#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 3: Water Leak from MSIV Room Could Be a Huge Problem for Nuclear Reactor Safety

(UPDATE 1/19/2014) New post with nuclide analysis result.

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This is a follow-up on yesterday's post.

TEPCO released the video which was being taken by the robot on the first floor of Reactor 3 and which was being monitored by a TEPCO employee who noticed the water.

The flow looks significant and fast.

From TEPCO's photos and video library, 1/18/2014:

Location of the MSIV Room:

Radiation levels on the 1st floor of Reactor 3, from yesterday's post:

The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) is one of the two most important safety systems in a nuclear reactor (the other one being the control rod drive mechanism). It seals off the water/steam from the Pressure Vessel in case of an emergency (like a big earthquake). This MSIV system is not supposed to fail.

If the MSIV of Reactor 3 was damaged during the March 11, 2011 earthquake/tsunami (either one) and the water has been leaking ever since, the safety standard for nuclear reactors around the world may be impacted, says one nuclear researcher that I follow on Twitter.

(Oh wait... Does it mean then that part of the reason why the water (coolant) inside the Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel dried up was because it was leaking through the damaged MSIV?)

To get a feel for the size of the MSIV, here's a photo and a video from one of the top manufacturers, Flowserve:

The 1st floor of Reactor 3 is where the human workers ventured in in June 2011 for the first time since the start of the accident on March 11, 2011 and took the smear samples from the floor. The result of the analysis of the smear samples, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

The location of the floor drain funnel is near the equipment hatch shield plug that was found slightly open, through which highly radioactive steam/water had been leaking. (TEPCO finally admitted the shield plug had been open on April 19, 2012, more than one full year after the start of the accident.)

Packbot was sent on November 18/19, 2011 to clean the hatch rail with what looked like a white towel. The result of the analysis of what the towel caught, if it was ever done, hasn't been released.

(Now I think about it, the towel Packbot was using was soaking-wet, and even on the next day after the cleaning the guide rails were very wet. I have assumed the water on the guide rails was from inside the Containment Vessel, but is it possible that it has been coming from the MSIV Room?)

From @BB45_Colorado, one of the nuclear researchers that I follow:

主蒸気隔離弁;近傍からの漏洩が発災直後からのものなら、主蒸気隔離弁は、地震や内部異常加圧に耐えられなかった事になります。BWRの安全設計の心臓部でこれは極めてまずいです。場合によっては、世界中のBWRの安全審査がひっくり返ります

If the leak from (or from near) the Main Steam Isolation Valve is from the start of the accident, that means the MSIV couldn't withstand the earthquake and/or internal abnormal pressurization. This is bad in the heart of the BWR safety design. It could affect the safety reviews worldwide.

Browsing the articles by the mainstream media in Japan (eg. Yomiuri, Mainichi/Kyodo) on this incident, it seems to me that they don't know what MSIV is or its importance.

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(Just In from TEPCO Nuclear) Water Leak Near MSIV Room on 1st Floor of Reactor 3 Found by Worker Monitoring Live Images Taken by Robot

(UPDATE 1/18/2014) Video, additional information in the new post. The water is flowing fast.

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No images, videos, details yet.

From TEPCO's email alert for the press in Japanese (1/18/2014):

福島第一原子力発電所３号機原子炉建屋１階主蒸気隔離弁室近傍における水漏れについて

Water leak found near the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor of Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant

本日（１月18日）午後２時40分頃、３号機原子炉建屋瓦礫撤去用ロボットのカメラ画像を確認していた当社社員が、３号機原子炉建屋１階北東エリアの主蒸気隔離弁室の扉付近から、水が、当該扉近傍に設置されている床ドレンファンネル（排水口）に幅約30cmで流れ込んでいることを発見しました。

Today (January 18) at around 2:40PM, our employee who was monitoring the images taken by the camera mounted on the robot for removing the debris from the Reactor 3 building found the water running, at 30cm wide, from near the door to the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room located in the northeast area of the 1st floor of Reactor 3 into the floor drain funnel near the door.

当該漏えい水は、原子炉建屋最地下階の床ドレンサンプへつながる床ドレンファンネルへ流入しており、原子炉建屋外への流出はありません。

This water is flowing into the floor drain funnel that connects to the floor drain sump in the basement of the reactor building, and there is no leak from the reactor building to outside.

なお、モニタリングポスト指示値の有意な変動、およびプラントパラメータ（原子炉注水流量、原子炉圧力容器底部温度、格納容器内温度等）の異常は確認されておりません。

There is no statistically significant change observed at the monitoring posts and in the plant parameters (amount of water injected into the reactors, temperatures at the bottom of reactor pressure vessels, temperatures inside the containment vessels, etc.).

現在、漏えい状況および原因等を調査しております。

We are currently investigating the situation of the leak and the cause of the leak.

当該漏えい箇所の雰囲気線量は約30mSv/hです。

The ambient air dose rate near the leak is about 30 millisieverts/hour.

Reactor 3 first floor radiation levels (from my 7/23/2013 post):

Compared to other reactors that had explosive events (Reactor 2 did not have hydrogen explosions like Reactors 1 and 3, but some kind of event did seem to happen in the Suppression Chamber), Reactor 3's radiation levels are markedly higher.

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#Fukushima I NPP Reactor 4 SFP Fuel Assembly Removal: 10% Done

From TEPCO's page dedicated to the Reactor 4 Spent Fuel Pool fuel removal operation:

Breakdown of transferred assemblies:

• Spent fuel: 132 assemblies/1,331 assemblies

• Unirradiated (New) fuel: 22 assemblies/ 202 assemblies

So far, no news of major or minor hiccups whatsoever, and the world hasn't ended yet.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (4/7): The Worst Case Would Be "High-Pressure Melt Through", Politicians Thought Recriticality Was Nuclear Explosion

(Continued from Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

■「食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"We were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."


――12日午後に１号機で爆発が起きたとき、どう思ったのか。

--What did you think when an explosion happened in Reactor 1 in the afternoon of March 12, 2011?

「映像を見た瞬間に水素爆発だと思った。その時の記憶はあいまいだが、下村健一・内閣審議官（当時）の書いたものよると、私は『建屋に水素が漏れて、建屋には水素があるので爆発した』と淡々と説明したとされている。多分、事実だろう」

"I thought it was a hydrogen explosion the moment I saw the image. I don't remember clearly, but according to what Kenichi Shimomura, who was a cabinet counselor at that time, wrote, I calmly explained that "hydrogen leaked into the building, and since there is hydrogen (sic) [probably "oxygen"] in the building an explosion happened." I think it is probably true."

「この爆発を機に、首相は私の言うことを信用しなくなった。『安全委員会にはほかに専門家はいないのか』と問われたので、『久木田豊委員長代理（当時）も詳しい』と答えると、『すぐに呼べ』と言われたので、久木田さんに来てもらい、私はオフィスに戻った」

"From this explosion on, Prime Minister stopped believing me. He asked me if there were other experts at the Nuclear Safety Commission. I answered that Acting Chairman Yutaka Kukita was also knowledgeable. He told me to "call him here immediately". So I had Mr. Kukita come, and I returned to my office."


――１号機の爆発のあった時間帯は、海水注入の議論をしていたころでもある。

--Around the time of the Reactor 1 explosion, the debate was ongoing on seawater injection [into the reactors].

「（海水注入の議論の中で）『再臨界の可能性はあるか』と首相から問われたら、『可能性はある』と答えたとしてもおかしくない。私には尋ねられた記憶がない」

"In discussing the seawater injection, it would not be odd if I had been asked by Prime Minister whether there was a possibility of recriticality and I had answered there was a possibility. I have no memory of being asked."

「実は水素爆発の前の時点から、海江田万里・経産相（当時）が議長になって海水注入の問題点を総理応接室（官邸５階）で話し合っていた。塩が析出し腐食も問題になるので長期間は無理だが、いまは炉心を冷やすことを何より優先し海水を入れろと私は主張していた。首相が海水注入を止めるよう言うはずはないと思う。海水注入中断の問題は、国会事故調査委員会などが指摘するように東電の武黒一郎フェローの勝手な判断が介在していたように思う。いずれにしても、吉田昌郎所長（当時）の判断で注入の中断はなかった」

"Even before the hydrogen explosion, Minister of Economy Banri Kaieda was chairing a meeting in the PM Reception Room (on the 5th floor of the PM Official Residence), and we were talking about the potential problems of seawater injection. I insisted that seawater be injected as cooling the reactor core was the first priority, even though it was not a long-term solution because of salt deposition and corrosion problem. I don't think Prime Minister would order a halt in seawater injection. The issue of halting the seawater injection arose, as pointed out in the National Diet accident investigation commission, from an arbitrary decision by TEPCO's Fellow Ichiro Takekuro. In any way, there was no halt thanks to Plant Manager Masao Yoshida."

「後に福山哲郎・官房副長官（当時）はじめ、政治家の人たちの著書を読んで気がついたのだが、みなさん再臨界イコール核爆発だと思っていたらしい。再臨界が仮に起きても核爆発とは違うことは、ＪＣＯ事故などからも明らかだ。食い違いがあることに気づかず議論をしていた」

"I realized later when I read books by politicians including Mr. Tetsuro Fukuyama (then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) that everyone had thought recriticality meant nuclear explosion. It is obvious from accidents like the JCO accident that even if criticality happens that's different from nuclear explosion. But we were talking past each other, and we didn't even know it."

――その日は深夜に自宅に戻るが、すぐにまた官邸に呼ばれる。

--You went home late that night, but was called back soon to the PM Official Residence.

「ほとんど寝ていない。ただ13日になると、いろいろな専門家から見解を聞く余裕が出てきた。とくに久木田さんとの意見交換は貴重で、その時点で最も怖いのは高圧溶融物放出（ＨＭＴ=High-pressure Melt Through）という現象だと意見が一致していた。これは溶融燃料によって圧力容器の壁が溶けて薄くなった末、圧力容器内と格納容器の圧力差によって燃料が容器を突き破って外に飛び出す現象だ。格納容器の壁まで貫通してしまう恐れがある」

"I hardly slept. But on March 13, I began to have more time [or "peace of mind"] to listen to other experts. Discussion with Dr. Kukita was particularly valuable, and we both agreed that the most frightening possibility at that time was the phenomenon called "High-pressure Melt Through" (HMT). HMT happens when the melted fuel melts the Pressure Vessel wall thin, and the melted fuel gets ejected through the Pressure Vessel due to the difference in pressure between the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. It is possible that the melted fuel could pierce through the wall of the Containment Vessel."

「14日の３号機の水素爆発の後、２号機の逃がし安全弁を急いで開くように助言したのは、２号機でＨＭＴが起きるのを心配して、圧力容器と格納容器の圧力を均一化した方がよいと考えたからだ。吉田所長はまずベントの準備を整えてからと主張していた。安全弁を開くと圧力容器内の水が水蒸気となって格納容器に流れ出し、燃料が空だきになる恐れがあるので、注水の備えがないと安全弁を開けない。難しい判断だ」

"After the hydrogen explosion of Reactor 3 on March 14, I advised that the relief safety valve of Reactor 2 should be opened quickly. I was worried that HMT might happen in Reactor 2, so I thought it would be prudent to equalize the pressure in the Pressure Vessel and the Containment Vessel. Plant Manager Yoshida insisted that preparation for the vent be done first. If the relief safety valve is opened, the water inside the Pressure Vessel becomes water vapor and flows into the Containment Vessel, leaving the fuel heated without water. So you cannot open the relief safety valve without preparation to inject water. It is a difficult decision."

――そう考えると、原子炉の底部から溶融燃料が落ちたのは不幸中の幸いと言えるか。

--In that sense, it was lucky that the melted fuel dropped from the bottom of the reactor.

「そうとも言える」

"You could say so."

班目氏の行動（３月13日）
3:40ころ 自宅で原子力安全委事務局からの電話
5:00ころ 官邸へ（官邸到着前に安全委オフィスで他の安全委員らと意見交換）
この間、３号機の高圧注水系停止などの事態が進む
10:04 原子力災害対策本部の会議
13:55 安全委オフィスに戻り、官邸の状況を説明
14:35 官邸へ
この間、保安院の安井氏らも加わって、３号機の水素爆発の可能性を議論
15:30 官房長官記者会見に同席（これ以降、数回）
21:35 原子力災害対策本部の会議
久木田委員長代理と最悪のシナリオを議論。政治家にメルトスルー後のコンクリート反応を説明

Dr. Madarame on March 13, 2011:
3:40AM received call at his home from the secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission
5:00AM went to the PM Official Residence (after speaking with other commissioners at the Nuclear Safety Commission office)
The situation at the plant grew more serious as Reactor 3's high-pressure core injection system stopped.
10:04AM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
1:55PM went back to the Nuclear Safety Commission office, and explained the situation at the PM Official Residence
2:35PM went back to the PM Official Residence
Discussed the possibility of a hydrogen explosion in Reactor 3 with others including Mr. Yasui from NISA
3:30PM accompanied Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] in the press conference (would do a few more times later)
9:35PM meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters
Discussed the worst case scenario [high-pressure melt through] with Deputy Chairman Kukita of Nuclear Safety Commission. Explained the core-concrete reaction after the melt through to the politicians

It is interesting to note that, according to Dr. Madarame's March 13, 2011 schedule, he was debating with another nuclear expert (Kukita) about the worst case of "high-pressure melt through", in which the melted core (corium) will eject from the Pressure Vessel at a high speed, possibly piercing through the Containment Vessel, while telling the politicians a more "benign" core-concrete reaction scenario.

If HMT had happened in Reactor 2, as Dr. Madarame and Dr. Kukita feared, it may have been an immediate evacuation from the plant. The worst case that PM Kan says he received (but decided to sit on it for months and deny the existence of the report) may have come true then.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (3/7): He Knew It Was a Core Melt by Early Morning of March 12, 2011, Didn't Know TEPCO Hadn't Done the Vent

(Part 4 available now)

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and says his explanation that there would be no hydrogen explosion is technically correct.

(Continued from Part 1 and Part 2, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

――事態が当初の見込みよりはるかに深刻だと気づいたのはいつごろか。

--When did you realize that the situation was much graver than the initial assessment?

「深夜を過ぎたころに１号機の格納容器の圧力があがっていると聞いたときに、これは変だと思った。ひょっとしたら、直流電源が止まっていたのかと疑った。それにしても１号機は非常用復水器（ＩＣ）によって自然循環で冷やせるので（電源喪失には）強いはずなのに、とも思った。その後、電源車のケーブルがつながらないとか、ケーブルがいくらあっても足りないとか耳にしたとき、配電盤も水没して、ポンプなどひとつひとつに電源をつなぎ込んでいるのかと推測した。現場で何が起き、どうしようとしているのかが（官邸にまで）伝わっていなかった。人間の心理は極端から極端に振れる。私は非常に絶望的な気持ちになっていた」

"I knew something was wrong when I was told that the pressure of the Reactor 1 Containment Vessel was rising, past midnight [of March 11, 2011]. Maybe the DC power stopped, I thought. Still, Reactor 1 could be cooled by the isolation condenser (IC) even in the loss of power situation. Later, I heard the cables from the power supply cars couldn't be connected, or that they needed more cables than available; I speculated that the switchboard was under water, and they were trying to supply power to individual pumps. We (at the Prime Minister's Official Residence) were not aware of what was going on at the plant and what they were trying to do. Human psychology goes from extreme to extreme. I started to feel extremely desperate."

■「安心したことが間違いだった」

"It was a mistake [PM Kan] to feel relieved"

――前夜に進言したベントは明け方になっても実行されていなかった。

--The vent you suggested the night before wasn't carried out by the next morning.

「前夜とはベントをする意味が大きく変わっていた。このころになると、炉心が溶けて（水蒸気やガスで）格納容器の圧力が高まっていると推測できた。格納容器を（破損から）守るためにベントが必要になっていた」

"The purpose of the vent had vastly changed from the previous night. By that time [morning of March 12, 2011], it could be assumed [I assumed] that the reactor core melted, and the pressure inside the Containment Vessel was rising (because of water vapor and gas). The vent was necessary in order to protect the Containment Vessel (from damage)."

――早朝になって、避難指示の区域を10キロ圏に広げている。

--In the early morning [of March 12, 2011] you expanded the evacuation zone to areas within 10-kilometer radius.

「炉心が溶けているとすると、３キロでは足りないと思った」

"I thought 3-kilometer radius was not enough if the reactor core melted."

――それほど悲観的に事態をみていたのなら、早朝にヘリコプターで現場に向かう菅直人首相（当時）に同行し、機内で「水素爆発はない」と話したのはなぜか。

--If your assessment of the situation was that pessimistic, why did you accompany (then) Prime Minister Naoto Kan in the early morning on a helicopter and told him "there would be no hydrogen explosion"?

「首相から炉心が露出したらどうなるか問われた。水素ができると答えると、爆発が起きるのかと問い返された。そこで格納容器の中は窒素で置換されていて（酸素はないので）爆発は起きませんと答えた。この説明は誤りではない。菅元首相は著書で、私の言葉を聞いて安心したのが『大間違いだった』と書いているが、私の説明に誤りはない。そこで（首相が）安心したことが間違いだった」

"Prime Minister asked me what would happen if the reactor core was exposed. I answered hydrogen would be generated. He then asked me if that would lead to an explosion. So I answered there would be no explosion because the Containment Vessel was filled with nitrogen (and there was no oxygen). My explanation is not wrong. Former Prime Minister Kan writes in his book that it was a "big mistake" to feel relieved by my words, but my explanation is not wrong. It was a mistake (for Prime Minister Kan) to feel relieved."

「ヘリに乗る直前に、これからベントを行うとの連絡を聞いていたように思う。現地に着くまでにベントは実施されるものだと思っていた」

"I think I heard, right before we boarded the helicopter, that they were about to do the vent. So I thought the vent would have been done by the time we arrive at the plant."

――とすると、ベント直後の発電所に降り立つことになるが、ヘリに乗った人たちは防護服を着ていなかった。

--If what you say is true, then you would have landed on the plant right after the vent. But no one on board the helicopter was wearing the protective clothing."

「防護服のことなど考えもしなかった」

"I didn't even think about the protective clothing."

――ヘリから降りた菅首相は「なぜベントを早くやらないのだ」と東京電力の武藤栄・副社長（当時）をいきなり怒鳴りつけたとされている。首相はベントが実行されていないことを知っていた。

--It is said that Prime Minister Kan, on getting off the helicopter, shouted at (then) TEPCO Vice President Sakae Muto, "Why aren't you doing the vent?" So the prime minister knew that the vent hadn't been done.

「首相と武藤さんとの会話を聞いていないが、首相はどこかで（ベントの未実施を）知らされていたのだろう。私は免震重要棟の会議室で知らされた。首相がベントのことを強く言ったのは、機内で私がベントの必要性を強調したせいかもしれない」

"I didn't hear the conversation between the prime minister and Mr. Muto, but I suppose the prime minister must have been told about (the vent not being done yet). I was told in the conference room of the Anti-Seismic Building [at the plant]. The prime minister may have used strong words about the vent because I emphasized to him the importance of the vent when we were on board.

Dr. Madarame's schedule on March 12, 2011, from Part 2:

0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

The vent, which was made extremely difficult because there was no power at the plant, was further delayed because of Kan's hastily arranged trip in the early morning of March 12, 2011. The hydrogen explosion was not from inside the Containment Vessel as Dr. Madarame had feared but in the building, either on the 4th floor or the 5th floor (operating floor), with the evidence suggesting the 4th floor, when the hydrogen gas was finally vented but came back into the building instead of going to the exhaust stack.

In other words, the vent may have caused the explosion after all (that was the conclusion of none other than NISA in December 2011). If the vent had been successfully carried out by the time Mr. Kan and Dr. Madarame arrived at the plant, they may have been just in time to witness the Reactor 1 explosion firsthand.

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Tokyo Gubernatorial Race Descending into a Whole Lot of Mess

Farce, you may say.

Titbits from the candidates and their supporters, from Sankei Shinbun (1/14/2014) and Nikkei Shinbun (1/15/2014):

1. Who is more like the "leader"? The one who's not running.

Morihiro Hosokawa, after meeting with ex-LDP PM Koizumi and declaring his candidacy on his birthday:

原発問題は知事として非常にやりがいのある仕事だ

"To deal with nuclear power plant issues is a very worthwhile job for me as a governor."

Junichiro Koizumi, after meeting with ex-PM Hosokawa and being asked why he was supporting Hosokawa:

東京が原発なしでやっていける姿を見せれば、必ず国を変えることができる

"If Tokyo shows it can survive [and prosper] without nuclear power plants, it can definitely change the whole nation."

For Mr. Koizumi (pictured right), January 14 was not Hosokawa's birthday, but the day, in the old lunar calendar (December 14), when 47 samurais took revenge on behalf of their lord who in their minds suffered injustice. Lunar December 14 is not January 14, but that's how Koizumi felt anyway.

Koizumi projects a future vision, while Hosokawa doesn't. The former lasted 5 years as the prime minister, the latter 9 months. Oh well.

2. Who is "anti-nuclear"? Just about everybody now (except for the ex-Chief of Staff of the Air Self Defense Force).

Yoichi Masuzoe and LDP backing him are scrambling to make the nuclear power issue a non-issue in the election. Masuzoe, who has been pro-nuclear, now says:

"I have always been saying zero nuke plant."

meaning he is all for gradually lessen the dependency on nuclear power. Prime Minister Abe chimes in from Ethiopia that he is hoping that the debate will be well-balanced, not just about the nuclear issue. As Mr. Koizumi remains popular and influential within LDP, the Abe administration officials are very reluctant to accuse Koizumi of "treason".


3. Anti-nuclear candidate Kenji Utsunomiya and his supporters in disarray (already)

Clearly, Mr. Utsunomiya and his political backers (Japanese Communist Party and Social Democratic Party) didn't expect the entry of Morihiro Hosokawa in the race with the backing from Junichiro Koizumi, who has been quite vocal in his anti-nuclear message of late.

Social Democrats are trying to back out from supporting him, saying the anti-nuclear faction should rally behind Hosokawa. Social Dems bet too early, I suppose.

Mr. Utsunomiya himself is accusing Mr. Koizumi for forcing a single-issue campaign.

Some people ask, "What about yourself, Mr. Utsunomiya?"


4. Who is for 2020 Tokyo Olympic? Everyone.

Yoichi Masuzoe:

五輪という大きな目標があれば全力で東京を改造することができる

With a big target like Olympics, we can truly transform Tokyo.

Morihiro Hosokawa:

五輪の一部を東北に

Part of the Olympics should be held in Tohoku

Kenji Utsunomiya:

環境に配慮した簡素な五輪

Simple, and environmentally-friendly Olympics

The official start of the election campaign is on January 23, and the election will be held on February 9.

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Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (2/7): "I Didn't Know What Was Going On in the Room, I Couldn't Call for Help Because My Cellphone Didn't Work in the Basement"

Part 1, Part 3, Part 4
========================

(Continued from Part 1, from Nikkei Shinbun: Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima" by Junichi Taki, editorial board member)

「海岸近くにある冷却系施設が津波で壊れているはずだから、（炉心で発生する）熱の捨て場がない。熱を捨てるには炉心に水をぶち込んで、水蒸気の形で熱を空気中に出すしかない。熱の捨て場を確保する目的で、ベント（排気）をしてくださいと進言した。この時点では炉心が溶け始めているとは思っていなかった」

"I assumed that the cooling system near the ocean had been damaged by the tsunami; there was no place to dump the heat (generated in the reactor core). To remove the heat, the only way was to pour water in the reactor core, and release the heat into the air in the form of water vapor. So I suggested that the vent be done in order to secure the space to remove the heat. At that point, I didn't think that the reactor core would start melting."

「また周辺住民の避難に関して、私が3キロ圏の避難を進言したことになっている。ここは記憶があいまいなのだが、国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）の予防的措置範囲（ＰＡＺ＝Precautionary Action Zone）が３～５キロだと承知しているので、３キロではどうかと問われれば、それでよい、国際的な考え方からも予防的に避難させるべきだと答えたに違いない。すでに福島県が２キロ圏内の避難を指示していることもおそらくそのときに聞いたはずだ」

"About evacuating the residents in the surrounding areas, it is supposed to be me who suggested the evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius. My memory on this is blurry, but I knew the IAEA's Precautionary Action Zone to be between 3 to 5-kilometer radius. So if I had been asked whether the 3-kilometer radius was OK, I must have answered that it was OK, and by the international standard the residents needed to be evacuated as a precaution. I must also have heard at the same time that Fukushima Prefecture had already instructed the residents within the 2-kilometer radius to evacuate."

「後から振り返れば、私はこのとき部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった。原発事故の際には保安院の緊急時対応センター（ＥＲＣ、経済産業省別館）で指揮がとられることになっていた。ＥＲＣでは指揮がとられていて、私は政治家の人たちに解説をすればよいのだと思っていた。ただ矢継ぎ早の質問に対し、私は何の資料も原発の図面すらなく、ただ記憶だけで答えていた。11日の夕方には原子力安全委員がオフィスに集まり始めていたが、官邸地下の危機管理センターからは携帯電話がかけられず、助けを得られなかった」

"In retrospect, I didn't know what was going on in the room. In a nuclear accident, NISA's Emergency Response Center (ERC, in the Ministry of Economy Annex building) was to be the command center. I assumed the ERC was doing the job, and I was there at the Prime Minister's Official Residence to explain things to the politicians. But I was answering a barrage of questions from my memory, without any reference material, not even a blueprint of the plant [reactors]. Commissioners [of Nuclear Safety Commission] started to gather in the office in the evening of March 11, but I couldn't make a call on my cellphone from the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence to get their help."

班目氏の行動（３月12日）
0:55 １号機格納容器の圧力上昇の情報 電源車到着するが、電源復旧できず、電源盤損傷の疑いを抱く
3:00ころ ２号機の隔離時冷却系（ＲＣＩＣ）運転の情報を確認（危険なのは１号機と判断）
5:00ころ 首相の現地視察への同行依頼を受ける
5:44 10ｋｍ圏内の避難指示
6:14 菅首相に同行しヘリで官邸を発つ（機内で首相に水素爆発の説明）
7:11 福島第１原発へ到着（到着後、ベント未実施を知る）
8:04 福島第１原発を出発
10:47 官邸に帰着し安全委オフィスに徒歩で戻る
12:08 原子力災害対策本部の会議（11:35呼び出し受ける）
13:00ころ 福島県選出国会議員への説明（13:30ころ以降は首相応接室に滞在）
15:18 １号機のベント成功の情報。その後、海水注入の問題点を議論
15:50ころ １号機で白煙発生の情報
17:00ころ テレビで１号機爆発を確認、水素爆発と直感。その後、菅首相の求めで久木田委員長代理を推薦
19:30ころ 安全委オフィスに戻る
22:05 原子力災害対策本部の会議(再び官邸）
24:00過ぎ 帰宅

Dr. Madarame on March 12, 2011
0:55AM Pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 rising; power supply cars arrived, but the power couldn't be restored; [Madarame] suspected the damage of the power control panel
3:00AM confirmed operation of Reactor 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), decided it was Reactor 1 that was in danger
5:00AM asked to accompany Prime Minister on the on-site inspection
5:44AM evacuation instruction to 10-kilometer radius areas
6:14AM leaving PM Official Residence on a helicopter with PM Kan, explaining about hydrogen explosion to Kan on board the helicopter
7:11AM arrived at Fukushima I NPP, learned that vent hadn't been done
8:04AM left Fukushima I NPP
10:47PM arrived back at PM Official Residence, and walked back to the office of Nuclear Safety Commission
12:08PM Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters meeting (Madarame was asked at 11:35AM to attend)
1:00PM met with Members of the National Diet elected from Fukushima (stayed in the prime minister's reception room from 1:30PM on)
3:18PM news of successful vent of Reactor 1, discussion of issues concerning seawater injection [into the reactors]
3:50PM news of white smoke rising from Reactor 1

His cellphone didn't work in the sub-basement... I don't know if it ever occurred to Dr. Madarame to go outside and make a phone call. Is he trying to tell us there was no landline telephone available at the Crisis Management Center?

NISA was indeed doing the job at the Emergency Response Center that day. They had their own computer simulation done on the spread of radioactive materials and drawing up the evacuation plan that was based on the simulation. It was NOT the stupendous concentric circles like Mr. Edano and Mr. Kan came up with on their own.

But what did NISA do? Or rather, what did Director-General of NISA do, who was at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and was in the position to tell the irascible Prime Minister Naoto Kan that his organization was getting a better handle on the situation and in fact coming up with the evacuation plan? Director-General Terasaka was shouted at and scolded by Kan, and he went home, never to return to the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the duration of the initial crisis. (He was the one whose excuse was "because I was liberal arts major.")

NISA's Deputy Director-General, after his boss left the building, had to deal with Prime Minister Naoto Kan, which he apparently did very poorly. He was a science major, but in electrical engineering.

Dr. Madarame in the book published in December 2012 (pages 39, 40):

15条通報を受け、午後5時40分頃、官邸に向かいました。到着すると、まず官邸五階の総理執務室に通されました。
「助けて下さい」
私を出迎えた保安院のナンバー２である平岡英治次長がそう懇願しました。いったい何事かと思いました。だいたい、本来この場にいるのは保安院トップの寺坂信昭院長のはずです。ところが、姿が見えない。

After receiving the Article 15 notice [ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2], I headed for the Prime Minister's Official Residence around 5:40PM [on March 11, 2011]. When I arrived there, I was led to the Prime Minister's Office on the 5th floor.

"Please help me."

Eiji Hiraoka, Deputy Director-General of NISA pleaded with me. I wondered, what was going on? To begin with, it should be the Director-General of NISA, Nobuaki Terasaka who should be there. But he was nowhere to be seen.

後で聞いたのですが、菅さんに原発の状況を聞かれたのに、寺坂さんはまともに質問に答えられなかったようです。それを厳しく叱責されたため、官邸を辞した後でした。その後、私は官邸内で寺坂さんにお目にかかった記憶はありません。

I heard it later that Mr. Terasaka couldn't answer the questions from Mr. Kan regarding the nuclear power plant. He was severely scolded, and left the building. I don't remember ever seeing Mr. Terasaka inside the Prime Minister's Official Residence.

寺坂さんは、経産省の事務官です。大学では経済を専攻し、経済はともかく、原子力はずぶの素人でした。ところが、どうしたことか、技術に精通しているべき保安院の院長に就いていました。寺坂院長が答えられなかったので、次は平岡次長が菅さんに詰問されました。平岡次長は技官ですが大学では電気を勉強していて、原子力には詳しくない。

Mr. Terasaka is an administrative official at Ministry of Economy. He majored in economics in college. He may know economics, but when it comes to nuclear energy he was a rank amateur. But for whatever reason he was the director-general of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, who should possess intimate knowledge of the [nuclear] technology. Since Director-General Terasaka couldn't answer, Deputy Director-General Hiraoka was grilled by Mr. Kan. Deputy Director-General Hiraoka is a technical official, but his major in college was electrical engineering and he didn't know much about nuclear energy.

日本の不運か、菅さんの悲運か、こんな時に、適任者が適切なポストにいない、とはまさに痛恨の極みです。平岡次長の「助けて」は、そういう理由だったのでしょう。

Was it Japan's misfortune? Was it Mr. Kan's ill fate? In the time like this, a qualified person wasn't in the appropriate position. A cry for help from Deputy Director-General Hiraoka could be understood in this context.

Or someone who could shout back at Mr. Kan and tell him to shut up.

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