Showing posts sorted by relevance for query daini water. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query daini water. Sort by date Show all posts

Tuesday, March 27, 2012

(UPDATED) INES Level 1 Contamination at Fukushima II (Daini), Caused by the Spill of Contaminated Water from Fukushima I (Daiichi), Says NISA

UPDATE: These are the 20-liter plastic containers that transported the contaminated water from Fuku-I to Fuku-II. They are wrapped in plastic. That's spill-proof, isn't it? TEPCO claims the lid in one of the containers was loose. From METI's press release on 3/27/2012:



=======================================
TEPCO transported 140 liters of the water after being treated by the cesium absorption towers (SARRY, Kurion) from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant to Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant for nuclide analysis, but somehow the water spilled and contaminated the buildings in Fukushima II.

Duh. Why TEPCO needed to transport a large quantity of contaminated water just for analysis, no one knows. The water contained maximum 700 becquerels/cubic centimeter of radioactive materials, so the 140 liters of this water could contain 700 x 1000 x 140 = 98 million becquerels of radioactive materials.

First, the overview of the incident from Jiji Tsushin (3/27/2012):

分析用汚染水漏れる=運搬先の福島第2原発で-東電

Contaminated water from Fukushima I for analysis spilled at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, says TEPCO

 東京電力は27日、福島第1原発から分析のため福島第2原発に運び込んだストロンチウムなどを含む汚染水が容器から漏れ、机や通路などを汚染したと発表した。経済産業省原子力安全・保安院は、汚染水の取扱規定に違反している可能性が高いとして、運搬状況を報告するよう指示した。

TEPCO announced on March 27 that the contaminated water spilled from the container and contaminated desks and corridors at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant. The water contained radioactive strontium and other nuclides, and was brought from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant to Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant for analysis. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has instructed TEPCO to report the details, as the company is likely to have been in violation of the regulation that specifies how the contaminated water should be handled.

 東電と保安院によると、汚染が見つかったのは第2原発3、4号機サービス建屋の机と通路など7カ所。水が付着した場所からは最高で1平方センチ当たり約700ベクレルの放射性物質が検出された。作業員の被ばくはないという。

According to TEPCO and the NISA, contamination was found at 7 locations in the service building for Reactors 3 and 4 at Fukushima II Nuke Plant, on the desks and corridors. Maximum 700 becquerels per cubic centimeter of radioactive materials have been found from the locations of the spill. There is no worker exposed to the contamination.

"140 liters" information comes from the ad hoc NISA press conference on March 27 at 9:15PM (that's unusual these days).

More detailed information from the press conference, by Ryuichi Kino:

東電の発表では、汚染は206Bq/cm2 [sic] という話だったが、保安院の発表では、最高700Bq/cm3と聞いているとのこと。ただ、運んでいた量が全部で140L。なんでこんなに多量の汚染水を運んでいたのかは、今のところ不明。保安院によれば今回の漏洩量は少ないが場合によっては汚染された水のすべてが漏洩した可能性があり、その場合に想定される放射性物質の量などからすると、国際原子力事象評価尺度(INES)の対象になり、暫定でINESレベル1と判断しているとのこと。

TEPCO announced the contamination as 206 Bq/cubic centimeter, but NISA says max 700 Bq/cubic centimeter. Total amount of the water was 140 liters. It's not known why such a large quantity of contaminated water was being transported. According to NISA, the amount of leak this time was small, but depending on the situation the entire amount could have leaked. If that was the case, INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) should be applied to the incident because of the amount of radioactive materials that would have been released; consequently, NISA considers the incident as INES Level 1, on a provisional basis.

もうひとつ疑問。東電は夕方6時からの会見で、この経緯をごく簡単に説明。汚染は1か所だけと発表していた。けれども保安院の発表では、汚染は全部で7か所と。事態の発生は午後0時42分とのことなので、それから5時間後の会見で詳細が発表されなかったのは、対応が遅すぎ。

Another question. TEPCO touched on this spill very lightly at the 6PM press conference, and said there was only one contamination. But NISA says there were 7 locations that were contaminated. The spill happened at 12:42PM, and TEPCO didn't have the details at the press conference, 5 hours after. Too slow.

Kino also reports this was the second time TEPCO transported a large quantity of contaminated water from Fukushima I to Fukushima II.

(Additional information)

Kino also says that the contaminated water is routinely sampled by the affiliate companies (probably Toshiba, Hitachi, and other top-tier contractors) for testing at their facilities.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO Wants to Dump Treated Water into the Ocean


From Nippon Television (1/25/2013):

東京電力は、第一原発の中に溜まり続けている汚染水について、濃度を下げる処理をし、漁業関係者などの同意を得た上で海に放出する考えを明らかにした。

TEPCO says it wants to treat the contaminated water to lower the radioactivity and discharge the treated water into the ocean, if the consent from people in the fishing industry is obtained.

第一原発では、放射性物質で汚染された水が溜まり続けていて、東電は敷地内のタンクを増設して管理している。

The water contaminated with radioactive materials keeps increasing at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. TEPCO is building more storage tanks to deal with the water.

東電は、きのう原子力規制委員会に対し、汚染の濃度を下げる処理をした上で海に放出する対策案を説明した。

Yesterday, TEPCO explained to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about their plan to treat the water to lower the level of contamination and discharge the treated water into the ocean.

東電は、漁業関係者などの了解が得られなければ海への放出はしないことを強調しているが、タンクの増設はいずれ限界に達する可能性があるだけでなく、敷地内に溜まり続ける汚染水の最終的な処分の方法は見通しが立っていない。

TEPCO emphasizes that they won't release the water into the ocean unless they can obtain the consent from people in the fishing industry. However, there's a limit to how many storage tanks can be installed in the compound, and there is no final disposal plan for the contaminated water that keeps accumulating.


The last time I heard about this news was, I think, about a year ago. Somehow TEPCO has come up with extra storage since. Way back in June 2011, TEPCO wanted to dump the water in the reactor and turbine buildings at Fukushima II (Daini) after treating the water. That plan went nowhere partly because of strong objection from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries who probably worried more about "baseless rumors" than the actual, potential harm to the marine life.

I doubt that fishermen in Tohoku and Kanto would agree. They have already been selling the fish they catch, which are contaminated with radioactive cesium to varying degrees (hopefully below 100 Bq/kg but they only sample test). They certainly do not want to draw attention to the marine contamination by having TEPCO dump the water from the plant, no matter how "clean" it may be.

TEPCO has been counting on Toshiba's ALPS to come online at Fukushima I, which will remove virtually all radionuclides (except for tritium). The ALPS was ready for a "hot" test (using contaminated water) when when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission demanded that the vessels used in ALPS be sturdy enough to withstand the drop from up to 6 meters high. Now, until TEPCO and Toshiba come up with such vessels, the ALPS cannot even be tested.

So now, the talk is back, of dumping the water into the ocean.

Let's see what else (other than dumping the water) can they do? One of the nuclear researchers that I follow on Twitter has a suggestion:

Build a boiler, use it to evaporate water. What's left is radioactive materials. Use bitumen to immobilize them, put them in containers and store them.


I have no idea if this ever occurred to TEPCO, or if this is a valid method. Maybe it did occur to TEPCO, may it didn't. Just as it didn't occur to them that the highly radioactive water might be leaking, or that they should just violate some peacetime law and regulations and drive on the highway with truckload of batteries.

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

#Fukushima II (Not I) Nuke Plant Wants to Dump 3,000 Tons of Water into the Ocean

Did you even know that there was water in the basement of Fukushima II ("Daini")? And that water needs to be treated to remove the radioactive materials?

TEPCO fears that the power supply equipments in the basements may degrade from the salt water from tsunami, but if they have been sitting in the salt water for nearly 3 months, they are practically worthless, I would assume.

Again, a brilliant design by GE, having the power supply in the basement in a nuclear power plant right by the ocean in an earthquake/tsunami-prone country.

From Japan's TBS News (10:58PM JST 6/7/2011; the link will probably be changed or disappear soon, as is often the case with the TV broadcasters):

東京電力が、福島第二原発の原子炉建屋などに溜まっているおよそ3000トンの水について、海に放出する計画を立てていることが分かりました。ただ、海産物への影響を懸念する農林水産省が猛反発していて、調整は難航しています。

It has been revealed that TEPCO wants to release about 3,000 tons of water in the reactor buildings [and turbine buildings, according to the news clip at the site] of Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant. However, fearing the negative effect on marine products, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is strongly against the plan, making the negotiations between TEPCO and the Ministry difficult.

 福島第二原発の原子炉は現在、冷温停止中ですが、震災で津波を被り大量の海水が原子炉建屋やタービン建屋などに溜まったままとなっています。このため東京電力は、大量の水を海に放出する計画を立て、政府関係者とすでに協議していることが分かりました。

The reactors at Fukushima II Nuke Plant are in "cold shutdown". But the tsunami after the March 11 earthquake inundated the reactor buildings and the turbine buildings. TEPCO planned the release of this large amount of water into the ocean, and has been negotiating with the government officials.

 塩分を含んだ水の量はおよそ3000トンに達すると見られ、溜まっている期間も長引いているため、このままでは建屋の地下にある電源装置が劣化する恐れもあります。

This salt water is estimated to be about 3,000 tons. Since it has been sitting in the basements for long time now, the power supply equipments in the basements may degrade

 この水について東京電力は、法律で認められているより低いレベルにまで放射能の除染を済ませた上で海に放出すると説明していますが、海産物への影響を懸念する農林水産省が猛反発し、調整が難航しています。(07日22:58)

TEPCO says it will remove the radioactive materials in the water to the level lower than allowed by law before releasing it into the ocean. But the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is strongly against the plan, fearing the effect on the marine products.

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

(UPDATED) Shukan Asahi: #Fukushima II (Daini) Extensive Damage from March 11, 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami


Shukan Asahi, one of the major weekly magazines in Japan by one of Japan's mainstream media (Asahi), has a scoop on Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant. I have no reason to believe this is true, but I also have no reason not to believe this is true. According to the person who used to work at Fuku II, it is more likely to be true.

According to the reporter, Fukushima II has sustained extensive damage from the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, and that hasn't been properly disclosed by any party (TEPCO or the government). He also says TEPCO knows there is no way the plant can be restarted anytime soon, if at all.

The reporter, Shun Kirishima (probably a pseudonym), works at Fukushima II and filed this report, according to Shukan Asahi. The article has several photographs, but the quality is rather bad.

Information from Shukan Asahi May 9, 2012 issue (the images of the article are posted at the end of the post):


1. Reactor 1 building still has no electricity restored after more than 1 year since the March 11, 2011 disaster. Aluminum window frames bend inward. (Photo 1)

2. Reactor 1 building basement is all rusted - pipes, light shades, equipment. Sands on the floor, mud caked on the cables on the ceiling (3-meter high).

3. The industry insiders had told the reporter earlier that TEPCO had informed them right after the March 11, 2011 disaster that Fukushima II wouldn't be operational for 5 years. It is a wishful thinking on TEPCO's headquarters' part that Fukushima II is anywhere near operational. It isn't, and it is damaged badly.



4. The office building is badly damaged, with ceiling collapsed and walls fallen down. (Photo 4)

5. Even though Fukushima II achieved cold shutdown 4 days after the earthquake/tsunami, it was a very close call. Some of the pumps for the heat exchanger didn't work, and some of the emergency diesel generators in Reactors 1 through 4 didn't work after the tsunami. In Reactor 1 building, 2 out of 3 diesel generators couldn't be used because they were damaged by the tsunami, even though they were in the reactor building above the 1st floor. (Photo 6)

6. Reactor 3 turbine building basement was flooded with water, even though TEPCO announced in March this year that there was no damage in the turbine building basements of Reactors 3 and 4. The reporter claims there is a handwritten note in the 2nd basement floor of Reactor 3 that says "2011.3.11 (inundated with water) 430 centimeters from the floor surface" - i.e. 4.3 meters of water in the basement (Photo 7). In the report in August last year, TEPCO says the water was from the skimmer surge tank overflow, but the reporter says it is hard to believe, because the 2nd floor of the basement was not just flooded but completely filled with water.



7. TEPCO says the damage at Fukushima II is due to the tsunami. But the pipes in the heat exchanger building on the 2nd floor, which was not flooded with the tsunami, show extensive damage, and they are being repaired or replaced. (Photos 9 and 10)



The Shukan Asahi article:




(UPDATE) Just as I posted, I also found TEPCO's newly released photographs (5/9/2012) of Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant. Everything looks great as far as these photographs show. There are photographs of Reactor 1's diesel generators.

Sunday, December 9, 2012

Cause Still Unknown for #Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant Pressure Rise in Reactor 1 Building


TEPCO doesn't have much to say about the rise in pressure in the Reactor 1 building at Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant after the M7.3 earthquake on December 7, 2012.

Yes they pumped the air out, thorough the exhaust duct, but no they don't know why the positive pressure happened. Just like anything else, they don't know the reason, but do immediate patchwork so that the undesirable conditions go away, for a short while at least.

Hardly anyone pays attention to Fukushima I or II Nuke Plants or the workers there any more, anyway. People are having a good time electioneering, and many net citizens are feeling righteous about cheering for the candidates and the parties who profess anti-nuclear (beyond nuclear, graduating from nuclear, whatever) sentiment.

Here's from the English press release from the incurious TEPCO on 12/8/2012 about Fukushima II (Daini):

At around 5:18 PM on December 7, a M7.3 earthquake occurred at the offshore of Sanriku. Upon plant checkup, no problem originating from the earthquake was found.

Since the pressure in Unit 1 Reactor Building had turned positive (though the pressure is kept negative to the outdoor air), the standby gas treatment system* was started upon judgment of an operator. The pressure in the Reactor Building increased to 0.05kPa right after the system was started and later the pressure turned back to negative and became stable. In order to investigate the cause of the pressure turning to positive, the standby gas treatment system was suspended and the Reactor Building ventilation air conditioning system was started on December 8. The pressure in the Reactor Building is being maintained in negative after switching the system. The cause of the incident will continue to be investigated.

* Standby gas treatment system: System that purifies the air in the Reactor Building utilizing high performance filter and discharge it to the outside through the exhaust stack. The system is comprised of systems (A) and (B).


By the way, remember the fluctuation of the water being injected into the Reactor Pressure Vessels at Fukushima I (Daiichi) Nuke Plant, back in August? The fluctuation was supposed to be due to the shaving debris from pipe installation clogging the mesh screens placed at the valves, and after cleaning the debris in the tank and flushing the pipes all were supposed to be OK. But no, the water continues to fluctuate to this day, and all TEPCO does is to adjust the water amount.

Curiosity may kill the cat, but I hope TEPCO's incuriosity will not kill us.

Monday, June 3, 2013

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO Admits Error in Measurement, Says 0.61Bq/Liter of Cesium in Groundwater They Plan to Release into Ocean


0.22 Bq/liter of cesium-134, and 0.39 Bq/liter of cesium-137 to be exact.

The amount is very small, less than 1/100 of the legal limit of radioactive cesium in the water allowed to be released from a nuclear power plant (90 Bq/liter).

But TEPCO has a credibility problem, as the company has been saying that there are no detectable radioactive materials in the groundwater that they've been pumping up (to prevent some of the water from entering the building basements) and are planning to release, with consent from interested parties, into the Pacific Ocean.

What kind of error that TEPCO admitted, you ask? It turns out that the company measured the sample groundwater with very low radioactivity at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant with very high radiation background, instead of at Fukushima II (Daini) with lower background or at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuke Plant in Niigata with no background to worry about.

Who pointed this problem out to TEPCO, who says they didn't have any procedure in place, actually, to measure low-radiation samples at a high-radiation location like Fukushima I?

Nuclear Safety Inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Agency.

The Nuclear Regulatory Agency is the secretariat of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, with many former NISA officials and inspectors. Finally doing some good by pointing out the obvious to an oblivious nuclear plant operator.

From TEPCO's handout for the press in Japanese (6/3/2013; summarized by me):

The germanium semiconductor detectors at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant have been used to detect gamma nuclides in samples with high radioactivity such as contaminated water in the building basements. For samples that require measurement at lower detection levels, the measurement has been done at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.

However, we tested the groundwater stored in the temporary storage tank at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, as part of the procedure in the future in carrying out and managing the groundwater bypass scheme [pump the groundwater, store it in the tank, then release it into the ocean].

We explained the scheme to Nuclear Safety Inspector, and on May 30, Inspector pointed out to us that in measuring samples using germanium semiconductor detectors, background self-shielding effect cannot be ignored.

So, we tested the two germanium semiconductor detectors used at Fukushima I by measuring the background without any sample, then with purified water with no contamination in a 2-liter marinelli container.

After examining the test results, we found that the marinelli container's shielding effect against the background affected the results by several Bq/liter.

We then tested the groundwater sample from April 16, 2013 that had been tested at Fukushima I and had been found with no detectable cesium, at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, and the result was below our target of 1 Bq/liter of radioactive cesium.


TEPCO's emphasis is, naturally, "below the company's target of 1 Bq/liter".

"Happy", the worker who tweeted from Fukushima I for much of the past two years, says:

地下水バイパスのタンクから本来なら検出限界値未満であるはずの汚染が検出されたって事は普通の人はなかなか気付かない事で、もう一つ問題があるんだよね。それは地下水バイパスシステム自体が汚染しちゃったって事。あんな大規模なタンクや配管を除染するのも大変だし…(tweet)

Detection of contamination from the water in the storage tank for groundwater bypass system, where contamination should be below detection level. There is one problem that people don't necessarily notice, and that is the contamination of the groundwater bypass system itself. It would be a huge headache to decontaminate such huge storage tanks and all the pipes.

東電は1べクレル未満なら問題ないって云いそうだけど…。当初、東電は検出されない(されるはずないないって思い込み?)って言ってた汚染が検出される事自体が問題なわけで、汲み上げる地下水が汚染してる可能性があるかもって計画設計してたらタンクも配管も汚染しなかったのに。(tweet)

I think TEPCO may say there is no problem if it is less than 1 Bq/liter, but the problem is the detection of contamination itself when TEPCO initially insisted there was no contamination (or TEPCO's wishful thinking that it would be impossible that there was any contamination?). If they designed the system with the assumption that the groundwater may be contaminated, the tanks and pipes wouldn't have been contaminated.

地下水を汲み上げた直後に汚染除去のフィルターを設置すべきだろうし、もっとシステムを考えるべきだったんだよね。地下水バイパスも突貫工事でやったし、1日でも早く魚連の理解を得て、海洋放出の既成事実を作りたかったんだろうな。(tweet)

There should have been a filter installed to remove radioactive materials from the groundwater after it was pumped up. The whole system should have been better considered. The bypass construction was a rush job. I think TEPCO wanted to obtain the consent from the fishery association as soon as possible and make release of groundwater a fait accompli.


His interview with AP's Yuri Kageyama has been pretty much ignored in Japan, by the way, mostly because it is an English article and partly because, I guess, it is about Fukushima I Nuke Plant which many in Japan simply ignore these days. Everything is sort of OK at the plant, isn't it? No major catastrophe has happened since after March 2011, so decommissioning work must be progressing fine, right?

(I have translated the article into Japanese. If your Japanese friends and acquaintances don't know about the interview, send them the link.)

Saturday, March 2, 2013

(UPDATED) UK's The Independent Reporter David McNeill Meets Atsufumi Yoshizawa: "I Am One of the Fukushima 50"


This is one of the very few times I've ever heard of the name of a worker who has worked at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant since the start of the accident on March 11, 2011.

Hardly anyone in Japan wants to know about them, for one reason ("We hate them because they work for TEPCO" kind of reason) or another ("I'm sure they want to be left alone" kind of PC reason). But that doesn't stop foreign journalists, and as has been the case since the start of the nuclear accident, they are good at bringing the personal stories out of the huge, inhuman mess of an accident.

I believe Mr. McNeill is based in Tokyo.

I'd love to read the article, but for some reason the Independent site seems to believe I have used up the free 5 page allowance for the month even though I never visited their site in a month until today and won't let me read.

You can try if you have better luck, here: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/i-am-one-of-the-fukushima-fifty-one-of-the-men-who-risked-their-lives-to-prevent-a-catastrophe-shares-his-story-8517394.html

(H/T blog reader wren for the link)

====================================

(UPDATE: The actual article)

'I am one of the Fukushima fifty': One of the men who risked their lives to prevent a catastrophe shares his story

They displayed a bravery few can comprehend, yet very little is known about the men who stayed behind to save Japan’s stricken nuclear plant. In a rare interview, David McNeill meets Atsufumi Yoshizawa, who was at work on 11 March 2011 when disaster struck

David McNeill, Saturday 02 March 2013

It was, recalls Atsufumi Yoshizawa, a suicide mission: volunteering to return to a dangerously radioactive nuclear power plant on the verge of tipping out of control.

As he said goodbye to his colleagues they saluted him, like soldiers in battle. The wartime analogies were hard to avoid: in the international media he was a kamikaze, a samurai or simply one of the heroic Fukushima 50. The descriptions still embarrass him. “I’m not a hero,” he says. “I was just trying to do my job.”

A stoic, soft-spoken man dressed in the blue utility suit of his embattled employer Tokyo Electric Power Co., (Tepco) Mr Yoshizawa still finds it hard to dredge up memories of fighting to stop catastrophe at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Two years later, debate still rages about responsibility for the planet’s worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl, and its impact. Fish caught near the plant this month contained over 5,000 times safe radiation limits, according to state broadcaster NHK.

A report this week by the World Health Organisation says female infants affected by the worst of the fallout have a 70 per cent higher risk of developing thyroid cancer over their lifetimes, but concluded that overall risks for the rest of the population are “low”. Over 160,000 people have been displaced from their homes near the plant, perhaps permanently, and are fighting for proper compensation. Stress, divorce and suicides and plague the evacuees.

Mr Yoshizawa says he feels “deep responsibility” for the crisis his company triggered. His eyes brim with tears at points in his story, which begins with the magnitude-9 quake less than 100 miles away from the plant under the sea on 11 March 2011. “It was so strong I fell on my hands and knees,” says the 54-year-old engineer. “There was no place to hide.”

The quake’s shockwaves ripped pipes from walls, bounced parked cars like toys and buckled roads at the 864-acre plant. Initially, Mr Yoshizawa believed the Daiichi’s defensive engineering had worked. The instant the tremors struck, control rods were automatically inserted into the plant’s three working reactors to shut down nuclear fission, a process known as “scram.” But the shaking had cut power from the main electricity grid, probably damaged the cooling system to reactor one, and a destructive tsunami over twice as high as the plant’s defences was just 49 minutes away.

Mr Yoshizawa was in charge of reactors five and six, which at the time were shut down for maintenance. He ran to the plant’s seismic isolation building and took his post beside manager Masao Yoshida, who was trying to assess the damage. In the windowless bunker they couldn’t see the tsunami that hit the complex. Waves of 13 to 15 metres high washed over the 5.7m sea wall. Water flooded the basements of the turbine buildings, on the ocean side of the reactors, shorting out electric switching units and disabling 12 of the 13 emergency generators and then backup batteries, the last line of defence. There was no power to pump water to the nuclear core and carry off the heat, or even measure the radiation. The engineers had lost control over the complex. Meltdown had begun.

Mr Yoshiizawa recalls hearing the first reports inside the bunker of oil tanks and cars floating in water outside. “I just couldn’t imagine a tsunami that big,” he says. The crisis quickly deepened. Just over 15 hours after the power loss, uranium fuel melted through the pressure vessel of reactor number one. Units two and three were not far behind. Thousands fled from nearby towns and villages. There was no plan for what to do next because Tepco had never predicted total loss of power at a plant.

Most of Daiichi’s employees had gone home to check on their families. Mr Yoshizawa says he thought of two things: “The safety of my workers, and the complete shutdown of the power plant.” His own wife and two daughters were safe in Yokohama, hundreds of miles south. There was no question of panic, or running back to see them, he insists. “It might seem strange to others, but it’s natural for us to put our company first. It’s part of the mind and spirit of Tepco workers to deal with emergencies.”

The engineer says he moved offsite for a few days to a disaster-response building in the town of Okuma, 5 km away. But on 15 and 16 March 2011 the situation at Daiichi reached its most critical phase. A series of hydrogen explosions had left much of the complex a tangled mess of radioactive concrete and steel. Unit three had exploded, three reactors were in meltdown and over 1000 fuel rods in the reactor four building, normally covered under 16 feet of water, had boiled dry, raising the spectre of a nuclear fission chain reaction. In his darkest moments, Mr Yoshizawa admits he shared the same fear as other experts – that the crisis could also trigger the evacuation of the Fukushima Daini plant 10 km away.

About 250 km south in Tokyo, the government feared a nightmare scenario: a vast toxic cloud heading toward the world’s most populated metropolis. Rumours swirled that Tepco was preparing to completely pull out its staff from the Daiichi plant, leaving it to spin out of control. Mr Yoshizawa denies this. “We never intended to abandon our jobs,” he insists. “At the time that rumour was circulating I was volunteering to go back.” He recalls despairing at the situation. “Most people thought we would not be coming back from the plant,” he says, on the verge of tears. In the media the Fukushima 50 was born, although Mr Yoshizawa says that in reality there were 70 of them, mostly in their middle age. “We had all resolved to stay till the end.”

Throughout the following weeks on the frontline of the crisis, the men endured brutal conditions. Deliveries stalled, food almost ran out and water was restricted to a single 500ml bottle every two days. Working in shifts, surviving on biscuits and sleeping when he could inside the radiation-proofed bunker, Mr Yoshizawa lost weight and grew a beard. As elite firefighters succeeded in getting water to the overheating reactors, the collective psyche inside the bunker lightened and the dreaded words “oshimai da” (it’s the end), were no longer heard. Exhausted and dishevelled on his first trip back to a sunny Tokyo a month after the quake, he was startled to find life going on as normal.

Public recognition or even gratitude for the ordeal endured by Mr Yoshizawa and his colleagues is scarce. Most are still employed by a company disgraced by revelations that it had repeatedly ignored pre-March 11 warnings about the risks of natural disaster. Taxpayers will have to bear the cost of cleaning up from the accident after Tepco was nationalised last year. Not a single manager has been held accountable for happened. The utility’s rehabilitation has been hampered by fresh stories that it had misled investigators before an on-site check of reactor one, lying that the reactor building was “too dark” for inspection. Some critics suspect the company was trying to conceal evidence of damage from the earthquake, an issue with potentially profound implications for restarting Japan’s 50 commercial reactors, most of which are shut down.

It took the government 18 months to publicly acknowledge Mr Yoshizawa and his comrades, when then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda officially thanked them last October. Most were not identified or even named, testimony both to the trauma Fukushima has inflicted on Japan’s collective psyche, and a deep-seated cultural reluctance to grandstand while others suffer. Some of the men fear reprisals or bullying of their children in school. A police van is permanently parked out the company’s headquarters in Tokyo. Tepco itself is reluctant to wheel the Fukushima 50 out in front of the media, for fear of what they might reveal about what happened – Mr Yoshizawa is shadowed throughout his interviews by a PR minder.

But if he nurses any bitterness toward his employer, he never reveals it. He praises the company for providing counseling to the ex-Daiichi workers and regular health checks – a select list of employees who absorbed potentially harmful amounts of radiation are qualified for unlimited aftercare. His own final tally of internal exposure was 50 millisieverts – the upper annual limit in the US for nuclear plant workers.

Now dealing with waste and fuel management, and back at Tepco headquarters, he says the work at the plant has far from ended. “Nobody has any experience of trying to safely extract nuclear fuel after such an accident,” he says. British and US engineers are helping in a collective effort that will take many years. He gets uncomfortable when he returns to Fukushima and has to remember the crisis. His family never discusses what happened. “My wife and children have already seen so much on TV and they don’t want to see or hear anything more about it. Occasionally they will ask me if I’m OK and I tell them what I tell you: I don’t have any problems.”

Living in limbo: refugees’ grievances

Two years on, thousands of people forced to leave their homes in the wake of the Fukushima disaster are living in limbo, yet to receive compensation and unable to move back owing to dangerous radiation.

More than 160,000 people were forcibly evacuated from the area when an earthquake and tsunami crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant on 11 March 2011, and tens of thousands left voluntarily.

Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), the company that owns the plant, has paid compensation to some nuclear refugees, including what it calls “temporary” compensation for living costs, but it has paid no money for assets damaged by the meltdown.

A recent report by Greenpeace documented a litany of complaints about complicated forms, insufficient living costs and low valuations on property. Greenpeace said the plan was drawn up by Tepco in July last year and is based on a “complex and disputed” government system.


(H/T blog readers NYUltraBuddha, prestant)

=======================

(UPDATE 3/4/2013) There is absolutely no coverage in Japan that Mr. Yoshizawa, TEPCO's senior manager, was interviewed by foreign press (The Independent, The Guardian).


Sunday, August 21, 2011

More on Fukushima II (Daini): Loss of Function to Remove Residual Heat for Up to 2 Days and 23 Hours, March 11 to 14

I hardly paid any attention to Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant in the early days of the crisis, but I got curious reading the comment from the reader "Joe Neubarth" to the post on the eyewitness account of Fukushima II on the day of the earthquake:

"Core Damage comes from a loss of cooling. I know of no report of loss of cooling at that facility. Did they go dark when the one electrical transmission tower fell north of Fukushima during the earthquake? Did they then have a delay if the startup of Emergency Diesel Generators? If there was a delay or if they lost the EDG's totally THEN there might be a melt down, BUT I have not heard of this happening."

I didn't know either (or I totally forgot). Did they or didn't they? So I went to TEPCO's site and see what they say.

Fukushima II Nuke Plant has 4 reactors. When the earthquake hit on March 11, control rods were successfully inserted in all 4 reactors at 2:48PM. Then the tsunami hit, and at 6:33PM on March 11:

Occurrence of a Specific Incident Stipulated in Article 10 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (loss of function to remove residual heat)

This happened on Reactors 1, 2, and 4, at the same time.

Then, the Residual Heat Removal System re-started one by one, on March 14:

Reactor 1: 1:24AM, March 14
Reactor 2: 7:13AM, March 14
Reactor 4: 3:42PM, March 14

So, the reactors weren't cooled for as long as 69 hours in case of Reactor 4, and 55 hours in case of Reactor 1. Is 55 hours long enough for the coolant (water) inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel to evaporate and for at least part of the fuel rods to be exposed and get damaged?

For all 4 reactors, the Reactor Coolant Filtering System came online between June 4 and July 17.

TEPCO also says the Suppression Chambers of Reactors 1, 2 and 4 suffered some event that caused the "loss of function to suppress pressure" in the morning of March 12. The function was restored on March 14 morning.

The above information is from TEPCO's status report on Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant as of August 21 (click to enlarge, or go to the link):

Friday, December 7, 2012

Slight Rise in Pressure in #Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant Reactor 1 Bldg After Dec 7 M7.3 Quake


Update on the Magnitude 7.3 outer-rise earthquake on December 7 off Miyagi Prefecture. (Yesterday's report is here.)

It looks something may have happened at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant. According to TEPCO, there was a small rise in pressure in the reactor building, which is to be kept at a negative pressure to prevent radioactive contamination from spreading into the environment.

Jiji Tsushin (12/7/2012):

福島第1「異常なし」=第2建屋内、圧力上昇も-東電

TEPCO: Fukushima I Nuke Plant "No abnormality", Fukushima II [reactor] building pressure rise

 東京電力は7日の地震後、福島第1、第2原発とも新たな異常はないと発表した。観測された揺れは小さく、原子炉への注水や使用済み燃料プールの冷却に影響はなかったという。

TEPCO announced that there was no new abnormality in Fukushima I and II Nuclear Power Plants. The quake measured on site was small, and it didn't affect the water injection into the reactors or the cooling of the spent fuel pools.

 ただ第2原発1号機では、原子炉建屋内の圧力が若干上昇。午後5時20分すぎ、作業員が手動で空気を排出し、圧力を下げる作業を行った。

However, in Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant, the pressure inside the Reactor 1 building rose a little. At 5:20PM, workers lowered the pressure by manually operating [the system that] pumps out the air.

 尾野昌之原子力・立地本部長代理は原因について、現時点では分からないとしつつ、「あまり深刻なものではない」と説明した。外部への放射性物質漏えいは確認されていないという。

TEPCO's manager Masayuki Ono explained "It's not very serious", even though he acknowledged the company did not know the cause of the pressure rise. According to TEPCO, there is no leak of radioactive materials in the environment.


Ah the famous last word, "No leak of radioactive materials in the environment".

There were 11 people injured in the M7.3 earthquake. There was a M6.2 earthquake 13 minutes after the M7.3 earthquake, but the Japanese tweets say there was no media report on that one, other than in the data pages of Japan Meteorological Agency and other meteorological news sites. Many people say they did indeed felt two shakes.

Right now, some people are trying to figure out what the hell is "autaah raizu" earthquake (and remember, "r" and "l" are indistinguishable to the Japanese) - a transliteration of "outer-rise" earthquake".

Sunday, January 8, 2012

Just In: Japanese Expert Says Fukushima II (not I) Nuke Plant's Containment Vessel Has Been Damaged by the Quake

Information from Iwakami Yasumi's USTREAM channel netcasting the workshop of an Osaka citizens' group "Kansai network to stop the disaster-debris acceptance" with a panel of experts including European experts.

One Japanese expert, Hiromitsu Ino, said a Containment Vessel at Fukushima II (Daini) is broken, and they are trying to repair it. It was probably caused by the earthquake, not tsunami.

The workshop is on-going at this link: http://www.ustream.tv/channel/iwj-osaka1#utm_campaign=t.co&utm_source=8481429&utm_medium=social

Hiromitsu Ino is professor emeritus at Tokyo University. His area of specialty is metallic materials science. He is the head of the Group of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.

I still remember a tweet last summer (I think) saying an acquaintance fleeing from the area near Fukushima II Nuke Plant right after the earthquake saw a smoke coming out of one of the reactor buildings (there are 4). Fukushima II, unlike Fukushima I, has 4 Mark-II type boiling water reactors built by Toshiba and Hitachi.

Saturday, May 10, 2014

Video of #Fukushima I NPP Seen from Ocean, 1.5 Kilometer Away


People at Umi-Labo ("sea laboratory") in Iwaki City, a non-profit citizens' group, went near TEPCO's Hirono Thermal Power Plant, Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant, and Fukushima I (Daiichi) Nuclear Power Plant for the second time on April 27, 2014 on a fishing boat that had survived the March 11, 2011 tsunami. They came as close as 1.5 kilometer from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

Apparently, there is no restriction that prohibits anyone from going near Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant by boat. So far, I only know of this group that has done that. No research institute nor nuclear expert (other than IAEA) has bothered.

According to Mainichi Shinbun (5/7/2014) reporting the trip:

  • The air radiation level on the boat at 1.5 kilometer from Fukushima I NPP was 0.05 microsievert/hour, surprisingly low, due to the shielding effect of water (ocean).

  • The ocean soil sample taken at Fukushima I NPP contained 417 Bq/Kg of radioactive cesium, whereas the ocean soil sample taken off Iwaki City had 287 Bq/Kg.


In the Mainichi article, the captain of the fishing boat says, "Isn't it amazing, how small Fukushima I NPP looks from the ocean? And this small plant is troubling the world." He had saved his boat by riding the tsunami waves on March 11, 2011.

Monday, August 29, 2011

Workers Entered Fukushima II (Daini) Reactor 4

While the attention is on Fukushima I, TEPCO has been quietly working on Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant located in Naraha-machi and Tomioka-machi.

On August 29, workers entered the Containment Vessel of Reactor 4 at Fukushima II for the first time since March 11. No details of the work inside the Containment Vessel have been released by TEPCO yet.

From NHK News (8/29/2011):

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所とともに事故を起こした、福島第二原発では、29日午前中から、4号機の原子炉を覆う格納容器の中に作業員が入り、内部が破損しているかや、放射線の量を調べています。

Workers entered the Containment Vessel of Reactor 4 at Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant to check the damages if any and measure radiation levels.

福島第一原発と第二原発で、事故のあと、格納容器に人が入るのは初めてです。

It is the first time after the accident that anyone entered the Containment Vessel of any reactor at either Fukushima I or Fukushima II.

福島第二原発は、3月11日の地震で4つの原子炉がすべて自動停止したあと、4号機を含む3つの原子炉では、海水を使って原子炉を冷やす設備の一部が津波によって壊れ、十分に冷やすことができなくなりました。

At Fukushima II, after the automatic shutdown of all 4 reactors after the March 11 earthquake, part of the cooling systems that use seawater to cool the reactors was broken by the tsunami in three of the reactors including Reactor 4, and the reactors were not cooled sufficiently.

このうち、4号機の原子炉は、外部電源を使った冷却によって、地震の4日後に100度以下の冷温停止状態となり、東京電力はその後も原子炉の状態が安定しているとして、29日午前10時すぎから、およそ10人の作業員が原子炉を覆う格納容器の中に入り、内部の調査をしています。

Reactor 4 was brought to a cold shutdown 4 days after the quake using the cooling system with external power supply. TEPCO determined that the condition of the reactor was stable, and sent about 10 workers inside the Containment Vessel to conduct the survey of the inside.

福島第二原発の4号機は、原子炉の圧力が一時高くなるなどしており、東京電力は設備が壊れているかを調べるとともに、内部の放射線量や温度などを測定するということです。

The reactor pressure rose temporarily in Reactor 4 after the quake. TEPCO is going to check for damages as well as measure the radiation levels and temperature inside.

福島第一原発と第二原発で、事故のあと、格納容器に人が入るのは初めてで、東京電力は、29日の調査で得られた結果を基に、今後内部で作業をするために必要な装備などを検討していくということです。

It is the first time since the accident that anyone entered the Containment Vessel in Fukushima I or Fukushima II. TEPCO says it will decide on the necessary work to be done inside the Containment Vessel, once it gets the result of the survey on August 29.

TEPCO is not just working on the Containment Vessel at Fukushima II by the way. It's been working on the heat exchanger for Reactor 4 also, as evidenced by TEPCO's announcement that one worker from a TEPCO affiliate company fell ill due to excess heat in the heat exchanger building while he was re-routing the temporary cable.

What is TEPCO up to? Restart Fukushima II? That's what the mayor of Naraha-machi wants TEPCO to do.

I also wonder whatever happened to the 3000 tonnes of contaminated water in the basement of the plant.

Thursday, May 17, 2012

Banri Kaieda Says Then-PM Naoto Kan Couldn't Decide Whether to Declare a Nuclear Emergency Without Knowing "Legal Basis"


. . . (sigh).

The Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission set up by the Diet called Banri Kaieda as witness on May 17.

Kaieda was the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry who oversaw the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency when the Fukushima nuclear accident happened in March 2011. After losing the leadership election of the Democratic Party of Japan to Yoshihiko Noda in August last year, thanks partly to NHK, he has kept a low profile unlike Naoto Kan (who went on a media blitz to spread his version of the accident), Yukio Edano (who quickly became the Minister of the Economy), or Goshi Hosono (who was promoted from a personal assistant to Kan to the minister in charge of the nuclear accident and then to the Minister of the Environment).

The hearing lasted two and a half hours, and the media reporting it picked different aspects of his testimony. So, from several newspapers and NHK, here's what Kaieda had to say about the early days of the worst nuclear accident in Japan. Nikkei Shinbun has the most extensive coverage. (Emphasis is mine.)

From Nikkei Shinbun (5/17/2012):

  • In accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, TEPCO notified the Ministry of Economy at 4:45PM on March 11, 2011 after the loss of power to Reactor 1 and Reactor due to the tsunami. Kaieda, as Minister of Economy, requested then-Prime Minister Kan to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. But it took PM Kan until after 7PM to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation.

    Kaieda said "It took a long time to obtain Mr. Kan's agreement [to declare a Nuclear Emergency and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters]" because Kan had to be satisfied with information such as the condition of the reactors and the legal basis for [declaring, etc.].

  • About injecting seawater into the reactors to cool, Kaieda said Mr. Kan expressed his concern that injecting seawater might cause re-criticality.

  • Kaieda felt that TEPCO didn't start the injection of seawater immediately because the company was hesitant to decommission the reactors. [If you pour in seawater into a reactor, the reactor cannot be restored.]

  • Kaieda received a telephone call on late night on March 14, 2011 from Masataka Shimizu, then-President of TEPCO, who told Kaieda that he would like to evacuate the workers from Fukushima I Nuke Plant to Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant. Kaieda interpreted the call to mean it was a "complete withdrawal".

  • Kaieda emphasized that he thought "it was a grave mistake" for Kan to closet himself in his office on the 5th floor of the Prime Minister's Official Residence. The risk control center [for the nuclear accident] was located in the basement.

  • Kaida felt that it was like a telephone game among the PM's Official Residence, TEPCO Headquarters, and Fukushima I Nuke Plant.


From Yomiuri Shinbun (5/17/2012):

  • Kaieda requested Kan that he declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, but Kan asked "what's the basis?" So then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano and PM's assistants [no doubt including Goshi Hosono] had to pour over the related laws and regulations. In the meantime, Kan did other things including attending a meeting with the opposition party leaders.


From NHK (5/17/2012):

  • About the delay in the vent to lower the pressure inside the Containment Vessel [of Reactor 1], Kaieda said he thought "TEPCO is hesitant, because the company wants to minimize the accident".


I didn't know the reason for the delay in declaring a Nuclear Emergency. I didn't know TEPCO's proposal to evacuate the workers was to Fukushima II Nuke Plant. As to injecting seawater (or for that matter, any kind of water) may have been hard with increasing pressure inside the RPV.

Two interesting points:

  • There was no one who was able to tell then-Prime Minister Kan, "Prime Minister, just do it", when Kan wasted everyone's time by wanting to know the legal basis for declaring a Nuclear Emergency. Instead, Kan insisted on knowing the legal basis, and Edano (and no doubt Hosono) went to look up the information for their Prime Minister when every second might have counted. Not really a picture of a resolute leader as Kan wants to portray himself.

  • TEPCO's "complete withdrawal" was what Kaieda thought, not necessarily what then-President Shimizu of TEPCO told him. He didn't tell Kaieda that he wanted complete withdrawal, but since he didn't tell Kaieda that it would be partial withdrawal either, in Kaieda's mind it was "complete withdrawal".


Yukio Edano's turn as the witness will come on May 27. Goshi Hosono will be interviewed by the commission on May 19, but it will be closed to public, according to Mainichi (5/18/2012). Hosono says he requested the open hearing, but the commission said no, because Hosono was not in a decision-making position when the accident started. (Huh?)

On May 28, Naoto Kan will be the witness.

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Professor Dapeng Zhao of Tohoku Univ: Fukushima I Nuke Plant Could Be Hit by Epicentral Earthquake

From Daily Mail (2/14/2012):

Stricken Fukushima nuclear plant at dire risk of massive new earthquake, scientists warn

By Damien Gayle

Scientists have issued a dire warning that the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant is at risk of a massive new earthquake.

Research using data from more than 6,000 recent tremors has found that last March's disaster has reactivated a seismic fault practically beneath the power station.

Now scientists are telling Japanese authorities to urgently shore up the damaged reactor in expectation of more massive 'quakes.

Fukushima Daiichi was the scene of the worst nuclear disasters in history after it was damaged by the March 11, 2011, magnitude 9 earthquake and following tsunami.

But this tremor's epicentre was about 100 miles from the site, off the coast of Japan, and a much closer one could occur in the future at Fukushima.

Dapeng Zhao, geophysics professor at Japan's Tohoku University, said: 'There are a few active faults in the nuclear power plant area, and our results show the existence of similar structural anomalies under both the Iwaki and the Fukushima Daiichi areas.

'Given that a large earthquake occurred in Iwaki not long ago, we think it is possible for a similarly strong earthquake to happen in Fukushima.'

The April 11, 2011, magnitude 7 Iwaki earthquake was the strongest aftershock of the 11 March earthquake with an inland epicentre.

It occurred 37 miles south-west of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, 124 miles from the March 11 epicentre.

The research, published in European Geosciences Union's open-access Solid Earth journal, shows that the Iwaki earthquake was triggered by fluids moving upwards from the subducting Pacific plate to the crust.

The Pacific plate is moving beneath north-east Japan, which increases the temperature and pressure of the minerals in it.

This leads to the removal of water from minerals, generating fluids that are less dense than the surrounding rock. These fluids move up to the upper crust and may alter seismic faults.

Ping Tong, lead author of the paper, said: 'Ascending fluids can reduce the friction of part of an active fault and so trigger it to cause a large earthquake.

'This, together with the stress variations caused by the 11 March event, is what set off the Iwaki tremor.'

The number of tremors in Iwaki increased greatly after the March earthquake. The movements in the Earth's crust induced by the event caused variations in the seismic pressure or stress of nearby faults.

Around Iwaki, Japan's seismic network recorded over 24,000 tremors from March 11, 2011 to October 27, 2011, up from under 1,300 detected quakes in the nine years before, the scientists report.

The 6,000 of these earthquakes selected for the study were recorded by 132 seismographic stations in Japan from June 2002 to October 2011.

The researchers analysed these data to take pictures of the Earth's interior, using a technique called seismic tomography.

Professor Zhao explained: 'The method is a powerful tool to map out structural anomalies, such as ascending fluids, in the Earth's crust and upper mantle using seismic waves.

'It can be compared to a CT or CAT scan, which relies on X-rays to detect tumours or fractures inside the human body.'

While the scientists can't predict when an earthquake in Fukushima Daiichi will occur, they state that the ascending fluids observed in the area indicate that such an event is likely to occur in the near future.

They warn that more attention should be paid to the site's ability to withstand strong earthquakes, and reduce the risk of another nuclear disaster.

The scientists also note that the results may be useful for reviewing seismic safety in other nuclear facilities in Japan, such as nearby Fukushima Daini, Onagawa to the north of Fukushima, and Tōkai to the south.

The paper at Solid Earth Open Access Journal of the European Geosciences Union is here.

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Result of "Decontamination" at a Kindergarten in Minami Soma City - Not Much of a Result

Minami Soma City in Fukushima Prefecture is one of the cities whose designation as "evacuation-ready zone" have been lifted and where the residents are supposed to return. The city had been urging the residents to return well before the designation was lifted, and as part of the efforts to encourage the residents to return and live in the city as before, the city has been busy "decontaminating" kindergartens and schools and other public places with advice from Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo University Radioisotope Center.

However, if you look at one and only result that the city has published, the decontamination didn't quite decontaminate, i.e. remove the contamination. If the city has better results elsewhere, it is not showing.

That one result is that of Ishigami Daini Kindergarten decontamination, done on July 30 as the kickoff event for Minami Soma's "decontamination month" (which was the month of August).

According to the "Decontamination Work Evaluation Sheet", the city found:

  • Drainage on the rooftop measured 33 microsieverts/hour (already decontaminated at the time of July 30 work);

  • As for indoor radiation level, the radiation 2 meters off the floor was higher than the radiation 1 centimeter off the floor;

  • Locations whose radiation levels got lower after the work: drainage on the rooftop, under the slide in the playground;

  • Washing the building didn't result in lower radiation;

  • Washing the asphalt [parking lot] with high-power washer didn't result in lower radiation;

  • Nearby residents complained of water from the decontamination work splashing on their properties; not enough notification prior to the work [it looks like the city didn't notify the residents at all].

Here's their before and after map of the radiation levels in various locations in the kindergarten:
  • Noticeable difference observed in before and after radiation levels: under the rain gutters, drainage, under the slide

  • Location where the radiation levels went up after the decontamination: center of the kindergarten playground, parking lot

  • Locations where the difference was not noticeably big: playground locations, indoors

The survey meter that they used was "POLIMASTER PM1703M" personal survey meter which measures gamma ray with the accuracy of 30%.

But not to worry. The IAEA Decontamination Mission is coming to Japan. They must surely know what they are doing and advise the Japanese government accordingly.

Does anyone care at this point if the "decontamination" actually decontaminate? It sure seems to be making people feel better that they did the work, and it brings money and job to the area's yard cleaning contractors and heavy equipment operators who will do the soil scraping.

Monday, March 25, 2013

#Radioactive Japan: 50 Millisieverts Radiation Exposure Per Year Is "Low" Enough to Bring Residents and Businesses Back to Tomioka-Machi in Fukushima


That's where Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant is located, but the town was heavily contaminated when the radioactive plume released from Fukushima I (Daiichi) Nuclear Power Plant (mostly from vent, from explosions to a lesser degree) hit south. The entire town has been designated as "no-entry (exclusion) zone".

But now, one year after similar measures were taken in other outlying cities and towns like Minami Soma City, Tomioka-machi and Namie-machi, another very contaminated town north of Fukushima I Nuke Plant, are being reorganized into new zones that signifies "hope" (at least for the government if not for the residents). No more forbidding "no-entry zone".

The areas which are expected to have cumulative radiation exposure of 20 millisieverts or less per year will be called the "zone in preparation for having the evacuation order lifted" (避難指示解除準備区域) where people are free to go back and live (or I should say strongly encouraged to go back and live) after the national government thoroughly decontaminate the areas.

The areas with the expected cumulative radiation exposure of 20 to 50 millisieverts per year will be called the "zone with restricted entry" (居住制限区域) which only means cannot cannot stay there overnight but no problem if they want to commute to work there.

Only if the cumulative radiation exposure per year in the areas exceed 50 millisieverts, the areas are designated as "zone where it is difficult for people to return" (帰還困難区域), and people cannot go back at all until 5 years after the accident, meaning only three more years. After three more years, the cumulative radiation levels per year are magically expected to drop below 50 millisieverts. (Good luck with that, with cesium-137 whose half-life is 30 years.)

Who measures the radiation levels? The national government under the pork-cutlet-over-rice prime minister (baseless rumors say he won't last long, as his stomach ailment has returned) of course. They will continue token "decontamination" - practically smearing the area with water and bagging the top soil (if that, these days), cutting branches of trees (and dumping in the rivers nearby) - mostly to profit general contractors, greatly save on compensation money, and claim "See, we're not Chernobyl! We're returning people in two years!".

Here's from Mainichi English, talking hopefully about cherry blossom viewing event in the most contaminated area inside Tomioka-machi (3/25/2013; emphasis is mine):

Nuke disaster exclusion zone change has Fukushima town ready for cherry blossom season

TOMIOKA, Fukushima -- The cherry blossoms in this town are on the edge of blooming, and as of March 25 local residents can see the buds in person for the first time since the Fukushima nuclear disaster began more than two years ago.

Tomioka had been locked inside the nuclear disaster exclusion zone since the town was evacuated in March 2011. However, the national government has determined that radiation doses in about 70 percent of the town have fallen to 50 millisieverts per year or less -- still high, but low enough to re-designate these areas as open to temporary visits.

The rezoning happens to cover a good portion of Yonomori Park, known for its some 1,500 cherry trees lining an L-shaped road and forming a pink tunnel when in full bloom.

"The buds look ready to pop open," said Kiyoshi Horikawa, the 72-year-old chairman of a local cherry blossom viewing group as he looked on the trees on March 25.

The day also marked the beginning of decontamination work on the trees. Unfortunately, the east-west part of the route generally remains in the exclusion zone and generally out-of-bounds even for quick visits. Many of the trees in that section are more than a century old.

Nevertheless, the town government is planning a cherry blossom-viewing bus trip for residents in late April, and includes the section still inside the exclusion zone.


So the national government has simply decided the radiation levels have dropped below 50 millisieverts per year in 70% of the town. Why didn't Russians think of this wonderful gimmick?

Monday, September 23, 2013

Photo Essay by Ryuichi Kino: Time Frozen in Ex-Evacuation Zone in #Fukushima


Independent journalist Ryuichi Kino went to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in June 2013, his fourth. Along the way, he went inside the ex-evacuation zone (no-entry zone within 20-kilometer radius from the plant) and took these photos, and posted on his Flickr site. (Copyright: Ryuichi Kino, all rights reserved.)

Kino wonders aloud in his tweet, "How do they expect the residents to live here? Will the tanks full of contaminated water and the reactor buildings that blew up disappear in five years?"


The following photos are only part of 54 photos of the set.

=================

Naraha-machi, where Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant is located. Farm road lined with plastic bags containing contaminated soil removed from farmland.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Tomioka-machi, where Fukushima II Nuke Plant is located. The fence bars entry to the "zone where the residents won't be able to return for 5 years". As if the radiation is suddenly higher beyond the fence.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

JR Joban Line Yonomori Station in Tomioka-machi. Nature is taking over.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Futaba-machi, from the distance. Half of Fukushima I Nuke Plant is located in Futaba-machi. The arch in the left of the picture says "Nuclear Power to Build Affluent Society and Town".)

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Futaba Kosei Hospital. Doctors, nurses, and patients were still trying to evacuate when Reactor 1 building exploded in hydrogen explosion on March 12, 2011. Beds and stretchers abandoned in haste.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Okuma-machi, with Reverse Osmosis waste storage tanks, exhaust stacks, and tall cranes working on the broken reactors in the backdrop. Would you feel safe, returning to the area?

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Okuma-machi. It looks almost normal.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Until you look up close.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Somewhere within the ex-evacuation zone. The survey meter shows 15.54 microsieverts/hour radiation (gamma).

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Ukedo District in Namie-machi, along the Pacific Ocean. Total wipe-out.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Memorial for the dead, in Ukedo District in Namie-machi. Someone does come here (probably more than one) to offer flowers and drinks.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

As far as eyes can see, plastic bags with radioactive waste from decontamination along Route 6 in Naraha-machi. As talks of building intermediate storage facilities for contaminated waste have stalled in the ex-evacuation zone, these bags are left like this in many locations.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Route 6 in Tomioka-machi. Buses carry workers to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

Guards manning the checkpoint to the "difficult for the residents to return" zone. Kino writes that they are from private security company, and that:

以前の警戒区域は法的根拠があ ったので警察権を行使することができたけど、今の帰還困難区域は強制力がないので、法的には立ち入りを止めることはできない。中に入らないという制限 は、ある意味で市民の協力により成り立っているということになる。

The evacuation zone had a legal basis, and the police authority was used to enforce it. But the current "difficult for the residents to return" zone does not have legal force behind it, and there is no way to legally stop one from entering the zone. Restriction of entry is, in a way, made possible by the cooperation of the residents.


ex evacuation zone, Fukushima

The national government is essentially telling the the residents, "At your own risk."

For more photos of the ex-evacuation zone by Kino, go to his Flickr page, here.

Sunday, May 4, 2014

International Nuclear Cooperation: Japan's Monju Reactor to Help France's Astrid, UK's Sellafield to Help Japan's TEPCO


As Japan's Prime Minister Abe tours Europe, he is securing the cooperation from Europe's largest nuclear nations that he hopes (I think) will enhance the status of Japan as a major nuclear nation and secure the nuclear future for Japan.

With France, Mr. Abe is offering Japan's Monju fast breeder reactor to conduct tests for the Astrid.

What's the Astrid? From the wiki entry for Generation IV reactors:

The European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative is funding three Generation IV reactor systems, one of which is a sodium-cooled fast reactor, called ASTRID, Advanced Sodium Technical Reactor for Industrial Demonstration, Areva, CEA and EDF are leading the design with British collaboration.[13][14] Astrid will be rated about 600 MWe and is expected to be built in France, with construction slated to begin in 2017 near to the Phénix reactor.[9]


Mr. Abe is eager to justify Japan's fuel cycle policy, and he wants to make nuclear technology and military weaponry as two of the major exports from Japan for which his government wants to become the top salesman.

From Nikkei Asia (4/30/2014; emphasis is mine):

Japan, France to work together on next-generation reactors

TOKYO -- The Japanese and French governments are working toward an agreement to cooperate in the development of fast reactors, a technology designed to reduce nuclear waste.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Francois Hollande will likely affirm the partnership in Paris on May 5. The agreement would build on an earlier comprehensive partnership formed last June in the field of nuclear energy.

Fast neutron reactors convert spent fuel, which remains radioactive for tens of thousands of years, into materials that emit radiation for just a few hundred years, thus helping to reduce overall nuclear waste.

When put into practical operation, such a reactor would generate electricity and cut down on nuclear waste at the same time.

France is developing the Astrid (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration), which it plans to start operating around 2025, but it lacks sufficient reactors to conduct tests. Japan will offer up its Monju prototype fast breeder reactor, which has been idle due to safety concerns, for the tests.

 

Good luck France. Workers, engineers, and scientists at Monju say they are not comfortable working there, unsure about safety.

Then, TEPCO has announced that they will closely collaborate with the UK's Sellafield Ltd. whose expertise in decommissioning a troubled reactor could benefit TEPCO in decommissioning Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

The Windscale accident was an INES Level 5 accident.

From TEPCO's presentation in English (5/2/2014):

Overview

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) considers it would be beneficial to share expertise with overseas operators which have similar decommissioning experience, to decommission Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

TEPCO has agreed with Sellafield Ltd. on exchanging information relating to the management and technology of decommissioning, towards a safer and stable decontamination and decommissioning at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Sellafield Ltd. is a company in UK which has engaged in the decommissioning of a reactor and radioactive waste facilities. On ahead of the formal information exchanging agreement, the two companies signed a cooperation statement, which clarifies the objectives and significance of the agreement.

Content of the Statement (Objectives and significance of the information exchanging agreement)

Overview of the objectives

  • Sharing expertise, experience and technology in radioactive waste management, clean up and decommissioning:

  • Visits in both directions (Fukushima Daiichi NPS, Sellafield) by representatives from both organisations, sharing of information / reports and similar exercises

  • Contributing to achieving the goals for both sites by learning from the similar challenges

  • Continuously assessing the effectiveness of cooperation


Overview of the significance

  • Proper visibility of the suppliers’ contribution

  • Strengthening of the links between our businesses and wider, civil society

  • Positive support of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) etc.


About technologies/knowledge of Sellafield Ltd.

  • Sellafield is working with the decommissioning of the Windscale nuclear reactor, which suffered radiation leak (INES-5).

  • It deals with the decommissioning and risk-reducing measurements fo the other facilities with high risk of radiation leakage

  • It has an experience of dealing contaminated water leak to the ground


It is clear from the comment by Mr. Naohiro Masuda, Chief Decommissioning Officer of a new TEPCO company called Fukushima Daiichi D&D Engineering Company, that this deal was brokered by the Japanese government and the UK government, regardless of whether TEPCO wanted it or not.

Mr. Masuda was the plant manager of Fukushima II (Daini) Nuclear Power Plant, which came very close to core melt after the loss of power after the earthquake on March 11, 2011. What the workers did under his leadership and why the core melt did not happen at Fukushima II would be worth recalling.

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Video Interview of Former Plant Manager of #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Masao Yoshida: "I Saw Divine Beings in Workers in Hellish Situation" (Part 1 of 2)



(UPDATE: Part 2 of the video interview transcript is here.)

Mainichi Shinbun has the slightly-paraphrased but full transcript of the video interview with Masao Yoshida, former Plant Manager of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. Since late July he has been hospitalized for cerebral hemorrhage, but the video interview, which was conducted on July 10, was shown at a small symposium in Fukushima on August 11, 2012.

I hope for the full recovery for Mr. Yoshida, so that he can continue to speak for the workers who have worked and who still work at the plant, trying to make the plant as stable as possible.

Mainichi's article reporting on the symposium has a screen capture of the video, which seems to be subtitled in English by the symposium organizer (a bookstore). But I don't have access to the video, so the following is my translation from the Mainichi transcript. It is most likely different from the official translation by the symposium organizer, and the mistakes contained in the translation below would be my mistakes, not the organizer's.

Here's Part 1 of the translation. The sentences are broken into paragraphs for easier reading. There are no paragraphs in the original Japanese text.

From Mainichi Shinbun (8/11/2012):

−−第1原発の現場の声を伝えてほしい。
Tell us about what it was like at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

◆昨年の大震災、それから私たちの発電所の事故で福島県の地元の方々に本当にご迷惑をおかけしている。この場で深くおわび申し上げる。まだしばらくこういう状況が続くが、我々も全力を挙げて復旧しており、ご理解をお願いする。

本来ならこの講演会に自分で出てきたいと思っていたが、昨年末から病気でずっと入院していてまだ体力が回復していない。そういう中でこういうビデオレターということで失礼する。政府などの事故調査委員会が開催されている中で、なかなか一般のマスコミの方に我々の生の声を届けるわけにはいかないと思っていた。事故調査委員会が一段落するまでは変な形でお話しをすることはルール違反になると私は思っていた。そういう中で(今回)話を聞いていただけるということは大変ありがたいと思っている。

The last year's earthquake and tsunami, and the accident of our nuclear power plant, have caused a great deal of hardship to the local residents in Fukushima Prefecture. I would like to take this opportunity to apologize deeply. The situation is likely to continue for a while, but we are doing our best to restore the plant. Please understand.

I wanted to come to this symposium in person, but I've been hospitalized since the end of last year and my strength hasn't been restored. So please excuse me for talking to you through video like this. As long as the accident investigation commissions were conducting their investigations, I didn't think I should speak to the mass media about the real situation at the plant. I thought it would be a violation of the rules to speak out, until the accident investigation commissions concluded their investigation. So, I welcome (this opportunity) in which you kindly allow me to speak.

−−発電所からの全面撤退がささやかれている。事実は?
Some say you [or TEPCO] contemplated full withdrawal from the plant. Is that true?

◆しゃべりだすととまらないが、基本的に私が考えていたのは第1原発をどうやって安定化させるかということに尽きる。そういう時に我々が現場を離れるということは絶対にあってはならない。かといって人命は非常に尊いので、関係のない人といったらおかしいが、事故の収拾に直接関与していない人には避難していただく。ただやはり現場で原子炉を冷やしたり、そういう作業をしている人間は撤退できないと思っていたし、本店にも撤退ということは一言も言っていないし、私は思ってもいなかった。本店には一言も撤退と言っていないということは間違いない。事故調にもそう話をしている。あとでいぶかしく思ったが結局、本店と官邸の間でそういう撤退騒ぎが起こっているが現場では一言も絶対そういうことは言っていない。これは間違っていない。

I could go on forever on the topic, but basically all I was thinking at that time was how to stabilize the plant. In such a situation, leaving the scene of the accident should never happen. However, the life is extremely precious, and people who were not involved, people who were not directly involved in the accident needed to be evacuated. Those people who were engaged in cooling the reactors, I didn't think they could evacuate. I have never said a word about withdrawal to the TEPCO headquarters, and it didn't enter my mind at all. I am 100 percent sure that I never said a word about withdrawal, and that's what I told the accident investigation commission [of the Cabinet Office] so. I was puzzled later [about the issue], but the fuss over "withdrawal" happened between the TEPCO Headquarters and the Prime Minister's Office, but we at the plant never said a word about that [withdrawal]. I'm quite positive on that.

−−自らの命を亡くす覚悟はあったか?
Were you prepared to die?

◆覚悟というほどの覚悟があったかはよくわからないが、結局、我々が離れてしまって注水ができなくなってしまうということは、もっとひどく放射能漏れになる。そうすると5、6号機はプラントはなんとか安定しているが、人もいなくなると結局あそこもメルト(ダウン)するというか、燃料が溶けることになる。そのまま放っておくと、もっと放射能も出る。福島第2原発も一生懸命、プラントを安定化させたが、あそこにも人が近づけなくなるかもしれない。そうなると非常に大惨事になる。そこまで考えれば、当然のことながら逃げられない。

そんな中で大変な放射能、放射線がある中で、現場に何回も行ってくれた同僚たちがいるが、私が何をしたというよりも彼らが一生懸命やってくれて、私はただ見てただけの話だ。私は何もしていない。実際ああやって現場に行ってくれた同僚一人一人は、本当にありがたい。私自身が免震重要棟にずっと座っているのが仕事で、現場に行けていない。いろいろな指示の中で本当にあとから現場に話を聞くと大変だったなと思うが、(部下は)そこに飛び込んでいってくれた。本当に飛び込んでいってくれた連中がたくさんいる。

私が昔から読んでいる法華経の中に地面から菩薩(ぼさつ)がわいてくるというところがあるが、そんなイメージがすさまじい地獄のような状態で感じた。現場に行って、(免震重要棟に)上がってきてヘロヘロになって寝ていない、食事も十分ではない、体力的に限界という中で、現場に行って上がってまた現場に行こうとしている連中がたくさんいた。それを見た時にこの人たちのために何かできることを私はしなければならないと思った。そういう人たちがいたから、(第1原発の収束について)このレベルまでもっていけたと私は思っている。

I don't know if I was prepared, but in the end, if we were to leave and water injection stopped, more radiation would leak. Then, Reactors 5 and 6, which were somehow stable, would melt, I mean the fuel would melt, once there was no one at the plant. If the plant was left all by itself, more radiation would leak. We managed to stabilize Fukushima II (Daini) Power plant, but we might not be able to be there [if Fukushima I was abandoned and more radiation leaked]. That would be a catastrophe. If you think that way, there is no way we could just run away.

In that situation, in the tremendous amount of radioactivity, my colleagues went to the scenes of the accident a number of times. It was them who did all they could, and all I did was to watch them do it. I didn't do anything. I really appreciate and thank every single one of my colleagues who went to the scenes of the accident. My job was to stay put in the Anti-Seismic Building, and I couldn't go to the accident scenes. I gave orders, and when I heard from the workers later, I knew it was a serious [terrible] situation. But [people who worked under me] went there without hesitation. There were many of them, who literally jumped into the scenes of the accident, trying to contain it.

In a Buddhism text that I've been reading for a long time, there is a mention of divine figures issuing from the ground. That was what I felt was happening in the hellish situation at the plant. Workers would go to the scenes of the accident, then come back upstairs (at the Anti-Seismic Building), they were dead tired, without sleep, with not enough food, reaching the limit of their physical strength. Then they would go out again, and come back, and go out again. There were many workers like them. When I saw these workers, I knew I had to do whatever I could for them. It's my belief that we have been able to restore the plant to the current level [of relative stability], because of these workers.


The precise word Mr. Yoshida uses for "divine figure" is "Bodhisattva" - one who vows to save all beings before becoming a buddha.

It was probably the first time that anyone from TEPCO spoke words of praise and appreciation for the workers at the plant in a personal way like Mr. Yoshida did. According to the local Fukushima newspapers, Yoshida's words were much appreciated by the families whose members worked or still works at the plant.

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

Just In: Masao Yoshida, #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Manager at the Time of Accident, Died


Mainichi Shinbun (7/9/2013):

東京電力福島第1原発の吉田昌郎(よしだ・まさお)元所長(58)が9日午前、死去したことが分かった。東電関係者が取材に明らかにした。在任中の2011年3月に東日本大震災と原発事故が起こり、現場対応に当たった。同年12月に退任。12年7月に脳出血で緊急手術を行った。

Masao Yoshida (age 58), who was the plant manager at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, died in the morning of July 9. Sources at TEPCO revealed the news to Mainichi. While he was the plant manager in March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident happened. He led the accident response at the plant. He left the post in December 2011. He underwent an emergency surgery in July 2012 for cerebral hemorrhage.


Jiji Tsushin says the cause of death was the cancer of the esophagus.

In the first and the only interview he gave was right before the emergency brain surgery. He said he saw divine beings in the workers, who would go out and do the work in a hellish situation, come back and go out again. He said he would like to spend his time speaking for the workers.

He did not get the chance. He must have had so much he wanted to say. He has now joined the divine beings. May he rest in peace.

For those of you who haven't read them, here are my posts from August 2012, on his interview on July 10, 2012, right before he fell ill.

====================

Video Interview of Former Plant Manager of #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Masao Yoshida: "I Saw Divine Beings in Workers in Hellish Situation" (Part 1 of 2)

Mainichi Shinbun has the slightly-paraphrased but full transcript of the video interview with Masao Yoshida, former Plant Manager of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. Since late July he has been hospitalized for cerebral hemorrhage, but the video interview, which was conducted on July 10, was shown at a small symposium in Fukushima on August 11, 2012.

I hope for the full recovery for Mr. Yoshida, so that he can continue to speak for the workers who have worked and who still work at the plant, trying to make the plant as stable as possible.

Mainichi's article reporting on the symposium has a screen capture of the video, which seems to be subtitled in English by the symposium organizer (a bookstore). But I don't have access to the video, so the following is my translation from the Mainichi transcript. It is most likely different from the official translation by the symposium organizer, and the mistakes contained in the translation below would be my mistakes, not the organizer's.

Here's Part 1 of the translation. The sentences are broken into paragraphs for easier reading. There are no paragraphs in the original Japanese text.

From Mainichi Shinbun (8/11/2012):

−−第1原発の現場の声を伝えてほしい。
Tell us about what it was like at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

◆昨年の大震災、それから私たちの発電所の事故で福島県の地元の方々に本当にご迷惑をおかけしている。この場で深くおわび申し上げる。まだしばらくこういう状況が続くが、我々も全力を挙げて復旧しており、ご理解をお願いする。

本来ならこの講演会に自分で出てきたいと思っていたが、昨年末から病気でずっと入院していてまだ体力が回復していない。そういう中でこういうビデオレター ということで失礼する。政府などの事故調査委員会が開催されている中で、なかなか一般のマスコミの方に我々の生の声を届けるわけにはいかないと思ってい た。事故調査委員会が一段落するまでは変な形でお話しをすることはルール違反になると私は思っていた。そういう中で(今回)話を聞いていただけるというこ とは大変ありがたいと思っている。

The last year's earthquake and tsunami, and the accident of our nuclear power plant, have caused a great deal of hardship to the local residents in Fukushima Prefecture. I would like to take this opportunity to apologize deeply. The situation is likely to continue for a while, but we are doing our best to restore the plant. Please understand.

I wanted to come to this symposium in person, but I've been hospitalized since the end of last year and my strength hasn't been restored. So please excuse me for talking to you through video like this. As long as the accident investigation commissions were conducting their investigations, I didn't think I should speak to the mass media about the real situation at the plant. I thought it would be a violation of the rules to speak out, until the accident investigation commissions concluded their investigation. So, I welcome (this opportunity) in which you kindly allow me to speak.

−−発電所からの全面撤退がささやかれている。事実は?
Some say you [or TEPCO] contemplated full withdrawal from the plant. Is that true?

◆しゃべりだすととまらないが、基本的に私が考えていたのは第1原発をどうやって安定化させるかということに尽きる。そういう時に我々が現場を離れるとい うことは絶対にあってはならない。かといって人命は非常に尊いので、関係のない人といったらおかしいが、事故の収拾に直接関与していない人には避難してい ただく。ただやはり現場で原子炉を冷やしたり、そういう作業をしている人間は撤退できないと思っていたし、本店にも撤退ということは一言も言っていない し、私は思ってもいなかった。本店には一言も撤退と言っていないということは間違いない。事故調にもそう話をしている。あとでいぶかしく思ったが結局、本 店と官邸の間でそういう撤退騒ぎが起こっているが現場では一言も絶対そういうことは言っていない。これは間違っていない。

I could go on forever on the topic, but basically all I was thinking at that time was how to stabilize the plant. In such a situation, leaving the scene of the accident should never happen. However, the life is extremely precious, and people who were not involved, people who were not directly involved in the accident needed to be evacuated. Those people who were engaged in cooling the reactors, I didn't think they could evacuate. I have never said a word about withdrawal to the TEPCO headquarters, and it didn't enter my mind at all. I am 100 percent sure that I never said a word about withdrawal, and that's what I told the accident investigation commission [of the Cabinet Office] so. I was puzzled later [about the issue], but the fuss over "withdrawal" happened between the TEPCO Headquarters and the Prime Minister's Office, but we at the plant never said a word about that [withdrawal]. I'm quite positive on that.

−−自らの命を亡くす覚悟はあったか?
Were you prepared to die?

◆覚悟というほどの覚悟があったかはよくわからないが、結局、我々が離れてしまって注水ができなくなってしまうということは、もっとひどく放射能漏れにな る。そうすると5、6号機はプラントはなんとか安定しているが、人もいなくなると結局あそこもメルト(ダウン)するというか、燃料が溶けることになる。そ のまま放っておくと、もっと放射能も出る。福島第2原発も一生懸命、プラントを安定化させたが、あそこにも人が近づけなくなるかもしれない。そうなると非 常に大惨事になる。そこまで考えれば、当然のことながら逃げられない。

そんな中で大変な放射能、放射線がある中で、現場に何回も行ってくれた同僚たちがいるが、私が何をしたというよりも彼らが一生懸命やってくれて、私はただ 見てただけの話だ。私は何もしていない。実際ああやって現場に行ってくれた同僚一人一人は、本当にありがたい。私自身が免震重要棟にずっと座っているのが 仕事で、現場に行けていない。いろいろな指示の中で本当にあとから現場に話を聞くと大変だったなと思うが、(部下は)そこに飛び込んでいってくれた。本当 に飛び込んでいってくれた連中がたくさんいる。

私が昔から読んでいる法華経の中に地面から菩薩(ぼさつ)がわいてくるというところがあるが、そんなイメージがすさまじい地獄のような状態で感じた。現場 に行って、(免震重要棟に)上がってきてヘロヘロになって寝ていない、食事も十分ではない、体力的に限界という中で、現場に行って上がってまた現場に行こ うとしている連中がたくさんいた。それを見た時にこの人たちのために何かできることを私はしなければならないと思った。そういう人たちがいたから、(第1 原発の収束について)このレベルまでもっていけたと私は思っている。

I don't know if I was prepared, but in the end, if we were to leave and water injection stopped, more radiation would leak. Then, Reactors 5 and 6, which were somehow stable, would melt, I mean the fuel would melt, once there was no one at the plant. If the plant was left all by itself, more radiation would leak. We managed to stabilize Fukushima II (Daini) Power plant, but we might not be able to be there [if Fukushima I was abandoned and more radiation leaked]. That would be a catastrophe. If you think that way, there is no way we could just run away.

In that situation, in the tremendous amount of radioactivity, my colleagues went to the scenes of the accident a number of times. It was them who did all they could, and all I did was to watch them do it. I didn't do anything. I really appreciate and thank every single one of my colleagues who went to the scenes of the accident. My job was to stay put in the Anti-Seismic Building, and I couldn't go to the accident scenes. I gave orders, and when I heard from the workers later, I knew it was a serious [terrible] situation. But [people who worked under me] went there without hesitation. There were many of them, who literally jumped into the scenes of the accident, trying to contain it.

In a Buddhism text that I've been reading for a long time, there is a mention of divine figures issuing from the ground. That was what I felt was happening in the hellish situation at the plant. Workers would go to the scenes of the accident, then come back upstairs (at the Anti-Seismic Building), they were dead tired, without sleep, with not enough food, reaching the limit of their physical strength. Then they would go out again, and come back, and go out again. There were many workers like them. When I saw these workers, I knew I had to do whatever I could for them. It's my belief that we have been able to restore the plant to the current level [of relative stability], because of these workers.


The precise word Mr. Yoshida uses for "divine figure" is "Bodhisattva" - one who vows to save all beings before becoming a buddha.

It was probably the first time that anyone from TEPCO spoke words of praise and appreciation for the workers at the plant in a personal way like Mr. Yoshida did. According to the local Fukushima newspapers, Yoshida's words were much appreciated by the families whose members worked or still works at the plant.

(Part 2 of 2) Video Interview Transcript of Former Plant Manager of #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Masao Yoshida: "We Put the Names of Workers on the Whiteboard, As a Grave Marker"

Following the part 1 , here's the part 2 of the video transcript of Mr. Masao Yoshida, former plant manager of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

Again, the occasion was a small symposium in Fukushima on August 11, 2012, and Mr. Yoshida's video interview was done in July, before he had cerebral hemorrhage.

The transcript is from Mainichi Shinbun article (8/11/2012), not from the video which only 140 or so people who attended the seminar got to watch.

−−吉田さんは所員の精神の支柱だった。
Workers relied on you as their mental [emotional] support.

◆私は何もしていない。私のとりえは福島第1原発に4回、赴任したことだ。第1原発のメンバーの名前もほとんどわかっているし、協力企業さんも結構つきあ いがあり、名前で呼べるんですね。「○○さん、○○くん、大丈夫か」とか。それだけだ。それで声をかけただけだ。私は。何もできていない。みんなやってく れたということだ。いまだにそう思っている。

I didn't do anything. All I can say is that I have worked at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant on 4 different appointments. I know almost all [TEPCO] workers at the plant, and I know many in the affiliate companies. I know their names. "Mr. so-and-so, are you alright?" That was it. I asked them. That's all I did. I couldn't do anything. Everyone else did it. That's how I still feel.

−−事細かなコミュニケーションをとったということか?
You mean you took time to communicate with them?

◆そうだ。やはり知らない間じゃないということだ。昔から一緒に仕事をした仲間だ。そういう仲間が大変な現場に行って帰ってき、出て行くというのを見ているので、頭を下げるしかない。

Yes. We know each other. We've been working together for a long time, we're colleagues [we've been in this together]. I watched these colleagues of mine go to the horrendous scene of the accident at the plant, come back, and go back out again. All I could do was to bow my head [and thank them].

−−3号機が爆発した段階では死ぬかと思ったか?
Did you think you would die when Reactor 3 blew up?

◆今回一番インパクトがあったのは1号機もそうだが、3号機の爆発というのがあった。これは今まで経験した中で非常に、あとから考えれば水素爆発だった が、その時点では何が起こったかわからないという状態なので、これから、もう破滅的に何か起こってるんじゃないかと思った。爆発について。一つは自分が死 ぬということ、メンバーも含めて、免震重要棟の人間は死んでたっておかしくない状態だった。3号機なんかは特にそうだった。あれだけのがれきが飛んでき て。私は、最初は行方不明者が何人ということを聞いた時に、確か数十人レベルでまだ安否が確認できていないというのが最初の状況だった。ああこれは10人 ぐらい死んだかもしれないというふうに思った。そこから時々刻々、だれだれがという話が入ってきて、軽傷の人間は何人かいたが。それから自衛隊の方には本 当に申し訳なかった。水を補給しにきてくれた自衛隊の部隊がけがをされて、本当に申し訳ないと思っている。不幸中の幸いで人命にかかわるものではなく、こ れはある意味、仏様のあれかなという感じが私はしている。

In addition to Reactor 1 ['s explosion], Reactor 3's explosion made the strongest impact [on me]. In retrospect it was a hydrogen explosion, but at that time we didn't know what was happening. I thought something catastrophic had happened. About the explosions. I could die, and all people in the Anti-Seismic Building could die, at any moment. It was particularly so after the explosion at Reactor 3. That much debris flying all over. When I first heard that several people were missing, safety of tens of people was not confirmed yet. I thought, maybe more than 10 people just died. Then, more information started to come in, confirming the safety of people, though there were some with minor injuries. And I feel very sorry for the Self Defense Force. The SDF troop came to supply water and they were caught in the explosion and were injured. I am very sorry. One consolation is that injuries were not life-threatening, and I feel as if it was some kind of divine providence.

−−原発に残ったメンバーの名前をホワイトボードに書くように指示したとのことだが、どのような思いだったか?
You instructed your people to write down the names of the members who remained in the plant on the whiteboard. What were you thinking?

◆ほとんどその時のことを思い出せないが、たぶん、要するに最後まで残って戦ったのはこんな人間だぞということを残しておこうということだ。今から思えば。わかんないですよ。私自身。本当に。

I hardly remember how it was, but probably I just wanted to show what kind of people remained and fought till the bitter end. In retrospect. I don't know myself, really.

−−墓標になると思って書いたということか。

You thought it would serve as a grave marker.

◆はい。そうだ。

Yes.

−−最後に何かお話はあるか?

Any last thoughts, comments?

◆いずれにしても今回の事象は、いろいろ国会とか政府事故調、民間事故調などで書かれているが、我々は特に政府事故調にはすべてを話をさせていただいた。 マスコミの方からいろいろ問い合わせがあるが、お話は全部すべてそちらでさせていただいているので、そこをベースに考えていただければいいと思っている。 ただやっぱりなかなか我々の肉声というのは通じない。調査委員会を通すと肉声がなかなか届かない。その部分はいろいろな形でちゃんとメッセージを発信して いかないといけないと思っている。私一人ではなくてあそこで一緒にやったいろいろな仲間の経験をちゃんと伝えたい。

This event [Mr. Yoshida uses an industry term for this accident] has been discussed and written up by the investigation commissions by the Diet, Cabinet Office, and the private foundation. We [at TEPCO] have thoroughly discussed with the Cabinet Office investigation commission in particular. There are many inquiries from the mass media, but we have said all to these commissions [TEPCO wasn't interviewed by the private commission] so I think it is enough for the media to go from there. But it is hard to have our true voice heard. Our true voice does not come across through the [reports of the] investigation commissions. For that part, I think we should spread the message in various ways. Not just my experience, but the experience of my colleagues who worked at the plant together, I would like to tell properly.

−−これから第1原発や福島県はどうあるべきか?

How should Fukushima I Nuke Plant and Fukushima Prefecture be, from now on?

◆そういう次元の高い話になると今すぐに答えがないが、やっぱり発電所をどうきちっと安定化させるかがベースだ。そこができていない中で、地元にお帰りい ただくわけにはいかないので、そこが最大の(課題だ)。これは事故当時も言っていたが、日本国中だけでなく世界の知恵を集めて、より発電所、第1原発をよ り安定化させることが一番求められている。いろいろなだれの責任うんぬんということもきちっとやるべきだが、やはり発電所を少しでも安定させる。それには 人も必要だし、技術もいろいろな知恵が必要だ。そこに傾注するということが重要なことだと思う。そのうえで、地元の方々に(通常の)生活に戻っていただけ るか考えることができる。いずれにしても現場を落ち着かせる、安定化させることが一番重要な責務だ。私はちょっとまだ十分な体力がないが、戻ったらそういう形で現場のために力を届けたい。

That's a high-level question, and I don't have a ready answer for that. But it comes down to how to make the plant stabilized in a proper way. We cannot have the residents [in the surrounding areas] come back home while this is not accomplished, so it is the largest (task). What's needed most, as I was also saying during the accident, is to make Fukushima I Nuke Plant more stabilized, using the knowledge and expertise not just in Japan but in the world. We should properly assign responsibility [for the accident] on people, but what's most important is to make the plant as stable as possible. We need people for that, we need technologies and new ideas. I think it is important to focus [on the stabilization of the plant]. Only then we can decide whether the local residents can return to their normal lives. In any way, the most important task is to calm down, stabilize the situation at the plant. I still don't have enough strength, but when I come back [from illness] I want to do all I can for the plant that way [i.e. making the plant more stable].


It seems it was this last paragraph that went on a "telephone game" in some foreign media:

  1. Yoshida says they need to stabilize the plant.

  2. That means the plant is not stable, as of now.

  3. Therefore, the plant is unstable, in danger.

  4. Run! It's dangerous.


All Mr. Yoshida said was the plant needs to be made more stable, in a proper way - replacing Kanaflex hoses would be one, removing the debris and clutter would be another - so that the plant's various operations can run in a smooth, predictable manner, with no accidents like small fires and water leaks, not to mention major accidents.

By the way, this "Yoshida said the plant is not stable" duly came back to Japan as a credible piece of news in English, but it quickly disappeared among more sensational headlines (like butterfly mutation due to Fukushima radiation, for one).

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