Plant Manager at #Fukushima I NPP on Highly Contaminated Water Routed to Wrong Buildings: "We Will Make Pump Switches Tamper-Proof"

Mr. Akira Ono, current plant manager at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, hasn't struck me as one of the brightest at TEPCO, but his "solution" to the problem defeats the whole purpose of having the temporary pumps in those buildings - which is to make those pumps readily accessible and operational in case of an emergency that necessitates those pumps.

From Reuters Japan (4/17/2014; part):

東電は１４日、汚染水の誤移送を発表したが、その中で通常は「切」にしている移送ポンプの電源が入ったことが直接の原因だと説明した。小野所長は記者団に対し「電源が何らかの形で入ったのは事実。調査を進めて対策を講じる」と述べた。

TEPCO announced on April 14 that contaminated water had been routed to wrong buildings, and explained the cause as the transfer pumps having been turned on. The pumps usually remain "off". Plant Manager Ono told the press that it was true that the pumps had been turned on for some reason, and that TEPCO would investigate and come up with countermeasures.

電源が入ったのが誤操作によるものではなく、故意による可能性も現状では排除できない。小野氏は「故意にでも、いじれないような管理体制にしたい」と述べた。

As it stands, the possibility cannot be excluded that someone had turned on the pumps not by mistake but intentionally. Mr. Ono said he would like to set up a control system whereby no one can tamper with [the pump switches].

Reuters has the English article (4/17/2014) that pretty much covers what Reuters Japan's article covers, but Ono's above comment is missing. Instead, it has Ono's comment that TEPCO has put speed first, instead of quality.

Well, as if it had a choice back in March and April in 2011.

Reuters' English article also translated the following words by Mr. Ono:

「恥ずかしい話。十分に管理できていない」

(My translation would be: "I am ashamed. We haven't been able to sufficiently manage the plant.")

into:

"It's embarrassing to admit, but there are certain parts of the site where we don't have full control," Akira Ono told reporters touring the plant this week.

which is quoted by other US media (including MSNBC), with the emphasis (naturally) on "we don't have full control."

As a Japanese native, I wouldn't have translated Mr. Ono's words that way, but everyone needs extra eyeballs...

Tweet

#Fukushima I NPP: Highly Contaminated Water from Turbine Buildings Routed to Wrong Buildings, and the Reason May Not Be What You Think

In fact, one of the long-time workers who tweet from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, "Sunny", seems to suspect a 'foul play'.

When I first read the document TEPCO submitted to Nuclear Regulation Authority regarding this incident two days ago, I simply could not comprehend. After reading equally incomprehensible accounts by the mainstream newspapers, NHK (link won't last), and TEPCO's press release (4/16/2014), I think I have finally figured it out.

Here's what seems to have happened between April 10 and April 13 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in transferring highly contaminated water from the basements of the turbine buildings which comes from the basements of the reactor buildings where core melt had happened in March 2011:

1. The water gets highly contaminated after it is injected into the reactor pressure vessels and comes in contact with the corium. The water accumulates in the basements of the reactor buildings, then it leaks into the adjacent turbine building basements.

2. From there, the water is normally routed to the Central Waste Building for storage. From the Central Waste Building, the water then goes to the cesium absorption system (either SARRY in the High-Temperature Incineration Building or Kurion in the Incineration Building) for treatment (removing cesium).

3. HOWEVER, on April 10, a temporary pump installed in the Central Waste Building was turned on by someone, and this highly contaminated water (Cs-134 at 10 million Bq/L, Cs-137 at 27 million Bq/L) was pumped from this building into the Site Bunker Building. There was yet another temporary pump in the Central Waste Building, and that pump was also turned on by someone. The contaminated water started to be pumped into the Incineration Building, which is not supposed to store this highly contaminated water.

4. There were two temporary pumps in the Incineration Building itself, which were also turned on by someone, and they started pumping the contaminated water back into the Central Waste Building.

To sum up, highly contaminated water went from:

Central Waste Building --> On-Site Bunker Building
Central Waste Building --> Incineration Building --> Central Waste Building

(From TEPCO's press release 4/16/2014, English labels are by me)

As all these were happening, TEPCO kept wondering why the water level in the Central Waste Building was lower than it should, and the water level in the Site Bunker Building was higher than it should. In the early morning of April 13, TEPCO finally figured out that the temporary pumps were running, but it took them nearly 12 hours to finally stopped the pumps (from TEPCO's press release 6/16/2014, timeline on page 3).

By then, 200 tonnes of highly contaminated water was diverted to locations that shouldn't have received any such water.

TEPCO says it didn't occur to them to check those temporary pumps sooner, because they were not supposed to be on.

There was nothing mechanically wrong with the temporary pumps, according to TEPCO.

"Sunny" at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant tweeted:

今回の焼却工作建屋の件、ヒューマンエラーではないだろう。つまり、故意に誰かがやった。

It is probably not a human error. In other words, someone did it on purpose.

Then,

間違いないな。「意図のある操作」だ。

I'm convinced. It was "intentional".

Just like in the incident in February this year when the "wrong" valve was opened to let the highly contaminated (beta nuclides) waste water overflow from the top of the tank, TEPCO says it is investigating. Just like then, it is likely that the investigation will fail to identify the cause (or the culprit), and TEPCO will simply stop the investigation.

I tweeted and wondered if this was an act of sabotage. With shortage of workers at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, there may be workers who go there for the express purpose of "making the point" - in this case, and in the case in February, to show how vulnerable and dangerous the plant is - by actually causing the problems like this.

But this is a country where a 30-year-old so-called researcher can appear in front of the cameras and shed tears carefully (not to smear her perfect makeup) and insist it was an innocent mistake, and male so-called journalists and even scientists fall for her and forgive her for her fraud of faking the data in the doctoral thesis and the paper in the so-called peer-review science magazine. This must also be an innocent mistake by an inexperienced worker who has been sent to Fukushima I NPP by a yakuza head-hunter and is being exploited by the subcontractor but who happens to know exactly what switches to flip to turn on the pumps that should not be on.

Tweet

#Fukushima I NPP: Multi-Nuclide Removal System (ALPS) May Be Obsolete Even Before It Starts Full Operation

TEPCO was counting on the multi-nuclide removal system ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System) to be operational in the summer of 2012, so that the only remaining radionuclide in the water going through the treatment cycle would be tritium.

The system, advertised as Toshiba's system but in fact developed by EnergySolutions based in Utah in the United States, was supposed to remove strontium and a host of other alpha, beta and gamma nuclides that still exist after cesium absorption (by SARRY and Kurion) and desalination (reverse osmosis, mostly).

The first hiccup came when Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was abolished and replaced by Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) in September 2012. NRA demanded additional safety tests of the vessels that would store highly radioactive waste after the treatment by ALPS, and hot tests were delayed. Then throughout this year, the system with three lines were on again off again in hot tests that started in March this year because of the leaks from tanks and vessels from what look like poor welds. (For ALPS problems, see my posts here.)

Then around October this year, I started to hear that there would be another set of ALPS to accelerate the treatment. But then in November, I read a magazine article in which a researcher said the current ALPS was not capable of effectively removing strontium, and an entirely new system needed to be developed.

Then finally I found this document (PDF) in the website of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (who continues to be in charge of promoting the nuclear energy and for reasons unknown to me in charge of dealing with contaminated water at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant):

The first meeting of a task force for a high performance multi-nuclide removal system

November 29, 2013

prepared by Tokyo Electric Power Company, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, and Toshiba

This document (available only in Japanese) is from the first meeting of the task force on November 29, 2013 at METI. I believe it was a closed meeting, and there was no news coverage as far as I know.

The presentation is, as often the case with TEPCO's, a fine example of how not to make a presentation as each page is jammed with information some of which does not belong on the page. So I'm doing my best to piece together a cohesive story here.

First, this is the current ALPS system, in trial hot runs at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant:

(From TEPCO's 3/29/2013 presentation in English)

Take note of the "Pretreatment Facilities", made up of iron coprecipitation and carbonate coprecipitation systems, and producing highly contaminated slurry as waste product to be stored in the "high integrity containers (HIC)" (I believe it was these containers that NRA wanted tested for integrity by dropping from height).

Now, it turns out that this pretreatment system produces too much waste product, according to the document at METI (English translation is mine):

"Estimated total waste product from the existing system is 2,300m3 annually (800 High Integrity Containers), 95% of which is the slurry from pretreatment (iron coprecipitation and carbonate coprecipitation)."

and

"In order to reduce waste product, we need to develop a radionuclide removal process that does not use iron coprecipitation and carbonate coprecipitation but is able to remove radionuclides as well as, or better than, the existing system."

Uh oh. After paying Toshiba and Kajima (construction) a ton of money to build a huge system (see the photos below) that is not even in full operation yet, they need a new one because the current one produces too much waste.

What I don't understand is that they, particularly Toshiba who picked EnergySolution's technology, should have known from the very beginning that the current ALPS system would create a large amount of slurry from coprecipitation process, much like the decontamination system by AREVA that use coprecipitation process (AREVA's system was stopped and practically abandoned when too much, highly radioactive slurry was created as the waste, on top of numerous technical problems).

But wait, it is not just about the amount of toxic waste that the existing ALPS is not performing to expectations. It's also about how it removes radionuclides.

From the document at METI, TEPCO/Toshiba(/Hitachi-GE) thought radionuclides, particularly cesium and strontium, existed in the contaminated water as "ions" at the time when the current ALPS system was being designed. However, it turns out that the nuclides exist in the contaminated water mostly as "colloids" and "particulates", not "ions". The existing ALPS system is fitted with ion-exchange media from the Finnish company Fortum. Uh Oh.

More than 93% of cesium-137 in the post-RO (reverse osmosis for desalination) waste water exists as "colloids", less than 2% as "ions" and 5% as "particulates".

59% of all beta (strontium-89, -90, Y-90) exists as "colloids", 37% as "particulates", and 4% as "ions".

The existing absorption materials (in vessels) can only remove these nuclides in "ion" form. The nuclides in "colloids" and "particulates" are removed by the pretreatment process, thus the large amount of slurry waste.

So now, after two full years of building and testing the ALPS, it is obsolete even before it reaches full operation.

At least this was on TEPCO's own money, not the taxpayers' money, though I feel sorry for the workers made to work in a high-radiation environment.

ALPS (photo taken on September 16, 2012):

housed in :

Tweet

#Fukushima I NPP: 63,000 Bq/L of All-Beta One Day, ND the Next Day, All Thanks to TEPCO's Mix-Up (Literally)

The news yesterday (12/16/2013) was that 63,000 Bq/Liter of all-beta that includes strontium-90 was detected in the groundwater sample from an observation hole right on the embankment near the open channel in the plant harbor. The fear was that the groundwater high in all-beta, well exceeding the TEPCO's in-house limit of 10 Bq/L for strontium, was leaking unchecked into the harbor, because the in-the-ground impermeable waterglass wall is not in place at this particular observation hole.

This sudden spike made no sense, as this observation hole, No. 0-3-2, had never had such a high number for all-beta - for that matter, not even for gamma nuclides (cesium).

Then the next day it all made sense. At some point between the collection of the samples and the measurement, TEPCO managed to mix up the sample from the hole No. 0-3-2 with the sample from the hole No. 1-16, which was found with 1,700,000 Bq/L of all-beta on the same December 16, 2013.

Another example of the deteriorating quality of the workers at the plant, AND of the managers who are supposed to train and oversee the workers.

From TEPCO's handout for the press, 12/17/2013 (English labels are by me):

Now, an interesting question is: Where is the groundwater that is sampled at the hole No. 1-16 coming from?

Note that the amount of radioactive cesium is below detection levels (2.8 Bq/L for cesium-134, 1.5 Bq/L for cesium-137), but all-beta (at least half of it is strontium-90) is 1.7 million Bq/L.

At first, I thought this water may be coming either from the leaky tanks that store waste water after cesium absorption and desalination (reverse osmosis), or the tanks that store treated waters, as that would explain the lack of cesium and abundance of all-beta.

Then, on close examination of the numbers for all-beta (see the table; click to enlarge),

• Water sample from the hole No. 1-16: 1,700,000 Bq/L

• Treated water (after cesium absorption and desalination): 19,000 Bq/L (8/9/2013)

• Waste water (after cesium absorption and desalination): 75,000,000 Bq/L (8/9/2013)

The water from the hole No.1-16 contains too much all-beta if it comes from treated water tanks, and contains too little all-beta if it comes from waste water tanks that are leaky. Besides, both treated water and waste water do contain radioactive cesium above the detection limit.

So my brilliant idea is not so brilliant after all, but there is one another, more likely possibility (h/t Kontan_Bigcat).

The water that is finding its way to the hole No. 1-16 may have come from the trenches, either from Reactor 2 or Reactor 3, and filled with the highly contaminated water from April/May of 2011 when the water leaked from the reactor buildings into the turbine buildings after it cooled the broken reactors then into the ocean via the trenches that connect the turbine buildings and water intakes at the embankment.

The reason for the non-detectable levels of radioactive cesium may be that radioactive cesium has been absorbed by the dirt/soil after two years and 9 months.

Whether or not this trench water has been leaking has been discussed at the meetings of Nuclear Regulation Authority, which usually end with one or more commissioners and/or experts scratching their heads at TEPCO's non-explanation. But as this blog wrote in July this year, detection of significant amounts of radioactive materials along the embankment started right after TEPCO started driving the sheet piles into the embankment and into the sea floor of the open culvert in the plant harbor in April in its effort to "stop" the groundwater from flowing into the harbor.

Looking at the cesium content of the trench water (7/31/2013 post) as of 7/31/2013, it is not likely that this water is currently leaking from the trench into the surrounding soil (cesium content is too low in the sample water from the observation holes).

Tweet

For Japanese Politicians, Contaminated Water Leak at #Fukushima Is All About "Who to Blame" (Other Than Themselves, Of Course)

Now that the 2020 Summer Olympic is in the bag, Japanese politicians have resumed the blame game instead of actually trying to solve the problems of contaminated water storage and leaks at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.

DPJ politicians are afraid of being criticized for their (lack of) response to the nuclear accident when they were in power. LDP politicians are afraid of being criticized for their (lack of) response to the nuclear accident now. But they can both criticize Ministry of Economy and Trade and Industry. So let's do that...

From Yomiuri Shinbun (9/8/2013; part):

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の汚染水問題を巡る国会審議の日程が、与野党の駆け引きに翻弄されている。

Scheduling of the debate in the National Diet over the contaminated water problems at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant is going nowhere because of political bargaining.

民主党は政府の対応を追及しようと閉会中審査の開催を求めるが、政権担当時の汚染水対応への負い目からか、腰が定まらない。一方の自民党にも政府への不満がくすぶっており、審査日程が決まる見通しは立っていない。

Democratic Party of Japan demands an "inspection while the Diet is not in session" [a special Diet procedure] in order to press on the government's response, but the party's effort lacks determination perhaps due to its own response to contaminated water while it was in charge of the government. On the other hand, there is a smouldering discontent inside Liberal Democratic Party over the government response, and there is no prospect that the date is set any time soon.

閉会中審査は、民主党の海江田代表が８月２６日の記者会見で求めた。これを受け、同３０日の衆院経済産業委員会理事懇談会で、民主党側が９月中旬までの開催を要求。だが、自民党が「政府の対応を見たうえで検討したい」と回答すると、民主党もこれをすんなりと受け入れた。

Head of DPJ Kaieda requested an "inspection while the Diet is not in cession" during his August 26 press conference. On August 30 during the informal gathering of the Lower House Economy and Industry Committee members, DPJ members requested that the "inspection" be started by the middle of September. However, they readily accepted the response from LDP that they would consider it after how the government responds.

...　民主党のちぐはぐな対応の背景には、自らの政権時代の対応を逆に批判されかねないとの懸念がある。海江田氏は６日、「民主党もただ単にケチをつけるのではなく、政権与党にあった時代の事故に対して大きな責任がある」と述べており、政府を攻めあぐねる展開も予想される。

Behind DPJ's inconsistent attitude is the fear that their own handling of the problems when they were in charge of the government may be criticized. Mr. Kaieda said on September 6 that "DPJ cannot just criticize LDP, as it shares a large responsibility for the accident that happened when the party was the ruling party". They may not be able to effectively attack the government on the issue.

一方の自民党も一枚岩ではない。政府の汚染水対策を議論した４日の経済産業部会などの合同会議では、出席議員から「今回の問題は経産省にある。今度（汚染水問題が）起こったら経産相が責任を取るということでいいのか」と批判の声が上がった。

On the other hand, LDP does not have monolithic solidarity either. In the meeting on September 4 to discuss the government response to the contaminated water problems, there were members of the Diet who criticized METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) saying "METI is the cause of the current problems. If it (contaminated water problem) happens again, are we correct in assuming Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will take responsibility [and resign]?"

Where have I heard something similar just recently? Oh yes, about Tokay Reprocessing Plant and its highly radioactive liquid waste and plutonium. NRA Commissioner Oshima, who is from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, just wanted to know if Ministry of Education would be held responsible, instead of being interested in understanding the situation and coming up with the solution.

While I wholeheartedly agree that METI is the cause of the current and past problems regarding the nuclear plant (most recently a METI career bureaucrat with his "assumption" about 300 tonnes of "contaminated water" into the ocean every day), it is just tired old déjà vu of politicians whose only interest is to cover their behind, whether they are DPJ politicians or LDP ones.

What's amazing to me personally is that after nearly two and a half years of abysmal track record of the national government when it comes to dealing with the nuclear accident and its aftermath (contamination, decontamination, compensating the victims, monitoring, etc.), many Japanese are still looking longingly to the national government for magical solutions.

"TEPCO cannot be trusted!" they say. But somehow they can still trust their government.

Soaring Nikkei index does wonders. It is up more than 300 points today, as investors celebrate 2020 Tokyo Olympic by buying up the stocks of construction companies and real estate companies.

Tweet

What's in the RO Waste Water at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant?

Lots of all-beta (that includes strontium), tritium, but not so much cesium or gamma emitters.

But first, let's do the quick recap of the water treatment system at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant that has been operational since mid 2011:

1. Water (filtered water + treated water) is injected into the reactors to cool the corium.

2. Water gets highly contaminated with radioactive materials from the corium, accumulates in the basements of the reactor buildings and turbine buildings which are connected.

3. Highly contaminated water get somewhat diluted by the groundwater seeping in (400 tonnes a day).

4. The water is then transported from the turbine building basements to either Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility or High Temperature Incinerator Building, which have been converted to storage of contaminated water.

5. From these buildings, the water is transported to Cesium Absorption Apparatus (which is currently Toshiba's SARRY only; Kurion's system has been off-line for a long time now, and AREVA's co-precipitation decontamination system is not used anymore). Most of radioactive cesium is removed by this process, from tens of thousands of becquerels per cubic centimeter to ND or close to ND. This water still contains high tritium and high all-beta. It also contains chloride, from the seawater injection in the early days of the accident in 2011.

6. The water treated at SARRY then undergoes desalination process, using Reverse Osmosis Apparatus to remove chloride. (Evaporative Concentration System, another desalination process, is not currently used.)

7. After being treated by Reverse Osmosis Apparatus, the water, though still high in tritium and containing all-beta (which cannot be removed at this point, as ALPS has been halted and there is no effective way to remove tritium), is mixed with filtered river water, and gets injected into the reactor.

8. The waste water after reverse osmosis process, high in chloride and high in all-beta and tritium, is stored in the tanks (assembled metal tanks or welded tanks), and this is the water that is found leaking from the tank(s) this time.

Here's the latest nuclide analysis of water at different stages of water treatment, published on August 8, 2013. No.8 water (in red rectangle) is the RO waste water:

Gamma
Cs-134: 1.1E+00, or 1.1 Bq/cm3
Cs-137: 2.7E+00, or 2.7 Bq/cm3
Sb-125: 3.0E+01, or 30 Bq/cm3

Tritium: 7.7E+02, or 770 Bq/cm3
All-beta: 7.5E+04, or 75,000 Bq/cm3

Tweet

(UPDATED with Diagrams) Real Leak of at Least 300 Tonnes of Really Highly Contaminated Water at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant, and Leak Continues

(8/21/2013 New post with two potentially big problems, uploaded.)

==================

As the world's mainstream media and alternative media suddenly rediscover Fukushima I Nuke Plant over the "assumption" by a career bureaucrat at Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (whose Agency of Natural Resources and Energy oversees the decommissioning of the plant) that "300 tonnes of highly contaminated [sic] water" may be leaking every day, a real leak of actual waste water with extremely high beta nuclides has been found.

According to TEPCO, who held an ad hoc press conference at noon on August 20, 2013, at least 300 tonnes of waste water after the cesium absorption (by SARRY) and desalination (by Reverse Osmosis Apparatus) has leaked from a huge 1,000-tonne steel tank (or two, they don't know yet), and it is likely that the waste water is STILL LEAKING as TEPCO hasn't been able to identify the location of the leak(s).

Information about the leak, from Jiji Tsushin (8/20/2013), TEPCO's press conference on 8/20/2013 and TEPCO's handout to the press (8/20/2013):

Leak from a group of 1,000-tonne steel tanks (tank is 12 meters in diameter, 11-meter high) in the area H4 which has total 26 tanks. The location is about 500 meters from the embankment.

One of the tanks in this particular group (No.5 in the group I in H4 area, or H4-I-5) was found with the water level that was 3.4-meter lower than before.

Nature of contaminated water: waste water after cesium absorption and desalination (called by TEPCO RO water)

Estimated amount of contaminated water: 300 tonnes (300,000 liters)

Density of radioactive materials (TEPCO's announcement is in Bq/cm3, as it is highly contaminated water; Jiji Tsushin reports the number in Bq/liter):

• All-beta including strontium: 80 million Bq/L (80,000 Bq/cm3)

• Radioactive cesium: 146,000 Bq/L (146 Bq/cm3)

Most of the leaked waste water went outside the low enclosure built around the tanks. The valve is installed to drain rainwater from the enclosure, and this valve was found "open", as it shouldn't have been.

The water leaked inside the enclosure has been collected (about 4 tonnes as of 12AM on August 20, 2013). The area is being inspected every three hours, but the leak CONTINUES (or TEPCO cannot confirm that the leak has stopped, though the company seems to think it has stopped).

TEPCO hopes to empty the tank No.5 and move the RO waste water into the tanks in the nearby group B, as the tanks in group B is only about 60% full. The rest of the tank in this H4 areas are 97.8% full.

The scale of the leak is one of the largest since the start of the accident (excluding the April 2011 leak of highly contaminated water from the Reactor 2 turbine building basement).

The manufacturer's warranty of the tank is 5 years.

There is a drain nearby that goes to the ocean, but hardly any radioactive materials have been detected from the water (most likely rainwater) in the drain.

Here's how one of the tanks looks like, from the leak in June 2013 from a tank in a different area:

From TEPCO's handout for the press, 8/20/2013 (English labels are by me):

Tweet

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Freeze Soil to Block Groundwater

I can honestly say "I knew that", because that's what one of our long-time readers, netudiant, suggested some time ago.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (5/30/2013):

凍土の遮水壁で汚染水抑制…政府委が設置方針

Control contaminated water by impervious wall of frozen soil, the government committee is to request

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所で増え続ける汚染水の抜本的な抑制策として、政府の汚染水処理対策委員会（委員長・大西有三京都大名誉教授）は、建屋周辺の土壌を凍らせて地下水の流入を防ぐ「凍土の遮水壁」の設置を打ち出す方針を固めた。

As a drastic countermeasure against the contaminated water that continues to accumulate at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, the government committee on contaminated water treatment countermeasures (chairman Yuzo Onishi, professor emeritus at Kyoto University) has decided to propose the installation of the "shield wall of frozen soil", whereby the soil around the reactor buildings will be frozen in order to stop the groundwater from leaking into the buildings.

３０日の会合で最終判断し、東電に実施を求める。

The final decision will be made in the meeting on May 30, and the government will tell TEPCO to implement the plan.

同原発の建屋には、地下水が１日平均４００トンずつ流れ込み、汚染水増加の最大の要因となっている。

400 tonnes of groundwater per day are leaking into the reactor buildings, and it is the biggest contributor to increasing contaminated water.

凍土の遮水壁は、大手ゼネコンが提案した。地中に管を並べて打ち込み、管内に氷点下数十度の冷却材を循環させ、周辺の土壌を一定の深さまで凍らせる。これが、建屋内と外側との水の動きを遮断する壁となる。地下に構造物があっても大きな障害とならず、１～２年程度で設置できる。

The impervious wall of frozen soil was proposed by a large general contractor. Rows of pipes will be driven into the ground, and coolant at dozens of degrees below zero Celsius will be circulated in the pipes to freeze the soil around the pipes to a certain depth. That will become the shield that will block the movement of groundwater. Even the underground structures won't be much of an impediment, and the wall could be set up in 1 to 2 years.

コンクリート製の遮水壁を造るのと違い、凍土法は管をすべて埋設した後、一気に土壌を凍らせ、短期間で壁が完成する。このため、施工中に壁の内側で地下水が減るなどして、建屋内から放射性物質を含む汚染水が外へ漏れ出る危険は少ない。

Unlike the impervious wall made of concrete, the wall of frozen soil will be built in a short period of time by burying all the pipes and freeze the soil all at once. Therefore, there will be little danger that the contaminated water leaks out from the reactor building, as could be the case if the level of groundwater inside the wall gets lower during the construction of the concrete wall.

That large general contractor is Kajima, who has also created the unmanned debris removal system for the Reactor 3 operating floor. Kajima is famous for huge civil engineering projects like tunnels, and this method of freezing the soil is very well known to them. The other major general contractors, Taisei and Shimizu also submitted their proposals, which involved concrete walls like TEPCO has been contemplating and included a study of overseas examples of such impervious walls.

Let's see what TEPCO says, because, as "Happy", unnamed former worker and journalist Ryuichi Kino said in the AP interview, cost-saving comes first for TEPCO. This frozen soil method looks faster and cheaper than the concrete wall or underground bypass.

From TEPCO's 4/26/2013 document on "How to prevent groundwater from coming into the reactor buildings" pages 36-47 , Kajima's excellent presentation (compared to the other two):

Plane view. Surround the reactor buildings and turbine buildings of Reactors 1-4 with frozen soil wall of about 1,400 meters in circumference.

Sectional view.

How to create frozen soil wall.

How continuous wall is possible with frozen soil wall.

According to Kajima (from the presentation),

• As long as the frozen soil remain frozen, the coefficient of permeability is zero (100% block of groundwater from flowing in).

• Even if power is lost, the wall remain frozen for several months up to a year.

• The wall self-repairs.

• Small footprint for installation equipment (2x2 meters, as opposed to 15x15 for normal wall construction), easy to remove.

• There is very little contaminated soil resulting from the construction of the wall.

• Construction of frozen soil wall won't interrupt decommission work
  

• By regularly replacing the coolant and pipes, the wall can be used for a very long time.




• Remote monitoring of temperature is possible.




• Continuous wall is possible.

Almost too good to be true!

Tweet

Groundwater Pump and Release from #Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Fukushima Fishermen Want Safety Assurance from Government, and Goverment Is Set to Give That Assurance

Another reason for TEPCO's shares jumping 18% in the morning session at Tokyo Stock Exchange is this:

TEPCO may get to release groundwater into the ocean soon.

From Jiji Tsushin (5/14/2013):

茂木敏充経済産業相は１４日の閣議後記者会見で、東京電力による福島第１原発の地下水放出が地元の懸念から先送りになったことについて、「関係者の了解を得ることが前提であり、国としても説明を尽くしていきたい」と述べた。地下水の放出については、汚染水抑制の観点から「極めて重要だ」と指摘した。

Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshimitsu Motegi commented in the press conference after the cabinet meeting on May 14 on the release of groundwater from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant [to the ocean] which has been postponed because of the concern from the locals, and said, "Obtaining the approval from those involved would be the prerequisite, and the national government will do its best to explain [to the locals]." As to the release of groundwater, he said "it is extremely important" from the standpoint of reducing the amount of contaminated water.

Why is Motegi saying this? Because that's what the Fukushima fishermen have said they need the government's assurance that the water is safe.

In other words, they will agree to the scheme as long as the national government tells them it is safe.

Trust in the government continues to run supreme in Fukushima after two years of pathetic performance by both the national government and the prefectural government when it comes to dealing with the accident and resultant contamination.

Also from Jiji Tsushin, from yesterday (5/13/2013):

福島県漁業協同組合連合会（県漁連）は１３日、同県いわき市で県漁協組合長会議を開き、東京電力が福島第１原発の汚染水増加対策として敷地内で地下水をくみ上げ、海に放出する計画について協議した。地下水は原子炉建屋で放射性物質に汚染される前の水で、東電は理解を求めたが結論は出ず、６月以降に改めて協議することになった。

The Federations of Fishery Cooperatives in Fukushima Prefecture held a meeting of the cooperatives presidents in Iwaki City in Fukushima on May 13 to discuss TEPCO's plan to draw groundwater in the plant compound and release it into the ocean as part of countermeasures against the increase of contaminated water at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The groundwater is the water before it enters the reactor buildings and gets contaminated with radioactive materials. TEPCO asked for understanding, but no agreement was reached. They will meet again in June.

　県漁連の野崎哲会長は終了後、記者団に「地下水と汚染水を混同している漁業者もいる」と述べ、さらなる説明を東電に求めた。また、国に対して「（国が）了承したということを明確にしてもらわないといけない」と語った。

Tetsu Nozaki, president of the Federations of Fishery Cooperatives in Fukushima Prefecture, said to the press after the meeting, "There are fishermen who are confusing the groundwater with the contaminated water", and asked for further explanation from TEPCO. He also said, "We need to know clearly that (the national government) has approved [the plan]."

　会議には県内の漁協幹部のほか、水産庁や県の担当者が出席。東電の新妻常正常務が改めて計画を説明した。東電は安全性に問題はないとしているが、漁業者から風評被害を懸念する声が上がっている。

The meeting was attended by the senior members of the Fishery Cooperatives in Fukushima and the officials from the Fisheries Agency and Fukushima prefectural government. TEPCO's executive director Tsunemasa Niizuma explained the plan. There is no problem with safety, according to TEPCO, but fishermen are worried about damages from baseless rumors.

There you go. For the mayor of Iwaki City, his out is that he objects to the release of groundwater "at this point" (see my previous post on the topic). For the Fukushima fishermen, as long as the national government vouches for the safety of the water released, they will be OK with the plan. Just blame the fickle and ignorant consumers, as they've been doing for the past two years.

TEPCO seems to be trying to keep the water level in the reactor building basements at about O.P. (Onahama Peil) +3000 (or three meters above the standard sea level used for the plant), so that it is groundwater that's flowing into the basement instead of highly contaminated water flowing out of the basement.

Judging by the high, and increasing bioconcentration of radioactive materials in the fish inside the plant harbor, contaminated water from somewhere may be already leaking into the ocean anyway. That news died quickly.

Now with this cleaner water dump, TEPCO may be able to hasten the dilution of radioactive materials in the harbor.

Tweet

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO to Release 'Uncontaminated' Groundwater to Pacific Ocean, Starting Later This Month

Here we go. TEPCO plans to discharge water from the wells that they have dug to intercept part of the groundwater before it leaks into the reactor buildings, into the Pacific Ocean.

400 tonnes of groundwater go into the basements of the reactor buildings every day. The 14 wells to intercept that water can only divert about one-quarter of it. It is better than no diversion, but not by much.

TEPCO has been laying the pipes to transport the water from the wells to the ocean.

As a measure to decrease the amount of groundwater going into the reactor building, this is not much of a help, but it is precedent-making. Discharge of groundwater into the Pacific Ocean, albeit supposedly uncontaminated water for now, may start as soon as this month, with the local fishing industry set to approve the plan.

The TEPCO's true desire is no secret: to discharge water treated by ALPS (multi-nuclide removal system), clean of almost all radionuclides except for tritium, which there is no effective way to remove.

From Kahoku Shinpo (5/8/2013):

福島原発地下水、月内にも海へ　東電「安全性問題ない」

Groundwater at Fukushima I Nuke Plant to be discharged to the ocean this month, TEPCO says "No safety problem"

東京電力は福島第１原発の放射能汚染水対策として、敷地内でくみ上げた地下水を海に放出する方針を固めた。「汚染前の水で安全性に問題はない」とし、地元市町村や漁業関係者の了承を得て５月中にも踏み切る。

TEPCO plans to release the groundwater drawn from the wells inside the plant compound into the ocean, as part of the measures to deal with water contaminated with radioactive materials at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. According to TEPCO, the groundwater is not contaminated as the water is drawn before it gets contaminated, and there is no problem of safety. After obtaining the approval from the local municipalities and fishing industry, the company will start [releasing the water] before May is over.

構内では大量の地下水が１～４号機の原子炉建屋に流れ込み、原子炉冷却水と混ざって１日約４００トンの放射能汚染水がたまり続けている。放水対象は建屋に流入する前にポンプでくみ上げた地下水で、「放射性セシウム１３７の濃度は１リットル当たり１ベクレル以下で通常の地下水と変わらない」（東電）としている。

A large amount of groundwater leaks into the reactor buildings of Reactors 1-4, which then mixes with the reactor cooling water to generate about 400 tonnes of contaminated water per day. The water to be released into the ocean is the groundwater that is drawn by pumps [into the wells] before it reaches the reactor buildings, and according to TEPCO, "Density of cesium-137 is less than 1 Bq/liter, and it is no different from normal groundwater."

東電は１３日の福島県漁連の組合長会議で方針を伝え、理解を求める。県漁連は「注意深く水質検査しながら行ってほしい」（野崎哲会長）と承認する考えだ。

TEPCO will announce the plan on May 13 at a meeting of the heads of the Federations of Fishery Cooperatives in Fukushima Prefecture, and try to win their understanding. The Federations' president (Tetsu Nozaki) is set to approve the plan, as he says "We would like [TEPCO] to proceed by carefully testing the water [for radioactive materials]."

渡辺敬夫いわき市長は「東電が『汚染されていない』と言っても消費者は理解してくれるのか。現時点では承知できない」と話した。

Takao Watanabe, Mayor of Iwaki City, says "Will consumers accept TEPCO's word that "it is not contaminated"? I cannot approve [the plan] at this point."

"At this point" is the key for Mayor Watanabe. He is free to change his opinion on May 13, or any other day. He can also join other mayors and farmers and fishermen in Fukushima Prefecture in crying "baseless rumors" by ignorant consumers.

Tweet

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Pond Leak of April 2013: All 7 In-the-Ground Water Storage Ponds Are Leaking Radioactive (Beta) Water

Jiji Tsushin (4/13/2013) says TEPCO has reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority that the in-the-ground water storage pond No.1 is indeed leaking into the surrounding soil.

TEPCO's handout for the press on April 13, 2013 shows that beta nuclides are being detected in the water taken from either the drains or the leak detection pipes or both in not only the ponds Nos 1, 2, 3 but all seven of these in-the-ground storage ponds:

(Click to enlarge)

The top table is for the sampled water from the drain holes, which are placed outside the bottom bentonite layer.

From the presentation material by TEPCO's President (4/10/2013), Page 7:

Confusing information about which pond had the highly contaminated waste water after the Reverse Osmosis (RO) treatment. Ponds Nos 1, 2, 3 have them for certain, and Pond No.6, I think. According to the TEPCO president presentation, Pond No.5 (capacity 2,000 tonnes) and Pond No.7 (capacity 4,000 tonnes) were empty.

Tweet

(UPDATED) Latest on #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Waste Water Pond Leaks: Pump Is Also Leaking, 22 Liters With 6.38 Billion Bq of All Beta

And the latest from TEPCO on April 11, 2013 in the email notice to the press No.35:

地下貯水槽No.3からNo.6への移送について、４月11日午後２時から移送を開始いたしましたが、同日午後２時３分に移送ポンプ出口配管の接続部（フランジ部）より漏えいが確認されたことから、同時刻に移送ポンプを停止いたしました。

Transfer of waste water from the in-the-ground water storage pond No.3 to the pond No.6 started at 2PM on April 11, but a leak was found at the flange of the pipe of the transfer pump at 2:03PM, so we stopped the pump.

漏えいについては、移送ポンプを停止したことにより停止しております。また、漏えいした水は、土中に染み込んでおります。

The leak stopped when the pump was stopped. The leaked water was soaked into the soil.

And No.37:

地下貯水槽No.3からNo.6への移送中に発生した水漏れについて、移送ポンプ出口配管の接続部（フランジ部）からの漏えいの原因調査のため、配管フランジの分解をおこないます。

We will disassemble the flange to investigate the leak that occurred during the transfer of waste water from the pond No.3 to the pond No.6.

また、漏えい水が滴下して染みこんだと思われる地下貯水槽上部覆土（盛土）の除去作業を開始いたします。

We will also start removing the soil that covers the top part of the water storage pond where the leaked water may have dripped.

The water contains 290,000 Bq/cm3 of all beta (mostly strontium), and 22 liters of this water leaked, as TEPCO's email notice No.36 confirms. That would be 6.38 billion becquerels of all beta (290,000 x 1000 x 22). Who is going to disassemble the flange and remove the dirt? TEPCO's president? One of Mr. Abe's ministers who frequent the plant for photo-ops?

They are having another press conference starting at any moment now (scheduled to start at 6PM local time).

Flange that leaked, from TEPCO's photos and videos library 4/11/2013:

TEPCO's Ono says the pump was never tested with running water. (UPDATE 4/14/2013) Ono in fact said during the press conference that the company sort of tested, by making sure the bolts were tightened to the specification, and that, by definition, was safety testing.

Tweet

4/11/2011 Update on In-the-Ground Storage Pond Leaks at #Fukushima I Nuke Plant: How The Ponds Were Constructed the Same Way as Solid Waste Disposal Sites

In the TEPCO's handout detailing the in-the-ground water storage ponds at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant that the company started to use to store extremely radioactive (beta, potentially 2 sieverts/hour) and saline waste water after the Reverse Osmosis (desalination) treatment, there was this diagram (click to enlarge):

Independent journalist Ryuichi Kino often asks questions that visibly irk the TEPCO spokesman, and he asked one such question in the press conference on April 10, 2013 as I watched live:

"So these ponds are constructed in the same way as a controlled final landfill site. Why? A controlled final landfill site is not meant to be waterproof. Why didn't you choose a covered final landfill site with concrete foundation, at least?"

There was no answer from the TEPCO spokesman other than to mumble they had their own reasons. I didn't hear any other reporter ask questions about the construction of the ponds.

Kino also reports that the company who supplied the polyethylene sheets says they are not responsible for the degradation due to radiation.

Here's Asahi Shinbun Fukushima local version (4/11/2013; part), inspired perhaps by Kino's questions:

第一原発地下貯水槽　ごみ処分場と構造同じ
●専門家「漏出は防げない」

In-the-ground water storage ponds at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant are constructed like a garbage disposal site. Experts say "They cannot prevent leaks."

福島第一原発で相次いで汚染水漏れを起こした地下貯水槽の基本構造は、遮水シートを使った「管理型」と呼ばれるごみ処分場と同じだったことが、東京電力の説明で分かった。その構造について、専門家からは「ごみ処分場の水準から見てもお粗末だ」などと厳しい批判が上がっている。

It has been revealed by the explanation given by TEPCO that the basic structure of the in-the-ground water storage ponds which leaked one after another at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant is the same as a type of waste disposal site called "controlled landfill site" using waterproof sheets. Experts heavily criticize the structure, as "badly made even from the standard of a waste disposal site".

東電によると、貯水槽は地面に穴を掘り、一番下に粘土を布で包んだベントナイトシートを張り、その上に２重の遮水シートを敷いた構造。「厳重な品質管理をしていた」と強調する。

According to TEPCO, these ponds were made by first digging holes in the ground, laying the bentonite sheet first and then two layers of waterproof sheets. TEPCO emphasizes they were doing the strict quality control.

この構造について、日本環境学会前会長の畑明郎・元大阪市大教授は「ため池にシートを敷いて汚染水をためているようなもの。近年の処分場ではあり得ないお粗末さだ。考え方自体が間違っている」とあきれる。その上で「一定の漏出は防ぐことができない。漏れることを前提に造るのが常識で、漏れてもすぐ分かる地上型ステンレスタンクにすべきだ」と提案する。

Commenting on this structure, Akio Hata, former chairman of the Japan Association on the Environmental Studies and former professor at Osaka City University, says, "It is as if you lay sheets in a pond to store contaminated water. It is impossibly pathetic considering the recent standard of disposal sites. It's wrong to even think about [using such a structure]." He suggests, "You cannot prevent all leaks. So you build a structure on the assumption that it will leak. It should be the above-ground, stainless-steel tank so that a leak can be detected easily."

放射性ストロンチウムなどを含む高濃度汚染水を地下貯水槽にためることは、原子力規制委員会の前身の旧原子力安全・保安院が昨年８月、了承している。しかし、どういう構造の施設ならば安全を担保できるかについては、法に基づく明確な審査基準もない。

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the regulatory agency overseeing TEPCO before the Nuclear Regulatory Authority was set up, approved the plan in August 2012 to store the highly contaminated water that contained radioactive strontium and other nuclides in the in-the-ground water storage ponds. However, there is no clear legal standard for examining what type of structure would secure the safety.

Needless to say, there was no expert at NISA who knew anything about waste management. NISA took TEPCO at their word and approved the plan.

The ponds were designed and speced by TEPCO and built by Maeda Construction, who has already said such a structure is used for solid waste storage not liquid.

During the April 9, 2013 press conference, TEPCO's spokesman Mr. Ono uttered a convoluted sentence regarding the delay in announcing the leaks:

漏洩していないとは思わないが、漏洩をしているという疑いは否定できない

"We don't think it is not leaking, but we cannot deny the doubt that it may be leaking."

Got that? In other words, TEPCO tried very hard to find other reasons first that may be contributing to higher chloride concentration or radioactive materials in the sampled water.

Tweet

4/10/2013 Update on Never-Ending Pond Leak Story out of #Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Radioactive Materials Found Outside the Liners

(The post will be updated as the day/night progresses...)

Let's start from the latest...　

(UPDATE) TEPCO says they will hold a press conference in J-Village from 3:30PM today (April 10) with TEPCO's president, who will explain the situation of the leak. The regular TEPCO press conference will start one hour earlier, at 4:30PM.

(UPDATE) NHK just reported that radioactive materials detected outside the liners for the pond No.1 was 0.11 Bq/cc (cm3) (or 110 Bq/liter) of radioactive strontium (and others, of course).

Just a headline from Kyodo News (11:27AM 4/10/2013):

福島第１原発の地下貯水槽の防止シート外側で微量の放射性物質が検出されたと、東京電力が発表。

TEPCO announced that a very small amount of radioactive materials has been detected outside the liners for the in-the-ground water storage.

No info on which pond, how much.

TEPCO so far has hoped that the leaks in the pond No.3 and the pond No.1 are at the locations where the leak detection pipes stick out, piercing through the HDPE layers. Unfortunately, that is not the case for the pond No.1.

Asahi Shinbun reports (4/10/2013; part):

新たに漏れが見つかったのは、１号貯水槽。これまで漏れが見つかった２、３号貯水槽のうち、２号貯水槽の汚染水の９２００トンを６日から移し替えている途中だった。

A new leak was found in the storage No.1. Leaks had been found in the storage No.2 and No.3, and 9,200 tonnes of waste water in the storage No.2 was being transported to the storage No.1 starting April 6.

東電によると、９日午前、３重構造の遮水シートの間にたまった水を調べたところ、１立方センチあたり高濃度の１万ベクレルが検出され、汚染水の漏れを確認した。

According to TEPCO, the water between the 3-layer waterproof sheets was tested in the morning of April 9, and found 10,000 becquerels/cm3 of radioactive materials which confirmed the leak of the waste water.

東電はこれまで、貯水槽の上部から漏れていると推定。満水状態にしなければ汚染水をためられるとしていた。しかし、今回漏れた１号貯水槽は５割しかたまっておらず、底に近い方のシートの継ぎ目などから漏れたことが確実となった。

So far, TEPCO had assumed that the leak was from the upper part of the storage, and insisted that they could use the storage as long as the storage was not filled to the top. However, the storage No.1 where the new leak was found was only 50% full. It is now certain that the location of the leak is near the bottom, probably from one of the joints of the liners.

Meanwhile, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority met in the morning of April 10 to discuss the leak problem, but the meeting lasted for only 30 minutes, as there is no effective way to deal with the leak.

Jiji Tsushin reports (4/10/2013; part):

会合では規制委として、汚染水を保管するタンクの増設前倒しを東電に要求することや、放射性物質を取り除く多核種除去装置の本格稼働を急ぐことなどが挙げられたが、新たに有効な対策は示されず、議論は３０分足らずで終了した。

At the meeting, they raised the issues such as demanding TEPCO to build additional storage tanks for the waste water ahead of schedule and pushing for the start of the multi-nuclide removal system [ALPS]. However, there was no effective measure [for the leak], and the meeting was over in less than 30 minutes.

規制委で事故対応を担当する更田豊志委員は「過酷な現場で作業を進めている」と述べ、現場に配慮して警告が十分できなかったと反省した。

Commissioner Toyoshi Fuketa, who is in charge of the accident response, said "The work is being carried out in an extremely harsh environment", and regretted that he could not give enough warning in consideration for the workers there.

Tweet

Latest on Ever-Changing #Fukushima I Nuke Plant In-The-Ground Water Storage Leak: Now the Pond No.1 Is Also Leaking

(For the latest on April 10, 2013, see my latest post with continuous update.)

(For more information, see the previous post on the leak, including photos of the "pond" construction.)

While the Nuclear Regulatory Authority has said there is no other choice but to continue using the in-the-ground water storage (as they themselves are partly responsible for the current mess because of their insistence on ALPS vessel safety, which has significantly delayed the deployment of the system), a blame game is starting between TEPCO and the construction company who built these storage facilities in the ground.

TEPCO, after having speced out the in-the-ground water storage for Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, contracted Maeda Construction, a second-tier general construction firm. TEPCO is blaming Maeda Construction for the faulty construction, and Maeda Construction is blaming TEPCO for sloppy specs.

Or both, is my guess. And some more.

Latest information from Mainichi Shinbun (4/9/2013):

Liners used for the in-the-ground storage construction:

• 1st and 2nd layers: Polyethylene (HDPE) sheet, 1.5 millimeter thick

• 3rd and the bottom layer: Bentonite sheet, 6.4 millimeter thick

Leak detection pipes were installed through the 1st and 2nd layers

TEPCO's claim:

"Similar specifications have been used for constructing agricultural ponds. There is no problem if the leak detection pipes pierce through the layers, as long as the location is above the water."

Maeda Construction's claim:

"In water storage ponds, if such pipes are used that pierce through the liner sheets, the sheets may get pulled by the weight of the water, creating the gap through which the water could leak. Therefore, you don't spec these pipes to pierce through the sheets. As to the sheets themselves, we have used them for the storage facilities for solid objects, but never water."

TEPCO's spokesman Mr. Ono claimed in the press conference that the bentonite sheet must have absorbed a large chunk of radioactive strontium, and that justified TEPCO's announcing 710 billion becquerels of all beta in the leaked 120 tonnes of waste water.

But wait... This is no ordinary waste water. It is extremely saline.

Another Mainichi article (4/7/2013) quotes Professor Hideo Komine of Ibaraki University (civil engineering and geotechnology), who says:

汚染水に含まれる高濃度塩分によってベントナイトが膨らまず、防水機能が発揮されなかった

[There is a possibility that] because of the high salt content in the waste water, bentonite did not expand, and didn't function as waterproof material.

ベントナイトは厚いほど防水性が増すため、シートの厚さ不足も背景にある

The thicker the bentonite sheet, the more waterproof. The sheet used at Fukushima I Nuke Plant may not be thick enough.

Oops. But wait, there's yet some more. It's not just salt in the water. There are also cation (or positive ion). There are people who thinks the effect of radioactive materials, salt, and cation in the waste water on the bentonite sheet must be studied.

On a comical note, TEPCO has sent out the email notice No.20 to the press (which these days they post on their websites, a slight improvement) saying the company has resumed transportation of waste water from the pond No.2 (the one found with 120-tonne leak) to the pond No.1.

Resumed? Yes, resumed. It was stopped. Why was it stopped? Well, it was stopped when they noticed that some of the water they had transported to the pond No.1 was coming back into the pond No.2.

Why? you ask? TEPCO says it must have been a siphon effect.

OH WAIT... TEPCO just published the email notice No.21, and it says:

本日午前にサンプリングした地下貯水槽No.1ドレン孔水（２箇所）および地下貯水槽No.1漏えい検知孔水（２箇所）の分析を実施いたしました。

We conducted the analysis of water taken this morning from the in-the-ground water storage No.1 drains (2 locations) and from the leak detection pipes (2 locations).

分析結果では、漏えい検知孔水（北東側）の塩素濃度が前日分析結果４ppmから910ppmに上昇しました。

According to the result, chloride concentration of the water taken from the leak detection pipe (northeast) rose to 910ppm from 4ppm yesterday.

なお、仮設ポンプによる地下貯水槽No.2から地下貯水槽No.1への移送については、本日12時47分に停止しました。

Transfer of water from the in-the-ground water storage No.2 to No.1 using the temporary pumps was halted at 12:47PM.

So the pond No.1 is leaking. First it was just No.2, then No.3. If they cannot use No.1 and No.3 (they continue to use No.3 despite the leak, which they claim very minor), 27,000-tonne capacity is removed from the total 58,000 tonnes from 7 ponds.

When I saw him yesterday via the vid, Mr. Ono, TEPCO's spokesman, was rather confident that the water leak may not be that bad, because the layers may have effectively absorbed the water.

And the biggest problem: radiation levels. Even though most of gamma nuclides have been removed, the water contains 290,000 becquerels/cubic centimeter of all betas (mostly strontium). The radiation level on the surface of the waste water may be as high as 2 sievert/hour (beta radiation only), says independent journalist Kino, citing the leak from a tank storing the same waste water that happened on February 3, 2012. (Here's TEPCO's document, in Japanese; see pages 2 and 3.)

Let's check in to their latest presser　(2:30PM local time) and hear what he has to say.

(Independent journalist Ryuichi Kino just tweeted that he is hurrying to the press conference, but says he got the email notice at 1:35PM, and sighs, "This is so like two years ago...")

============================

(UPDATE) TEPCO press conference is still going on, nearly two hours after the start. My take is that TEPCO are in big trouble, trying to find any empty storage that can take 400 tonnes/day of the waste water after RO... Mr. Ono is very subdued today. A lot of reporters, and the room is almost full.

Tweet

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: At Least 120 Tonnes of Contaminated Water with 710 Billion Bq of Beta Nuclides Leaked from One of In-The-Ground Water Storage Locations

(4/9/2013 The latest on the leak in the new post)

===============================

That's according to TEPCO as of April 6, 2013.

The latest is that there may be additional 47 tonnes of the water leaked (Kyodo News 4/6/2013), and that may be from the in-the-ground storage No.3 (TEPCO, latest email to the press (No.12) on 4/7/2013).

And there is a possibility that instead of 710 billion becquerels of all beta in the water there may be 35 trillion becquerels of all beta.

But first thing first, here's my best effort of summarizing the leak incident.

Yesterday, I watched part of the press conference, I read articles, I read tweets, togetters, and I still didn't clearly get what exactly happened and how - why the water was leaking, how much was leaking, when they found out about it, what was their plan, why the water was stored there in the first place.

At least I sort of figured out the last question. The in-the-ground storage, where the leakage occurred, was not supposed to be used for storing the waste water after the Reverse Osmosis (desalination) treatment with high salt content and high beta nuclides. But the multi-nuclide removal system ALPS couldn't start as planned (September last year; TEPCO is now doing the hot trial run), the water treated by SARRY or Kurion's system (cesium removal) had to be stored somewhere to wait for the treatment by ALPS. So, this water is stored in the tanks made for the post-RO waste water. So, for the post-RO waste water, they started to use in-the-ground storage (there are 7 of them) in early February this year, which was originally meant for post-ALPS treatment water.

For the leak of contaminated water, this is what I have gathered from Jiji, Asahi, NHK, and TEPCO:

• TEPCO dug up 7 locations in the Fukushima I Nuke Plant compound to create in-the-ground water storage, and has started to use them on February 1, 2013. Total capacity of these 7 storage locations is 58,000 cubic meters (tonnes).

• Construction was carried out by Maeda Construction. They dug up the ground, installed layers of liners, poured concrete to protect and secure the liners, and put in the plastic water storage devices (see the photos below).

• The storage location 2 holds 13,000 tonnes of the waste water, with max capacity of 14,000 tonnes. This is where they noticed the leak.

• They measured beta nuclides (35 Bq/cm3) during the routine sampling test of water on April 3 in the drain hole on the northeast corner, and on April 5, 5,838 Bq/cm3 of all beta from the leak detection hole on the northeast corner between the bentonite sheet and unwoven fabric sheet/HDPE sheet. That's when TEPCO determined that the water was leaking into the ground.

• The storage location 2 is 60 x 52 x 6 meters. TEPCO had confirmed the strength of the protective sheets, but the company did not do a leak test prior to actual use.

• TEPCO estimated the amount of leak using the data from the water gauge in the storage, and came up with the number of about 120 tonnes, or slightly under 1 percent of the waste water stored. Calculating from the all beta from the detection hole (5,838 Bq/cm3), TEPCO says 710 billion becquerels of radioactive materials may have leaked.

There is also confusing information as to how full these in-the-ground storage locations already are.

BUT WAIT, THAT MAY BE MUCH, MUCH MORE BECQUERELS.

Why? Because the number TEPCO used to calculate the amount of radioactive materials in the leaked water was from the water taken from the leak detection hole in the bottom protection layer, and NOT the waste water in the storage.

So, how many becquerels of all beta does the waste water in the storage have?

• Asahi Shinbun article which I consulted did say "290,000 Bq/cm3 strontium" in the water in the storage, and that's the number reported by TEPCO on March 6, 2013 as the amount of all beta in the waste water after the Reverse Osmosis treatment. Again, that is the waste water being stored in the holes in the ground with several layers of sheets...

• Using that number, 290,000 Bq/cm3, instead of 5,838 Bq/cm3, there could be nearly 35 trillion becquerels of all beta in 120 tonnes of the leaked waste water.

• In the press conference on April 6, TEPCO didn't disclose the radioactivity of the stored waste water, and none of the reporters at the press conference seems to have asked about it.

Here's the link to a togetter in Japanese discussing the above points.

From TEPCO's handout for the press, here's what a in-the-ground water storage facility looks like:

The quality of information coming out of TEPCO's press conference has markedly gone downhill in the past few months.

In the first few weeks of the nuclear accident in 2011 when one of TEPCO's managers who gave press conference was Vice President Muto, very few reporters understood what Mr. Muto was saying. Not because Mr. Muto, who is a nuclear engineer, was obfuscating but because reporters didn't know much about nuclear reactors/plants at all. They didn't know what to ask, they didn't comprehend the answers they got. Mr. Muto himself didn't seem to understand that the (mostly) young reporters didn't have a clue of what he was talking about.

Then came Mr. Matsumoto, TEPCO's PR spokesman, sometime in late March-early April time frame. The reporters were getting up to speed, and Mr. Matsumoto, after initial bureaucratic awkwardness, turned out to be OK, giving out technical information in more or less straight-forward manner. I was impressed when he explained with a straight face, no pretense, in the press conference how his company was trying to stop the leak of highly contaminated water (probably from Reactor 2 turbine building) in early April of 2011 with baby diaper polymers and shredded newspaper, using onsen bath salts as tracer.

Then came Mr. Ono, new spokesman, starting this year. Suddenly, TEPCO's press conference has become muddled again. Mr. Ono, whose manner of speech is not clear to begin with, has a convoluted and confusing way of explaining things to the reporters who are by now quite knowledgeable about things nuclear and particularly about Fukushima I Nuke Plant. I've seen them often lose patience with Mr. Ono, who often becomes defensive. He does not seem to know well enough of the subject matter (nuclear, and this plant in particular) to be able to speak clearly. The reporters, in turn, reacting to this muddled-through way of communication, have reverted back to the initial state of not knowing what to ask.

People say "It's the company, TEPCO". I'm inclined to say it's this particular spokesman who is wiping out what credibility TEPCO had accumulated in the past 2 years by trying to be straight-forward in disclosing information.

Tweet

Stating the Obvious: #Fukushima Reactor 2's Suppression Chamber May Be Leaking

TEPCO may have hoped that it was one of those vent pipes from the dry well to the suppression chamber in Reactor 2 that was leaking the water injected into the RPV, but the awkward 4-legged Robot by Toshiba couldn't find any leak. So the conclusion is that the suppression chamber is probably leaking.

I would think it will be much harder (near impossible) to plug, because the suppression chamber is submerged in highly contaminated water.

From Jiji Tsushin (3/15/2013; part):

圧力抑制室から漏水か＝福島第１原発２号機－東電

TEPCO says leak may be from the Reactor 2 suppression chamber

東京電力は１５日、福島第１原発２号機格納容器下部の圧力抑制室につながる「ベント管」を調べた結果、水漏れはなかったと発表した。原子炉建屋地下に漏れ出している水は、圧力抑制室から出ている可能性が高くなったという。

TEPCO announced on March 15 that there was no leak after examining the "vent pipes" that connect to the suppression chamber of Reactor 2 containment vessel at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The water leaked into the basement of the reactor building was likely to be coming from the suppression chamber.

In that press conference on March 15, TEPCO's spokesman (no longer Mr. Matsumoto, I don't know the name of this young person who croaks when he speaks) didn't explicitly admit that the leak was from the suppression chamber; instead, he said, in response to a question by the reporter from Tokyo Shinbun on how TEPCO felt about the discovery (after 27 minutes):

Since the leak is not from the PCV (primary containment vessel), it will be easier to plug the leak.

How could a repair job in an inaccessible part of the suppression chamber (lower half) be easier?

His reasoning was that the PCV was closer to higher contamination, so any repair work away from the PCV would be easier. He tried to spin it as a positive discovery. "The PCV is sound, and it's a good thing", he said. The only problem was how to find the leak in the lower half (submerged part) of the suppression chamber, or other locations, he said.

It didn't seem like an answer to me, but as usual, the reporter said "OK, I got it", and that was the end of his questions.

(I miss the previous spokesman Matsumoto, who looked like Doraemon. He didn't try to spin, like the current one does.)

One of the photos taken by Toshiba's robot, released on March 15, 2013. Lots of white noise (click to enlarge):

The radiation levels inside the Reactor 2 torus room is not known. TEPCO couldn't lower the camera and dosimeter through the hole drilled on the 1st floor when they found out there were unexpected pipes blocking the way.

Tweet

Recent Aerial View of #Fukushima I Nuke Plant

The photos were taken on February 10, 2013, from a Kyodo News helicopter at an altitude of 1,500 meters. For the first time, the government allowed the aerial photographs within 3 kilometers of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant as long as the altitude is 1,500 meters.

Sankei Shinbun has an article (2/10/2013) with these photographs:

Reactor 4 building, with the steel frame being built (upper left) to suspend the crane for the removal of spent fuel in the future. The blue keyhole shape is the reactor well. The Spent Fuel Pool is covered with steel sheet:

Reactors 1, 2, 3, 4, from the right. Reactor 3 building is flanked by platforms for the debris removal equipment, where human workers observe the work in tungsten vests. When TEPCO holds the plant tours for the media, the highest radiation is usually registered on the road outside the Reactor 3 turbine building on the ocean side (lower left), at over 1,000 microsieverts/hour (or 1 millisievert/hour):

Storage tanks for treated water taking up the available space at the plant:

At the end of the article, Sankei says that at about 3 kilometer south of the plant at an altitude of 500 meters the radiation level inside the helicopter was 2.5 microsieverts/hour, but the radiation level inside the 3-kilometer radius at an altitude of 1,500 meters hardly registered at all.

Tweet

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: TEPCO Wants to Dump Treated Water into the Ocean

From Nippon Television (1/25/2013):

東京電力は、第一原発の中に溜まり続けている汚染水について、濃度を下げる処理をし、漁業関係者などの同意を得た上で海に放出する考えを明らかにした。

TEPCO says it wants to treat the contaminated water to lower the radioactivity and discharge the treated water into the ocean, if the consent from people in the fishing industry is obtained.

第一原発では、放射性物質で汚染された水が溜まり続けていて、東電は敷地内のタンクを増設して管理している。

The water contaminated with radioactive materials keeps increasing at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. TEPCO is building more storage tanks to deal with the water.

東電は、きのう原子力規制委員会に対し、汚染の濃度を下げる処理をした上で海に放出する対策案を説明した。

Yesterday, TEPCO explained to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about their plan to treat the water to lower the level of contamination and discharge the treated water into the ocean.

東電は、漁業関係者などの了解が得られなければ海への放出はしないことを強調しているが、タンクの増設はいずれ限界に達する可能性があるだけでなく、敷地内に溜まり続ける汚染水の最終的な処分の方法は見通しが立っていない。

TEPCO emphasizes that they won't release the water into the ocean unless they can obtain the consent from people in the fishing industry. However, there's a limit to how many storage tanks can be installed in the compound, and there is no final disposal plan for the contaminated water that keeps accumulating.

The last time I heard about this news was, I think, about a year ago. Somehow TEPCO has come up with extra storage since. Way back in June 2011, TEPCO wanted to dump the water in the reactor and turbine buildings at Fukushima II (Daini) after treating the water. That plan went nowhere partly because of strong objection from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries who probably worried more about "baseless rumors" than the actual, potential harm to the marine life.

I doubt that fishermen in Tohoku and Kanto would agree. They have already been selling the fish they catch, which are contaminated with radioactive cesium to varying degrees (hopefully below 100 Bq/kg but they only sample test). They certainly do not want to draw attention to the marine contamination by having TEPCO dump the water from the plant, no matter how "clean" it may be.

TEPCO has been counting on Toshiba's ALPS to come online at Fukushima I, which will remove virtually all radionuclides (except for tritium). The ALPS was ready for a "hot" test (using contaminated water) when when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission demanded that the vessels used in ALPS be sturdy enough to withstand the drop from up to 6 meters high. Now, until TEPCO and Toshiba come up with such vessels, the ALPS cannot even be tested.

So now, the talk is back, of dumping the water into the ocean.

Let's see what else (other than dumping the water) can they do? One of the nuclear researchers that I follow on Twitter has a suggestion:

Build a boiler, use it to evaporate water. What's left is radioactive materials. Use bitumen to immobilize them, put them in containers and store them.

I have no idea if this ever occurred to TEPCO, or if this is a valid method. Maybe it did occur to TEPCO, may it didn't. Just as it didn't occur to them that the highly radioactive water might be leaking, or that they should just violate some peacetime law and regulations and drive on the highway with truckload of batteries.

Tweet