NISA Presents TEPCO's Severe Accident Operation Manual

It is available at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's website, along with the "event-based" operation manual.

Severe Accident Operation Manual: http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/10/20111024003/20111024003-4.pdf

Event-Based Operation Manual: http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/10/20111024003/20111024003-3.pdf

But as I posted here already, it didn't matter. The severe accident manual still assumed some form of electricity would still be available in case of a severe accident. It wasn't available (station blackout), and the company couldn't use the manual.

I believe TEPCO's and NISA's initial unwillingness to submit the documents without redaction may have come from two considerations:

• security reasons, not particularly for Fukushima I Nuke Plant or for TEPCO, but for the similar plants with multiple BWRs in other parts of Japan and the world which may have very similar operation manuals;

• on-going national policy and effort to sell nuclear power plants with operational expertise (by TEPCO) overseas, particularly in developing countries like Turkey which just had an earthquake that have killed hundreds.

Curiously, the US nuclear regulator NRC issued an updated version of its paper "Regulatory Effectiveness of the Station Blackout Rule (NUREG-1776)" on March 13, 2011, two days after the Fuku-I accident started on March 11. It affirms the effectiveness of the NRC regulation concerning the station blackout. I'm sure it's effective until the actual station blackout hits...

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TEPCO Submitted the Uncensored Severe Accident Manual, But Didn't (and Couldn't) Use It Anyway

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) is currently reviewing the document to determine which part can be safely disclosed to the public, but it doesn't seem to matter anyway.

In yesterday's (October 17, 2011) joint press conference of all relevant government agencies and TEPCO, TEPCO submitted the progress report on its "roadmap" (link is TEPCO's English) to stabilize the situation at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. In the press conference, there was a mention of the "Severe Accident Manual" that TEPCO had been criticized for blackening it out almost completely for "confidentiality" concern.

Independent journalist Ryuichi Kino asked TEPCO's Matsumoto about the Manual, and it turned out that TEPCO didn't (and couldn't) use the Manual anyway. Kino tweets:

じゃあ地震の時にはシビアアクシデント手順書を使ったのかと思ったんだけども、松本さんの答えはＮＯ。地震直後は自動でスクラムしているので、通常の運転手順書で作業したと。ではシビアアクシデント手順書はいつから使ったのかと聞いたら、使ってないと回答

So I thought TEPCO must have used this Severe Accident Manual on March 11 earthquake. [TEPCO's] Matsumoto's answer was "No". The reactors were automatically scrammed after the earthquake, which was the normal operating procedure. So the company proceeded with the normal operating manual. So I asked when TEPCO started using the Severe Accident Manual. The answer was that it never did.

津波以降の事象は想定を超えているものであり、全電源喪失で真っ暗になった中で弁を開閉する作業のようなものは、シビアアクシデント手順書には書いてないと。この記事の追認だけども、最初から使える状況ではなかったっていうことみたいだなあ。→ http://bit.ly/ofttef

The events at the plant after the tsunami were beyond what was expected, and procedures like opening and closing the valves in the complete darkness after all-station blackout are not in the Severe Accident Manual. So, just like this article (Kyodo News) says, the Manual was not usable from the beginning.

The link Kino gives goes to Kyodo News Japanese article (10/2/2011). Most newspapers used the part about "no hydrogen explosion in the Reactor 2 suppression chamber", but not about the Severe Accident Manual. From 10/2/2011 Kyodo News:

東京電力福島第１原発事故で、過酷事故などに対応する「運転操作手順書」が役に立たなかったとする報告書を東電の社内事故調査委員会がまとめたことが２日、分かった。手順書は、非常用ディーゼル発電機などが動くことを前提としていたが全て動かず、事故対応に生かせなかった。

It was revealed on October 2 that TEPCO's accident investigation committee concluded that the Severe Accident Manual had been useless. The Manual had assumed that the emergency power supplies like diesel generators would be operational; in reality they all failed, and couldn't be used to deal with the accident.

　また２号機の圧力抑制プール付近では水素爆発はなかったと、従来と異なる判断を示した。

The committee also determined that there was no hydrogen explosion near the Suppression Chamber of Reactor 2, a different conclusion from what it had been assumed.

TEPCO's (for that matter, all nuclear power plant operators') severe accident procedure relied on having electricity available somehow.

So what DID TEPCO use to deal with the accident?

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TEPCO Did It Again - Blacked-Out Table of Contents

of the severe accident manual that was demanded on September 6 by a Diet committee.

On instruction from the regulatory agency Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, TEPCO submitted an almost completely blacked-out document. Not satisfied, to say the least, the committee asked for re-submission.

NISA accordingly instructed (the link is in Japanese, PDF) TEPCO again on September 8, telling the company to "report to the agency by 6PM as to what conditions are necessary for the disclosure of the information, if any".

On September 12, TEPCO submitted the front cover and the table of contents of the document "Operation Manual for Reactor 1 (Severe Accident)", 3 pages total, with 48 lines out of 50 were blacked out. All the lawmakers in the committee could read was "fire extinguishing line" and "inert gas".

TEPCO's Matsumoto explained that the manual is a company's internal document and not for public consumption, and the company has to protect intellectual properties and the physical protection of nuclear facilities. (Information from Asahi Shinbun, 9/12/2011)

We can blame TEPCO all we want. But again, the company is following instruction from NISA, and NISA makes no effort to have the information disclosed.

The Diet committee is asking for re-re-submission.

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