#Fukushima's "Lesson" Learned Well by the Japanese Government: Don't Plan for Core Melt, Don't Train, Don't Alarm Residents

The first Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Training since the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident was being planned last year. What did the national government assume in an nuclear accident, now that they had supposedly learned the "lessons" from the Fukushima accident?

Why, eliminate the situations like "core melt" (meltdown), of course! We cannot alarm the public, can we?

From Kyodo News (6/30/2012; emphasis is mine):

国の訓練想定「炉心溶融なし」　原発事故後、「不安増長」と

Assumption by the national government on [Nuclear Emergency Preparedness] training: "No core melt", as it would "increase uneasiness" after the nuclear accident.

東京電力福島第１原発事故後、初となる国の原子力総合防災訓練について、計画作りを指示された原子力安全基盤機構が「最悪ケースの想定は避ける」として、福島事故で起きた炉心溶融（メルトダウン）を除外するなどの方針をまとめていたことが３０日、分かった。共同通信が情報公開請求で計画案を入手した。

It was discovered on June 30 that the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) had drafted the plan for the National Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Training [last year] that would exclude the possibility of core meltdown as had happened in the Fukushima nuclear accident and avoid assumption of the worst-case scenario. JNES had been instructed to draft the plan [by the national government]. Kyodo News obtained the draft plan with the freedom of information request.

「地域住民の不安を増長する」という理由。一方で、福島事故で役立たなかった対応拠点施設（オフサイトセンター）が一定段階から本格的に機能すると想定していた。

[The reason for excluding "core melt"] was because it would increase uneasiness among the local residents. In the meantime, the plan assumed the Off-Site Centers, which didn't work in the Fukushima nuclear accident, would be functioning fully after a certain period of time.

同機構は、経済産業省原子力安全・保安院の安全規制を実務面で支援。保安院の指示で２０１１年度訓練の計画案を作成した。

JNES supports the practical aspect of safety regulations by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. It drafted the plan for the Training for the fiscal 2011 under the instruction from NISA.

More than not assuming the core melt, the fully-functioning Off-Site Centers triggered a belly laugh from me.

Here's the list of all the Off-Site Centers, at NISA's site. By design, they are located within the 20-kilometer radius from the respective nuclear power plants or nuclear facilities.

The Off-Site Center for Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant was only 5 kilometers away from the plant, and didn't even have the maps of the areas outside the 10-kilometer radius from the plant. It didn't have air filters to block radioactive materials either.

The Off-Site Center for Ooi Nuclear Power Plant (which has been having a series of seemingly minor problems indicative of deferred or sloppy maintenance) is 7 kilometers away from the plant, and the only way to access the plant is by one road.

Japan is very ill-suited to operate a nuclear power plant, and it is not the matter of technology.

(Neither is India, if workers got sick drinking tritium-laced water from a water cooler... I wonder how much removed the water was from the source of tritium...)

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