#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO Denies Damage by Earthquake in Interim Accident Report, Insists No Explosion in Reactor 2

without giving even a speculation as to why then Reactor 2 released the largest amount of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.

On December 2, TEPCO issued the interim report on the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident which was compiled by the company and supposedly vetted by the experts outside the company.

As the hurricane-force wind knocked out power lines and telephone lines in my neighborhood, my DSL line's dead, and I cannot see the large files like PDF files that TEPCO dumped on their website.

So my knowledge of the content right now is limited to what people who (had to) read these files have said so far. Links are in Japanese.

Here's one from Mainichi Shinbun (12/2/2011):

東京電力は２日、福島第１原発事故の社内調査委員会（委員長・山崎雅男副社長）の中間報告書を公表した。地震による配管など主要設備の損傷を改めて否定し、想定外の津波で全電源が喪失し、原子炉を冷却できなかったことが事故の原因と結論づけた。山崎副社長は会見で「国と一体となって安全対策を実施してきた」と繰り返し強調した。来年６月をめどに最終報告をまとめる。

TEPCO disclosed the interim report on the internal investigation (headed by Vice President Masao Yamasaki) of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. The company again denied the damage of the main facilities at the plant including pipes due to the earthquake, and concluded that the tsunami that exceeded the expectation causing the station blackout was the reason why the cooling of the reactors failed, which caused the accident. Vice President Yamasaki emphasized again that the company "has been one with the national government in carrying out safety measures". The final report is expected by June next year.

　社内事故調査は政府の「事故調査・検証委員会」とは別に、東電が今年６月に始めた。

TEPCO's internal investigation is separate from the national government's investigation committee. TEPCO started the investigation this June.

　報告書はＡ４判で１３０ページ。津波対策について、東電は０８年には明治三陸沖地震（１８９６年）と貞観津波（８６９年）のモデルを使って津波水位を最大１０．２メートルと試算したが、「具体的根拠のない仮定」と判断し、対策に反映させなかったと従来の主張を繰り返した。今回、同原発を襲った地震については、「政府の地震本部の見解に基づく地震より、広範囲を震源域とする巨大地震」などと認定。「想定した前提を大きく外れる事態で、結果として事故拡大を防止できなかった」とした。

The report is in 130 pages in A4 size paper. As to the countermeasures for tsunami, TEPCO simply repeated what it had said before; that the company calculated the maximum tsunami height to be 10.2 meters based on the earthquakes/tsunamis in 1896 and 869, but dismissed its own calculation as "baseless assumption" and did not use it in countermeasures. As to the earthquake, it was "a huge earthquake that exceeded the area specified by the government's earthquake countermeasures headquarters", and "the situation exceeded the expectation, and as the result the company couldn't prevent the accident from getting worse", TEPCO says.

　地震の影響について、原子炉のデータなどから、配管や冷却装置など主要設備に損傷はないと評価。津波で非常用発電機が浸水するなどして使えず、散乱するがれきで１～３号機の注水作業が難航したことなどから「津波の浸水で多重の安全機能を同時に失ったことで発生し、長時間の電源喪失と除熱機能の喪失が要因」と断定した。

As to the effect of the earthquake, TEPCO concluded that there was no damage to the main facilities such as pipes and cooling mechanisms, based on the reactor data. Emergency diesel generators couldn't be used because of tsunami, and the cooling operation of Reactors 1, 2 and 3 was made difficult by the debris from tsunami, and the accident was "caused by the simultaneous loss of multi-layered safety functions because of tsunami water, and loss of electricity and loss of cooling for a long period of time were the factors, says TEPCO.

　水素爆発については、１、３号機の各建屋にどう水素が流出したかは不明だが、格納容器のふたなどの結合部分から漏れ出た可能性を指摘。２号機では爆発はなく、４号機の爆発音を誤認したと推定した。

As to the hydrogen explosions, it is unknown how hydrogen gas spread in the reactor buildings of Reactors 1 and 3, the company says, but it is possible that leak may have been from the flange of the Containment Vessels. TEPCO also says there was no explosion in Reactor 2; it was just mistaking the sound of Reactor 4 explosion.

　今後の対策として、建屋や重要機器の浸水防止や電源喪失時の炉心損傷防止などに重点を置くとした。

For future countermeasures, TEPCO will put emphasis on the prevention of water leakage into the buildings and into important equipment, and on the prevention of the fuel core damage during the power outage.

Huh? It was a huge, mega earthquake that exceeded anyone's expectation and TEPCO admits it couldn't do anything to contain the accident, and yet there was no damage from the earthquake?

While the Mainichi reporter only parrots what TEPCO told the media, a more thinking person says the following about non-exploding Reactor 2, from a post in the news bulletin board called "Asyura" (quick translation, subject to revision later):

東電が公表した「福島原子力事故調査報告書（中間報告書）」がメディアで断片的に扱われているが、あまりにひどい内容に愕然とさせられる。

"Fukushima Nuclear Accident Investigation Report (Interim Report)", as published by TEPCO, is reported in the media in a piecemeal fashion. But I am appalled at this shoddy report.

　政府（保安院・経産省）も事前に報告を受けているはずで、このような杜撰な事故調査報告書の公表を許した政府にもあきれかえる。

The national government (NISA/Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) must have been notified beforehand. I am also appalled at the government that allowed TEPCO to announce such shoddy accident report.

　デタラメさを指摘したい点はテンコ盛りだが、なによりゲンナリしたのは、号機単位で最大量の放射性物質を大気中に放出した２号機の圧力抑制室（Ｓ／Ｃ）に関する“調査報告”である。

There are so many things that I want to point out as false, but one of the most disgusting one is the "investigation report" on the Suppression Chamber of Reactor 2, which released the largest amount of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.

... (first point is not covered here; the following is his second point) ...

【引用】
Quote [from the report]

「　２号機については、４号機の爆発音に前後して発生した圧力抑制室の圧力指示値が０MPa［abs］に低下したため、２号機の圧力抑制室付近で爆発的な事象が発生した可能性があると誤って認識したものと考えられる。

As to Reactor 2, the pressure gauge of the Suppression Chamber dropped to 0 MPa [abs], which coincided with the explosive noise in Reactor 4. This explosive noise in Reactor 4 was misunderstood as some explosive event near the Reactor 2 Suppression Chamber.

　圧力抑制室の損傷は大気開放を意味するため、絶対圧力で０MPa［abs］というのは物理的にはあり得ないが、計器誤差まで考慮し、何らかの損傷が発生して圧力抑制室の圧力が低下した可能性は否定できない」

A damage to the Suppression Chamber would mean it would be open to the atmosphere, so 0 MPa [as] is not technically possible. However, considering the possibility of the instrument error, we cannot deny that there was some kind of damage to the Suppression Chamber that caused the pressure to drop."

「圧力抑制室の圧力計が０MP a［abs］（真空）に低下した原因は、圧力計が故障していた可能性が高いと考えられる」

"It is highly likely that the pressure gauge was broken when it showed the Suppression Chamber pressure gauge dropping to 0 MPa [abs] (vacuum)."


【コメント】
My comments

　言語明瞭だが意味不明の代表例のような文章で、実に回りくどく、言っていることはわかるが、何を言いたいのかがまるでわからない説明である。

The sentences are typical of those where the individual words used are clear but together they don't make sense. Very circumlocutory, you understand the language but you cannot tell what they want to say.

　後からいろいろな事実が出てきても、枝野流にそんなことは言っていないと強弁する意図が見え見えである。

Intention is clear to me. Just like [former Chief Cabinet Secretary] Edano, TEPCO is going to say "We didn't say that", even after the facts will have come in.

　腐敗しきった東電は、恥ず知らずなことに、Ｓ／Ｃが損壊したという表現を一切使わず、「圧力抑制室の圧力指示値が０MPa［abs］に低下した」事象に問題をすり替えている。

The totally corrupt TEPCO, shamelessly, never uses the expression that indicates the Suppression Chamber was damaged; instead it talks about the event whereby "the pressure gauge of the Suppression Chamber dropped to 0 MPa [abs]".

　２号機Ｓ／Ｃに関して重要なことは、「圧力計」の値ではなく、穴が開いて膨大な放射能が大気中にばらまかれるに至った原因である。

What's most important in the Reactor 2 Suppression Chamber is not the number on the pressure gauge but how it broke and released a large amount of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.

　原因が爆発ではないのなら、何によってＳ／Ｃに穴が開いたのかを説明するのが事故調査の基本である。

If it was not an explosion, then what caused a hole in the Suppression Chamber? The accident investigation should address that point.

　肝心なＳ／Ｃに穴が開いたのかどうかという“重要問題”には言及せず、圧力計が絶対値で０気圧を示したワケをあれこれ書いているのだ。

Skirting the "important issue" of what caused a hole in the Suppression Chamber, TEPCO writes about various reasons why the pressure gauge showed 0 pressure.

　事実が明らかになったときの予防線のように、「何らかの損傷が発生して圧力抑制室の圧力が低下した可能性は否定できない」と書きながら、次の段落では、「圧力抑制室の圧力計が０MP a［abs］（真空）に低下した原因は、圧力計が故障していた可能性が高いと考えられる」と書いている。

After writing "...we cannot deny that there was some kind of damage to the Suppression Chamber that caused the pressure to drop", as if to make excuse when the truth finally comes out, TEPCO writes in the next paragraph "It is highly likely that the pressure gauge was broken when it showed the Suppression Chamber pressure gauge dropping to 0 MPa [abs] (vacuum)".

　損傷と圧力計をごちゃ混ぜに書くことで、読者がなんとなく意味がある説明のように錯誤してくれるのを期待しているようだ。
「何らかの損傷が発生」する度合いが高ければ、Ｓ／Ｃが損壊し圧力が低下するだけでなく、圧力計まで壊れることだってあるだろう。

To write about the Suppression Chamber damage and the pressure gauge together, it is as if TEPCO was hoping that readers would somehow make sense of TEPCO's explanation. But I think it is possible that the pressure gauge could have been broken if the likelihood of "some kind of damage" occuring was high, not just damage to the Suppression Chamber that dropped the pressure.

　「圧力抑制室の圧力計が０MP a［abs］（真空）に低下した原因は、圧力計が故障していた可能性が高い」と書いているが、急激に圧力計の値が低下したのだから“故障していた”という表現は微妙におかしい。

TEPCO writes "It is highly likely that the pressure gauge was broken when it showed the Suppression Chamber pressure gauge dropping to 0 MPa [abs] (vacuum)". But if the pressure gauge suddenly dropped, the expression that "the pressure gauge was broken" doesn't quite make sense.

　可能性としては、４号機の爆発とほとんど同じタイミングで２号機の圧力抑制室の圧力計が故障したという“偶然”であろう。東電は本気でそのように考えているのだろうか？

One possibility is that the pressure gauge of Reactor 2 Suppression Chamber "happened to break" at the same time as the explosion in Reactor 4. Does TEPCO seriously believe in that kind of possibility?

　最後に、ＲＣＩＣの停止で原子炉水位が低下し炉心溶融まで始まるという危機的な状態に陥った２号機には夜を徹して対策チームが対応にあたっていたはずである。

Lastly, Reactor 2 was in a dangerous situation after the RCIC stopped, the water level inside the reactor dropping and core meltdown starting. A team of workers was working all night to avert a disaster.

　４号機で爆発が起きたのは４階か５階と言われている。
　２号機で何かが壊れたような“大きな音”がしたとしたらＳ／Ｃのある地下である。

It is said that the explosion in Reactor 4 was either on the 4th floor or the 5th floor. If there was a "big noise" in Reactor 2 as if something was broken, it must have been the basement where the Suppression Chamber is.

　体感も含めてだが、２号機で事故対応に当たっていた人たちは、４、５階で起きた爆発音と地下で起きた“大きな音”の違いさえわからないと東電は主張したいのだろうか。

Is TEPCO insisting that workers at Reactor 2 couldn't tell the explosion noise on the 4th or 5th floor [of Reactor 4] from a "big noise" in the basement of Reactor 2?

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Yet More #Radioactive Rice from Fukushima, From Watari District of Fukushima City

Watari District of Fukushima City (60 kilometers from Fukushima I Nuke Plant) is one of the most contaminated districts in Fukushima City, even though the city flatly refuses to even temporarily evacuate some of the residents because the city (or volunteers, rather) will "decontaminate".

Following Onami District, Watari District has now been found with rice with radioactive cesium that exceeds the national provisional safety limit of 500 becquerels/kg.

Watari District of Fukushima City is where Professor Tomoya Yamauchi of Kobe University found that "decontamination" didn't decontaminate at all, and in locations it increased the radiation.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (12/3/2011), who tries to tell the readers it may still be OK once the rice is milled:

福島市大波地区や福島県伊達市で収穫された玄米から国の暫定規制値（１キロ・グラムあたり５００ベクレル）を超える放射性セシウムが見つかった問題で、同県は２日、福島市渡利地区の稲作農家３戸が収穫した玄米からも、規制値を超えるセシウムが検出されたと発表した。

Onami District of Fukushima City and Date City in Fukushima Prefecture have been found with rice with radioactive cesium exceeding the national provisional limit (500 becquerels/kg). Now, the prefectural government announced on December 2 that the rice harvested at 3 farms in Watari District of Fukushima City was also found with radioactive cesium exceeding the provisional limit.

　政府は週明けにも、渡利地区などのコメを出荷停止対象とする方針を固めた。

The national government plans to order the rice in Watari District not to be shipped.

　県によると、渡利地区の４７戸の稲作農家のうち、今回、２５戸を調査。その結果、３戸が生産した３袋（９０キロ・グラム）の玄米から、１キロ・グラムあたりそれぞれ５１０ベクレル、５５０ベクレル、５９０ベクレルのセシウムが検出された。農家３戸が生産した６５袋分（約２トン）はいずれも自宅で保管されており、市場に流通していない。玄米は精米すると放射線量が半分から３分の１程度に下がるという。

According to the Fukushima prefectural government, 25 farms out of 47 farms in Watari District were tested. From 3 bags (30 kilograms each, total 90 kilogram) from 3 farms tested 510 becquerels/kg, 550 becquerels/kg, and 590 becquerels/kg respectively. The three farms harvested 65 bags total (about 2 tonnes), which are stored at the farms and not sold in the market. Once milled, radioactive materials in rice are supposed to drop to half or one-third.

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OT: I'm Back On Line...

After over 32 hours of no power thanks to multiple trees fallen over the power line along the way. Boy that was quite a wind - a hurricane-class wind on otherwise sunny warm day...

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Reactor 1: TEPCO and NHK's Obfuscation on Corium in the Concrete

In the first post on the subject, I translated what NHK reported:

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の事故で、メルトダウンが起きた１号機の燃料は、鋼鉄の原子炉の底を突き破って相当の量が格納容器に落下し、容器の底のコンクリートを溶かして最大で６５センチ浸食していると推定されることが、東京電力の解析結果から分かりました。

It has been discovered by TEPCO's analysis that the significant amount of Reactor 1's melted fuel pierced through the steel Reactor Pressure Vessel and dropped onto the Containment Vessel, then melted the concrete at the bottom of the CV. It is estimated that the melted fuel may have eaten into the concrete to maximum 65 centimeters deep.

Maximum 65 centimeters deep from the bottom of the concrete floor, right?

Well no. It's 65 centimeters from the bottom of the deep groove on the concrete floor.

And neither NHK nor TEPCO would bother to tell you how deep the groove is.

At least, NHK Kabun (NHK's last remaining conscience, as far as I'm concerned) tweeted and gave the link to its blog post, where NHK's analysis of the concrete-eating corium is shown with the screenshots from the program:

The text below the screen says: "In the worst case, it [the corium] may have reached 65 centimeters from the surface of the concrete. Where the concrete is the thinnest, it may have reached within 37 centimeters from the steel plate [of the Containment Vessel].

The "surface of the concrete" turns out to be the surface of the bottom of the groove that is X centimeter deep.

It's one thing for TEPCO's Matsumoto to say "surface of the concrete" (as we've gotten used to hearing technically correct explanations from him), but for NHK to say so while showing the graphics indicating it is the surface of the bottom of the groove is at once deceptive and covering its behind. NHK can now say "We showed it in the graphics that it was 65 centimeters from the bottom of the groove, and people should have paid attention."

(I'm asking NHK Kabun if they know the depth of the groove, but does anyone know or have access to a schematic diagram with measurement?)

Well, it does look like the Institute of Applied Energy is more right than TEPCO in saying the corium has eaten 2 meters into the concrete. And perhaps people like Hiroaki Koide of Kyoto University and the engineers who designed the reactors at Fukushima I Nuke Plant may be more right than the Institute of Applied Energy, and the corium has indeed escaped the Containment Vessel long time ago.

As the wiki entry on "corium" states, the corium can eat into the concrete 1 meters in the first one hour, and several centimeters per hour afterwards:

The fast erosion phase of the concrete basemat lasts for about an hour and progresses into about one meter depth, then slows to several centimeters per hour, and stops completely when the melt cools below the decomposition temperature of concrete (about 1100 °C). Complete melt-through can occur in several days even through several meters of concrete; the corium then penetrates several meters into the underlying soil, spreads around, cools and solidifies.[3] During the interaction between corium and concrete, very high temperatures can be achieved.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: 1.6 Million Bq/Kg of Cesium from Ocean Soil In Front of Water Intake for Reactors

(Update) OH WAIT A MINUTE.... The information says "... becquerels/kg of WET SOIL. The density will be way higher in DRY SOIL. TEPCO does not provide information on the water content in the samples.

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730,000 becquerels/kg of cesium-134, and 870,000 becquerels/kg of cesium-137 from the ocean soil in front of the water intake for Reactors 1 through 4, south side.

The north side is also high, with 640,000 becquerels/kg of cesium-134 and 760,000 becquerels/kg of cesium-137 (total 1.4 million becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium).

They must have analyzed for other nuclides but they are not saying yet.

From TEPCO's handout for the press on December 1, 2011 (Japanese only):



Photos of sample collection, from the same handout:

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Institute of Applied Energy: Corium Could Be 2 Meters Deep into Concrete

TEPCO's worst-case scenario (here and here) pales in comparison with the analysis by the Institute of Applied Energy, also presented on November 30 at the workshop held by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.

From what Yomiuri Shinbun reported (01:01AM JST 12/1/2011):

国の委託を受けて実施したエネルギー総研の解析では、１号機は燃料の８５％、２、３号機は７０％が格納容器に落下。炉心を取り囲むステンレス製の大型構造物「シュラウド」が損傷したり、格納容器の床のコンクリートも最大２メートル侵食したりしていると指摘した。そのため、コンクリートに支えられた圧力容器が傾いている可能性もあるとした。

The analysis done by the Institute of Applied Energy commissioned by the national government, 85% of fuel dropped to the Containment Vessel in Reactor 1, and 70% of fuel dropped to the Containment Vessels in Reactors 2 and 3. The researchers at the Institute pointed out the possibility of the damage to the stainless-steel shroud that surrounds the fuel core, and of the corium having eaten away the concrete floor of the Containment Vessel up to 2 meters deep. Because of that, they also said it was possible that the RPV got tilted.

Yomiuri doesn't specify which Reactor the Institute of Applied Energy was talking about, but my guess is Reactor 1.

Some nuclear experts have suggested that if the corium had escaped from the RPV it would spread out flat and evenly on the pedestal and be easily cooled by water. Well, even TEPCO admits that may not the case as far as the shape and the location of the corium is concerned (they do say the corium is cooled), and the Institute of Applied Energy says the corium could be 2 meters deep into the concrete.

My totally amateur 2 cents are that the concrete foundation may have cracked in the earthquake, and that it is possible that the crack or cracks are there in the pedestal. So, even if the corium wanted to spread out thin and flat, it would find those cracks and go there. Once the core-concrete reaction starts, it would be a positive feedback loop; the temperature gets higher not just from the contact with the corium but from the core-concrete reaction, the hole in the concrete would get bigger, and more corium would go into the bigger hole.

(From my other post on the topic, TEPCO's drawings indicating the thickness of the CV concrete)

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TEPCO Says Corium Would Stop at 70 Centimeters into CV Pedestal, So No Worry

(Update: Institute of Applied Energy says it could be 2 meters deep. See new post.)


Update to my previous post on the corium eating into the CV pedestal in Reactor 1 of Fuku I:

TEPCO says they are pretty sure that the corium would stop at 70 centimeters deep, and the core concrete reaction has stopped.

The company is pretty confident that the corium escaped from the RPVs of Reactors 2 and 3, if any, remains on the pedestals of the CVs and not eating into the concrete.

From their presentation on November 30, 2011, Reactor 1:

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"Now They Tell Us" Series: TEPCO Admits Reactor 1 Corium May Be 65 Centimeters into the Concrete Pedestal of Containment Vessel

(UPDATE: See TEPCO's drawing of Reactor 1 in my next post.)
(UPDATE 2: Government-commissioned research institute says "corium 2 meters into the concrete". See my post.)

There you go! It took TEPCO only 8 and a half months to say what many people have been saying at least for 8 months.

The corium has long escaped the Reactor Pressure Vessel as admitted by TEPCO and the government. There are experts (like Hiroaki Koide) who have suggested the corium may have already left the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1, and TEPCO itself said back in May that Reactor 1 CV may have a 7-centimeter hole. Now the company says the corium may have eaten into the concrete floor of the CV to about 65-centimeter deep.

For Reactors 2 and 3, TEPCO thinks (hopes, wishes...) that a good chunk of the corium dropped from the RPV onto the CV. No mention whether the corium there is eating into the concrete or not.

From NHK News (11/30/2011; quick translation, subject to revision):

溶融燃料 相当量が格納容器に（11月30日 19:00更新）

Significant amount of melted fuel in the Containment Vessel

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の事故で、メルトダウンが起きた１号機の燃料は、鋼鉄の原子炉の底を突き破って相当の量が格納容器に落下し、容器の底のコンクリートを溶かして最大で６５センチ浸食していると推定されることが、東京電力の解析結果から分かりました。

It has been discovered by TEPCO's analysis that the significant amount of Reactor 1's melted fuel pierced through the steel Reactor Pressure Vessel and dropped onto the Containment Vessel, then melted the concrete at the bottom of the CV. It is estimated that the melted fuel may have eaten into the concrete to maximum 65 centimeters deep.

２号機と３号機についても一部の燃料は格納容器に落下していると推定しており、改めて事故の深刻さが浮き彫りになっています。

For Reactors 2 and 3, TEPCO also estimates that part of the fuel has dropped to the Containment Vessels, showing how severe the accident has been.

福島第一原発の１号機から３号機については、核燃料が溶け落ちるメルトダウンが起き、一部の溶けた燃料が原子炉から格納容器に落下したとみられていますが、事故から８か月以上がたっても、詳しい状況は分かっていません。

In Reactors 1 thorugh 3 of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, core meltdowns have occurred, and it is considered that part of the melted fuel has dropped from the RPVs to the CVs. However, the details are not yet known even after more than 8 months since the accident started.

これについて東京電力や国内の複数の研究機関が、これまで得られた原子炉の温度や注水状況などから溶けた燃料の状態を異なる方法で解析し、３０日、国が開いた研究会で結果を発表しました。

Using different methods, TEPCO and various other research institutions have been analyzing the state of the melted fuel based on the reactor temperatures and the amount of water being poured into the reactors, and the results were announced on November 30 at a workshop held by the national government.

このうち東京電力の解析では、最も厳しい評価をした場合、１号機については、すべての燃料が溶け落ち、原子炉の底を突き破って相当の量が格納容器に落下したと推定しています。

TEPCO's result shows that, in the most severe case, all of the fuel would have melted, of which a significant portion pierced through the bottom of the Reactor Pressure Vessel and dropped onto the Containment Vessel.

格納容器の底にはコンクリートがあり、さらに鋼鉄の板で覆われています。

There is a concrete platform [pedestal] at the bottom of the Containment Vessel, which is then covered with steel plates.

燃料が格納容器の底に落ちると、高熱で反応してこのコンクリートを溶かして浸食するということで、最悪の場合、１号機で６５センチの深さまで達すると推定しています。

When the melted fuel drops to the bottom of the Containment Vessel, a core-concrete reaction takes place at a high temperature, melting the concrete. In the worst case, in Reactor 1, the melted fuel could reach 65 centimeters deep into the concrete.

最もコンクリートの薄いところでは、格納容器の鋼板まで３７センチしかないということで、改めて事故の深刻さが浮き彫りになっています。

At the thinnest part of the concrete, it is only 37 centimeters to the outer steel plate of the Containment Vessels. This is a very severe accident.

また、２号機と３号機についても、最悪の場合、それぞれ５７％と６３％の燃料が溶け落ちて、その一部が格納容器に落下したと推定しています。

TEPCO also estimates that in the worst cases for Reactors 2 and 3, 57% and 63% of the fuel have melted, respectively, and part of the fuel dropped onto the Containment Vessels.

東京電力によりますと、原子炉と格納容器の温度は、２１日現在で、いずれも１００度以下になっていて、溶けた燃料は水で冷却されており、コンクリートの浸食は止まっていると評価しています。

According to TEPCO, the temperatures of the RPVs and CVs as of November 21 are all below 100 degrees Celsius, the melted fuel is cooled by the water, and the erosion into the concrete has stopped.

研究会では、このほかの研究機関の解析結果も発表され、複数の結果を基に原子炉や燃料の状態について議論されました。
東京電力や国は、今回の解析結果をさらに詳しく分析し、今後の廃炉に向けて核燃料をどのように取り出すかなどについて検討することにしています。

In the workshop, the results from other research institutions were announced, and the experts discussed the conditions of the reactors and fuel based on those results. TEPCO and the national government plans to further analyze the result of the study, and determine how to remove the fuel for decommissioning the reactors.

原子力安全基盤機構、技術参与の阿部清治さんは、東京電力の解析結果について「間違っているとは思わないが、まだ第一歩だと受け止めている。解析結果は一つだけでは答えを導き出すことができないからだ。今後はいろいろな解析結果を積み重ねて、事故の実態を分析していく必要がある」と話しています。

Seiji Abe, technical advisor to the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) says about TEPCO's analysis, "I don't think it is wrong, but it is only the first step. You can't get answers from only one analysis. We will need to understand the situation from various analyses."

TEPCO's presentation is posted on their site, but only in Japanese:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_07-j.pdf

Here's the list of documents that were presented in the workshop on November 30:

Status of the fuel core in Reactors 1 through 3:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_09-j.pdf

Plant parameters after the accident (including data that hasn't been disclosed so far)
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_03-j.pdf

Modification of JAEA model
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_04-j.pdf

Various approaches taken to estimate the condition of the fuel
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_05-j.pdf

MAAP analysis and core-concrete reaction
http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_06-j.pdf

(You can still flip through the pages to see the charts and graphs.)

TEPCO's drawing that indicates the thickness of the CV concrete:

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"Trap of Prometheus" Series Part 2 - Resignation of a Researcher (3/4)

(Recap from my previous "Prometheus" post:)

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Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" series is still on-going, and right now it's Part 3 about suppressing the scientific data. It continues to be an excellent article, and it continues to be printed on the "third page" (see my post on the Part 1 of the series).

I just finished reading the Part 2 "Resignation of a Researcher", which has 21 installments. Even though Asahi Shinbun is busy taking down the blog sites that compile all the series articles for convenient reading, they cannot suppress them all, and I read it on this blog.

In it, there is a very curious piece of information about SPEEDI simulation, the NISA and the PM's Office's decision to set the evacuation zone in concentric circles. In short,

• The Ministry of Education had ordered the SPEEDI simulations from the beginning and knew exactly where to send the official to do the actual measurements in Namie-machi, Fukushima;

• Not only the Ministry of Education ordered SPEEDI simulation calculations but also the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered its own SPEEDI simulation calculations with much more accuracy;

• NISA was setting the evacuation zone on March 11 evening based on the simulation;

• NISA stopped their work as soon as the PM's Office, based on no credible information or agreed-on procedure, announced the concentric circle evacuation zones.

Reading the Part 2 of the series, it sure looks as if almost everything bad that happened afterwards could have been prevented if the politicians and bureaucrats on the initial (and crucial) 1st and 2nd days of the nuclear accident had acted to protect the public, which I think is their constitutional duty. Instead, they played games, a turf war as if this was just another ordinary day in Kasumigaseki.
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In the Installment 11, we learned that the Ministry of Education knew exactly where to look for high radiation because it had SPEEDI simulation result, but it didn't bother to tell anyone about the radiation levels when the information would have made the difference. In the Installment 12, we learned that it was a surprise for the Ministry of Education when the PM's Office didn't follow the agreed-upon protocol to use SPEEDI and unilaterally issued an evacuation order in concentric circles.

In the Installment 13, we'll learn how the NISA was on the verge of coming up with the "correct" evacuation map that was not in concentric circles.

研究者の辞表（１３）送られなかった167枚

Resignation of a Researcher (13) 167 simulation maps that were never sent

SPEEDIの予測データはどう流れたのだろうか。（＝上地兼太郎朝日新聞記者）

How was the SPEEDI simulation data shared? (reporting by Kentaro Uechi)


震災から約4時間後の3月11日午後7時3分、国は原子力緊急事態宣言を出す。首相官邸に原子力災害対策本部ができた。

7:03PM on March 11, about 4 hours after the earthquake/tsunami. The national government declared nuclear emergency. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was set up in the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

経済産業省の原子力安全・保安院は、対策本部の事務局を担う一方、同省別館3階に緊急時対応センター（ＥＲＣ）を立ち上げた。他省庁からも人がかき集められた。

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry acted as the secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. But at the same time, it also set up the Emergency Response Center (ERC) on the 3rd floor of the annex building of the Ministry. People from other ministries were also called in.

SPEEDIの予測は本来、文部科学省が原子力安全技術センターを使って1時間ごとに行う。出来た予測図は保安院にも送られるが、保安院は独自の予測も出そうとした。それに向け、同日夜には同センターのオペレーターをＥＲＣに入れた。

SPEEDI simulation is normally done every hour by the Nuclear Safety Technology Center under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Science. The simulation map is sent to NISA. But NISA wanted to do its own simulation, and invited an operator from the Nuclear Safety Technology Center to its ERC.

保安院が独自で行った1回目のSPEEDI予測は午後9時12分に出た。翌12日午前3時半に福島第一原発2号機でベント（排気）をした場合、放射性物質はどう拡散するかという予測だ。放射性物質は南東の太平洋へ飛ぶ結果が出た。

The 1st SPEEDI simulation result by NISA came out at 9:12PM. The simulation was about how radioactive materials would disperse if the vent was done on Reactor 2 of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant at 3AM on March 12. The result showed that radioactive materials would be dispersed southeast over the Pacific Ocean.

12日午前1時12分に2回目の予測。今度は同時刻に1号機のベントを仮定した。これも海へ拡散していた。保安院は16日までに45回173枚の独自予測をはじき出した。

The 2nd simulation result by NISA was out at 1:12AM on March 12. This time, the assumption was the vent of Reactor 1 at 3AM. Again, radioactive materials would disperse over the ocean. By March 16, NISA would create its own 173 maps in 45 simulations.

保安院の予測の特徴は、様々な情報を集めて放射性物質の放出量を推測したことだ。放出量を1ベクレルと仮定した文部科学省に比べ、予測の精度は高かった。

What was unique about NISA's simulations was that they estimated the amount of radioactive materials that would be released, using various data. Unlike the simulations done by the Ministry of Education that used the unit emission (1 becquerels/hr), the accuracy of the NISA simulations was much higher.

官邸の地下には、各省実働部隊が詰めるオペレーションルームがある。保安院は課長補佐以下の職員数人をそこに出していた。保安院から予測図を受け取る専用端末も備（そな）えられていた。

There was an operation room in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence where the working groups from various ministries were stationed. NISA had several officials (assistant manager class) there. The room was equipped with the dedicated terminal to receive the simulation maps from NISA.

官邸5階には首相の管直人ら災害対策本部の中枢が陣取っている。避難区域を決めたのはこの中枢であり、その決定にはSPEEDIの情報を参考にすることになっている。ということは、予測図は専用端末を経て５階まで運ばれていなければならなかった。しかし・・・。

The core members of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters including Prime Minister Naoto Kan remained on the 5th floor of the PM's Official Residence. It was this core members who decided the evacuation zone, and that decision was to be based on the SPEEDI information. Which means the simulation maps should have been received at the terminal [in the basement] and then carried to the 5th floor. But...

オペレーションルームの専用端末に送られたのは１，２回目の予測図だけ。保安院が独自で行ったSPEEDI予測のうち、４３回１６７枚はＥＲＣ内で止まっていた。

Only the 1st and the 2nd simulation maps were sent to the dedicated terminal in the operation room. Of all SPEEDI simulations that NISA did on its own, 167 maps from 43 simulations remained at [NISA's] ERC.

しかもプリントアウトして内閣官房の職員に渡したのは２回目の分だけだった。２回目の予測図はＡ４判で計３枚だが、そのうち何枚を渡したか、渡した後どうなったかも保安院は確認を取っていない。何故（なぜ）こんなことになったのか。

Worse, only the 2nd simulation maps were printed out and handed to an official of the Prime Minister's Office. There were three pages of maps for the 2nd simulation, but NISA does not know how many pages were handed to the official, or what happened to them afterwards. How did this happen?

Stay tuned for the last segment of this appalling saga of bureaucrats and politicians being bureaucrats and politicians (i.e. doing what they knew how, best) in the face of the grave nuclear accident.

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Official in Date City, Fukushima: "Residents Here Think They are the Victims of Accident Caused by TEPCO"

I thought they were. Apparently not to this official of a city where radioactive cesium in rice has just been found that exceeds the national provisional limit, and where blasting the fruit trees with water from a high-pressure washer and stripping the barks will decontaminate the fruits next year.

The following article appeared on the Fukushima local version of the largest national paper Yomiuri Shinbun.

From Yomiuri Shinbun Local (Fukushima) version (11/27/2011):

東京電力福島第一原発事故を受け、国際放射線防護委員会（ＩＣＲＰ）の委員らが２６日、県庁を訪れ、自治体の担当者らと意見交換した。

Commissioners from the ICRP visited the Fukushima government office on November 26 to exchange ideas with the municipal officials in Fukushima.

　放射線防護の専門家であるＩＣＲＰ委員が直接、県内の現状を聞いて除染や健康管理などの面で助言し、復興に役立てるのがねらい。

The purpose was for the ICRP commissioners to directly learn about the current situation in Fukushima Prefecture and to advise on decontamination and health care and assist in recovery and reconstruction [of Fukushima].

　ＩＣＲＰ第４委員会のジャック・ロシャール委員長や丹羽太貫・京都大名誉教授のほか、チェルノブイリ原発に近いベラルーシやフランス、ノルウェーの研究者らも出席。自治体や県立医大の担当者らが、それぞれ福島の現状について発表した。伊達市の職員は、「住民に除染方法を説明しても『東電がやるべきだ』と被害者意識が強く、なかなか協力が得られない」などと実情を説明した。

In attendance were Jacques Lochard, ICRP Committee 4 Chair, Otsura Niwa, professor emeritus at Kyoto University, and researchers from Belarus, France, and Norway. Officials from local municipalities and the prefectural medical university made the presentation on the current situation in Fukushima. An official from Date City explained the situation in the city, saying "Even when we explain how to decontaminate to the residents of the city, they have this victim mentality of "TEPCO should do it", and they don't cooperate readily."

　意見交換会は２７日も行われ、ＩＣＲＰの委員らが、土壌改良や住民の健康管理などチェルノブイリ原発事故で得た経験を披露し、福島第一原発事故での放射線防護について助言などを行う。

The meeting will continue on November 27. The ICRP commissioners will share the experience they have obtained from the Chernobyl accident in soil remediation and health care of the residents, and advise on the radiation protection from the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident.

The official from Date City is complaining that the residents think they are the victims of the worst nuclear accident that the country has ever had, and that they are not doing what the officials like him tell them to do, which is to clean up the mess (radioactive materials spewed out of the broken reactors and spent fuel pools in Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant) themselves.

Amazing.

By the way I happen to remember seeing Dr. Niwa's name somewhere else at some other time. He was one of those "experts" who ridiculed and trashed people of Kyoto in August who were against burning the radioactive firewood (1130 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium) from Rikuzen Tataka City in Iwate Prefecture.

Dr. Niwa is now the president of his own company, Biomedics, which specializes in pharmaceuticals for cancer and auto immune diseases.

Interesting.

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Tokyo to Further "Support" Fukushima in 2013 Winter National Athletic Meet

How? By holding the speed skate events in the outdoor skate rink in Koriyama City in Fukushima Prefecture.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (11/30/2011):

東京都は、２０１３年に予定されている第６８回冬季国体について、福島県郡山市をスピードスケート種目の会場とすることを決めた。

The Tokyo Metropolitan government has decided to use Koriyama City in Fukushima Prefecture as the venue for the speed skate events in the 68th Annual Winter National Athletic Meet scheduled in 2013.

　ほかのアイスホッケー競技などは東京で実施する。東京電力福島第一原発の事故で大きな被害を受けている福島の支援が目的で、１９４７年に始まった冬季国体史上、開催都道府県以外の場所が競技会場になるのは初めて。

Other events like ice hockey games will be hosted in Tokyo. The purpose is to support Fukushima Prefecture that has suffered a tremendous damage by the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. It is the first time since the start of the Winter National Athletic Meet in 1947 that a location outside the host prefecture will be used as a event venue.

　都は今年９月、日本体育協会と文部科学省からスケートとアイスホッケー競技の開催を要請された。冬季国体で東京は、０５年にアイスホッケー競技の会場になったことはあるが、スピードスケートを開くために必要な１周４００メートルのリンクは持っていない。このため、福島県と協議を重ね、４００メートルの屋外リンクがある「郡山スケート場」（郡山市）を使用することで合意した。運営費は都など主催者側が負担する。

In September, the Tokyo Metropolitan government was asked by the Japan Athletics Association and the Ministry of Education and Science to host skate and ice hockey games. Tokyo hosted ice hockey games in the 2005 meet, but it does not have a skate rink that can hold speed skate events as the rink needs to be 400 meters long. The Tokyo Metropolitan government was in negotiation with the Fukushima prefectural government, and they have agreed to use Koriyama Skate Rink in Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture that has outdoor 400-meter rink. The cost to operate the rink will be paid by the event sponsors including the Tokyo Metropolitan government.

It could be a "give and take", another wonderful Japanese tradition, like "dango". The Tokyo Metropolitan government will pay Koriyama City/Fukushima Prefecture for the trouble of hosting the speed skate events, and maybe someday soon Tokyo and Fukushima will sign an agreement to ship "low-contamination" disaster debris from Fukushima to Tokyo and burn it, just like between Tokyo and Iwate/Miyagi. Then the Fukushima prefectural government can pay the Tokyo Metropolitan government a "special fee" to facilitate the operation, just like Miyagi and Iwate are paying.

They must be hoping that people/sheeple will totally and completely forget about the nuke accident and radiation contamination by the time 2013 winter rolls around.

Koriyama is the city that is feeding school kids with locally grown and harvested rice from this year, and where 500,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was found from rice hay.

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Japan's Decon Bubble: This Is the Way They'll Decon Orchards in Fukushima

They will power-wash the trees and call it "decontamination".

At least in this video, they put down the tarp under the tree.

NHK News on 11/28/2011 has a clip that shows exactly the same "decon" method but without any tarp to at least shield the soil from radioactive materials being sprayed down.

This "advanced technology decontamination" as per Minister Hosono will be used by 600 fruit orchards (2200 hectares) in 3 municipalities in Fukushima (Date City, Kunimi-machi, Koori-machi) starting in the middle of December. And the fruit farmers themselves will get to do the decon job.

NHK News also has this from the head of the JA in Date City:

「農家の方には、大変な負担になると思うが、安全な果物を消費者に届けるには、早急に除染をしなければならない。一日も早く完了させたい」

"I know it will be a heavy burden on the fruit farmers, but in order to deliver safe fruits to consumers we need to do decontamination as soon as possible. We want to finish it as soon as possible."

Ummm. No thank you. And what is the point of power-washing the radioactive materials off the trees into the ground so that the roots can absorb?

Has Fukushima Prefecture done any study to show that this power-washing method is effective?

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#Radiation in Japan: 450,000 Bq/Kg Cesium from Dirt in Kashiwa City, Chiba

It's the number you may expect to see in the most contaminated area inside Fukushima Prefecture, like Namie-machi, which is a focus of Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus".

But no, this is in Chiba Prefecture, and Kashiwa City is just outside of Tokyo.

Yomiuri Shinbun (11/28/2011) reports:

千葉県柏市の市有地で局所的に高い放射線量が検出された問題で、環境省は２８日、地表から深さ５～１０センチの地層で１キロ・グラムあたり最高約４５万ベクレルの放射性セシウムを検出したと発表した。

Regarding the localized high radiation spot in the city-owned land in Kashiwa City in Chiba Prefecture, the Ministry of the Environment announced on November 28 that the maximum 450,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected in the soil 5 to 10 centimeters deep from the surface.

　調査は今月１、２日に実施された。同省は「東京電力福島第一原発事故で放出された放射性物質が蓄積している可能性が高い」と指摘。セシウムを含む雨水が側溝側面の破損した部分から浸透し、放射性物質の濃度が増したとみている。同省は追加調査を行い、汚染範囲などを推定する。

The survey was conducted on November 1 and 2. The Ministry says it is highly likely that the radioactive materials released from the Fukushima I Nuclear Plant accident have accumulated. The rainwater containing radioactive cesium seeped through the broken side wall of the drain, and increased the density of radioactive materials. The Ministry plans to conduct additional survey, and estimate the size of the contaminated area.

　柏市が１０月に発表したこの地層近くの調査結果では、最高で同約２７万ベクレルの放射性セシウムが検出されている。

In the October survey by Kashiwa City of the nearby location, maximum 270,000 becquerels/kg of radioactive cesium was detected from the soil.

Information about 276,000 becquerels/kg soil in Kashiwa City is in my post here.

Kashiwa City has the details in Word file, on this page (2nd and 3rd files from the document list in the middle of the page). They still only measure cesium-134 and cesium-137. No strontium 89/90, no plutonium or other nuclides such as silver-110m which is increasingly being detected in spider, cow, and abalone.

Natural concentration does wonders, turning Kashiwa and potentially anywhere in Kanto or Tohoku into the evacuation zone-level contamination. Unlike Fukushima's evacuation zone where the national government has said (at least) they will be responsible for the "decontamination", people are on their own cleaning up the radioactive mess elsewhere.

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#Radioactive Rice Keeps Coming: 1050 Bq/Kg of Radioactive Cesium from Date City, Fukushima

Asahi Shinbun has a convenient map that plots locations where the rice has been found with radioactive cesium far exceeding the provisional safety limit of 500 becquerels/kg. The white circle is Onami District in Fukushima City where up to 1270 Bq/kg of radioactive cesium has been found in the rice. The two red circles are the locations in Date City where the rice exceeding the limit has been found this time. So far.

And unlike in Onami District in Fukushima City, they are only testing one bag out of every 50. Some comfort.


From Asahi Shinbun (11/28/2011):

福島市大波地区（旧小国村）のコメから国の基準値（１キロあたり５００ベクレル）を超える放射性セシウムが検出された問題で、福島県は２８日、緊急調査の結果、大波地区に隣接する同県伊達市の旧小国村と旧月舘町の両地区の計３戸のコメでも基準を超え、一部は流通していた、と発表した。県は両地区のコメの出荷自粛を要請した。政府は、２９日にも両地区のコメの出荷停止を指示する方針だ。

After radioactive cesium exceeding the provisional safety limit was detected in rice harvested in Onami District of Fukushima City (former Oguni-mura), Fukushima Prefecture announced on November 28 that rice from 3 farms in the adjasent areas of Onami District, former Oguni-mura and former Tsukidate-machi, both of which became part of Date City, was found with radioactive cesium exceeding the limit. Part of the rice has been sold in the market. The prefectural government has requested that the shipment of rice from these two districts to be voluntarily halted. The national government is going to order the halt of the rice shipment from the districts.

　県によると、このうち、伊達市の旧小国村のもち米９キロが地元の直売所から消費者に売られていた。基準超えのコメの一般消費者への流通が分かったのは初めて。

According to the Fukushima prefectural government, 9 kilograms of "mochi" rice harvested in former Oguni-mura part of Date City had been already sold to consumers at a local farm stand. This is the first case of the rice exceeding the limit having been found to have been sold to the general public.

　県によると、伊達市の旧小国村では、１０１戸の農家の１１９サンプルのうち２戸の２サンプルで１キロあたり５８０ベクレルと７８０ベクレルを検出。同市の旧月舘町では、６戸の８サンプルのうち１戸１サンプルで同１０５０ベクレルを検出した。

According to the prefecture, in former Oguni-mura of Date City, 2 samples from 2 farms out of 119 samples from 101 farms tested 580 becquerels/kg and 780 becquerels/kg respectively. In former Tsukidate-machi of Date City, 1 samples from 1 farm out of 8 samples from 6 farms tested 1050 becquerels/kg.

Just to remind you: If a government ask you to voluntarily do something, the government does not compensate you for your inconvenience. If the government orders you to do something, then the government is obligated to compensate.

The Fukushima prefectural government hasn't posted the press release on their website yet, but Yomiuri Shinbun (11/29/2011) reports that 4 additional farms in Onami District of Fukushima City had the rice whose radioactive cesium exceeded the provisional safety limit, bringing the total to 10 farms.

The prefecture and the media are trying their best to isolate these cases as "special", saying that these farms are located in the mountains or near the mountains.

Well, I would think that condition applies to the significant number of rice farms in Japan.

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Angler Who Died of Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia Didn't Live Inside 30 Km Radius of Fuku-I

and didn't eat fish inside the 30 kilometer radius, according to the irate journalist who had written about the angler cum journalist in the Rod and Reel magazine.

As it stands, for now, the Japanese blog that said he did wasn't quoting from the actual article in the magazine but from his/her (probably his) own concern for radiation.

False information that he was living inside the 30-kilometer zone and eating fish caught inside the zone quickly spread via tweets and blogs and message boards, and just as quickly it was debunked via tweets and blogs, just like the story about neutron beams detected in the Tokyo Metropolitan area. Self-correcting mechanism of the Internet. (The neutron beam story is more convoluted than this one, but that may be a later post.)

It's not that the areas outside 30-kilometer radius is any safer than inside, as the radiation contamination in Fukushima City or Date City (both are now found with radioactive cesium rice that exceeded the national provisional safety limit) shows.

The angler/journalist Abe did die of acute lymphocytic leukemia on September 16 at the age of 24 after having been hospitalized on August 26. His friends and people at the magazine didn't think it was because of the nuke accident, but they do not rule that out. It is unknown at this point, they say. (If you read Japanese, you can read about it on this site.)

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Reactor 2: Temperature Gauges Go Haywire

Some of the temperature gauges for the Reactor 2 Suppression Chamber and the Containment Vessel seem to be malfunctioning.

In each case, only one gauge out of several seems to be affected. Cause unknown, according to TEPCO. Countermeasures: closer monitoring of gauges.

From TEPCO's own words in the press handout on November 28 (page 3):

Gas temperature of Suppression Chamber of Unit 2:

・11/26 17:00, read 52.7℃, but at 11:00 pm on the day we confirmed that it read “Overscaled” (digital recorder).

・11/27 5:00, it read 102.6℃. Though the readings were not stable, as there were no significant changes or variations in the temperatures of the same types of 2 thermometers and the pool water in Suppression Chamber, we have been investigating the causes for this event including the possibility of malfunction of the measuring instruments. Later, we inspected the measuring instruments and estimated that the readings were overscaled due to certain impacts on the signal detection line seeing that signal from the temperature detector is not stable. We will keep monitoring readings of this instrument and also monitor the temperature using instruments close to it.

Temperature inside the Primary Containment Vessel (Drywell) of Unit 2 (base line temperature of the air conditioning unit, local cooling equipment):

・11/27 5:00, read 78.2℃

・11/27 6:50, it was confirmed that it read approximately 84 , increasing in a staircase pattern. On the other hand, it was also confirmed that the temperature changes of the bottom of the Reactor Pressure Vessel and the water in the pool of the Suppression Chamber were smaller than that of the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (Drywell) and that there was no significant change in the temperature. Now we have been decreasing the flow rate of water injection as stated below and therefore it is expected that the temperature inside the Primary Containment Vessel will rise, but, as the line temperature of which rose in a staircase pattern was only one line of the five lines and the rest of the lines did not show the same changes, we have been investigating the causes for this event, including the possibility of malfunction of the measuring instruments.

- At 7:11 pm on November 24, we adjusted the flow rate of water injection from Core Spray
System from approx. 7.2 m3/h to approx. 5.6m3/h (for feed water system, the flow rate is kept
at 2.9 m3/h).
- On November 26 (from 10:18 am to 11:02 am), we adjusted the flow rate from Core Spray
System from approx. 5.5 m3/h to approx. 4.5m3/h (for feed water system, the flow rate is kept
at 3.0 m3/h).

Later we inspected the instrument but got no data indicating malfunction, and the readings after the inspection are not different from those before. Therefore, we estimated that the signal detection line was somehow affected, which raised the temperature indicated. We will keep monitoring this instrument and also monitor the temperature using instruments close to it.

Another instrument malfunctioning apparently occurred in front of Main Anti-Earthquake Building on November 28, necessitating the workers to wear full-face masks. From the same handout (also page 3)

Approx. 14:28 [on November 28], the alarm went off from an indicator installed in front of Main Anti-Earthquake Building to continuously measure airborne radiation dose (continuous dust monitor).
14:38, in response to the alarm, we instructed to put full face masks on at 2:38 pm accordingly.
16:04, we measured the airborne radiation dose in front of Main Anti-Earthquake Building. As the result, we confirmed that it read below detection limit. It was announced that the workers did not have to wear a full face mask as per normal. We are investigating the cause of the alarm.

Some terminal feeling at Fuku-I, where all they could do is to monitor the gauges.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Yoshida's Last Day on the Plant Was November 14

And TEPCO/Government kept silent for 2 full weeks until November 28.

Tweet from Ryuichi Kino:

統合会見。毎日、政府と東電、保安院はテレビ会議やってるのに、２週間も現場指揮官が理由不明で不在にしているにもかかわらず、保安院は気にせず。園田さんも気にせず。東電は説明せず。どういう統合会議だろう？

Consolidated press conference. The national government, TEPCO and NISA hold teleconference everyday. For two weeks the commander [Yoshida] at the plant was absent, no reason given. NISA didn't care, Sonoda [cabinet office spokesman, who drank the treated water] didn't care, TEPCO didn't bother to explain [for 2 weeks]. What kind of press conference is this?

Asahi Shinbun (11/28/2011) mentions only in passing, dutifully:

吉田氏は今月１４日まで発電所に出勤。

Mr. Yoshida worked at the plant until November 14.

That was 2 days after Goshi "Everyone should share the pain of Fukushima" Hosono visited the plant with his side kick "I will drink Fuku-I treated water because it is safe" Sonoda.

Here's from the photo of that November 12 occasion (from cryptome). From left, Yoshida, Hosono, Sonoda.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Yoshida's Message to Plant Workers

From the tweet of NHK's Jun Hori:

吉田所長は原発で作業にあたる人たちに対し「検診で病気が見つかり残念ながら重要な事故に免振棟を去らざるを得ません。皆さんとこのような形で別れることは断腸の思いで、迷惑をかけることになり心よりお詫びします」というメッセージを出した。

Yoshida, head of Fukushima I Nuke Plant, issued a message to the plant workers as follows: "An illness was found during the medical exam, and I have no choice but to leave the plant, despite the on-going plant accident. To have to part with you like this is gut-wrenching, and I apologize from the bottom of my heart for any inconvenience that my leaving the post may cause."

As usual, TEPCO says it won't disclose what kind of illness that Yoshida suffers, or the cumulative radiation exposure he has received ever since March 11, as such information is "private".

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Head of the Plant Yoshida Is Hospitalized, Will Resign as of December 1st

Jiji Tsushin reports (3:18PM JST 11/28/2011):

東京電力は２８日、福島第１原発の吉田昌郎所長が体調を崩して入院し、１２月１日付で所長職を退任すると発表した。

TEPCO announced on November 28 that Masao Yoshida, head of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, has fallen ill and been hospitalized; he will resign as the head of the plant as of December 1st.

(Oh no...)

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"Trap of Prometheus" Series Part 2 - Resignation of a Researcher (2/4)

(Recap from my previous "Prometheus" post:)

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Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" series is still on-going, and right now it's Part 3 about suppressing the scientific data. It continues to be an excellent article, and it continues to be printed on the "third page" (see my post on the Part 1 of the series).

I just finished reading the Part 2 "Resignation of a Researcher", which has 21 installments. Even though Asahi Shinbun is busy taking down the blog sites that compile all the series articles for convenient reading, they cannot suppress them all, and I read it on this blog.

In it, there is a very curious piece of information about SPEEDI simulation, the NISA and the PM's Office's decision to set the evacuation zone in concentric circles. In short,

• The Ministry of Education had ordered the SPEEDI simulations from the beginning and knew exactly where to send the official to do the actual measurements in Namie-machi, Fukushima;

• Not only the Ministry of Education ordered SPEEDI simulation calculations but also the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered its own SPEEDI simulation calculations with much more accuracy;

• NISA was setting the evacuation zone on March 11 evening based on the simulation;

• NISA stopped their work as soon as the PM's Office, based on no credible information or agreed-on procedure, announced the concentric circle evacuation zones.

Reading the Part 2 of the series, it sure looks as if almost everything bad that happened afterwards could have been prevented if the politicians and bureaucrats on the initial (and crucial) 1st and 2nd days of the nuclear accident had acted to protect the public, which I think is their constitutional duty. Instead, they played games, a turf war as if this was just another ordinary day in Kasumigaseki.
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In the Installment 11, we learned that the Ministry of Education knew exactly where to look for high radiation because it had SPEEDI simulation result, but it didn't bother to tell anyone about the radiation levels when the information would have made the difference. In the next Installment 12 below, we'll see in more detail why the information wasn't shared.

研究者の辞表（１２）いきなり同心円避難

Resignation of a Researcher (12) Suddenly, it was evacuation in concentric circles

3月15日、毎時330マイクロシーベルトの値が出る場所を、なぜピンポイントで指示できたのか。（＝依光隆明朝日新聞記者）

Why was the Ministry of Education able to precisely identify the location that would measure 330 microsieverts/hour radiation on March 15? (reporting by Takaaki Yorimitsu)

東京・霞が関の文部科学省。時に身ぶり手ぶりを交えながら、科学技術・学術政策局次長の渡辺格（いたる）さん（53歳）説明する。「実は、単位放出のSPEEDIを使いました」。

The Ministry of Education and Science in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo. Itaru Watanabe (age 53), Senior Deputy Director-General, Science and Technology Policy Bureau talks with occasional gestures. "In fact, we used SPEEDI in unit emission mode."

SPEEDI（スピーディ）とは、放射能の影響を予測するシステムのことだ。放出された放射性物質がどう広がるのか。風向きや風速、地形を計算し、飛ぶ範囲を予測する。

SPEEDI is a simulation system to forecast the effect of radiation. It considers wind directions, wind speeds and topography and forecasts the dispersion of radioactive materials released.

放射性物質は同心円状には広がらず、汚染エリアは複数の突起を形成する。そのエリアをSPEEDIで予測し、迅速に住民を避難させなければならない。それが原子力防災の基本中の基本とされている。

Radioactive materials do not spread in concentric circles, and the area of contamination would take the shape with multiple protrusions. Forecast the shape of the contaminated area with SPEEDI and evacuate residents as quickly as possible - that is the fundamental principle of nuclear emergency preparedness.

予測の基（もと）になるのは、原発からの放出源情報だ。ところが今回の事故ではそれが入手できなかった。

The forecast would be based on the information from the nuclear plant as to how much radioactive materials are being emitted. That information was not available in this accident.

しかし、そういう事態でも仮の値を入力することで予測ができる。それが、1時間に1ベクレル放出したと仮定する「単位放出」で計算するやり方。渡辺さんはその手法で正確に高汚染地域を把握していた。

However, it is possible to make forecast by entering a formal [as opposed to actual] number. That is the "unit emission", which assumes 1 becquerel/hour emission. Using this method, Watanabe was able to correctly identify the area with high radiation contamination.

渡辺さんが特殊な手法を用いたわけではない。原子力安全委員会が定めた指針では、事故発生直後は放出量を正確に把握することが難しいため、単位放出または事前に設定した値で計算するとある。そうして計算した予測図形をもとに、監視を強化する方位や場所を割り出していく。

It is not that Watanabe used a special method. The guideline set by the Nuclear Safety Commission specifies that the simulation calculation is to be done by unit emission or by the predetermined number because it is difficult to know the precise amount of emission right after the accident. Based on the map thus calculated, the areas and the directions that will need increased monitoring are to be decided.

「単位放出で情報を流す、という点ではマニュアル通りでした。放出量が分からないときに単位放出を各関係者に配るというのがマニュアルになっていましたから」。

"It was exactly according to the manual, to provide information of the unit emission calculation. It was in the manual that the unit emission calculation was to be distributed to parties involved when the actual amount of emission was unknown."

マニュアルによると、配る先は一部の省庁と原子力安全委員会、福島県、そして現地対策本部。「実際に避難範囲を決める場合、SPEEDIを使ったのかどうか は文部科学省では分かりません。避難範囲を決めたのは文科省では無く、原子力対策本部ですから。今回は本来の使い方はされず、いきなり同心円状で避難の指示がなされた」。

According to the manual, the information was to be distributed to several government ministries and agencies, the Nuclear Safety Commission, Fukushima Prefecture, and the local countermeasures headquarters [in Fukushima]. "The Ministry of Education does not know whether the SPEEDI result was used in deciding the evacuation zones. The evacuation zones were decided not by the Ministry of Education but by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. This time, the manual wasn't followed, and the order to evacuate in concentric circles was issued abruptly."

マニュアルでは文科省は情報を出すだけで、それを使って避難指示を出すのは原子力災害対策本部、つまり官邸だ。

According to that manual, the Ministry of Education would provide information, and using that information the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters would issue evacuation orders. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was the Prime Minster's Official Residence.

しかし、首相の管直人も、経済産業大臣の海江田万里も、官房長官の枝野幸男もSPEEDIを知らなかったと主張する。特に海江田と枝野は20日過ぎまで知らなかったと国会答弁している。いったいどうなっていたのか。

However, Prime Minister Kan, Minister of Economy and Industry Banri Kaieda, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano all insist that they didn't know about SPEEDI. In particular, Kaieda and Edano said in the Diet meeting that they didn't know about it until after March 20. What was going on?

(To be continued in the next posts.)

It sure looks like someone (or some people) couldn't resist playing "Sir Humphrey" in what may have been the biggest emergency situation that the country ever faced. And PM Kan, unlike the fictional PM Hacker, didn't care to know how to use the career bureaucrats.

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#Radioactive Ocean: NHK Survey Shows 1.74 Microsievert/Hr at Ocean Bottom off Fukushima

(UPDATE) Additional info from the person who watched the program is as follows:

Radioactive silver (Ag-110m) was ND level in the seawater where abalones were found with radioactive silver. So there is no way of telling whether Ag-110m exists in marine life just by analyzing the water.

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That was one piece of new information from NHK's ETV (Educational TV) program aired on November 27 at 10PM in Japan, "Mapping the Radiation Contamination - Marine Contamination", 4th in the series.

I'm sure I can still view the video at a third party site, until NHK finds out and takes down the video as it almost always does. While I look for the video, here's what the Japanese viewers are tweeting:

• NHK's own survey off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture on September 11, 2011.

• Radiation on the ship: 0.14 microsievert/hr, in the water 0.025 microsievert/hour. The number increases as it gets deeper. On the rock [at the bottom of the ocean] 1 microsievert/hour. Maximum number at the bottom of the ocean 1.74 microsievert/hour. Fine-grained sands at the bottom. The radiation level at the bottom of the ocean was max 70 times that of the ocean surface. (from this tweet)

• Bioconcentration of radioactive cesium seen 10 to 20 kilometers off the coast of Fukushima. At the bottom of the ocean, 200 to 300 becquerels/kg [of cesium in the ocean soil]. The radiation level at the bottom 1 microsievert/hour. The area is an abalone fishery. 40 becquerels/kg in the sea water, 420 becquerels/kg in arame (type of seaweed that abalones eat), 2000 becquerels/kg in abalone. 50-fold concentration [from seawater to abalone].

• Radioactive silver (Ag-110m) in abalone 410 becquerels/kg, in abalone liver 1800 becquerels/kg. (these two points from this tweet)

• Effect of ocean currents is not what you may think. The Kuroshio Current, which comes up from south, may generally prevent the contaminated water from Fukushima from spreading further south. But the coastal current behaves totally different, and radioactive cesium has actually being transported south from Fukushima along the coast. In addition, as rivers reach the Pacific Ocean and discharge water, that creates their own micro-currents. As it turned out, a location off Ibaraki (Kajima) measured lower in radiation of the ocean soil than a location off Chiba (Inubozaki), which is much further south from Fukushima than the Ibaraki location. (from this and this tweets)

Abalone liver is a gourmet food in Japan.

And a Fukushima fisherman, with anger and sadness:

It's all fine idea, this "decontamination". But where will radioactive materials go after they are decontaminated? Into the river and in the end, into the ocean!

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Comment Section of This Blog (Repost of 10/19/2011 Post)

This is the second warning for those who come here to talk (among themselves I suppose) about totally off-topic issues endlessly. If this continues, I will spend time deleting these comments.

In addition to what I've already said in the October 19 post, I may add:

The comment section is not the place to advertise. Google's SPAM filter often fails miserably, letting in the spammers and deleting legit comments, but I can and I will filter out comments with links to external commercial sites and sites of questionable quality, as I see fit.

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In case some of the readers haven't figured out, there are certain things you need to know.

First, this is my personal blog, not a public, free-topic forum. I haven't actively censored the comments (except for whatever Google decides to put in the SPAM folder, which is a real pain), but I can, and I will if the current situation continues.

What is the current situation as I see it?

• Totally off-topic (i.e. unrelated to the post that the comment section is attached to) comments on religions, personal attacks or ridicules on posters who some readers don't agree with;

• And these comments just keep going on and on.

I have kept the comment section of the blog open, so that people can share information, opinions and ideas RELATING TO the on-going nuclear crisis in Japan and the posts that I write. I welcome criticism to the posts, as well as criticism on other posters that you may disagree with, in a civil way.

However, I do not tolerate persistent personal attacks, and comments on religions that have very little to do with the posts or this blog which has been covering the events in Japan since March 11.

If the current situation continues, I will start actively removing the posts that I believe may be discouraging other people from posting comments and information by totally crowding out others.

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