Japanese Net Citizens' (Anecdotal) Response to TEPCO with No Money to Buy Batteries and No Permit to Transport Batteries: "TEPCO Should Have Used Credit, and We Need New Emergency Laws and Regulations"

One month after it was first reported by Asahi Shinbun, some Japanese net citizens on Twitter seem to be slowly realizing what happened on March 13, 2011 when Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant workers didn't have enough money to buy car batteries which would have given them a good fighting chance.

Sadly, their response to this revelation indicates to me the same thing would happen again and again.

The tweets that I've seen on the subject are limited in numbers, I don't have that many followers (4,700, give or take) and I don't follow that many. So the following is nothing but anecdotal.

About TEPCO workers collecting money to go to Iwaki City and buy car batteries at large auto parts stores, managing to buy only 8:

• They should have asked nicely.

• They should have bought on credit.

• Maybe the stores didn't trust TEPCO to sell on credit.

• I'm embarrassed for Japan, what would the world think of us Japanese?

There is no indication that any of them even thought about "other" solutions (see my previous post for some).

About 1,000 batteries from Toshiba stuck in Tokyo because there was no permit to transport them on the highway, I tweeted in Japanese. Not many have read Asahi Shinbun's article (partly because it appeared in the subscribers' only section of the online paper), and they simply do not know about the episode. But I got this response　from an independent journalist:

That's understandable, because we don't have laws and regulations for emergency situations like that. I think there are some who predicted it [that Toshiba or TEPCO waited for the permit while core melt was occurring]. But it is us [the citizens of Japan] who have allowed it [the lack of emergency laws and regulations] to continue. So we have to change many things, but that's hard to do. If an earthquake and tsunami of the same magnitude happened right now, it is likely that we would repeat the same [mistakes].

To him, and to many others in Japan, it is a matter of creating new laws and regulations so that people can follow follow, and NOT of individual initiative and how to start thinking independently. And thinking fast.

I wrote back to him,

It's not the matter of whether you have the laws and regulations in place. If a government bureaucrat told Toshiba or TEPCO they couldn't transport the batteries on the highway without the permit, even as they knew (though they dared not tell the public) the reactor core was melting, Toshiba or TEPCO could simply say, "Oh OK, yes we understand, sir", and start driving to Fuku-I anyway. People are not trained to be bold and cunning, able to make judgment on their own on the fly in a situation like that. So what they might be fined or even arrested afterwards for transporting dangerous stuff on the highway? That would have been much better than having nuclear reactors blowing up one after another.

I'm afraid he doesn't know what I'm talking about. But we're in agreement as to repeating the same mistake in the future.

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PM Noda Visits J-Village, #Fukushima I Nuke Plant: "As a Citizen of Japan, I Thank You."

So far, the news is out on his morning visit to J-Village in Naraha-machi, Fukushima, where met with workers who had remained at the plant during the early days of the nuclear accident, and thanked them for their effort.

Why does he bother? Jiji says it's to show people that the Fukushima nuclear accident is still the number one priority for the administration. For what? At this point, I haven't a clue.

From Jiji Tsushin (10/07/2012):

野田首相、福島第１原発を視察＝作業員らを慰労

Prime Minister Noda to visit Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, to thank the workers

　野田佳彦首相は７日、東京電力福島第１原発を視察するため福島県を訪問した。原発事故現場の視察は就任直後の昨年９月以来２度目。先の民主党代表選で再選を果たし、内閣改造で態勢強化を図った首相は、引き続き政権の最重要課題として原発事故対応に取り組む姿勢を示したい考えだ。

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is in Fukushima Prefecture on October 7 to visit Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. It will be the second time [for Mr. Noda] to visit the scene of the nuclear accident since September last year, when he became the prime minister. He has been re-elected as the leader of Democratic Party of Japan, and has reshuffled his cabinet to strengthen his position. With the visit, he intends to show that the Fukushima nuclear accident continues to be the first priority for the administration.

　首相はまず、事故処理活動の拠点となっている同県楢葉町の「Ｊヴィレッジ」を訪問。昨年３月の原発事故発生直後、危険を顧みず現場に残って処理に当たった作業員らと面会し、「本当に語り尽くせないご苦労があったと思う。恐怖と過酷な環境の中、奮闘いただいたことに国民の一人として感謝申し上げたい」とねぎらった。

Prime Minister visited the J-Village in Naraha-machi, which has been the staging area for the accident response work. He met with the workers who had remained at the plant despite danger right after the start of the nuclear accident in March last year, and thanked them by saying, "You must have suffered such hardships that you can't even begin to tell us. I would like to thank you, as a citizen of Japan, for your strenuous effort in the middle of fear and harsh environment."

Harsh is an understatement.

I don't know if the quote by Jiji Tsushin is verbatim or abbreviation. I would have liked him to say that and more, as the prime minister of the national government whose official, national policy has been to pursue nuclear energy, instead of as one citizen.

Before he went to J-Village, Noda also met with the policemen patrolling the 20-kilometer radius no-entry zone. According to Yomiuri TV, he thanked them by saying:

「内閣総理大臣として、そして一人の日本国民として、深甚なる敬意と感謝を申し上げます。本当にありがとう」

"As the prime minister, and as a citizen of Japan, I offer my profound respect and appreciation. Thank you very much."

From the words, Mr. Noda seems to appreciate policemen more than the Fuku-I workers.

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#Fukushima Reactor 3 Explosion, Reactor 2 Core Melt, Possibly Because TEPCO Couldn't Break the Rules to Bring Batteries to the Plant

What rules, you ask? Good social rules like "If you want something from a store, you purchase it with money." Or "In order to transport potentially dangerous materials or equipments, you apply for a government permit and wait until the permit is issued." They are all good and proper in peacetime.

TEPCO was no longer in peacetime, starting March 11, 2011. But the company and the workers clearly didn't know how to operate in an extraordinary situation they found themselves in. So they stuck to what they knew best - be a law- and rule- abiding good citizens.

From the teleconference video that TEPCO newly released, at 7:17AM of March 13, 2011 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant (Video 05-06 at TEPCO's Photos and Video page for October 5, 2012):

資材班です、すいません。これからバッテリー等を買出しに行きます。えーと、現金が不足しております。現金をこちらに持ち出している方、是非お貸しいただきたいと思います。すいません、申し訳ありませんが、現金をお持ちの方、貸していただけないでしょうか？よろしくお願いします。

This is Materials Group, sorry to interrupt. We are going out to buy batteries and other things. But, uh.., we're short on cash. For those of you who have cash with you here, we would really appreciate if you could lend it to us. We're sorry [and embarrassed] but if you have cash, could you let us borrow it? Thank you in advance.

After this announcement, a senior executive (I believe it's Mr. Komori in TEPCO's Headquarters in Tokyo) is heard muttering, "No money? That is miserable. We have to do something..."

Asahi Shinbun transcribed the entire 150 hours of TEPCO's teleconference video, and has written several articles (subscribers only) about their findings. This battery episode was in the third installment of the series of articles that were published in early September. The following is my summary of the situation, based on the Asahi Shinbun article on September 5, 2012, based on their own transcription of the video:

Early morning on March 13, 2011 (28 hours or so before the Reactor 3 building exploded). TEPCO's workers had figured out that by rigging up the car batteries they could provide just enough power to operate the main steam safety-relief valve (SR valve) to release pressure inside the Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel. Ten 12-volt batteries were all they needed for that operation for the moment, they figured. The problem was that they didn't have 10. They asked the workers with cars to please remove the batteries so that they could be used.

20 car batteries were offered. But they needed more. Much more, in order to monitor the conditions of Reactor 3 and Reactor 2. The monitoring systems in the central control room were also down, because of lack of electricity. They needed the batteries in the order of 50, 100.

Iwaki City was 30 kilometers south of the plant, and there were big auto parts stores in the city. So, TEPCO workers decided to drive down there and buy car batteries at the store.

But 8 car batteries were all they managed to buy in Iwaki City. Asahi Shinbun article doesn't say whether it was lack of money or lack of inventory at the auto parts stores.

It was not that TEPCO's Headquarters in Tokyo had sat paralyzed. It had already ordered 1,000 batteries from Toshiba on March 12 and arranged for having them shipped to the plant immediately.

There was a problem. A government permit was needed, apparently, to transport that many batteries on the highway, and the permit was not readily coming. The vehicle loaded with 1,000 batteries couldn't leave Tokyo unless the issue of the permit was resolved somehow.

In the end, 320 of 1,000 batteries did arrive at the plant, in the evening of March 14, long after the Reactor 3 explosion. The core inside the Reactor 2 Pressure Vessel had already been exposed.

This single episode, I believe, epitomizes what's fundamentally wrong with the Japanese in a crisis situation: They cannot break rules.

So they couldn't monitor the reactors, couldn't open the SR valve, but knew if they had batteries, even the car batteries and plenty of them, they would be able to do both. If they didn't, there would be core melt, and a large amount of radioactive materials would be released. It was not the time to observe rules and regulations imposed by the society or the government.

1. Instead of going all the way to Iwaki City to buy car batteries, they could have stopped any and every car and truck they encountered outside the plant, asked, begged, threatened, the drivers to give up their car batteries because otherwise there would be multiple meltdowns at the nuclear plant.

What would the drivers do? Refuse? Somehow, I don't think so. They could even ask the residents to spread the word that the plant needed car batteries to prevent nuclear catastrophe.

They could have asked the Self Defense Force to round up car batteries from the neighborhood for them. The SDF could still have said "no", though, needing a permission from the prime minister.

2. If they went to Iwaki City, they could have just taken the batteries, instead of trying to buy them, if lack of money was the issue. This was the biggest emergency in TEPCO's corporate life. They could have simply told the store managers to bring all the car batteries in stock and just taken them. They could write a note saying how many batteries and how much, and TEPCO would pay for them later, after the reactors were restored.

What would the store managers do? Refuse to give the batteries to TEPCO unless they they were paid on the spot? I don't think so.

3. If the government was making a fuss about the permit to transport batteries, either Toshiba or TEPCO (I don't know who was in charge of transportation) could have told the government to take a hike and just started driving. Or said nothing to the government and just started driving.

What would the government do? Stop the truck by force? When the reactors were on the verge of blowing up? I don't think so.

4. Also, if the Japanese government was a pain in the neck even in the emergency like that, TEPCO could have asked the US government/military for help. Could you bring the batteries to us? The US military could have easily transported battery vehicles in their Chinooks. Would the US government/military say "No we can't do anything, without the request from your government"? When transporting batteries to the plant might save the reactors from meltdowns? I don't think so.

What would the Japanese government do to the US government/military? Get angry that the US helped stop meltdowns? Let them get angry.

50, or 100 batteries may or may not have prevented the meltdowns, but at least they would have given the workers under Plant Manager Masao Yoshida a fighting chance - a better grip on the situation, a little more control over the reactors, and ability to lower pressure so that they could continue to inject water easily and prevent the core from getting exposed.

Fight or flight. 火事場の馬鹿力 (Extraordinary strength at the scene of a fire). TEPCO tried to fight, that much is apparent from the teleconference videos. But they tried to do so within the boundaries of socially acceptable rules and norms in Japan during peacetime when nuclear reactors were operating normally.

When I read the Asahi's article for the first time, the truth is that it didn't occurred to me either that TEPCO could have broken all the rules in an emergency like this. I just thought, "Bureaucrats are bureaucrats no matter what..." over the permit to transport Toshiba batteries on the highway. I mentioned that to an American friend, who immediately said, "Why did they (TEPCO) have to wait for the permit in a make or break situation like this?"

I'm Japanese after all. I was thinking like TEPCO.

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Japan to Stop Using SPEEDI to Decide Whether to Instruct Residents to Take Potassium Iodide Pills

Instead, the decision will be made using the air radiation levels and the water levels inside the nuclear reactors.

In other words, when (if) they do distribute the pills to citizens who may be affected by a nuclear accident, it may be too late. If the last year is any indication, such data will be released several weeks to several months after a nuclear accident happens.

As to the water levels inside the reactors, it's a joke. TEPCO and NISA insisted there was water inside the Reactor Pressure Vessels until mid May.

But no matter, that's what the Nuclear Safety Commission under Dr. Haruki "Detarame" Madarame has decided and is duly reported by NHK.

NHK conveniently omits the now-known fact that the SPEEDI simulation data was there from the beginning. The politicians and the bureaucrats, in their petty turf war, couldn't make any use of it. They even had three sets of simulation from three different entities - the Ministry of Education, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and TEPCO, from the beginning of the accident. Everyone decided to drop the ball all at once.

How did they manage to do that? Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometeus" has an excellent coverage on that (part 1 here, part 2 here).

From NHK News (1/4/2012):

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の事故で、放射性物質の広がりを予測するシステムが機能せず、甲状腺の被ばくを避けるヨウ素剤の取り扱いに混乱が生じたことから、国の原子力安全委員会は、ヨウ素剤の服用を指示するかどうかの判断に予測システムは使わないことを決め、空気中の放射線量など別の指標を導入することになりました。

In the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, the system to forecast the dispersion of radioactive materials didn't function, causing the confusion as to what to do with the potassium iodide pills to avoid radiation exposure in the thyroid. So the Nuclear Safety Commission has decided not to use the system any more to instruct residents to take the pills; instead, the air radiation levels and other indicators will be used.

原子力事故の際、甲状腺の被ばくを避けるヨウ素剤を服用するかどうかは、放射性物質の広がりを予測する「ＳＰＥＥＤＩ」というコンピューターシステムのデータを基に国などが判断し、住民に指示することになっています。

In a nuclear accident, in order to decide whether to take potassium iodide pills to prevent thyroid irradiation, the national government is to use the data from the simulation system to forecast the dispersion of radioactive materials, called SPEEDI, and to instruct the residents.

しかし、福島第一原発の事故ではシステムが機能せず、国や福島県が判断を示さなかったことから、市町村によってはヨウ素剤の取り扱いに混乱が生じました。このため原子力安全委員会の作業部会は、今後も迅速な対応につながるか疑わしいとして、ヨウ素剤の服用を指示するかどうかの判断に予測システムは使わないことを決めました。

However, in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, this system did not function and the national government and the Fukushima prefectural government did not make a decision [on whether to instruct residents to take the pills], causing confusion in the municipalities affected on what to do with the potassium iodide pills. The working group at the Nuclear Safety Commission has determined that it is doubtful that SPEEDI data will be used for a quick response in the future and therefore the SPEEDI system won't be used in determining the need for the administration of the pills.

代わりに、空気中の放射線量や原子炉の水位などのデータの利用を検討しています。さらに、服用の基準についても国際的な動きに合わせて見直し、１歳児の甲状腺の被ばく線量で今の半分の５０ミリシーベルトに引き下げるということです。作業部会では今後、指標についての具体的な数値を検討し、ことし３月までに提言にまとめることにしています。

Instead, the Commission is considering using the data such as the air radiation levels and the water level in the reactor. Further, the levels to instruct the residents to take the pill will be revised based on the prevailing international standards. For 1 year-old, it will be an equivalent dose of 50 millisieverts at the thyroid, which is half of the current level. The working group will further consider the numbers and will make a suggestion to the government by March.

WHO's standard for 1-year old is 10 millisieverts.

(I sent a tweet to NHK Kabun (culture and science), telling them the article is false about SPEEDI. I was surprised when NHK Kabun marked my tweet as "favorite".)

Speaking of potassium iodide, there are tweets from the residents in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture that they just received an envelope from the city that contained potassium iodide pills. They are wondering why, and wondering if Reactor 4 is as safe as TEPCO has said after the water level decrease in the Skimmer Surge Tank.

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More on Accident at Marcoule Nuclear Waste Processing Site in France: Furnace Had Many Problems Before

as reported by Kyodo News. Interestingly, if you go to Kyodo News site the article is not there. It was carried by several local/regional papers but in print only, as far as I know.

Rough translation from the original Japanese article, as appeared in Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun (9/15/2011):

French nuclear facility: Explosion took place right after the restart of the furnace operation

Employee says "The melting furnace broke down last week"

(Kyodo News-Paris) Regarding the explosion that took place on September 12 at the low-level radioactive waste treatment center (CENTRACO) in Marcoule in southern France, it was revealed that the melting furnace that exploded had broken down last week, and it was restarted on the day of the accident. French papers including Le Figaro reported it on September 14 as information from the sources in the French prosecutor's office who interviewed the employees at the center.

According to the employees testimony, the melting furnace, which is used to melt low level radioactive waste like workers' gloves, protective clothes and metal pumps, was stopped last week after "numerous problems" had been detected. The operation resumed in the morning of September 12, but metals weren't melted well. When an employee tried to break the lump using a stick-shaped object, the molten metal spewed from the lump, causing the explosion.

French prosecutors are set to start investigation on death and injury by negligence in a few days.

From the beginning of the accident, the French media had pointed out the possibilities of heated metal coming in contact with water, or of some chemical reaction taking place near the furnace as the cause of the explosion.

However, the prosecutors say, "To promote further melting using an equipment is a well-known procedure, even if it not practiced widely", indicating they haven't ruled out other possibilities.

According to the major French TV network TF1, the area around the furnace remains in high temperature and no one can approach anywhere near it, and the prosecutors and the French nuclear control bureau haven't made much progress in their investigation.

Le Figaro's article on September 13 had these details:

• Furnace was set at 1,500 degrees Celsius but the metal didn't completely melt;

• The employee tried to break the molten mass with a crowbar ("barre à mine").

Oh boy. Crowbar?

But just as TEPCO has the manual for the outside world and the "real" manual(s) for the workers to follow, breaking the molten metal blob with a crowbar probably is part of the "real" manual at the French plant.

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A Furnace Exploded at French Nuke Processing Facility, 1 Killed, 4 Injured, No Leak

or so they say for now. The facility is just outside Marseilles. The French Safety Authority has already declared the event as "closed" as of 4:56PM French Time.

First, from Reuters (9/12/2011):

(Reuters) - An explosion in a furnace at the Marcoule nuclear waste treatment site in southern France Monday killed one person, but there was no leak of radioactive material outside the site, officials said.

Four people were injured, one with serious burns, in the blast at the Centraco site, owned by French power utility EDF and adjacent to the Marcoule nuclear research center. The Centraco site does not house any nuclear reactors.

Fatalities in accidents at active nuclear sites in France are extremely rare, although deaths occasionally occur during plant construction.

Monday's blast comes amid heightened safety concerns in the wake of Japan's Fukushima disaster in March.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, said it was seeking information from France about the explosion and had activated its incident and emergency center.

France's ASN nuclear safety watchdog said it was launching an inquiry into the cause of the explosion at 13:06 p.m. (1106 GMT) that hit shares in EDF, France's main power utility.

EDF said the blast was contained within the furnace, which is used to melt waste with levels of radioactivity ranging from low to very low.

"There was an explosion at the site of Marcoule at 13:06 p.m. causing one death and four injured," an EDF spokeswoman said. "We don't know the cause," she added.

STRESS TESTS

Local emergency services said there were no traces of radioactivity on the four people injured.

"The risk of fire is over and there is no radioactive or chemical contamination of either the interior or exterior of the site," a rescue worker said.

Police also said there was no contamination outside the Centraco complex, in operation since 1999.

The Centraco site is next to the town of Codolet in the Gard region, about 30 km (18 miles) from the city of Avignon and about 80 km from the Mediterranean coast.

The complex, employing some 350 people, processes scrap metal such as valves and pumps used in nuclear plant operations in a melting plant and also burns combustible waste in an incinerating plant, according to Centraco's website.

France -- the world's most nuclear-reliant country -- is carrying out stress tests on its 58 nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster when the Japanese nuclear site was damaged in an earthquake and tsunami.

EDF shares, listed since late 2005, extended an earlier 3 percent loss to sink 6 percent in heavy volume, briefly touching a lifetime low of 17.89 euros. The stock later stabilised down 5 percent at 18.5 euros.

In its 2010 annual report, the ASN says that in 2008 it identified some weak spots in the Centraco site, operated by EDF subsidiary Socodei, that prompted it to ask Centraco to put forward an action plan to improve safety. It said the situation had improved since then at the site.

Malcolm Sperrin, director of Medical Physics and Clinical Engineering at the Royal Berkshire Hospital in Reading, England said: "The French authorities are highly competent at disaster management and also in the implementation of safe practice in all industrial environments.

"It is unlikely that there will be significant, or any, releases of radiation into the wider environment but this will need to be confirmed in the next few hours or days."

The announcement by the French Safety Authority (ASN) says "End of the event":

The event that occurred this morning in Centraco, nuclear installation located near Marcoule site (Gard) is considered as closed.

The explosion of a furnace dedicated for the melting of the metallic radioactive waste triggered a fire that ended at 13h00 (11.00 UTC)

The building where the explosion occurred was not damaged. Injured people do not suffer from any radiological contamination and all measures conducted by the licensee outside of the building have shown no trace of radioactive contamination.

One worker died and 4 others have sustained injuries, one of whom suffered deep burns.

This event does not involve any radiological issue and no protective actions was required for the population.

ASN, the French Nuclear Safety Authority, has suspended its emergency organization; ASN is still in permanent contact with the prefecture of Gard and the licensee Socodei. ASN will conduct dedicated inspections in liaison with Labour inspection in order to analyse the reasons of the accident.

Centraco is owned by SOCODEI. The installation is dedicated to the treatment and conditioning of low level radioactive waste, either by melting of metallic waste or by incineration of incinerable waste.

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