Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (1/7): "#Fukushima I NPP Wasn't Much of a Topic in March 11, 2011 Meeting Despite Station Blackout and Emergency Core Cooling Failure"

Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
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Dr. Haruki Madarame was the chairman of the now-defunct Nuclear Safety Commission at the time of the start of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. He became instantly infamous and reviled in Japan when it was reported that he had reassured then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in the morning of March 12, 2011 that there would be no explosion. A few hours later, the Reactor 1 building blew up in a hydrogen explosion.

Nikkei Shinbun interviewed Dr. Madarame recently, who was as candid as he had been in the past few times he had spoken about his role in the early days of the nuclear accident, readily admitting his errors. (In his testimony to the Diet Commission that investigated the Fukushima I NPP accident in February 2012, Dr. Madarame said he didn't remember the 1st week of the accident, as he was so tired from lack of sleep.)

Nikkei's article from the interview is very informative but also quite long, so it will be in 7 installments.

In the first installment below, Dr. Madarame paints a picture of the Kan administration and himself not knowing what was going on and not knowing what to do.

As is quite usual in the Japanese media, no other media even writes about this Nikkei article.

From Nikkei Shinbun (1/10/2014):

班目氏、３年目の証言　「あり得た、フクシマ最悪の筋書き」
編集委員　滝　順一

Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima"
by Junichi Taki, editorial board member

東日本大震災で起きた福島第１原子力発電所の事故当時、原子力安全委員長だった班目春樹氏（東京大学名誉教授）。原発事故時には政府に技術的助言を与える立場にあったが、的確な助言ができなかったとして非難を浴びた。2012年夏に退任して以来、表舞台に出ることはほとんどなかった同氏がこのほど日本経済新聞の取材に応じた。

Dr. Haruki Madarame (professor emeritus at Tokyo University) was the chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission when the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident happened after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. He was in a position to give technical advice to the national government, but he was later criticized as not having been able to give accurate advice. He has maintained a low public profile since he retired as the chairman in the summer of 2012, but Nikkei Shinbun spoke to him recently.

その中で班目氏は、溶融核燃料が格納容器の外に飛び出る最悪の事態を一時想定したことを明らかにした。また現在の原子力防災の体制については、福島の教訓を十分にくみ取っていないとも指摘。首相の近くにいて事故対応にあたった班目氏の証言や分析は今後の原子力行政を考える上で参考になりうる。当時を振り返りながら、弁明も含めて重い口を開いた。

In our interview, Dr. Madarame revealed that he had at one time assumed the worst case scenario whereby the melted fuel would be ejected from the containment vessel. He also pointed out that the current nuclear disaster countermeasures do not fully reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. We believe the testimony and analysis by Dr. Madarame, who was close at hand by the prime minister and advising him in dealing with the accident, could be useful in thinking about the future nuclear policy. He opened up reluctantly, looking back at those early days of the accident and sometimes defending himself.


■「部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった」

"I wasn't sure what was going on in the room."


――東日本大震災の発災時にはどこにいたか。
-- Where were you when the Great East Japan Earthquake hit?

「（３月11日の）２時46分には原子力安全委員会（霞が関の中央合同庁舎４号館）のオフィスにいた。1時間ほど過ぎたころ、原子力災害対策特別措置法に基づく10条通報（全交流電源喪失）があり、やがて15条通報（非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能）もきた。原子力災害対策本部が立ち上がるはずだが、連絡がなかなか来ないので、行って待っていようと考え、首相官邸へ行った」

"At 2:46PM (on March 11, 2011), I was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission (in the Central Government Building No.4 in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo). One hour later, the Article 10 notice (station blackout) based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness came in. Then the Article 15 notice (emergency core cooling system failure). The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters should now be established, but there was no message [from the Prime Minister's Official Residence]. So I thought I'd go there and wait."

「15条通報の文書には、原子炉への注水ができず炉内水位が見えないので、念のため通報するとあった。このことから私は、直流電源（蓄電池）は生き残ったと思い込んでいた。水位計は壊れていて水位が読めないのだなと楽観的に考えていた。直流電源は少なくとも８時間、おそらく半日くらいは十分にもつだろうから、早く電源車などを確保して直流電源を維持すればよいと考えていた」

"The Article 15 notice said the notice was by way of precaution, as it was impossible to inject water into the reactor and the water level inside the reactor couldn't be measured. So I [erroneously] got it in my head that the DC power (storage batteries) was still available, and that the water level couldn't be measured because the water gauge was broken. The DC power would last at least 8 hours, probably half a day easily, so I thought we would just need to keep the DC power by securing power supply cars.

「19時ころに原災本部の会議が開かれたが、このときは地震と津波の対策協議が主で、原発はそれほど大きな話題にはならなかったと記憶している。私に発言の機会はなかった」

"Around 7PM, a meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was held. But as far as I remember, the topic of the meeting was mostly about dealing with the earthquake and tsunami, and the nuclear power plant was not discussed much. I didn't have an opportunity to speak [I wasn't asked for an opinion]."

「その後いったんオフィスに戻ったが、官邸から呼ばれ、21時ころに官邸地下の危機管理センターの横にある中二階の小さな会議室に初めて入った。政治家の人たちが大変心配していて、これからどうなると尋ねられた。部屋には原子力安全・保安院の平岡英治次長（当時）らがいたが、質問に答えられなかったのだと思う」

"I went back to my office after the meeting, but then I was called back to the Prime Minister's Official Residence and at about 9PM went into the small conference room in the mezzanine floor next to the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the first time. Politicians in the room were very worried, and they asked me what would happen next. People from Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, including Deputy Director-General Eiji Hiraoka, were in the room, but none of them seemed to have been able to answer the questions."


班目氏の行動（３月11日）
14:46 地震発生（原子力安全委員会オフィスに在席）
15:42 10条通報（１～５号機の全交流電源喪失）
16:00 安全委臨時会議を開催し緊急技術助言組織を立ち上げる。臨機応変の対応を宣言
16:45 15条通報（１、２号機の非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能、直流電源喪失の連絡はなかった）
17:40ころ 首相官邸へ。電源車の調達を知り、是認
19:03 原子力災害対策本部開催（発言機会なし、20:00ころいったん安全委オフィスに戻る）
21:00ころ 官邸へ。３ｋｍ圏内避難指示、炉心損傷を防ぐため注水とベント（排気）を助言

Dr. Madarame on March 11, 2011:
2:46PM Earthquake (he was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission)
3:42PM Article 10 notice (station blackout of Reactors 1 through 5)
4:00PM Held emergency meeting of the Nuclear Safety Commission and set up the emergency technical advisory. Declared that his organization would take such steps as the occasion demanded.
4:45PM Article 15 notice (ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2, but there was no mention of loss of DC power)
5:40PM Went to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Approved of the procurement of power supply cars
7:03PM Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (no opportunity to speak, returned to his office around 8PM)
9:00PM Went back to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Advised on evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius from the plant and on water injection and vent to prevent core damage

(To be continued to Part 2)

So Dr. Madarame wasn't asked for his opinion, and he didn't volunteer any.

It took two hours and 18 minutes after the Article 15 notice to set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and when it was finally set up, they didn't even talk about the nuclear emergency.

Banri Kaieda, who was Minister of Economy at that time, said in May 2012 that then-PM Naoto Kan couldn't decide whether to declare a nuclear emergency without knowing the legal basis in detail. And there was no one who would shout back at Mr. Kan.

Misfortune of Japan for having the wrong people at the very wrong time.

Was the Fukushima nuclear accident preventable? Dr. Madarame seems to think so. Stay tuned for the next installment of the interview.

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Update on Anti-Nuclear Former PM Tag Team for Tokyo Governorship: Anti-Nuclear, Pro-Casino?

(UPDATE) To the dismay of many, yet another former prime minister has declared his support for Hosokawa. Mr. Naoto Kan, who was the prime minister presiding over the unfolding nuclear disaster in March 2011, is urging Tokyo residents who are anti-nuclear to vote for Mr. Hosokawa.

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Anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa is about to officially declare his candidacy in the gubernatorial race in Tokyo, with the support from another anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (see my previous post from 1/8/2014). But what little has been leaked about his policies as the governor of the most populous prefecture in Japan is not so simplistic.

While I could find nothing concrete about his energy policy beyond the "beyond nuclear" slogan, I found a few hints that may indicate Hosokawa's thinking.

Hosokawa's words, as reported by his close associates, according to Tokyo Shinbun (1/12/2014):

「カジノを容認したら女性の支持は離れるだろうか」
"If I allowed casinos, would women stop supporting me?"

「五輪は東京だけが独り占めしていいのか。被災地が置き去りにならないか」
"Should Tokyo monopolize the Olympics? Should the disaster-affected areas be left behind?"

「都知事選には日本の命運がかかっている。勝ち負けは関係ない。世論を喚起できればそれでいいんだ」
"The Tokyo gubernatorial race will determine Japan's destiny. It doesn't matter if I win or lose. All I want to do is to galvanize the public opinion."

I believe Hosokawa means "the public opinion toward 'beyond nuclear'," whatever the phrase means.

I have a feeling that LDP and the Abe administration, supporting the candidacy of Yoichi Masuzoe, won't be very disappointed even if their candidate loses to Hosokawa in the election, if Hosokawa is for bringing the casino (Las Vegas Sand and MGM are eagerly waiting, saying Macao wouldn't even come close to Tokyo in potential) to Tokyo Bay. If Hosokawa is hinting at moving some Olympics venues to the disaster-affected Fukushima to help spread the economic benefit of having the Olympics in Tokyo in 2020, great for LDP.

"Beyond nuclear"? As long as it remains a slogan, without any actionable steps toward it, LDP will tolerate.

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#Fukushima I NPP: 2.2 Million Bq/L of All-Beta from Water Sample from an Observation Well Near the Plant Harbor

What's more significant than the number is Fukushima Minyu's interpretation that the contamination may be from the water in the trench(es) that contain extremely highly contaminated water from April/May 2011.

From Fukushima Minyu (1/11/2014):

海側井戸で220万ベクレル検出　第１原発、上昇傾向続く

2.2 million becquerels [per liter] detected from a well near the harbor at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, upward trend continues

東京電力福島第１原発の海側にある観測用井戸の水から高濃度の放射性物質が検出されている問題で、東電は１０日、ストロンチウム９０などベータ線を出す放射性物質の濃度がさらに上昇し、過去最高値の１リットル当たり２２０万ベクレル検出したと発表した。

A large amount of radioactive materials have been detected from observation wells on the ocean side of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. On January 10, TEPCO announced that the density of all-beta including strontium-90 had further increased and the latest measurement was 2.2 million becquerels per liter, the highest recorded so far.

井戸は２号機の東側にあり、海までの距離は約４０メートル。水は９日に採取した。昨年１２月３０日採取分の２１０万ベクレルを上回り、依然として上昇傾向が続いている。

The well is located on the east side of Reactor 2, about 40 meters from the plant harbor. The water sample was collected on January 9. The density was even higher than the sample taken on December 30, 2013 which had 2.1 million becquerels/liter.

この井戸の近くには、２０１１（平成２３）年３月の事故直後に極めて高い濃度の汚染水が漏れた電源ケーブル用の地下道（トレンチ）があり、汚染が地中で拡散しているとみられる。

The well is located near the underground trench for electrical cables where water with extremely high contamination was found leaking right after the March 2011 accident. It is likely that the contamination is spreading into the surrounding soil.

Jiji Tsushin reports the same news but it says "The cause of the high all-beta measurement is unknown."

The level of radioactive cesium in this water was ND (not detected).

How "extremely high" was the contamination of the water that was found leaking from the Reactor 2 turbine building via the trench into the harbor in April 2011?

From TEPCO's press release, 4/5/2011:

• Iodine-131: 5.2 billion Bq/Liter (or 5.2 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-134: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

• Cesium-137: 1.9 billion Bq/Liter (or 1.9 million Bq/cm3)

The air dose rate measured above the water in April 2011 was over 1 Sievert/Hour (survey meter went overscale).

If this trench water is spreading in the soil, it makes sense that cesium is not detected from the water, as cesium has been bound to the soil.

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JAEA to Recreate a Core Melt to Better Understand #Fukushima I NPP Accident

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) of Monju fame (most recently with free video playback software download that infected the PC in the central control room at Monju) will conduct an experiment that creates a small-scale core melt (commonly referred to as "meltdown").

Let's see. JAEA had a fire at Monju, which they hid. They dropped the fuel handling machine in the reactor. There were so many irregularities that Nuclear Regulation Authority was recommending shutting down the organization, when the pro-nuclear Abe administration came in and pledged to continue fuel recycle using Monju operated by JAEA.

(I would be much more comfortable if it weren't JAEA who will be doing the experiment.)

From Yomiuri Shinbun (1/8/2014):

炉心溶融を実験で再現…原子力機構、事故対策へ

JAEA to recreate core melt in an experiment, [result] to be utilized in dealing with Fukushima I NPP accident

日本原子力研究開発機構は、東日本大震災の際に東京電力福島第一原子力発電所で起きた炉心溶融（メルトダウン）を再現する小規模実験を、新年度に行う。

Japan Atomic Energy Agency will conduct a small-scale experiment in the new fiscal year (that starts April 1, 2014) that will recreate a core melt that happened at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant after the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami.

事故の際、核燃料の過熱や溶融がいつごろ、どのように進んだのかは、これまで限られたデータを基にコンピューター計算で推定されただけで、不明な点が多い。実際の核燃料を冷却水のない「空だき」で過熱させる実験により、機構は「事故で起きた現象を明らかにして、今後の原発の事故対策に役立てたい」と話している。

So far, the progression of core melt has only been simulated by computer models based on limited data, and there is much that are still unknown. By using an actual fuel rod and overheat it without coolant [water], JAEA hopes to "better understand what actually happened in the accident and utilize the knowledge gained from the experiment in dealing with the accident."

実験は、茨城県東海村にある原子炉安全性研究炉で行う。研究炉の中心部にステンレス製のカプセル（長さ１・２メートル）を入れ、ミニ燃料棒（同３０センチ）１本を水に触れないようにして収める。カプセルの周囲の核燃料から飛んでくる中性子によって、ミニ燃料棒の中のウランも核分裂し、２０００度以上の高温になって溶ける。

The experiment will be carried out in JAEA's Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) in Tokai-mura in Ibaraki Prefecture. A stainless steel capsule (1.2 meter long) will be inserted in the center of the reactor, and a miniature fuel rod (30 centimeters long) will be placed in the capsule without touching water. Uranium in the miniature fuel rod will undergo nuclear fission as it is being hit by neutrons emitted from the nuclear fuels surround the capsule, causing the temperature to rise above 2,000 degrees Celsius and causing the fuel rod to melt. [See the diagram by Yomiuri. English labels are by me.]

機構によると、実際の原発で使う長さ約４・５メートルの燃料棒の束に比べて少量で、核分裂はすぐに止まり、溶けて数分後には冷えて固まるという。固まった燃料は分析した後、他の核燃料と同様に、敷地内のプールで冷やして保管する。

According to JAEA, since [the fuel rod to be used] is much smaller than 4.5 meter-long fuel rods used in a real nuclear power plant, nuclear fission will stop shortly, and the melted fuel will cool and solidify in a few minutes. The solidified fuel will be analyzed, and then stored in the pool on the premises with other nuclear fuels.

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(OT) No, #Fukushima I NPP Did Not Cause High Radiation Reading on California Beach, Experts and Officials Say

But yes, the beach was "contaminated" with naturally occurring thorium and radium.

From Half Moon Bay Review (1/8/2014):

Experts say beach radiation unrelated to Fukushima

...The amateur video went viral, drawing more than half a million views to date, and spurring government inspectors to conduct their own surveys.

After watching the clip, El Granada electrical engineer Steven Weiss grabbed his own radiation measurement equipment to test the radiation reports for himself.

On Monday, Weiss carried a Geiger counter in each hand for a second survey of Surfer's Beach. As he descended to the waterline, the readings on his gadgets climbed. He tested various spots: the side of the bluffs and the white sand closest to the waterline, both registering levels that were high but not suspiciously so as far as he was concerned. But when he placed the sensors down near a line of black silt along the back of the beach, the meters on both his gadgets spiked. The counters registered about 415 counts per minute. A cpm of 30 is considered the baseline for radioactivity typically found in the air.

“It's not normal. I've never seen 400 cpm when I just wave my Geiger around.” he said. “There has to be something radioactive for it to do that.”

Weiss is no amateur; for 40 years he has made a living designing Geiger counters, most recently for International Medcom Inc. After he verified the hotspot, he took a sample of the dark sediment and sent it to his company's main offices in Sebastopol for analysis.

International Medcom CEO Dan Sythe later put the dirt sample in a spectrum analyzer to view the radioactive “signature” of the particles, the photon energy associated with each isotope. What he found was different from cesium-137, the fissile material used in the Fukushima reactors. He would know – since the 2011 meltdown, Sythe has visited Japan nine times to help map the cesium fallout.

Instead he was seeing radium and thorium, naturally occurring radioactive elements.

...

Nonetheless, the presence and concentration of natural thorium and radium at Surfer’s Beach left experts puzzled. Both elements are actually common at beaches. In fact, a 2008 study by the Journal of the Serbian Chemical Society found similar concentrations at Southern California beaches.

Sythe offered a couple possible explanations. A vein of thorium could be spilling out from the nearby coastal bluffs, he suggested. Alternatively, he heard mention of an old oil pipe running nearby the beach. Oil pipelines had a tendency to collect heavy radioactive minerals, he said.

Peterson thought the minerals could be just washing up with the salt water from the shores. The radioactive materials all were just past the high tide line, so it made sense that would be where the minerals would build up, he said.

“The conditions that are out on the beach could be the same conditions that have been out there for millennia,” he said.

Update: Tests by government health inspectors have found no connection between the elevated radiation levels at Coastside beaches and the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, according to a statement by the California Public Health Department released late on Tuesday evening. An analysis by county and state officials found the radiation was the result of naturally occurring minerals, a conclusion similar to reports by independent experts.

(Full article at the link)

But the net media who went there to prove the source of radiation was the wrecked nuclear plant halfway across the globe is undeterred:

...Working to relieve concerns that the high radiation readings indicated fallout from Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had finally reached the United States, electrical engineer Steve Weiss, a radiological expert who has worked on Geiger counters for 40 years, examined the same beach as the man in the video, and presented even worse results.

Weiss found levels well in excess of 1,400% of what acceptable amounts should be.

“It’s not normal. I’ve never seen 400 cpm when I just wave my Geiger around,” Weiss told the Review. “There has to be something radioactive for it to do that.”

After a spectrum analysis of the dirt on the cove, the paper later discovered the isotopes to be naturally occurring thorium and radium, and not cesium-137, the fissile material employed at the Fukushima reactor. This led many to scrap the notion that radiation from the damaged nuclear plant in Japan was the cause of the high readings. We, however, were not convinced, and set out on a mission to conduct radiation measurements up and down the coast.

And on they went, armed with a pocket geiger counter ("Inspector" brand, it looks).

Unless you find cesium-134 in addition to cesium-137, you can't tell whether cesium-137 is from Fukushima or from the atmospheric nuclear testing that the US has done so many times. And without analysis by a gamma-ray spectrometer to see the distinct peaks for nuclides and knowledge to read them, well...

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#Fukushima I NPP: Data on Strontium in Water Hasn't Been Published for 6 Months, and Will Not Be Published Until TEPCO Figures Out What's Wrong

What's worse is (as usual) TEPCO didn't say anything until now.

What's even worse is that TEPCO is not going to release the data until it fully investigates why the new results differ from the old results.

Nuclear Regulation Authority was openly expressing doubt about the data that came from TEPCO on radioactive materials measurement, and that was about 6 months ago.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (1/9/2014):

東電、ストロンチウム濃度公表せず…測定誤り？

TEPCO will not publish data on strontium density, measurement error?

東京電力は８日、福島第一原子力発電所の港湾や井戸で海水や地下水を採取して調べている放射性ストロンチウムの濃度について、「測定結果に誤りがある可能性があり、公表できない」と発表した。

TEPCO announced on January 8 that regarding the density of radioactive strontium in the sea water and groundwater whose samples are taken from the plant harbor and wells at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, there is a possibility of errors in the measurement results and the results cannot be published.

海水などは定期的に採取して汚染状況を監視することになっており、放射性セシウムなどは毎週、濃度を分析して公表している。しかし、汚染水に含まれる主要な放射性物質の一つであるストロンチウムは、毎月分析することになっているが、昨年６月に採取した海水などの分析結果を最後に、半年近くも公表していなかった。

Water samples are regularly collected to monitor contamination, and the density of radioactive cesium are measured and published every week. Strontium is supposed to be measured every month, but the result of measurement hasn't been published for nearly a half year since the last one for the seawater samples taken in June last year.

東電によると、昨年夏まで使っていた装置の分析結果にばらつきがあり、信頼性に乏しかった。同９月に新たな装置を導入し、信頼性が向上したが、「旧装置と異なる分析結果になった原因を詳しく解明してから、新たな装置による結果を公表したい」と説明している。

According to TEPCO, the measurement results from an equipment used until the summer of 2013 were not consistent and not reliable. TEPCO switched to a new equipment in September and the reliability was enhanced. But TEPCO says, "We would like to investigate first why the new results differ from the old results, before we announce the new results from the new equipment."

Curious to know what kind of "inconsistencies"?

According to TEPCO's own words during the regular press conference on January 8 (well captured by this tweet from @jaikoman), the density of strontium - a beta nuclide - exceeded the density of all-beta, which is impossible.

No other entity is allowed to take measurements of radioactive materials inside the plant. It has been TEPCO's monopoly. It was less than two months ago that IAEA visited the plant and endorsed TEPCO's method of measurement.

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TEPCO to Return J-Village to #Fukushima Prefecture by 2018 for Use in Preparation for 2020 Tokyo Olympics

TEPCO's President Naomi Hirose says, "2020 Olympics seems like a good target."

J-Village, located in Naraha-machi about 20 kilometers south of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, has been used as the staging area for the emergency and restoration work at the plant since March 15, 2011. It was originally built as a non-monetary "donation" by TEPCO to Naraha-machi and Fukushima Prefecture to compensate for the "inconvenience" of having TEPCO's nuclear power plants, in line with the common practice in prefectures in Japan where nuclear power plants are located or being planned.

Naraha-machi was designated as "no-entry zone" around Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant until August 10, 2012. Since then, it has been designated as "areas in preparation for the lifting of evacuation order" - i.e. residents are allowed to return.

It was the ex-mayor of Naraha-machi who demanded that J-Village be "returned" so that the town could use it for the original purpose (soccer (football) training).

Optimism abounds in Fukushima and in Japan in general these days.

From Jiji Tsushin (1/8/2014):

福島のＪヴィレッジ、１８年返還＝東京五輪で活用目指す－東電社長

J-Village to be returned to Fukushima Prefecture in 2018 to be utilized for prep for Tokyo Olympics [in 2020], says TEPCO president

東京電力の広瀬直己社長は８日、福島県庁で佐藤雄平知事と会談し、福島第１原発事故対応の拠点を置いている運動施設、Ｊヴィレッジ（福島県楢葉町）について、「２０２０年の東京五輪は良い目標だ。１８年ごろまでに五輪に向けて活用できるようにしたい」と述べ、１８年ごろ県に返還することを目指す考えを示した。

TEPCO's president Naomi Hirose met with Governor Yuhei Sato on January 8 at the Fukushima prefectural government building, and indicated TEPCO will return J-Village (in Naraha-machi, Fukushima Prefecture) to Fukushima Prefecture. Hirose said, "Tokyo Olympics in 2020 is a good target. I would like to have it [J-Village] ready by 2018 to be utilized for the Olympic." J-Village has been used as the staging area for the work dealing with the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident.

Ｊヴィレッジは、日本サッカー協会などが運営し、サッカー日本代表などの合宿に使われていたが、原発事故後は東電が利用。賠償や除染などを担う福島復興本社を置いている。

J-Village was operated by the Football Association of Japan and was used as a training camp for the national team. Since the nuclear accident, it has been used by TEPCO. It is where TEPCO's Fukushima Revitalization Company is located, which deals with compensations and decontamination.

J-Village, by the way, was one of the three locations where a small amount of plutonium-241 of Fukushima origin was found by the researchers at the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS). The researchers measured the soil samples as early as April of 2011, and didn't tell the world until March 8, 2012. Half life of plutonium-241 is relatively short at 14 years, and it decays into americium-241 which is readily absorbed into legumes.

TEPCO's Japanese homepage showing the sign of Fukushima Revitalization Company at J-Village:

"Revitalization of Fukushima is our starting point," TEPCO says.

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Anti-Nuclear Former Prime Ministers of Japan May Join Forces, with One Running for the Governor of Tokyo, Says Asahi

(UPDATE) It looks almost official. TV Tokyo reports (1/9/2014) that Hosokawa has decided to run, and Koizumi has already pledged support. TV Tokyo says "Hosokawa and Koizumi are both popular with voters", which is probably true.

=========================

Now it gets somewhat interesting, with two weeks left till the official announcement of candidacy.

Former prime ministers - Morihiro Hosokawa (Japan New Party, 1995-1996) and Junichiro Koizumi (LDP, 2001-2006) may join forces, with Mr. Hosokawa running in the gubernatorial election for Tokyo set to be held on February 9, according to the latest Asahi Shinbun article.

Mr. Hosokawa was the first prime minister since 1955 who was not from Liberal Democratic Party. His coalition later evolved into Democratic Party of Japan. He has taken to pottery after he retired from politics.

Mr. Koizumi retains substantial influence within/out LDP even after he retired from politics, and he has caused a stir among anti-nuclear citizens who look at Koizumi's anti-nuclear stance with great suspicion. Koizumi doesn't seem to care about his critics, though, and continues to openly speak up against nuclear energy.

Hosokawa's potential entry into the gubernatorial race, from Asahi Shinbun (1/9/2014; part):

２３日告示の東京都知事選まで２週間。細川護熙（もりひろ）元首相の名前が急浮上した。舛添要一・元厚生労働相が立候補の意向を示し、自民は支援する方向で調整に入ったが、構図が大きく変わる可能性が出てきた。

Two weeks till the official announcement on January 23 of the Tokyo gubernatorial election, the name of the former prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa has suddenly surfaced as a candidate. As Yoichi Masuzoe, former Minister of Health and Labor, has announced his intention to run with the LDP support, Hosokawa's entry into the race could vastly change the election landscape.

本命の１人となる舛添氏が立候補表明するなかで、「脱原発」を旗印に、細川氏と小泉純一郎元首相の連携が実現すれば、都知事選の台風の目になる。

Mr. Masuzoe is considered to be one of the favorite to win the race. But if the alliance of Mr. Hosokawa and the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi materializes under the "anti [beyond] - nuclear" slogan, it could become the eye of a storm.

細川氏は政治の世界から引退して約１５年。再び表舞台へ駆り立てている要因は、原発やエネルギー問題への危機感だ。

It's been 15 years since Mr. Hosokawa retired from politics. The main reason he is considering a comeback is his sense of crisis over nuclear power plants and energy issues.

細川氏が立ち上げた日本新党の関係者によると、細川氏は１月上旬、「安倍政権のエネルギー政策は国を過（あやま）つかもしれない。都知事選で有権者に脱原発を訴えることは重要だ。勝ち負けじゃない」と語ったという。

According to a person involved in Japan New Party, which Mr. Hosokawa started [it doesn't exist any more], Mr. Hosokawa told him in early January that "The energy policy of the Abe administration may harm the nation. It is important to appeal anti (beyond) - nuclear to the voters in the Tokyo gubernatorial election. It's not the matter of win or lose."

すでに立候補した場合の準備も進めており、この関係者は「本人の判断次第でいかようにも対応出来るよう、全部準備はしている」と話す。

This person says the preparation is already underway should Hosokawa decide to run. "Depending on his decision, anything is possible. It's been all prepared."

細川氏が立候補するかどうかの大きなカギを握るのが、小泉氏の動向だ。

The key to Hosokawa's candidacy is Mr. Koizumi's intention.

両氏は昨秋に会談し、脱原発で連携していくことを約束していた。関係者は「細川氏が立候補すれば、小泉氏は絶対についてくる。小泉氏と組めば都知事選の構図が一気に変わる」と期待を込める。細川氏も小泉氏の動向を注視しているという。

The two met and spoke last fall, and promised to join forces in anti-nuclear movement. The person involved [in Japan New Party] is hopeful, saying "If Mr. Hosokawa runs, Mr. Koizumi will definitely support him. If Mr. Hosokawa joins forces with Mr. Koizumi, the election landscape will suddenly changes." He says Mr. Hosokawa is watching Mr. Koizumi carefully.

...一方、舛添氏を支援する方向の自民党は警戒感を隠さない。すでに細川氏の動きについて情報収集を開始。党幹部の一人は「細川氏だけなら怖くない。しかし、小泉氏が付けば、核融合を起こしかねない」と漏らす。

... On the other hand, LDP, who will support Mr. Masuzoe, is openly wary. The party has already started gathering information on Mr. Hosokawa's moves. One of the senior party members says, "We're not afraid of Mr. Hosokawa, if he is alone. However, if Mr. Koizumi is behind him, it could lead to a nuclear fusion [meaning "very significant event that could jeopardize their soon-to-be-declared candidate Masuzoe"]."

If it is going to be a choice among Mr. Kenji Utsunomiya (attorney backed by Social Democrats and Communist Party), Mr. Yoichi Masuzoe (scholar-author-TV personality-politician backed by LDP and DPJ) and Mr. Hosokawa (with Mr. Koizumi's backing) and if I am forced to choose, I'll be totally at a loss for whom to vote. Mr. Utsunomiya and his message look too "1990s", Mr. Masuzoe is too slick and sleazy for my liking. Beyond the historical significance, Hosokawa was utterly ineffective as the prime minister who effectively threw out the job in only 9 months.

Hosokawa's ancestor was the lord that governed today's Kumamoto after Kiyomasa Kato, extremely popular lord who was displaced by the Tokugawa administration in the 17th century. Maybe Hosokawa is more fit for governing a prefecture, instead of the entire nation.

Asahi's hope that the anti-nuclear stance will get many votes seems little more than a hope, though. From all indications, the Fukushima nuclear accident is long over in the minds of most Japanese.

If Hosokawa runs in the race, it will be the very first time that a former prime minister of Japan runs for a prefectural office. At least I've never heard of it.

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Latest from Fast Breeder Monju: PC Hacked by Someone Accessing from a Korean Site, After a Night-Shift Worker Downloaded a Free Video Software off the Net

Net citizens in Japan are incredulous.

"So this fast-breeder project burns hundreds of millions of yen every year, and the worker downloads a free software off the net?" "A video playback software cannot be for business use, can it?"

(I'd say, "Don't they have antivirus software and firewall? They are also free...")

From NHK News (1/6/2013):

福井県敦賀市にある、高速増殖炉「もんじゅ」の中央制御室にあるパソコンが、韓国のサイトから不正なアクセスを受けたうえで、メールなどの情報が盗まれた可能性があることが分かりました。

It has been revealed that a personal computer in the central control room of the fast breeder Monju in Tsuruga City in Fukui Prefecture may have been accessed illegally and information including emails may have been stolen.

もんじゅを管理する日本原子力研究開発機構は、「安全上重要な情報は、外部に流出していないとみられる」と説明しています。

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), who operates [well, tries to operate would be more accurate...] Monju, says, "Important security information is not likely to have leaked."

日本原子力研究開発機構によりますと、今月２日、もんじゅの中央制御室で、男性職員の当直長が８台の業務用パソコンのうちの１台で映像再生用のフリーソフトを更新していたところ、そのあと韓国のサイトから３０回余りの不正なアクセスがありました。

According to JAEA, a male supervisor on night duty on January 2 was downloading a free software for video playback on one of the eight personal computers used for operations, when 30 or so incidents of illegal access to the PC from a Korean site happened.

このパソコンには、業務連絡に使っていたおよそ４万２０００通のメールや職員の訓練報告書などの情報が保存されていますが、外部に送信された記録が残っていて、一部が盗まれた可能性があるということです。

The PC in question stores about 42,000 emails and training reports. There is a record of external transmission, and part of the information may have been stolen.

日本原子力研究開発機構は、フリーソフトの更新の際にコンピュータウイルスに感染したとみていますが、もんじゅにあるほかのパソコンへの不正なアクセスは確認されていないとして、「安全上重要な情報は外部に流出していないとみられる」と説明しています。

JAEA thinks the computer was infected with a virus during the update of the free software, but says no illegal access to other PCs at Monju has been confirmed. "It is not likely that critical security information has been leaked outside," JAEA explains.

もんじゅを巡っては、テロ対策に不備があるとして去年１１月、原子力規制委員会が「厳重注意」を行っています。

Last November, Nuclear Regulation Authority issued a "reprimand (stern warning)" to Monju's operator for deficiencies in countermeasures against terrorism.

Yup. We're supposed to take JAEA's comment at face value, as if they are on top of things while in fact they weren't aware of the illegal access until they were contacted by their security firm, according to Yomiuri Shinbun (1/7/2014).

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Radioactive Materials from Atmospheric Testing Persist in Upper Atmosphere (Stratosphere), According to Swiss Researchers

More plutonium and cesium remain in the stratosphere than in the troposphere (which sits directly above the earth), though the amount is still very miniscule, measured in microbecquerels (1 microbecquerel = 0.000001 becquerel).

First, from BBC News (1/7/2014; emphasis is mine):

Nuclear weapon test debris 'persists' in atmosphere
By Rebecca Morelle

Radioactive particles from nuclear tests that took place decades ago persist in the upper atmosphere, a study suggests.

Previously, scientists believed that nuclear debris found high above the Earth would now be negligible.

However this research shows that plutonium and caesium isotopes are still present at surprisingly high concentrations.

The work is published in the journal Nature Communications.

Lead author Dr Jose Corcho Alvarado, from the Institute of Radiation Physics at Lausanne University Hospital in Switzerland, said: "Most of the radioactive particles are removed in the first few years after the explosion, but a fraction remains in the stratosphere for a few decades or even hundreds or thousands of years."

However, he said the levels were not high enough to pose a risk to human health.

Radioactive hangover

At the height of the Cold War, when the nuclear arms race was in full swing, weapons were being developed and tested around the world.

But more than 50 years on, their radioactive legacy remains.

While nuclear explosions initially throw material up into the air, scientists had thought that the radioactive particles would remain for a limited time.

In the troposphere (the lower layer of the atmosphere that sits directly above the Earth), the isotopes are removed fairly quickly, as they are "washed out" by attaching to rain or snow or are drawn down by gravity.

However, in the stratosphere (the layer that sits from about 10-50km above the Earth), the Swiss team believes that some particles become trapped.

"The concentrations we measured were in the order of about 1,000 to 1,500 levels higher in the stratosphere than in the troposphere," said Dr Jose Corcho Alvarado.

While the tests were carried out over Switzerland, the team said they expected similar levels would be found at the same latitude elsewhere around the world.

The scientists also found that this material can be moved around in the atmosphere by natural events such as volcanic eruptions.

For example, in 2010 after Iceland's Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted, plutonium levels in the lower atmosphere increased.

While scientists say the long-term effects are not clear, the lead author Dr Jose Corcho Alvarado said: "It is important to say that this is not dangerous for the population."

He added that the nuclear debris could be tracked to find out more about how particles in the atmosphere move around.

The paper at the Nature Communications (peer-reviewed) (emphasis is mine):

Anthropogenic radionuclides in atmospheric air over Switzerland during the last few decades

Abstract:
The atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s and early 1960s and the burn-up of the SNAP-9A satellite led to large injections of radionuclides into the stratosphere. It is generally accepted that current levels of plutonium and caesium radionuclides in the stratosphere are negligible. Here we show that those radionuclides are present in the stratosphere at higher levels than in the troposphere. The lower content in the troposphere reveals that dry and wet deposition efficiently removes radionuclides within a period of a few weeks to months. Since the stratosphere is thermally stratified and separated from the troposphere by the tropopause, radioactive aerosols remain longer. We estimate a mean residence time for plutonium and caesium radionuclides in the stratosphere of 2.5–5 years. Our results also reveal that strong volcanic eruptions like Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 have an important role in redistributing anthropogenic radionuclides from the stratosphere to the troposphere.

The diagrams presented in the paper showing the activity concentration of plutonium (239+240) and cesium (137) in the atmosphere. The unit is microbecquerel/cubic meter (μBq/m3):

Plutonium:

Cesium:

(H/T Enformable)

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TEPCO Apologizes to #Fukushima I NPP Subcontractors and Explains, "Additional Risk Benefit of 10,000 Yen (US$96) a Day Doesn't Mean Additional Risk Benefit of 10,000 Yen a Day"

Uh... what does that mean, you may ask?

And why is TEPCO apologizing? Because, apparently, TEPCO's announcement that the company would double the risk benefit for the workers hired by the subcontractors to work at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant from 10,000 yen a day to 20,000 yen a day has caused anxiety and confusion among TEPCO's primary contractors and subcontractors.

Why are TEPCO's primary contractors (1st tier) and subcontractors (and subcontractors of the subcontractors... to the nth degree) anxious and confused? Because the workers they hire now knows how much TEPCO is paying the primary contractors and can compare it to what they actually receive.

The article below is by Mainichi English on January 5, 2014, translated from the Japanese article on the previous day. The title, "TEPCO allows contractors to dip into 'labor fund' increase", is very unclear.

The original Japanese title for the article is:

東電:福島原発作業、日当「中抜き」容認…元請けに文書

which I started to translate (till I found Mainichi's own English translation) as:

TEPCO allows "taking a cut" of the daily wages for the workers at Fukushima I Nuke Plant, TEPCO's letter to the prime contractors reveals

It's about "skimming", as Reuters' article on December 19, 2013 made abundantly clear.

From Mainichi English (1/5/2014; emphasis is mine):

TEPCO allows contractors to dip into 'labor fund' increase

Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), after announcing last November that "labor funds" would be increased for contract work on the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, told contractors that not all the money had to go to wage increases, effectively reneging on its earlier announcement, it has been learned.

When contracting out work, in addition to base money for wages, TEPCO sets aside extra funds to pay workers at the plant based on radiation exposure and the type of work they do. However, until a Nov. 8 announcement the company had not revealed exact numbers, saying that doing so would "affect future contracts and bids." This was criticized as encouraging contractors and subcontractors to dip into the labor funds.

When TEPCO announced "emergency safety measures" for the Fukushima plant on Nov. 8 last year, it revealed that until then it had been setting aside 10,000 yen of these extra funds per worker. In order to improve workers' wages, however, the utility said it would increase this amount by another 10,000 yen per day starting with work contracted the following month. This was also clearly indicated in documents the company distributed to contractors.

TEPCO president Naomi Hirose said at a press conference, "I ask that prime contractors thoroughly enact (wage improvements). Workers will be aware of the 10,000 yen increase, so we ask that contractors follow through."

However, on Nov. 29, TEPCO sent a message to its contractors in the name of the chief of its supplies division. The message concerned the Nov. 8 announcement, and apologized that "the measure had not been understood correctly, bringing confusion to our business partners." It read that the increase of 10,000 yen was "for making efforts to improve workers' wages" but "does not mean that the amount (paid to workers) will be increased by 10,000 yen."

A representative of TEPCO's PR department told the Mainichi Shimbun, "The wages paid to workers are decided in contracts made between workers and subcontractors, so we explained that the labor funds we set and the actual wages paid to workers are different." Furthermore, the PR official said the increase of 10,000 to 20,000 yen in daily extra labor funds was "introduced as a representative case, but the actual amount could be lower." The official would not discuss the actual amount of increases made because it was "a contract matter."

The Nov. 8 announcement had been reported as a "doubling" of payments to workers by a local paper. One worker who works at the Fukushima plant said, "Some subcontractors have properly increased wages and others haven't, creating a stronger feeling of unfairness amongst those on-site. These TEPCO documents could lower the morale of the workers."

To be fair, TEPCO's President Naomi Hirose did say in the November 8, 2013 press conference that adding 10,000 yen to the existing 10,000 yen daily risk benefit would not mean all workers hired by the subcontractors would now receive 10,000 yen more per day. He emphasized that TEPCO would pay the prime contractors (top-tier subcontractors) additional 10,000 yen per day per worker. How the money was to be distributed down the subcontracting pyramid would not be TEPCO's responsibility but the prime contractors' and subcontractors' responsibility, Hirose said.

"Sunny", one of the workers who have been tweeting from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, is angrily calling the contractors unethical in his tweet:

電力の社長が出しますと言ってるのに、最末端の作業員は貰っていない。国税を投入しているのにこのような【会社の都合】で消えてしまうのは問題というレベルではもはやない。これは企業としての倫理の問題である。それでも出さない企業は、淘汰されるべきである。

President of the electric power company [TEPCO] says he is paying more, but the workers at the bottom [of the subcontracting pyramid] are not receiving it. Taxpayers' money is being used [to restore the plant] but the money to the workers disappear because of "circumstances at the companies". This is beyond the level of being problematic; it is the corporate ethics problem. Those companies that still won't pay the workers should be screened out.

Mainichi's original Japanese article has a diagram that shows how the skimming is done (English labels are by me):

From what I sometimes hear, though, this is what actually happens, in some cases: "Oh you want more risk benefit? OK, here you are. Oh by the way your regular pay will be reduced."

According to anecdotal stories in the press in the past, there are workers at the plant with no risk benefit; the benefit has been all skimmed off by the layers of subcontractors before it reaches the workers.

When this additional 10,000 yen risk benefit was announced in November last year, both "Sunny" and "Happy" (who is leaving the plant) were hoping that the national government, who claims to be "in charge" of restoring the plant, would make this additional money go directly to all contract workers. Well that didn't happen, and is not likely to happen.

Just like in late March 2011, when it comes to treating the workers who work at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, it is a private company's problem, not the government's problem, whether it is under DPJ or LDP. So sorry to hear that the workers have little to eat and drink at the plant, but no we're not going to do anything because it is TEPCO's problem, said an elite career bureaucrat at Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. My jaw dropped when I watched him say so in the press conference.

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