO workers and workers from affiliate companies (Hitachi, Toshiba, Kandenko, etc. and their subcontractors) remained at the plant as the radiation levels were several hundred millisieverts/hour and at one point exceeding 1 sievert/hour (see the AP article from 3/16/2011 at the link), with only 2 meals per day and sleeping on the floor as the government refused to provide workers with better food and other provisions. And the world hailed them as heroes as "Fukushima 50".

Mr. Edano, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary, is a lawyer.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (4/7): The Worst Case Would Be "High-Pressure Melt Through", Politicians Thought Recriticality Was Nuclear Explosion

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

■「食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"We were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."


――12日午後に１号機で爆発が起きたとき、どう思ったのか。

--What did you think when an explosion happened in Reactor 1 in the afternoon of March 12, 2011?

「映像を見た瞬間に水素爆発だと思った。その時の記憶はあいまいだが、下村健一・内閣審議官（当時）の書いたものよると、私は『建屋に水素が漏れて、建屋には水素があるので爆発した』と淡々と説明したとされている。多分、事実だろう」

"I thought it was a hydrogen explosion the moment I saw the image. I don't remember clearly, but according to what Kenichi Shimomura, who was a cabinet counselor at that time, wrote, I calmly explained that "hydrogen leaked into the building, and since there is hydrogen (sic) [probably "oxygen"] in the building an explosion happened." I think it is probably true."

「この爆発を機に、首相は私の言うことを信用しなくなった。『安全委員会にはほかに専門家はいないのか』と問われたので、『久木田豊委員長代理（当時）も詳しい』と答えると、『すぐに呼べ』と言われたので、久木田さんに来てもらい、私はオフィスに戻った」

"From this explosion on, Prime Minister stopped believing me. He asked me if there were other experts at the Nuclear Safety Commission. I answered that Acting Chairman Yutaka Kukita was also knowledgeable. He told me to "call him here immediately". So I had Mr. Kukita come, and I returned to my office."


――１号機の爆発のあった時間帯は、海水注入の議論をしていたころでもある。

--Around the time of the Reactor 1 explosion, the debate was ongoing on seawater injection [into the reactors].

「（海水注入の議論の中で）『再臨界の可能性はあるか』と首相から問われたら、『可能性はある』と答えたとしてもおかしくない。私には尋ねられた記憶がない」

"In discussing the seawater injection, it would not be odd if I had been asked by Prime Minister whether there was a possibility of recriticality and I had answered there was a possibility. I have no memory of being asked."

「実は水素爆発の前の時点から、海江田万里・経産相（当時）が議長になって海水注入の問題点を総理応接室（官邸５階）で話し合っていた。塩が析出し腐食も問題になるので長期間は無理だが、いまは炉心を冷やすことを何より優先し海水を入れろと私は主張していた。首相が海水注入を止めるよう言うはずはないと思う。海水注入中断の問題は、国会事故調査委員会などが指摘するように東電の武黒一郎フェローの勝手な判断が介在していたように思う。いずれにしても、吉田昌郎所長（当時）の判断で注入の中断はなかった」

"Even before the hydrogen explosion, Minister of Economy Banri Kaieda was chairing a meeting in the PM Reception Room (on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence), and we were talking about the potential problems of seawater injection. I insisted that seawater be injected as cooling the reactor core was the first priority, even though it was not a long-term solution because of salt deposition and corrosion problem. I don't think Prime Minister would order a halt in seawater injection. The issue of halting the seawater injection arose, as pointed out in the National Diet accident investigation commission, from an arbitrary decision by TEPCO's Fellow Ichiro Takekuro. In any way, there was no halt thanks to Plant Manager Masao Yoshida."

「後に福山哲郎・官房副長官（当時）はじめ、政治家の人たちの著書を読んで気がついたのだが、みなさん再臨界イコール核爆発だと思っていたらしい。再臨界が仮に起きても核爆発とは違うことは、ＪＣＯ事故などからも明らかだ。食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"I realized later when I read books by politicians including Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama (then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) that everyone had thought recriticality meant nuclear explosion. It is obvious from accidents like the JCO accident that even if criticality happens that's different from nuclear explosion. But we were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."

――その日は深夜に自宅に戻るが、すぐにまた官邸に呼ばれる。

--You went home late that night, but was called back soon to the PM Official Residence.

「ほとんど寝ていない。ただ13日になると、いろいろな専門家から見解を聞く余裕が出てきた。とくに久木田さんとの意見交換は貴重で、その時点で最も怖いのは高圧溶融物放出（ＨＭＴ=High-pressure Melt Through）という現象だと意見が一致していた。これは溶融燃料によって圧力容器の壁が溶けて薄くなった末、圧力容器内と格納容器の圧力差によって燃料が容器を突き破って外に飛び出す現象だ。格納容器の壁まで貫通してしまう恐れがある」

"I hardly slept. But on March 13, I began to have more time [or "peace of mind"] to listen to other experts. Discussion with Dr. Kukita was particularly valuable, and we both agreed that the most frightening possibility at that time was the phenomenon called "High-pressure Melt Through" (HMT). HMT happens when the melted fuel melts the Pressure Vessel wall thin, and the melted fuel gets ejected through the Pressure Vessel due to the difference in pressure between the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. It is possible that the melted fuel could pierce through the wall of the Containment Vessel."

「14日の３号機の水素爆発の後、２号機の逃がし安全弁を急いで開くように助言したのは、２号機でＨＭＴが起きるのを心配して、圧力容器と格納容器の圧力を均一化した方がよいと考えたからだ。吉田所長はまずベントの準備を整えてからと主張していた。安全弁を開くと圧力容器内の水が水蒸気となって格納容器に流れ出し、燃料が空だきになる恐れがあるので、注水の備えがないと安全弁を開けない。難しい判断だ」

"After the hydrogen explosion of Reactor 3 on March 14, I advised that the relief safety valve of Reactor 2 should be opened quickly. I was worried that HMT might happen in Reactor 2, so I thought it would be prudent to equalize the pressure in the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. Plant Manager Yoshida insisted that preparation for the vent be done first. If the relief safety valve is opened, the water inside the Pressure Vessel becomes water vapor and flows into the Containment Vessel, leaving the fuel heated without water. So you cannot open the relief safety valve without preparation to inject water. It is a difficult decision."

――そう考えると、原子炉の底部から溶融燃料が落ちたのは不幸中の幸いと言えるか。

--In that sense, it was lucky that the melted fuel dropped from the bottom of the reactor.

「そうとも言える」

"You could say so."

班目氏の行動（３月13日）
3:40ころ 自宅で原子力安全委事務局からの電話
5:00ころ 官邸へ（官邸到着前に安全委オフィスで他の安全委員らと意見交換）
この間、３号機の高圧注水系停止などの事態が進む
10:04 原子力災害対策本部の会議
13:55 安全委オフィスに戻り、官邸の状況を説明
14:35 官邸へ
この間、保安院の安井氏らも加わって、３号機の水素爆発の可能性を議論
15:30 官房長官記者会見に同席（これ以降、数回）
21:35 原子力災害対策本部の会議
久木田委員長代理と最悪のシナリオを議論。政治家にメルトスルー後のコンクリート反応を説明

Dr. Madarame on March 13, 2011:
3:40AM received call at his home from the secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission
5:00AM went to the PM Official Residence (after speaking with other commissioners at the Nuclear Safety Commission office)
The situation at the plant grew more serious as Reactor 3's high-pressure core injection system stopped.
10:04AM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
1:55PM went back to the Nuclear Safety Commission office, and explained the situation at the PM Official Residence
2:35PM went back to the PM Official Residence
Discussed the possibility of a hydrogen explosion in Reactor 3 with others including Mr. Yasui from NISA
3:30PM accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] in the press conference (would do a few more times later)
9:35PM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
Discussed the worst case scenario [high-pressure melt through] with Deputy Chairman Kukita of Nuclear Safety Commission. Explained the core-concrete reaction after the melt through to the politicians

It is interesting to note that, according to Dr. Madarame's March 13, 2011 schedule, he was debating with another nuclear expert (Kukita) about the worst case of "high-pressure melt through", in which the melted core (corium) will eject from the Pressure Vessel at a high speed, possibly piercing through the Containment Vessel, while telling the politicians a more "benign" core-concrete reaction scenario.

If HMT had happened in Reactor 2, as Dr. Madarame and Dr. Kukita feared, it may have been an immediate evacuation from the plant. The worst case that PM Kan says he received (but decided to sit on it for months and deny the existence of the report) may have come true then.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (3/7): He Knew It Was a Core Melt by Early Morning of March 12, 2011, Didn't Know TEPCO Hadn't Done the Vent

(Part 4 available now)

==============

and says his explanation that there would be no hydrogen explosion is technically correct.

(Continued from Part 1 and Part 2, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――事態が当初の見込みよりはるかに深刻だと気づいたのはいつごろか。

--When did you realize that the situation was much graver than the initial assessment?

「深夜を過ぎたころに１号機の格納容器の圧力があがっていると聞いたときに、これは変だと思った。ひょっとしたら、直流電源が止まっていたのかと疑った。それにしても１号機は非常用復水器（ＩＣ）によって自然循環で冷やせるので（電源喪失には）強いはずなのに、とも思った。その後、電源車のケーブルがつながらないとか、ケーブルがいくらあっても足りないとか耳にしたとき、配電盤も水没して、ポンプなどひとつひとつに電源をつなぎ込んでいるのかと推測した。現場で何が起き、どうしようとしているのかが（官邸にまで）伝わっていなかった。人間の心理は極端から極端に振れる。私は非常に絶望的な気持ちになっていた」

"I knew something was wrong when I was told that the pressure of the Reactor 1 Containment Vessel was rising, past midnight [of March 11, 2011]. Maybe the DC power stopped, I thought. Still, Reactor 1 could be cooled by the isolation condenser (IC) even in the loss of power situation. Later, I heard the cables from the power supply cars couldn't be connected, or that they needed more cables than available; I speculated that the switchboard was under water, and they were trying to supply power to individual pumps. We (at the Prime Minister's Official Residence) were not aware of what was going on at the plant and what they were trying to do. Human psychology goes from extreme to extreme. I started to feel extremely desperate."

■「安心したことが間違いだった」

"It was a mistake [PM Kan] to feel relieved"

――前夜に進言したベントは明け方になっても実行されていなかった。

--The vent you suggested the night before wasn't carried out by the next morning.

「前夜とはベントをする意味が大きく変わっていた。このころになると、炉心が溶けて（水蒸気やガスで）格納容器の圧力が高まっていると推測できた。格納容器を（破損から）守るためにベントが必要になっていた」

"The purpose of the vent had vastly changed from the previous night. By that time [morning of March 12, 2011], it could be assumed [I assumed] that the reactor core melted, and the pressure inside the Containment Vessel was rising (because of water vapor and gas). The vent was necessary in order to protect the Containment Vessel (from damage)."

――早朝になって、避難指示の区域を10キロ圏に広げている。

--In the early morning [of March 12, 2011] you expanded the evacuation zone to areas within 10-kilometer radius.

「炉心が溶けているとすると、３キロでは足りないと思った」

"I thought 3-kilometer radius was not enough if the reactor core melted."

――それほど悲観的に事態をみていたのなら、早朝にヘリコプターで現場に向かう菅直人首相（当時）に同行し、機内で「水素爆発はない」と話したのはなぜか。

--If your assessment of the situation was that pessimistic, why did you accompany (then) Prime Minister Naoto Kan in the early morning on a helicopter and told him "there would be no hydrogen explosion"?

「首相から炉心が露出したらどうなるか問われた。水素ができると答えると、爆発が起きるのかと問い返された。そこで格納容器の中は窒素で置換されていて（酸素はないので）爆発は起きませんと答えた。この説明は誤りではない。菅元首相は著書で、私の言葉を聞いて安心したのが『大間違いだった』と書いているが、私の説明に誤りはない。そこで（首相が）安心したことが間違いだった」

"Prime Minister asked me what would happen if the reactor core was exposed. I answered hydrogen would be generated. He then asked me if that would lead to an explosion. So I answered there would be no explosion because the Containment Vessel was filled with nitrogen (and there was no oxygen). My explanation is not wrong. Former Prime Minister Kan writes in his book that it was a "big mistake" to feel relieved by my words, but my explanation is not wrong. It was a mistake (for Prime Minister Kan) to feel relieved."

「ヘリに乗る直前に、これからベントを行うとの連絡を聞いていたように思う。現地に着くまでにベントは実施されるものだと思っていた」

"I think I heard, right before we boarded the helicopter, that they were about to do the vent. So I thought the vent would have been done by the time we arrive at the plant."

――とすると、ベント直後の発電所に降り立つことになるが、ヘリに乗った人たちは防護服を着ていなかった。

--If what you say is true, then you would have landed on the plant right after the vent. But no one on board the helicopter was wearing the protective clothing."

「防護服のことなど考えもしなかった」

"I didn't even think about the protective clothing."

――ヘリから降りた菅首相は「なぜベントを早くやらないのだ」と東京電力の武藤栄・副社長（当時）をいきなり怒鳴りつけたとされている。首相はベントが実行されていないことを知っていた。

--It is said that Prime Minister Kan, on getting off the helicopter, shouted at (then) TEPCO Vice President Sakae Muto, "Why aren't you doing the vent?" So the prime minister knew that the vent hadn't been done.

「首相と武藤さんとの会話を聞いていないが、首相はどこかで（ベントの未実施を）知らされていたのだろう。私は免震重要棟の会議室で知らされた。首相がベントのことを強く言ったのは、機内で私がベントの必要性を強調したせいかもしれない」

"I didn't hear the conversation between the prime minister and Mr. Muto, but I suppose the prime minister must have been told about (the vent not being done yet). I was told in the conference room of the Anti-Seismic Building [at the plant]. The prime minister may have used strong words about the vent because I emphasized to him the importance of the vent when we were on board.

Dr. Madarame's schedule on March 12, 2011, from Part 2:

0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

The vent, which was made extremely difficult because there was no power at the plant, was further delayed because of Kan's hastily arranged trip in the early morning of March 12, 2011. The hydrogen explosion was not from inside the Containment Vessel as Dr. Madarame had feared but in the building, either on the 4th floor or the 5th floor (operating floor), with the evidence suggesting the 4th floor, when the hydrogen gas was finally vented but came back into the building instead of going to the exhaust stack.

In other words, the vent may have caused the explosion after all (that was the conclusion of none other than NISA in December 2011). If the vent had been successfully carried out by the time Mr. Kan and Dr. Madarame arrived at the plant, they may have been just in time to witness the Reactor 1 explosion firsthand.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (2/7): "I Didn't Know What Was Going On in the Room, I Couldn't Call for Help Because My Cellphone Didn't Work in the Basement"

Part 1, Part 3, Part 4
========================

(Continued from Part 1, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

「海岸近くにある冷却系施設が津波で壊れているはずだから、（炉心で発生する）熱の捨て場がない。熱を捨てるには炉心に水をぶち込んで、水蒸気の形で熱を空気中に出すしかない。熱の捨て場を確保する目的で、ベント（排気）をしてくださいと進言した。この時点では炉心が溶け始めているとは思っていなかった」

"I assumed that the cooling system near the ocean had been damaged by the tsunami; there was no place to dump the heat (generated in the reactor core). To remove the heat, the only way was to pour water in the reactor core, and release the heat into the air in the form of water vapor. So I suggested that the vent be done in order to secure the space to remove the heat. At that point, I didn't think that the reactor core would start melting."

「また周辺住民の避難に関して、私が3キロ圏の避難を進言したことになっている。ここは記憶があいまいなのだが、国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）の予防的措置範囲（ＰＡＺ＝Precautionary Action Zone）が３～５キロだと承知しているので、３キロではどうかと問われれば、それでよい、国際的な考え方からも予防的に避難させるべきだと答えたに違いない。すでに福島県が２キロ圏内の避難を指示していることもおそらくそのときに聞いたはずだ」

"About evacuating the residents in the surrounding areas, it is supposed to be me who suggested the evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius. My memory on this is blurry, but I knew the IAEA's Precautionary Action Zone to be between 3 to 5-kilometer radius. So if I had been asked whether the 3-kilometer radius was OK, I must have answered that it was OK, and by the international standard the residents needed to be evacuated as a precaution. I must also have heard at the same time that Fukushima Prefecture had already instructed the residents within the 2-kilometer radius to evacuate."

「後から振り返れば、私はこのとき部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった。原発事故の際には保安院の緊急時対応センター（ＥＲＣ、経済産業省別館）で指揮がとられることになっていた。ＥＲＣでは指揮がとられていて、私は政治家の人たちに解説をすればよいのだと思っていた。ただ矢継ぎ早の質問に対し、私は何の資料も原発の図面すらなく、ただ記憶だけで答えていた。11日の夕方には原子力安全委員がオフィスに集まり始めていたが、官邸地下の危機管理センターからは携帯電話がかけられず、助けを得られなかった」

"In retrospect, I didn't know what was going on in the room. In a nuclear accident, NISA's Emergency Response Center (ERC, in the Ministry of Economy Annex building) was to be the command center. I assumed the ERC was doing the job, and I was there at the Prime Minister's Official Residence to explain things to the politicians. But I was answering a barrage of questions from my memory, without any reference material, not even a blueprint of the plant [reactors]. Commissioners [of Nuclear Safety Commission] started to gather in the office in the evening of March 11, but I couldn't make a call on my cellphone from the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence to get their help."

班目氏の行動（３月12日）
0:55 １号機格納容器の圧力上昇の情報 電源車到着するが、電源復旧できず、電源盤損傷の疑いを抱く
3:00ころ ２号機の隔離時冷却系（ＲＣＩＣ）運転の情報を確認（危険なのは１号機と判断）
5:00ころ 首相の現地視察への同行依頼を受ける
5:44 10ｋｍ圏内の避難指示
6:14 菅首相に同行しヘリで官邸を発つ（機内で首相に水素爆発の説明）
7:11 福島第１原発へ到着（到着後、ベント未実施を知る）
8:04 福島第１原発を出発
10:47 官邸に帰着し安全委オフィスに徒歩で戻る
12:08 原子力災害対策本部の会議（11:35呼び出し受ける）
13:00ころ 福島県選出国会議員への説明（13:30ころ以降は首相応接室に滞在）
15:18 １号機のベント成功の情報。その後、海水注入の問題点を議論
15:50ころ １号機で白煙発生の情報
17:00ころ テレビで１号機爆発を確認、水素爆発と直感。その後、菅首相の求めで久木田委員長代理を推薦
19:30ころ 安全委オフィスに戻る
22:05 原子力災害対策本部の会議(再び官邸）
24:00過ぎ 帰宅

Dr. Madarame on March 12, 2011
0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

His cellphone didn't work in the sub-basement... I don't know if it ever occurred to Dr. Madarame to go outside and make a phone call. Is he trying to tell us there was no landline telephone available at the Crisis Management Center?

NISA was indeed doing the job at the Emergency Response Center that day. They had their own computer simulation done on the spread of radioactive materials and drawing up the evacuation plan that was based on the simulation. It was NOT the stupendous concentric circles like Mr. Edano and Mr. Kan came up with on their own.

But what did NISA do? Or rather, what did Director-General of NISA do, who was at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and was in the position to tell the irascible Prime Minister Naoto Kan that his organization was getting a better handle on the situation and in fact coming up with the evacuation plan? Director-General Terasaka was shouted at and scolded by Kan, and he went home, never to return to the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the duration of the initial crisis. (He was the one whose excuse was "because I was liberal arts major.")

NISA's Deputy Director-General, after his boss left the building, had to deal with Prime Minister Naoto Kan, which he apparently did very poorly. He was a science major, but in electrical engineering.

Dr. Madarame in the book published in December 2012 (pages 39, 40):

15条通報を受け、午後5時40分頃、官邸に向かいました。到着すると、まず官邸五階の総理執務室に通されました。
「助けて下さい」
私を出迎えた保安院のナンバー２である平岡英治次長がそう懇願しました。いったい何事かと思いました。だいたい、本来この場にいるのは保安院トップの寺坂信昭院長のはずです。ところが、姿が見えない。

After receiving the Article 15 notice [ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2], I headed for the Prime Minister's Official Residence around 5:40PM [on March 11, 2011]. When I arrived there, I was led to the Prime Minister's Office on the 5th floor.

"Please help me."

Eiji Hiraoka, Deputy Director-General of NISA pleaded with me. I wondered, what was going on? To begin with, it should be the Director-General of NISA, Nobuaki Terasaka who should be there. But he was nowhere to be seen.

後で聞いたのですが、菅さんに原発の状況を聞かれたのに、寺坂さんはまともに質問に答えられなかったようです。それを厳しく叱責されたため、官邸を辞した後でした。その後、私は官邸内で寺坂さんにお目にかかった記憶はありません。

I heard it later that Mr. Terasaka couldn't answer the questions from Mr. Kan regarding the nuclear power plant. He was severely scolded, and left the building. I don't remember ever seeing Mr. Terasaka inside the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

寺坂さんは、経産省の事務官です。大学では経済を専攻し、経済はともかく、原子力はずぶの素人でした。ところが、どうしたことか、技術に精通しているべき保安院の院長に就いていました。寺坂院長が答えられなかったので、次は平岡次長が菅さんに詰問されました。平岡次長は技官ですが大学では電気を勉強していて、原子力には詳しくない。

Mr. Terasaka is an administrative official at Ministry of Economy. He majored in economics in college. He may know economics, but when it comes to nuclear energy he was a rank amateur. But for whatever reason he was the director-general of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, who should possess intimate knowledge of the [nuclear] technology. Since Director-General Terasaka couldn't answer, Deputy Director-General Hiraoka was grilled by Mr. Kan. Deputy Director-General Hiraoka is a technical official, but his major in college was electrical engineering and he didn't know much about nuclear energy.

日本の不運か、菅さんの悲運か、こんな時に、適任者が適切なポストにいない、とはまさに痛恨の極みです。平岡次長の「助けて」は、そういう理由だったのでしょう。

Was it Japan's misfortune? Was it Mr. Kan's ill fate? In the time like this, a qualified person wasn't in the appropriate position. A cry for help from Deputy Director-General Hiraoka could be understood in this context.

Or someone who could shout back at Mr. Kan and tell him to shut up.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (1/7): "#Fukushima I NPP Wasn't Much of a Topic in March 11, 2011 Meeting Despite Station Blackout and Emergency Core Cooling Failure"

Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
================

Dr. Haruki Madarame was the chairman of the now-defunct Nuclear Safety Commission at the time of the start of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. He became instantly infamous and reviled in Japan when it was reported that he had reassured then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in the morning of March 12, 2011 that there would be no explosion. A few hours later, the Reactor 1 building blew up in a hydrogen explosion.

Nikkei Shinbun interviewed Dr. Madarame recently, who was as candid as he had been in the past few times he had spoken about his role in the early days of the nuclear accident, readily admitting his errors. (In his testimony to the Diet Commission that investigated the Fukushima I NPP accident in February 2012, Dr. Madarame said he didn't remember the 1st week of the accident, as he was so tired from lack of sleep.)

Nikkei's article from the interview is very informative but also quite long, so it will be in 7 installments.

In the first installment below, Dr. Madarame paints a picture of the Kan administration and himself not knowing what was going on and not knowing what to do.

As is quite usual in the Japanese media, no other media even writes about this Nikkei article.

From Nikkei Shinbun (1/10/2014):

班目氏、３年目の証言　「あり得た、フクシマ最悪の筋書き」
編集委員　滝　順一

Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima"
by Junichi Taki, editorial board member

東日本大震災で起きた福島第１原子力発電所の事故当時、原子力安全委員長だった班目春樹氏（東京大学名誉教授）。原発事故時には政府に技術的助言を与える立場にあったが、的確な助言ができなかったとして非難を浴びた。2012年夏に退任して以来、表舞台に出ることはほとんどなかった同氏がこのほど日本経済新聞の取材に応じた。

Dr. Haruki Madarame (professor emeritus at Tokyo University) was the chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission when the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident happened after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. He was in a position to give technical advice to the national government, but he was later criticized as not having been able to give accurate advice. He has maintained a low public profile since he retired as the chairman in the summer of 2012, but Nikkei Shinbun spoke to him recently.

その中で班目氏は、溶融核燃料が格納容器の外に飛び出る最悪の事態を一時想定したことを明らかにした。また現在の原子力防災の体制については、福島の教訓を十分にくみ取っていないとも指摘。首相の近くにいて事故対応にあたった班目氏の証言や分析は今後の原子力行政を考える上で参考になりうる。当時を振り返りながら、弁明も含めて重い口を開いた。

In our interview, Dr. Madarame revealed that he had at one time assumed the worst case scenario whereby the melted fuel would be ejected from the containment vessel. He also pointed out that the current nuclear disaster countermeasures do not fully reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. We believe the testimony and analysis by Dr. Madarame, who was close at hand by the prime minister and advising him in dealing with the accident, could be useful in thinking about the future nuclear policy. He opened up reluctantly, looking back at those early days of the accident and sometimes defending himself.


■「部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった」

"I wasn't sure what was going on in the room."


――東日本大震災の発災時にはどこにいたか。
-- Where were you when the Great East Japan Earthquake hit?

「（３月11日の）２時46分には原子力安全委員会（霞が関の中央合同庁舎４号館）のオフィスにいた。1時間ほど過ぎたころ、原子力災害対策特別措置法に基づく10条通報（全交流電源喪失）があり、やがて15条通報（非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能）もきた。原子力災害対策本部が立ち上がるはずだが、連絡がなかなか来ないので、行って待っていようと考え、首相官邸へ行った」

"At 2:46PM (on March 11, 2011), I was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission (in the Central Government Building No.4 in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo). One hour later, the Article 10 notice (station blackout) based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness came in. Then the Article 15 notice (emergency core cooling system failure). The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters should now be established, but there was no message [from the Prime Minister's Official Residence]. So I thought I'd go there and wait."

「15条通報の文書には、原子炉への注水ができず炉内水位が見えないので、念のため通報するとあった。このことから私は、直流電源（蓄電池）は生き残ったと思い込んでいた。水位計は壊れていて水位が読めないのだなと楽観的に考えていた。直流電源は少なくとも８時間、おそらく半日くらいは十分にもつだろうから、早く電源車などを確保して直流電源を維持すればよいと考えていた」

"The Article 15 notice said the notice was by way of precaution, as it was impossible to inject water into the reactor and the water level inside the reactor couldn't be measured. So I [erroneously] got it in my head that the DC power (storage batteries) was still available, and that the water level couldn't be measured because the water gauge was broken. The DC power would last at least 8 hours, probably half a day easily, so I thought we would just need to keep the DC power by securing power supply cars.

「19時ころに原災本部の会議が開かれたが、このときは地震と津波の対策協議が主で、原発はそれほど大きな話題にはならなかったと記憶している。私に発言の機会はなかった」

"Around 7PM, a meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was held. But as far as I remember, the topic of the meeting was mostly about dealing with the earthquake and tsunami, and the nuclear power plant was not discussed much. I didn't have an opportunity to speak [I wasn't asked for an opinion]."

「その後いったんオフィスに戻ったが、官邸から呼ばれ、21時ころに官邸地下の危機管理センターの横にある中二階の小さな会議室に初めて入った。政治家の人たちが大変心配していて、これからどうなると尋ねられた。部屋には原子力安全・保安院の平岡英治次長（当時）らがいたが、質問に答えられなかったのだと思う」

"I went back to my office after the meeting, but then I was called back to the Prime Minister's Official Residence and at about 9PM went into the small conference room in the mezzanine floor next to the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the first time. Politicians in the room were very worried, and they asked me what would happen next. People from Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, including Deputy Director-General Eiji Hiraoka, were in the room, but none of them seemed to have been able to answer the questions."


班目氏の行動（３月11日）
14:46 地震発生（原子力安全委員会オフィスに在席）
15:42 10条通報（１～５号機の全交流電源喪失）
16:00 安全委臨時会議を開催し緊急技術助言組織を立ち上げる。臨機応変の対応を宣言
16:45 15条通報（１、２号機の非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能、直流電源喪失の連絡はなかった）
17:40ころ 首相官邸へ。電源車の調達を知り、是認
19:03 原子力災害対策本部開催（発言機会なし、20:00ころいったん安全委オフィスに戻る）
21:00ころ 官邸へ。３ｋｍ圏内避難指示、炉心損傷を防ぐため注水とベント（排気）を助言

Dr. Madarame on March 11, 2011:
2:46PM Earthquake (he was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission)
3:42PM Article 10 notice (station blackout of Reactors 1 through 5)
4:00PM Held emergency meeting of the Nuclear Safety Commission and set up the emergency technical advisory. Declared that his organization would take such steps as the occasion demanded.
4:45PM Article 15 notice (ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2, but there was no mention of loss of DC power)
5:40PM Went to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Approved of the procurement of power supply cars
7:03PM Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (no opportunity to speak, returned to his office around 8PM)
9:00PM Went back to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Advised on evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius from the plant and on water injection and vent to prevent core damage

(To be continued to Part 2)

So Dr. Madarame wasn't asked for his opinion, and he didn't volunteer any.

It took two hours and 18 minutes after the Article 15 notice to set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and when it was finally set up, they didn't even talk about the nuclear emergency.

Banri Kaieda, who was Minister of Economy at that time, said in May 2012 that then-PM Naoto Kan couldn't decide whether to declare a nuclear emergency without knowing the legal basis in detail. And there was no one who would shout back at Mr. Kan.

Misfortune of Japan for having the wrong people at the very wrong time.

Was the Fukushima nuclear accident preventable? Dr. Madarame seems to think so. Stay tuned for the next installment of the interview.

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Haruki Madarame: "No Memory of First Week of the Accident Because I Couldn't Sleep"

The NISA's head in the early days of the accident says he didn't advise the PM because he was a liberal arts major.

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) set up by the Japan's Diet is eliciting some interesting reactions (or excuses I should say) from the officials in charge of Japan's nuclear policies who also oversaw the initial government response to the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident.

The Commission held its fourth hearing on February 15, 2012 which was net-cast live (archived here, if you understand Japanese). The following is from what's been reported in the media about the hearing, as tweeted by the Commission (@jikocho):

From Sankei Shinbun (2/15/2012):

官邸への助言など、事故当時のそれぞれの行動について、班目氏は「１週間以上寝ていないのでほとんど記憶がない。私がいた場所は固定電話が２回線で携帯も通じず、できる助言は限りがあった」と説明。

About the advice to the Prime Minister and other activities during the early days of the accident, Mr. Madarame said, "I didn't sleep for more than a week, and I hardly remember anything. There were only two landlines where I was, and there was no cellphone signal. What advice I could give was limited."

寺坂氏は「私は文系なので、官邸内の対応は理系の次長に任せた」と述べた。

Mr. Terasaka [who was the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency then] said, "I am a liberal arts major. So I delegated the dealings with the Prime Minister's Residence to my subordinate who was a science major."

班目氏は津波や全電源喪失に備える原発の安全指針について「瑕疵（かし）があったと認めざるを得ない。おわびしたい」と謝罪。指針が改善されなかった背景について「低い安全基準を事業者が提案し、規制当局がのんでしまう。国がお墨付きを与えたから安全だとなり、事業者が安全性を向上させる努力をしなくなる悪循環に陥っていた」と言及し、「わが国は（対策を）やらなくてもいいという言い訳に時間をかけ、抵抗があってもやるという意思決定ができにくいシステムになっている」と述べた。

As to the safety guidelines for nuclear power plant to prepare for the tsunami and station blackout, Mr. Madarame apologized by saying "I have to admit there were flaws. I would like to apologize." As to why the guidelines weren't improved, Madarame said, "Low safety standards are proposed by the plant operators, and the regulatory agencies simply rubber-stamp them. With the approval from the national government, they are considered safe, and there is no incentive for the operators to improve safety. It is a vicious cycle." He also said, "The system in this country is set up so that people spend much time in making up excuses for not doing anything, and decision-making is not done against opposition."

He speaks the truth on that point.

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Another Tokyo University Professor Haruki "Detarame" Madarame Tells Like It Really Is: "It's All About Money, Isn't It?"

The current chair of the Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission is Haruki Madarame, who's been dubbed "Detarame" Haruki in Japan, or "Falsehood, nonsense" Haruki. "Detarame" nicely rhymes with his last name.

He was a professor at Tokyo University before he became the chair of the NSC in April 2010. He gave an interview to a citizens' group back in 2005 on nuclear energy. Far from being "falsehood" or "nonsense", his talk was very frank, and totally made sense.

He quite readily admitted, among other things, that:

• He and his fellow nuclear scientists in Japan didn't quite know what they were doing;

• There is no such thing as safe nuclear technology;

• The nuclear power generation was filthily profitable;

• It's all about money - if someone's unwilling to have a nuclear waste dump in his backyard, tell him you'll pay him twice the amount promised before. If he still says no, tell him you'll pay him 5 times as much, or 10 times as much.

Somewhere down the line, someone will say yes, and that's all that matters. And Madarame saw nothing wrong with that. In fact, he didn't see anything wrong with any of his positions, because that was how it was.

Too bad it had to take the Fukushima nuke accident for the average Japanese to realize not only they'd been served with imperfect and dangerous "clean energy" technology but also that a nuclear expert like Madarame at the nation's top research institute knew quite well about the danger and the nature of the nuclear technology and industry and was openly telling people about it. Laughing, as if it was a funny joke.

Quite a contrast to another Tokyo University professor, Tatsuhiko Kodama, who seems to have inspired many people beyond Japan's border.

Madarame also said in the interview, "Trust us." And trust we did.

Here's the 2005 interview video with English subtitle (EX-SKF/Tokyo Brown Tabby):

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Haruki "the Detarame (Falsehood)" Madarame's Furious Backtracking on His Remark about Recriticality in Reactor 1 at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant

He senses a danger that his cushy and prestigious position as the head of the Nuclear Safety Commission is in jeopardy over his alleged remark which may have caused the delay in cooling the Reactor 1 RPV.

It is hard to believe he is a scientist and not a lawyer or politician. With that fine parsing ability of the words, he could make a wonderful assistant to a certain President of the United States (there are many candidates).

First, it was reported (see my post) that when Japan's Prime Minister Kan sought the advice from Madarame regarding the seawater injection to the Reactor 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) on the evening of March 12 (by which time, now we all know, the entire core melted down) Madarame said:

"There is a possibility of recriticality if seawater is injected."

After that remark was publicly announced at the government-TEPCO joint press conference, Madarame was furious, and took it as a personal insult (see my post). His rebuttal?

"I couldn't have said such a thing."

But then, a talk ensued among the concerned parties including Madarame, and a "compromise" remark emerged. Now, Madarame's remark is modified thus:

"The possibility of recriticality if seawater is injected is not zero."

To an uncritical, non-scientific mind, that still means "there is a possibility".

Not so. The latest narrative coming from this ex-Tokyo University professor and current chief of the Nuclear Safety Commission who assured PM Kan that "the nuclear reactors at Fukushima are OK, they will never explode" on their trip to the plant on March 12 morning is this (from Yomiuri Shinbun article in Japanese):

"When I say 'the possibility is not zero', it means 'it is practically zero'."


Let me know when you figure that out.

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#Fukushima Blame Game: "I Didn't Say That," Says Madarame about Recriticality

His assessment that seawater might cause recriticality in the Reactor 1 was what supposedly prompted Prime Minister Kan to order TEPCO to halt the seawater injection on the night of March 12, as I reported in my post yesterday.

Now, Madarame, the head of the Nuclear Safety Commission and ex-Tokyo University Professor, says "I didn't say that."

I'm sure that's the case, Mr. Madarame. Just like the comment you say you didn't make, that the 20 millisieverts/year radiation for school children is acceptable, or your current position that you knew from the beginning that it was a core meltdown and told the government so.

Asahi Shinbun (5/21/2011):

　班目春樹・原子力安全委員長は２１日夜、朝日新聞の取材に対し、政府・東電統合対策室の会見について「再臨界の危険性があるなどと私は言っていない。侮辱と思っている」と反論した。

Responding to the press conference earlier by the government/TEPCO consolidated headquarters to deal with Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident, Haruki Madarame, chief commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Agency told Asahi Shinbun on the evening of May 21 that he "didn't say there was a risk of recriticality. I feel insulted."

　会見で配布された海水注入をめぐる事実関係の発表文には、「原子力安全委員長から、『再臨界の危険性がある』との意見が出された」などと記されていたが、班目委員長は「発表文は東電と官邸と保安院が作ったもの。原子力安全委員会として抗議する」と話した。

The announcement distributed at the press conference regarding the timeline of the seawater injection said "Chief commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Commission was of the opinion that "there was a danger of recriticality"." But Madarame said, "That announcement was made by TEPCO, the Prime Minister's Office, and NISA. We will protest as the Nuclear Safety Commission."

　会見には安全委事務局の加藤重治内閣府審議官も同席していたが、班目委員長の発言は否定していなかった。

The Nuclear Safety Commission's secretary Shigeharu Kato was present at the press conference, but he didn't deny the remark allegedly made by Madarame.

Haruki Madarame is increasingly known in Japan among nuclear critics and opponents as "Detarame" Haruki, which rhymes nicely with his family name Madarame. "Detarame" in Japanese means "outrageous nonsense, lie, falsehood".

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Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission Chief: "I Have No Idea Why Professor Kosako Is So Upset!"

And this hilarity from the head of Nuclear Safety Agency, who says he is "genuinely puzzled as to what Professor Kosako is upset about", from Sankei Shinbun (5/2/2011; my translation, emphasis is mine):

　福島第１原発の事故を受け、文部科学省が定めた校庭の利用基準「年間被曝（ひばく）線量２０ミリシーベルト以下」をめぐって与党内からも見直し論が出る 中、政府の原子力安全委員会（班目春樹委員長）は２日、定例会議を開いたが、同問題はまったく議題とならなかった。また、政府の対応を批判した小佐古敏荘 （こさこ・としそう）東大大学院教授の内閣官房参与辞任について、班目委員長は会議終了後、「新聞報道しか知らないが、正直に言って小佐古氏が何に憤慨し ているのかわからない」と述べた。

Even as the members of the ruling party have started to call for the revision of the annual allowable radiation exposure limit of 20 millisieverts for children for using school yards, the number set by the Ministry of Education and Science, the government's Nuclear Safety Commission chaired by Haruki Madarame held its regular meeting on May 2. There was no discussion whatsoever about the issue in the meeting. Referring to the resignation of Professor Toshiso Kosako of Tokyo University as the Prime Minister's special advisor over the government response to the nuclear crisis at Fukushima [and in particular about the radiation exposure for children], Madarame said, "I only know what's reported in the newspapers, but honestly, I haven't a clue as to why Professor Kosako is so upset."

　同委員会は先月１９日、福島県の小学校などでの屋外活動における積算放射線量の基準について文部科学省から助言要請を受け、「年間２０ミリシーベルトま で」と回答。小佐古教授は先月２９日の辞表提出時、「（この数値を）基礎に毎時３・８マイクロシーベルトと決まったが間違いだ」と指摘した。

On April 19, the Ministry of Education and Science requested advice from Madarame's Nuclear Safety Commission on the [new] standard for the cumulative radiation level for outdoor activities in schools in Fukushima Prefecture, and the Commission told the Ministry "up to 20 millisieverts per year" was acceptable. When he tendered his resignation on April 29, Professor Kosako pointed out that "3.8 microsieverts per hour limit was decided, based on (this number of 20 millisieverts per year), but that is a mistake."

　会見した班目委員長は「子供たちが年間２０ミリシーベルトを浴びても良いと言ったことはない。（被曝量を）可能な限り低くしていくのが原則だ」とし、文 科省が同委員会に報告した同県内の小学校などでのモニタリング結果についても「われわれは満足していない。『毎時３・８マイクロシーベルトを下回ったから 校庭を使わせる』との非常に安易な報告と受け止めた」と述べ、文科省側への不満を示した。

In the press conference [after the meeting], Madarame said "We never said it was OK for children to be exposed to 20 millisieverts radiation per year. The basic rule is to minimize the radiation level." Regarding the monitoring data of the schools in Fukushima that the Ministry of Education and Science reported to the Commission, Makurame said, "We are not happy. We took it to mean the Ministry would allow the use of school yards as long as the radiation was below 3.8 microsieverts/hour."

　同委員会は文科省への回答にあたって、正式な会合を招集せず、助言要請からわずか約２時間後には「妥当だ」との助言をまとめたが、議事録も作成していない。

In advising the Ministry of Education and Science, the Commission didn't call a formal meeting, and gave the advice that "it was appropriate [to set the annual exposure limit for children at 20 millisieverts]" 2 hours after the advice was first sought. There was no minutes of the Commission's deliberation.

　こうした同委員会の手続きについて、小佐古教授は「法に基づく手順遂行に基づく判断に欠けたところがあるように見受けた」と指摘しているが、同委員会事務局は「法律に基づかない助言であり、手順遂行に問題はない」と話している。

The Commission's procedure was one of the things that Professor Kosako pointed out as shortfalls when he said "I thought it lacked in the judgment following the proper procedure based on law". The Commission says its advice is not based on law, and there is no problem in the procedure.

　班目委員長は「非常にせっぱ詰まった状況で会合を開くよりも、できるだけ早く回答すべきだと判断した」と弁明したが、「事故発生から数十日が経過し、いつまでも緊急時だというのは良くない。助言については議事録を残そうとの方針転換はしてきている」と付け加えた。

Madarame defended his Commission's advice, saying "We decided it would be better to give advice as soon as possible instead of holding a meeting in an emergency situation." But he added, "Since it's been more than a month since the accident, it cannot be an emergency situation much longer. As to the advice we give, we are thinking of creating a minutes [of the deliberation]."

Apparently, 4 Commissioners quickly exchanged ideas and decided on the 20 millisieverts per year limit for children, and that was promptly adopted by the Ministry of Education and Science. But the Commission denies that it ever said 20 millisieverts were acceptable. Something doesn't add up here, does it?

But aside from who really "advised" the Ministry of Education and Science on the final number, Commissioner Madarame comes across as another "space alien" just like the former Prime Minister Hatoyama, who doesn't seem to share the same common sense with the rest of us. He genuinely doesn't understand why Professor Kosako was in tears over the 20 millisieverts for children.

Madarame told [link is Japanese] the grandstanding Prime Minister Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuke Plant on March 12, "But Prime Minister, the nuclear reactors won't blow! It is structurally impossible." It was possible, and they did blow. (Or at least Spent Fuel Pools did.)

And his Commission sat on the SPEEDI simulation data of the nuclear fallout from Fukushima, dutifully following the government order.

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