Showing posts with label Naoto Kan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Naoto Kan. Show all posts

Friday, August 9, 2013

Naoto Kan, TEPCO Top Management Won't Be Prosecuted Over #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Accident and Its Aftermath


Not surprising at all, particularly when then-Prime Minister Noda said back in March 2012 that no one in particular was at fault, we were all at fault.

When everyone is said to be responsible, no one is responsible.

All Japanese papers "leaked" this story on August 8, 2013. Some leak. A very detailed one at that, too.

Here's one from Asahi Shinbun (8/8/2013; part):

原発事故、全員が不起訴へ 東電前会長や菅元首相ら

All people concerned, including former chairman of TEPCO and former Prime Minister Kan, won't be prosecuted

 東京電力福島第一原発の事故をめぐり、検察当局が、業務上過失致死傷などの疑いで告訴・告発された東電幹部や政府関係者ら全員を、不起訴処分にする方向で調整していることが8日、わかった。今月中にも処分を出す見通しだ。

It was revealed on August 8 that the Public Prosecutors Office is coordinating [among themselves] so as not to prosecute any one of those who have been charged for professional negligence resulting in deaths and injuries over the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. They include TEPCO's top management and government officials. The prosecutors are expected to announce this non-institution of prosecution by the end of August.

原発周辺の被災者ら計約1万5千人は、入院患者が事故直後の避難途中に死亡し、住民が被曝(ひばく)して傷害を負ったなどとして、震災以降、断続的に告訴・告発した。対象は菅元首相のほか、東電の勝俣恒久前会長、清水正孝元社長、原子力安全委員会の班目春樹元委員長、枝野幸男元官房長官と海江田万里元経済産業相ら数十人で、検察当局は昨年8月に受理。東京、福島両地検に応援検事を集め、事情を聴いてきた。

Total 15,000 people, mostly people near the plant and affected by the nuclear accident, have been filing charges intermittently since the accident in March 2011 that they suffered injuries, such as hospital patients having died during the evacuation right after the accident, and residents exposed to radiation. The charges were against former Prime Minister Kan, TEPCO's former chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, former president Masataka Shimizu, Nuclear Safety Commission's chairman Haruki Madarame, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda, and dozens of others. The charges were received by the prosecutors in August last year. The Public Prosecutors Office has asked for help from prosecutors in the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office and Fukushima District Prosecutors Office, and has been questioning.

...その結果、今回の規模の大地震や津波は、発生以前に専門家の間で予測されていたとは言えず、原子炉格納容器の圧力を下げるベント(排気)の遅れが原発建屋の水素爆発を招いたとする告訴内容も、放射線量が高く、停電したことが作業遅延の原因と判断。菅元首相や東電幹部らの刑事責任を立証するのは、困難と結論づけるとみられる。

...As the result, [the Public Prosecutors Office] has come to the conclusion that an earthquake and tsunami on such a large scale cannot be said to have been predicted by experts before it actually took place. As to the cause of hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings, they have dismissed the charges that the delay in vent to lower the pressure inside the Containment Vessels led to the hydrogen explosions; instead, the prosecutors decided that the delay was caused by high radiation levels and power outage. The Public Prosecution Office is expected to conclude that it will be difficult to establish criminal liability of former Prime Minister Kan and TEPCO management.


Never mind that an earthquake and tsunami of that magnitude have actually been predicted by experts. Never mind that the government under Naoto Kan hid the data of radiation levels "so as not to panic the populace", when it was them who panicked. It was those bureaucrats at NISA who had the more accurate simulation of radiation dispersion and were about to set the more precise evacuation areas, but completely dropped that effort as soon as they learned that Kan, Edano, and Kaieda came up with those childish concentric circles.

Never mind that it was the government who did nothing to stop farmers in Fukushima from tilling the contaminated land and plant crops right after the March 11, 2011 accident.

A UN committee member spoke of Japanese judicial system as "medieval" where the prosecution almost always wins, near 100%. The Japanese prosecution hardly ever even thinks of indicting the national government officials and powerful corporate elites, and there is no grand jury system in Japan.

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Tuesday Humors: Naoto Kan Sues Shinzo Abe for Defamation, Self Defense Force Dispels Baseless Rumors on Ibaraki Beach, NRA Starts Nuke Plant Inspection, TEPCO's Shares Jump 12% in One Day


You really can't take any of them seriously, can you?

Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan sues current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for defamation, over Abe's email magazine's mention of Kan "stopping the injection of seawater into the reactor and later taking credit for seawater injection". According to Kan, that's patently false. Why is he suing Abe now, for the mail magazine article that appeared in May 2011? I suppose in Kan's mind the lawsuit should boost the chance of his party, Democratic Party of Japan, in the coming Upper House election (July 21 for most of Japan).

From Sankei Shinbun (7/16/2013; part):

安倍首相のメールマガジンは平成23年5月20日付配信。首相は「東電はマニュアル通り淡水が切れた後、海水を注入しようと考えており、実行した。しかし、やっと始まった海水注入を止めたのは、何と菅総理その人だった」と記載。その上で「海水注入を菅総理の英断とのウソを側近は新聞・テレビにばらまいた」としている。

Prime Minister Abe's mail magazine was distributed as of May 20, 2011. According to Prime Minister [Abe] wrote, "Following the manual, TEPCO was planning to inject seawater after the supply of fresh water depleted. However, it was Prime Minister Kan himself who stopped the seawater injection which had just started." Further, he wrote "[Mr. Kan's] advisors then spread the lie in newspapers and TV that injection of seawater was Prime Minister Kan's heroic decision."

菅氏は「内容は全くの虚偽の情報に基づく。私の名誉を著しく傷つける中傷記事だ」と述べた。

Mr. Kan said [in the press conference he held in the Diet building], "The content is based on totally false information. The article has severely damaged my honor."


(Go ahead and laugh now.)

Next, Self Defense Force tanks and ship on the Ooarai beach in Ibaraki Prefecture. Saturday July 13 was the beach opening day for Ooarai in Ibaraki, the town become famous because of a popular "anime" based on the town.

To an outsider (including myself), the anime, "GIRLS und PANZER", is totally hilarious, totally detached from the reality-based world where everyone else lives but the Japanese in Japan. It is about a world where cute high school girls are well-trained and versed in "the way of tanks" (like "the way of tea" or "the way of flower arrangement").

Ooarai requested tanks and a training ship from Self Defense Force to attract more people to town on the beach opening day, as the town's beach is suffering from "baseless rumors". Self Defense Force obliged, as it wants to increase recruitment. So the event was a triple-win: Ooarai dispelling baseless rumors, anime fans getting to do their cosplay on the real tanks and real ship, and SDF promoting itself to the population.

See how they all enjoy the day on the beach... (Screenshots of a TV report of the event from this blog at 2ch; click to enlarge):







Next, Asahi Shinbun reports (7/26/2013) that Nuclear Regulatory Authority has started the examination and inspection of 10 reactors at 5 nuclear plants. They are:

Hokkaido Electric: Tomari Reactors 1, 2, 3
Kansai Electric: Takahama Reactors 3, 4, Ooi Reactors 3, 4
Shikoku Electric: Ikata Reactor 3
Kyushu Electric: Sendai Reactors 1, 2

(For the locations of these plants, see my post from July 5, 2013.)

According to Asahi, assessment of Ooi reactors won't be done while the faults inside the compound are being investigated, and assessment of Tomari Reactors 1 and 2 will be delayed as Hokkaido Electric wants Reactor 3 to be assessed first. (That's the reactor where use of MOX fuel is planned.)

So, there are 6 reactors to be assessed. Asahi says three teams will each assess two, three reactors concurrently, and one team is specialized in earthquake/tsunami assessment. There will be 80 people at Nuclear Regulatory Agency (secretariat of Nuclear Regulatory Authority) doing the assessment. And all this to be finished in about 6 months.

NRA spent less than 6 months coming up with the safety regulatory standards, and now will spend 6 months (or less, my guess) in applying the standards.

(You can laugh now.)

And last but not least, for no good reason that I could find, TEPCO's shares jumped 12.6% in one day on Tuesday in Japan. Contaminated groundwater found along the seawall must be bullish for the stock. After all, for a long time now, particularly in the US but also elsewhere, bad news is good news, and bullish for the stock market.

From Nikkei Shinbun, TEPCO's intraday chart (7/16/2013):


The 5-year chart shows a shallow cup and handle pattern, and if that plays out TEPCO's shares could be going over 1,300 yen:


"OT" humor: Russia's RIA Novosti reports (7/15/2013) that "US Urges Russia to Protect Reporters, Human Rights Activists", and "Putin Blasts US for Intimidation in Snowden Asylum Saga".

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Naoto Kan Was Guest of Honor at an Anti-Nuclear Event in San Diego, California, Said It Was He Who Stopped TEPCO from "Abandoning" #Fukushima I Nuke Plant


An environmental activist group called "Friends of the Earth" held an event on June 4, 2013 in San Diego, California, in which they featured former NRC chairman Gregory Jaczko and former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan. The event seems to be part of the group's ongoing effort to shut down San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant that provides (if the two reactors are operating) 20% of electricity in San Diego County.

I suppose Mr. Naoto Kan to the people outside Japan ("hero" who "saved" the world from the bigger disaster) is like Mr. Toru Hashimoto to some people inside Japan ("hero" who speaks the uncomfortable truth).

So what did Mr. Kan tell the adoring US audience? It looks like the same stuff he's been selling for the past two years: TEPCO wanted to abandon the site, and he was the one who stopped them from doing so.

As far as I'm concerned, he was the prime minister of Japan who hid behind a middle-level manager at TEPCO when the water with low-level contamination had to be discharged into the ocean to make room for the highly contaminated water. Kan's cabinet didn't notify the neighboring countries, didn't have the guts to announce the discharge. Instead, a manager at TEPCO did the press conference, and then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano said they sent a fax to IAEA about the discharge and that it should be sufficient.

From Friends of the Earth blog (6/4/2013):

Former Japanese Prime Minister Naota Kan warned today that restarting the damaged San Onofre nuclear reactor is driven by the same industrial and regulatory forces in the United States that are seeking the restart of Japanese nuclear reactors. He told a nuclear safety seminar that the worst-case nuclear accident at Fukushima-daiichi would have required evacuating a 190-mile radius from from the disaster, an area in which 50 million people live, threatening the entire future of his nation.

The major safety risks of restarting the San Onofre nuclear reactor located between Los Angeles and San Diego was put in the context of the devastating accident at Fukushima during an international seminar held at the San Diego County Government offices today.

Guest of Honour, former Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, described in detail the March 2011 accident at Fukushima-daiichi, the consequences of the earthquake and tsunami that led to the meltdown of three reactors, the threat from the hundreds of tons of high level nuclear waste spent fuel at the site, and the ongoing challenge to control the hazards at the site today.

...Naoto Kan described how the operator of the Fukushima-daiichi nuclear reactors, Tokyo Electric Power Company, wanted to abandon the site. Kan refused to accept this given Fukushima's six reactors and the hundreds of tons of spent fuel pools that would devastate central Japan.

Naoto Kan told the seminar that it would have been be such a terrible disaster, many times greater than Chernobyl, that it would be definitely necessary to evacuate Tokyo and wider region. Naoto Kan explained that he was confronted with having to consider a worst case scenario that would have required a radius of 190 miles from Fukushima to be evacuated affecting 50 million people.

Kan told of the 160,000 people that remain displaced from Fukushima, with families scattered across Japan.

“Until March 2011 I thought about how to safely operate nuclear power. After Fukushima, my whole mindset has changed … and that we must now not operate nuclear reactors,” said Naoto Kan.

(Full article at the link)


In Japan, if the "industrial forces" mean electric power companies, yes they want to restart. They are bleeding money. Regulatory forces? If that means the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, so far they haven't shown much eagerness to restart anything anytime soon, to the surprise of many in Japan. The ones who want the restart of nuclear power plants in Japan are in those municipalities where nuclear power plants are located. They want money (government subsidies, electric power companies' gifts and donations), they want jobs.

Even when there is no government subsidy, Mayor of Tokai-mura, where J-PARC (that leaked radioactive gold and mercury into the environment through ventilation fans without anyone realizing that the extra-strong proton beams had evaporated the gold plate in their Hadron Collider by accident) is located, wants the restart of J-PARC experiment as soon as possible. Why? Because it is such a prestige and honor to have an advanced technological facility like this in his village!

(Never mind they were using ventilation fans like any household or restaurant kitchen...)

Monday, March 11, 2013

Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan Still Selling His Version of #Fukushima Nuclear Accident After Two Years


He continues to insist that such a huge earthquake and tsunami had never been anticipated. He continues to take full credit for preventing TEPCO from "withdrawing" (撤退), which was in fact "taking shelter" (退避).

Mr. Kan says he was invited to speak at a symposium by Dr. Helen Caldicott on March 11, 2013 in New York City commemorating the Fukushima nuclear accident, but he couldn't come in person, thus the video.

Here's the link to the English transcript, for those of you who'd rather read.

My Experiences as Prime Minister during the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster from Cinema Forum Fukushima on Vimeo.


Mr. Kan remains a hero for many people for saving Japan and the world from a nuclear accident which could have been far worse, and a champion for renewable energy proponents. There are also many who hold him to be criminally liable for what happened.

"Countdown, Meltdown", the book by Mr. Yoichi Funabashi, president of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation that did the first large-scale investigation of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident, depicts how Mr. Kan and his cabinet ministers reacted to the accident in the early days. Mr. Kan and Mr. Goshi Hosono, then Mr. Kan's personal adviser, according to Mr. Funabashi, were in mortal fear that Japan would be taken over and occupied by a foreign power (the United States, most likely) if they accepted the foreign help in dealing with the unfolding nuclear disaster.

Monday, December 31, 2012

(Now They Tell Us) US Nuclear Terrorism Specialists Were Sent to Japan Right After the Start of Fukushima Nuclear Accident to Measure Radiation


A short article by Kyodo News doesn't reveal much details, but it is clear, sort of, that the US was measuring radiation from the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident from very early on.

Kyodo News writes as if everybody knew there was a team of US experts measuring radiation around Fukushima I Nuke Plant right after the accident. (Did we?)

Kyodo News (12/31/2012):

米、原発事故に核特殊チーム派遣 初展開、菅政権把握せず

US sent a nuclear special team to Japan, first [overseas] deployment of the team; Kan administration did not know about the deployment

東電福島第1原発事故直後に、原発周辺の放射線量を測定するために米政府が日本に派遣したのは、核テロなどに備える特殊専門チームだったことが31日、分かった。このチームが海外へ本格展開した初の事例だったが、当時の菅直人政権中枢は派遣の事実を当初把握していなかったことも判明。チームが実測したデータの公表が遅れ、住民の「無用な被ばくを招いた」(福島県浪江町議会の吉田数博議長)恐れがある。

It was revealed on December 31 that a team that the US government sent to Japan in order to measure radiation around Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant right after the start of the nuclear accident was a special team to counter nuclear terrorism. It was the first overseas deployment for this team, but the core officials in the Kan administration weren't aware of the deployment at that time. The actual measurement [as opposed to simulations like SPEEDI] by the team was therefore delayed, and it may have caused "unnecessary radiation exposure" for the residents (Namie Town Assembly chairman).

チーム派遣決定に関わった複数の米政府関係者と、日本側当局者らが共同通信に明らかにした。

Multiple sources in the US government and the Japanese counterparts who were involved in the deployment disclosed the news to Kyodo Tsushin.

派遣されたのは、上空からガンマ線を実測し汚染状況を分析する「被害管理対応チーム」の33人。

The team consisted of 33 people in "Damage Control and Response Team" [my translation, probably not the official name] in charge of measuring gamma radiation from the sky and analyzing the situation of contamination.


Could this team be from Nuclear Emergency Support Team? Kyodo article has a photograph provided by the US National Nuclear Security Administration, so it is likely it was this team.

Monday, November 5, 2012

#Radioactive Japan: Naoto Kan Is One of Candidates Considered by an Anti-Nuke Citizens' Group as Next Governor of Tokyo


Never a dull day in Japan, full of (literally) fantastic stories.

This one I thought was a bad joke floating on the net, but it turns out the joke has a real possibility. So far, it is just a possibility, but the anti-nuclear citizens' group "Let’s Decide Together / Citizen-initiated National Referendum on Nuclear Power" set up a committee called "I Change Tokyo", and will interview several candidates on November 8 to decide who to endorse.

From the tweets (here and here) by the secretary-general of the group and a publishing author, reporting on a preliminary meeting they had on November 4:

「私はこの人を推す」では7人がプレゼン/湯浅誠、上原公子、宇都宮健児、菅直人、山本太郎……。意見交換をして「脱原発」だけじゃなく「原発」都民投票や「日の丸・君が代処分」など6項目について、考えを質し姿勢を確かめようということになりました。

Seven people made presentations about the candidates they would endorse. [The candidates were] Makoto Yuasa, Hiroko Uehara, Kenji Utsunomiya, Naoto Kan, Taro Yamamoto... We decided to speak with [these candidates] and ask them not only about "beyond nuclear" (脱原発) but 6 issues including nuclear plant referendum in Tokyo and punishment over the national flag and the national anthem.


As this news spread and people were dismayed, a horde of people started filling the net defending Kan by the now familiar refrain: "He saved Tokyo!" "He saved the world!" "Resolute leader!" "He stopped Hamaoka!"
  • Mr. Makoto Yuasa is a social activist and a former advisor to PM Naoto Kan.

  • Ms. Hiroko Uehara is a former mayor of Kunitachi City in Tokyo and a Social Democrat.

  • Mr. Kenji Utsunomiya is a high-profile attorney.

  • Mr. Taro Yamamoto is an actor turned anti-nuclear activist.


If Mr. Kan is really running for the governor of Tokyo, I guess temporary "downsizing" is in fashion. The boy wonder mayor of Osaka City was the governor of Osaka Prefecture, and now he says he will enter the national politics.

Among other things, I remember Mr. Kan as hiding behind TEPCO in early April in 2011 when they had to dump low-contamination water to make room for the highly contaminated water collected after cooling the broken reactors at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. Messrs. Kan (PM) and Edano (Chief Cabinet Secretary) and Kaieda (Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, in charge of NISA) had a middle manager of TEPCO make an announcement in the press conference, instead of them, particularly the "resolute" prime minister, announcing it. The message was clear: the nuclear accident was a problem of a private enterprise, nothing to do with the government. When the neighboring countries got upset that they hadn't been informed prior, Mr. Edano said the Foreign Ministry had sent them a fax.

Some argue that the citizens of Tokyo who elected Ishihara deserve no better. I suppose. But even those people didn't expect disaster debris with radioactive particles, arsenic, and asbestos to be burned right where they lived, thanks to the "resolute" governor.

Other mainstream choices for the coming gubernatorial election? Current Vice Mayor of Tokyo Naoki Inose with the strong endorsement from Mr. Ishihara, and Ms. Yuko Ando, Fuji TV newscaster, as LDP candidate.

The rationale behind the female newscaster is that a woman will be more attuned to what matters to people, kinder and gentler coalition building skills, and other typical blah blah blah. Well that has worked well for the citizens of Yokohama City, whose mayor "attuned" to the people's concerns kept feeding school children with radioactive beef despite protests from the parents.

Laugh and be merry. A laugh a day keeps radioactive cesium at bay.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

(UPDATED WITH EMBEDDED VIDEOS) TEPCO's Video of Teleconferencing in the Early Days of the #Fukushima Accident in March 2011


(UPDATE) From Sankei Shinbun's Youtube channel, when Reactor 3 exploded:


When they were trying to operate SR valve in Reactor 2 to reduce pressure:


==========================================

Live now at Nico Nico Video, but it is set to be over in less than 10 minutes...

Link is here: http://live.nicovideo.jp/watch/lv102784801?ref=top&zroute=index

Screen shot:


I'm watching it, but there is no sound. Comments from people who have been watching this (2 hours 30 minutes into the video) are interesting. Some examples:

I now think better of Dr. Madarame. In the video, he was not what I thought he was.

TEPCO HQ is so incompetent.


There was a clip right now with sound:

"1F (Fukushima I), there is a tsunami warning in Hamadori right now, 3 meter high they say. Please pay attention and be careful."


That must have been from the afternoon of March 11, 2011... (CORRECTION: It was on March 14, 2011, after one of the aftershocks that happened between 10AM and 11AM. From Japan Meteorological Agency data, 3/14/2011.)

TEPCO should just disclose everything, with sound. Even NHK says so.

Here's the link to Nikkei Shinbun's article, which has a video when Reactor 3 blew up:
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG0401X_W2A800C1000000/?dg=1

It was more like Plant Manager Yoshida was calling "mayday, mayday" when Reactor 3 blew up. The people at TEPCO HQ didn't seem to comprehend what Yoshida was saying for several seconds, and started to respond as if Yoshida had just said he was going out to lunch.

They started to say "hai", "hai" - OK, yes -, then "Uh... so it's the same as Reactor 1? OK it's an emergency. I will issue emergency communication then..."

In the background at Fukushima I Nuke Plant, you can hear frantic workers scrambling to figure out what happened and what to do.

Thursday, August 2, 2012

PM Noda to Meet with Organizers of Friday Protest Against Ooi Nuke Plant Restart, as Early as on August 3


Just like this sometimes-cynical old-timer (I presume; at least he doesn't seem to be in the same generation as the organizers of the Friday protest) has astutely predicted, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan had already coordinated with current Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda so that PM Noda would meet with these young organizers as representatives of anti-nuclear movement, even before Mr. Kan met with the organizers on July 31.

Now, Asahi Shinbun says PM Noda will be happy to meet with the organizers on Friday August 3. Oops. The government is moving in quickly. The meeting was supposed to be sometime next week.

I wonder what these "single issue" organizers will say to Noda. Saikado Hantai? Do they have any other game plan? (......no?) This will likely be the last meeting if

From Asahi Shinbun (8/2/2012):

野田佳彦首相は、毎週金曜日に官邸前で関西電力大飯原発(福井県おおい町)の再稼働への抗議行動を呼びかけている市民団体のメンバーと、近く面会する意向を固めた。早ければ、次の抗議行動が予定される3日にも会う方向で調整している。

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided to meet with the members of the citizens' group who has been calling for a protest every Friday at the Prime Minister's Official Residence against the restart of KEPCO Ooi Nuclear Power Plant (Ooi-cho, Fukui Prefecture). The coordination is under way to set up the meeting on August 3, the day when the next protest is planned.

 首相は13の市民団体や個人による連絡組織「首都圏反原発連合」の代表者と会う意向。これまで首相は「一つ一つ、デモの皆さまに出て行って会うことは前例がない」として、超党派の国会議員でつくる「原発ゼロの会」を通じた面会要請も断ってきた。だが、抗議行動は広がりをみせ、「民意を軽く考え過ぎている」との批判が政権内からも出ていることを踏まえ、方針転換した。

Prime Minister Noda will meet with the representatives of "Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes", which is made up of 13 different citizens' groups and individuals. So far, the prime minister has declined to meet with the protesters, saying there is no precedent to do so. He has so far declined the request for a meeting through the bi-partisan group of politicians called "Zero Nuke Plant". However, as the protest is growing bigger in size and there is criticism within his administration that [PM Noda is] not taking people's wishes seriously, Mr. Noda has had a change of heart.

 ただ、首相には大飯原発の再稼働を見直す考えはなく、面会ではエネルギー政策の見直し方針への理解を求めるとみられる。

However, the prime minister has no intention of reconsidering the restart of Ooi Nuclear Power Plant, and he is expected to ask for understanding of the government's energy policy review.


Whatever that means. One of the organizers has tweeted his thinking on the demands that his group would make. The demands are:

Stop all nuclear power plants immediately and decommission them.
Stop all restarts immediately.
Scrap all the new constructions of nuclear reactors and plants immediately.
Withdraw immediately from nuclear fuel recycling business immediately.
Scrap the appointment of the members for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Help the victims of the nuclear accident.
Make people accountable for the accident.
Improve the work condition of the plant workers.
Remove excessive police presence in the protests at PM's Official Residence.


(Sarcasm hat on.) I can almost hear the dialogue...

Friday Protest Organizers: ... ... [plug in the sentence from above.]

Prime Minister Noda: Thank you very much for your comment. We will try our best to come up with a plan to operate nuclear power plants safely to protect the way of living for the Japanese people. (Noda repeats the answer for every single "request".)


(Sarcasm hat off.)

There are many tweets praising the organizers for this "achievement" of securing a meeting with the nation's prime minister.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant "Roadmap" Monthly Progress Report (1): Workers Picking Up Radioactive Debris for Future Testing, Getting 0.3 Millisievert for 1-Hour Work


Hardly anyone seems to pay serious attention to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant itself these days, except occasional, perfunctory mentions of how radioactive materials are still spewing from the reactors and how the groundwater is being contaminated because the basements are leaking (almost always without citing the actual numbers).

All the talk about imminent collapse of Reactor 4 has all but died down, and no sensational stories about the plant are circulating on Japanese Twitter.

So what is TEPCO, now officially the government company with the capital infusion of 1 trillion yen (US$12.8 billion), doing these days at the plant?

Very prosaic, mundane jobs like picking up concrete debris to save for later testing, trying to unclog the pipe to insert a thermocouple, hosing down the fuel assembly. They have been also building the multi-nuclide absorption towers (Toshiba), trying to replace Kanaflex hose for the transport of contaminated water, trying to clean the subdrain pit water, and asking workers from affiliate companies how they are doing.

This post is the first installment from the monthly report, about the workers picking bits of concrete rubble near the blown-up reactors at Fukushima I Nuke Plant. In the report, it is the last item, but it stuck with me as I browsed through the report yesterday while listening to the press conference given by Naoto Kan and his "Zero Nuke" group of politicians.

The workers got 0.3 millisievert radiation exposure for one-hour work of picking up concrete bits, and the concrete bits are not very "radioactive" in Fuku-I standard (it would be considered extremely high outside the plant), at 2,000 microsieverts/hour (or 2 millisieverts/hour).

Where is that former Prime Minister who supposedly scolded top executives at TEPCO and urged them to go to Fukushima I Nuke Plant, saying he himself would go with them? Why isn't he picking up the pieces of radioactive rubble, instead of the workers who may be paid only 8,000 yen (US$102) per day for their work?

From TEPCO's July 30, 2012 monthly progress report on the "Roadmap to decommissioning the reactors at Fukushima (available in Japanese only), pages 84 to 89 (I added the labels):


The former Prime Minister Naoto Kan was busy trying to re-invent himself as champion of "ordinary citizens" who are against nuclear power plants and as key man who can connect these citizens with the power that be (Prime Minister Noda and his high-ranking ministers like Mr. Edano), when he and his supposedly anti-nuclear group of politicians held a press conference and the closed meeting with those "citizens" on July 31. But that will be another post.

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Accident: "I'm Not Responsible" Says Naoto Kan, Former Prime Minister of Japan


From Jiji Tsushin (7/11/2012):

自己責任を否定=原発事故調に反論-菅前首相

Former Prime Minister Kan denies responsibility for self, argues against the Diet Investigation Commission['s conclusions]

民主党の菅直人前首相は11日付のブログで、東京電力福島第1原発事故について「原因の大半は、事故発生の2011年3月11日以前にある。これが私の結論だ」と述べ、自らの責任を否定する一方、東電や経済産業省原子力安全・保安院の対応を批判した。

In his blog post dated July 11, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan, of Democratic Party of Japan, commented on the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident by saying, "Almost all the causes for the accident had existed before March 11, 2011, the day the accident happened. And that's my conclusion." He denied his own responsibility, and criticized the response [to the accident] by TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

国会の事故調査委員会が報告書で、首相官邸の過剰な現場介入を「事故の進展を止められず、被害を最小化できなかった最大の要因」と結論付けたことへの反論。菅氏は当面、ブログで持論を連載する。

It is a rebuttal to the Diet Investigation Commission's report that concluded the excessive interference by the Prime Minister's Office with the efforts at the plant was "the largest factor that prevented [TEPCO from] arresting the progress of the accident and minimizing the damage". Mr. Kan plans to write about his conclusions on his blog for a while.


Mr. Kan sounds very familiar. Just blame the predecessors. It's the default position of the current president of the United States.

Mr. Kan's blog is here, if you read Japanese: http://ameblo.jp/n-kan-blog/

(Or "Blame Canada"...)

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

LDP "Shadow Foreign Minister: "Prime Minister's Office Refused to Accept Radiation Data from the US"


On June 18, 2012, Asahi Shinbun reported that:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received the fax from the US showing the contamination map created from the actual data collected by Global Hawk drones via the US Embassy in Tokyo on March 18 and 20 last year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Asahi that it immediately forwarded the fax to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Ministry of Education. NISA and the Ministry of Education both sat on the data.


A Lower House Representative and "Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs" of LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) describes the event a bit differently.

Itsunori Onodera, a Representative from Miyagi District 6, tweeted on June 18, 2012 as follows:

福島原発事故直接の米国データ公表しなかった件、事故直接、官邸が受け付けないので、何とかして欲しいと私の事務所にも米国大使館から要請があり、官邸につなぎました。ですが結局無視されてしまいました。あまりに無責任。

About the data from the US right after the Fukushima nuclear accident started, the US Embassy asked my office to do something because the Prime Minister's Official Residence wouldn't accept the data from them directly. So I liaised with the PM's Official Residence. However, in the end it was ignored. It is just too irresponsible.


Some of the people responding to his tweet are rather critical of him. They say, "So what did you do then? Did you speak out?"

Mr. Onodera, as with many people at that time - journalists, experts, politicians, bloggers - may have self-censored so as not to cause panic among the population. Or simply, the earthquake and tsunami damage seemed overwhelmingly bigger than the nuclear accident, even after 3 (visible) explosions. (What happened in Reactor 2 is still not known or disclosed.) It was when some people were saying "Let's go out, have fun and spend money so that the economy doesn't contract and deflation further sets in", as I read at that time on an online message board in Japan.

But the government officials at the Prime Minister's Official Residence knew full well what the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident meant, as Mr. Edano was on record suggesting the evacuation plan for wider areas in Kanto be considered. If what Mr. Onodera says is true, there's some explaining to do for Mr. Edano, Mr. Kaieda, and Mr. Kan.

Sunday, May 27, 2012

#Fukushima Accident Investigation: It's Naoto Kan's Turn to Take the Witness Stand in the Diet Commission

For all Naoto Kan fans, here's the link at Nico Nico Video (you need an account if you don't have one):

http://live.nicovideo.jp/watch/lv93459134?ref=nicotop

At IWJ's USTREAM Channel:

http://t.co/aU6Of2kC

(Watching the testimony at Nico Nico)

He's now blaming Haruki Madarame.

Why was he in the meeting with the opposition leaders to begin with on March 11, 2011 when the situation deteriorated rapidly in Fukushima I Nuke Plant?

Just like Yukio Edano, Kan is busy painting himself as "victim" who was left out of the info loop.

About TEPCO "withdrawal" - Kaieda came in the morning of March 15, 2011.

...

It was the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency who declined help from the US, one of the commissioners just said.

Thursday, May 17, 2012

Banri Kaieda Says Then-PM Naoto Kan Couldn't Decide Whether to Declare a Nuclear Emergency Without Knowing "Legal Basis"


. . . (sigh).

The Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission set up by the Diet called Banri Kaieda as witness on May 17.

Kaieda was the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry who oversaw the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency when the Fukushima nuclear accident happened in March 2011. After losing the leadership election of the Democratic Party of Japan to Yoshihiko Noda in August last year, thanks partly to NHK, he has kept a low profile unlike Naoto Kan (who went on a media blitz to spread his version of the accident), Yukio Edano (who quickly became the Minister of the Economy), or Goshi Hosono (who was promoted from a personal assistant to Kan to the minister in charge of the nuclear accident and then to the Minister of the Environment).

The hearing lasted two and a half hours, and the media reporting it picked different aspects of his testimony. So, from several newspapers and NHK, here's what Kaieda had to say about the early days of the worst nuclear accident in Japan. Nikkei Shinbun has the most extensive coverage. (Emphasis is mine.)

From Nikkei Shinbun (5/17/2012):

  • In accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, TEPCO notified the Ministry of Economy at 4:45PM on March 11, 2011 after the loss of power to Reactor 1 and Reactor due to the tsunami. Kaieda, as Minister of Economy, requested then-Prime Minister Kan to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. But it took PM Kan until after 7PM to declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation.

    Kaieda said "It took a long time to obtain Mr. Kan's agreement [to declare a Nuclear Emergency and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters]" because Kan had to be satisfied with information such as the condition of the reactors and the legal basis for [declaring, etc.].

  • About injecting seawater into the reactors to cool, Kaieda said Mr. Kan expressed his concern that injecting seawater might cause re-criticality.

  • Kaieda felt that TEPCO didn't start the injection of seawater immediately because the company was hesitant to decommission the reactors. [If you pour in seawater into a reactor, the reactor cannot be restored.]

  • Kaieda received a telephone call on late night on March 14, 2011 from Masataka Shimizu, then-President of TEPCO, who told Kaieda that he would like to evacuate the workers from Fukushima I Nuke Plant to Fukushima II (Daini) Nuke Plant. Kaieda interpreted the call to mean it was a "complete withdrawal".

  • Kaieda emphasized that he thought "it was a grave mistake" for Kan to closet himself in his office on the 5th floor of the Prime Minister's Official Residence. The risk control center [for the nuclear accident] was located in the basement.

  • Kaida felt that it was like a telephone game among the PM's Official Residence, TEPCO Headquarters, and Fukushima I Nuke Plant.


From Yomiuri Shinbun (5/17/2012):

  • Kaieda requested Kan that he declare a Nuclear Emergency Situation and set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, but Kan asked "what's the basis?" So then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano and PM's assistants [no doubt including Goshi Hosono] had to pour over the related laws and regulations. In the meantime, Kan did other things including attending a meeting with the opposition party leaders.


From NHK (5/17/2012):

  • About the delay in the vent to lower the pressure inside the Containment Vessel [of Reactor 1], Kaieda said he thought "TEPCO is hesitant, because the company wants to minimize the accident".


I didn't know the reason for the delay in declaring a Nuclear Emergency. I didn't know TEPCO's proposal to evacuate the workers was to Fukushima II Nuke Plant. As to injecting seawater (or for that matter, any kind of water) may have been hard with increasing pressure inside the RPV.

Two interesting points:

  • There was no one who was able to tell then-Prime Minister Kan, "Prime Minister, just do it", when Kan wasted everyone's time by wanting to know the legal basis for declaring a Nuclear Emergency. Instead, Kan insisted on knowing the legal basis, and Edano (and no doubt Hosono) went to look up the information for their Prime Minister when every second might have counted. Not really a picture of a resolute leader as Kan wants to portray himself.

  • TEPCO's "complete withdrawal" was what Kaieda thought, not necessarily what then-President Shimizu of TEPCO told him. He didn't tell Kaieda that he wanted complete withdrawal, but since he didn't tell Kaieda that it would be partial withdrawal either, in Kaieda's mind it was "complete withdrawal".


Yukio Edano's turn as the witness will come on May 27. Goshi Hosono will be interviewed by the commission on May 19, but it will be closed to public, according to Mainichi (5/18/2012). Hosono says he requested the open hearing, but the commission said no, because Hosono was not in a decision-making position when the accident started. (Huh?)

On May 28, Naoto Kan will be the witness.

Monday, May 14, 2012

TEPCO's Chairman Katsumata: PM Kan's Meddling Excessive During the First Critical Hours of the Accident

Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata of TEPCO appeared before the Diet investigation commission on the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant Accident on May 14. For the most part, just like when they called TEPCO's then-VP Muto, the commissioners didn't seem to be successful at drawing any useful information from him.

But one thing he said about then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan caught my attention because I didn't know about it.

From Jiji Tsushin (part; 5/14/2012):

東京電力福島第1原発事故を検証する国会の事故調査委員会(委員長=黒川清・元日本学術会議会長)は14日、東電の勝俣恒久会長を参考人として招き、公開で事情聴取した。勝俣会長は菅直人前首相が事故直後、第1原発の吉田昌郎前所長に携帯電話で直接指示していたことについて、「所長は復旧に全力を尽くすのが一番大事。時間を取られるのは芳しいことではない」と批判した。

The Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (Chairman Kiyoshi Kurokawa, former head of the Science Council of Japan under the Cabinet Office) held a public hearing on May 14 with TEPCO's Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata as a witness. Chairman Katsumata referred to then Prime Minister Naoto Kan giving direct orders to Masao Yoshida, the plant manager of Fukushima I Nuke Plant, over the cellphone immediately after the start of the accident. Katsumata criticized that "the plant manager's primary duty was to do his best to restore the plant. It was not a good thing that he [Yoshida] had to take time dealing with the prime minister".


Well we could also say that it should have been the job of the TEPCO headquarters in Tokyo to shield Yoshida from having to answer phone calls from the prime minister who claimed to know a lot about nuclear power because he had a technical degree (he went on to become a patent attorney after graduation), so that the plant manager could do his job at the plant.

Mr. Katsumata, whatever you think of him as the head of "evil" TEPCO, is extremely sharp, which was very evident last year when I watched his press conference. It would take equally intelligent and clever people to get information out of him, but the Diet commissioners have been more keen on grand-standing (as the sessions are open to public and netcast live).

The Diet's commission will call then-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda on May 16. We'll see if the commissioners do better job on Kaieda.

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

In March Last Year, NISA Officials Had Withdrawn from #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Before TEPCO Did

Sankei Shinbun never liked Naoto Kan. For that matter, none of the Japanese mainstream media outlets liked him. While he was in charge of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident as the prime minister of Japan, they were highly critical of his handling of the accident. That seems to have stopped after Noda was elected as the party leader and prime minister; they hardly snickered at Noda's declaration of "cold shutdown state".

Sankei still goes after him with this article on April 24, 2012, albeit obliquely. The article is about the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency which is supposed to be abolished and replaced by the new agency under the Ministry of the Environment (Goshi Hosono's influence-peddling outfit), and what a disgrace it was that the agency regulating the nuclear industry had failed so miserably in the first days of the accident.

In the 2-part article titled "Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency withdrew from the plant on its own, 3 days after the disaster struck", Sankei reports (part):

 保安院には順守することを定めた4つの行動規範がある。筆頭は「強い使命感」であり、こう続く。《常に国民の安全を第一に考えた任務遂行》《緊急時における安全確保のための積極果敢な行動》。残り3つは「科学的・合理的な判断」「業務執行の透明性」「中立性・公正性」だ。しかし、11年前の保安院設置時に掲げられた崇高な理念は浸透していなかった。

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency has the code of conduct that everyone should adhere to. The first is "Strong sense of duty: carry out tasks with the safety of the citizens first; act aggressively to secure safety in an emergency". The other three are: "Scientific and rational decision-making", "Transparency in carrying out tasks", "Neutrality and fairness". However, these noble ideals codified when the agency was created 11 years ago hadn't become part of the agency.

 1号機が水素爆発した昨年3月12日。原子力災害対策本部が置かれた首相官邸は異常な雰囲気に包まれた。飛び交う断片情報に駆け回る関係閣僚や官僚。しかし、そこにいるべき重要な人物がいなかった。

March 12, 2011, when Reactor 1 had a hydrogen explosion. The atmosphere was unusually tense at the Prime Minister's Official Residence where the nuclear disaster response headquarters was set up. The ministers and bureaucrats were scurrying to piece together the fragmented information. But there was one person missing from the scene.

 当時の保安院院長、寺坂信昭(59)だ。原子力規制を担う組織のトップで、原災本部事務局長でもある。彼はその前日、つまり東日本大震災発生の当日午後7時すぎ、原災本部初会合終了時には官邸を去り、保安院に戻っていた。

Nobuaki Terasawa (age 59), Director General of the NISA was missing. He was the head of the organization that regulates the nuclear industry, and he was also the head of the secretariat of the nuclear disaster response headquarters. He had left the Prime Minister's Official Residence at 7PM on the previous day on March 11, 2011, after the first meeting of the nuclear disaster response headquarters, and had returned to the NISA.

 「事務系の人間なので、私が残るよりも技術的により分かった人間が残った方がいいと判断した」。今年2月15日の国会事故調査委員会で、証人として呼ばれた寺坂は、そう弁明した。質問した委員の中央大法科大学院教授、野村修也(50)は「規制行政庁のトップに原子力についての知見を持たない方がなっておられるということか」と言葉を失った。

"Because I am not the technical person [don't have a technical degree], I decided it was better to have someone there who understood [the nuclear technology] better, rather than me staying there." Terasaka tried to explain in the February 15 hearing of the investigation committee of the Fukushima accident set up by the Diet. Professor Shuya Nomura (age 50) of Chuo University Law School was left speechless. "So the head of the regulating agency was someone who didn't know much about nuclear technology."

 保安院に戻ってからも、寺坂が官邸に電話したのは「数回程度」(寺坂)。規制機関のトップとして、首相の右腕となり事故対応の中心的役割を担うべき人物は全く機能しなかった。

After he returned to the NISA, Terasawa called the PM's Official Residence "a few times" (according to Terasawa). He was supposed to be the right-hand man for the prime minister as the head of the regulating agency and be in charge of responding to the accident. It didn't work that way at all.

“敵前逃亡”は寺坂だけではない。福島第1原発で勤務していた保安検査官らも同様だった。当時、原発敷地内には保安検査官ら職員8人がいた。平時は施設の巡視点検などを行うのが役割だが、緊急時には現場確認や本院への情報提供を行うことになっている。

It was not Terasawa alone who "fled in the face of the enemy". The Nuclear Safety Inspector and other NISA officials who worked at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant did the same. At the time of the accident, there were 8 NISA officials including Nuclear Safety Inspector. In normal times, they would make a tour of inspection on the plant. In an emergency, they were to inspect the scene of the accident and provide information to the NISA.

 彼らは、3号機が水素爆発し、2号機でも原子炉内部の放射性物質を含む蒸気を外部に逃す「ベント」ができないなど、状況が悪化する中、事故から3日後の昨年3月14日午後5時には、独断で現地を離れていた。国は現場の情報を得るチャンネルを失い、情報収集は東電に頼らざるを得ない状況が生まれた。

As the situation deteriorated after Reactor 3 had a hydrogen explosion and the vent couldn't be carried out at Reactor 2 to release the radioactive steam from inside the reactor, they withdrew from the plant on their own decision by 5PM on March 14, 2011, 3 days after the start of the accident. So the national government lost the channel through which to obtain information at the scene of the accident, and now had to rely on TEPCO for information.

 保安検査官らが撤退した日は、東電が政府に「全面撤退」を申し入れたとされる時期と重なる。当時の首相、菅直人(65)は同15日早朝に東電本店に乗り込み「撤退はありえない」と拒否したが、この時すでに政府側が現場から撤退していたのだ。

Around the same time the Nuclear Safety Inspectors and others left the plant, TEPCO was said to be asking the government for "complete withdrawal" from the plant. Then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan (age 65) made his way to the TEPCO headquarters in the early morning of March 15, and refused TEPCO's said request to withdraw. But at that time, the government side had already withdrawn from the scene of the accident.


I have no problem with having the NISA's head without a technical or science degree. What you would need in the situation like this is not the technical or scientific knowledge but common sense, leadership, good grasp of overall picture, and will and authority to commandeer people who do know technical details. Instead, he simply went home because he didn't have a technical degree.

With that kind of director general, it's not surprising at all that the NISA people at the plant withdrew on their own. I wonder if Kan had known about it when he went to TEPCO. Probably not. The NISA head would probably not have told the prime minister, because he probably didn't know about it himself.

Sunday, April 15, 2012

Japan's PM Noda in March 2011 as Finance Minister: "Don't Say Anything That Weakens TEPCO"

TEPCO's share price, to be more specific.

I posted on Friday about what Yukio Edano as Chief Cabinet Secretary was saying on March 12, 2011 ("We should start thinking about wide-area evacuation including Tokyo and Ibaraki"). It was revealed by the information disclosure request from Tokyo Shinbun.

Now it's Asahi Shinbun's turn. Asahi uncovered what the then-Finance Minister had said about TEPCO in the early days of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident. The then-Finance Minister is today's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

Remember the mention of some ministers who were worried about the stock market in the meeting after Reactor 1 blew up on March 12, 2011? Noda looks like he was one of them.

From Asahi Shinbun (4/15/2012):

「東電弱める発言は控えて」 財務相時に野田氏が発言

"Refrain from saying things that may weaken TEPCO", said Mr. Noda as finance minister

東京電力福島第一原発事故をめぐり、野田佳彦財務相(当時)が昨年3月31日夜の原子力災害対策本部会議で、東電の株価急落を懸念し、「(東電を)弱める発言は控えてほしい」と発言していたことがわかった。経済産業省原子力安全・保安院が13日、朝日新聞の情報公開請求に対し、複数の会議メモを開示した。

It has been revealed that Yoshihiko Noda, then-Minister of Finance, worried about the rapid decline of TEPCO's share price, said "I want you to refrain from saying things that may weaken (TEPCO)" during the meeting of the nuclear disaster response headquarters on the night of March 31, 2011. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry disclosed multiple memos of the meeting at the information disclosure request from Asahi Shinbun on April 13.

 会議は事故の約3週間後で、このころ、原子力損害賠償法に基づく事故の補償が巨額になる見通しから、東電の株価は急落。30日には東電の勝俣恒久会長が会社存続が厳しいとの見通しを示していた。

The meeting took place about 3 weeks after the start of the nuclear accident last year. Around that time, the share price of TEPCO dropped significantly on the prospect that the amount of accident compensations would be huge under the Atomic Energy Damage Compensation Law. On March 30, 2011, TEPCO's chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata was hinting that the existence of the company was in doubt.

 メモを総合すると、会議で野田財務相が「東電に国有化の話が出て、株価がストップ安に。株主60万人のうち、59万人ほどは個人で、経済への影響も大きい。東電を弱める発言は控えてほしい」と、東電への批判を牽制(けんせい)していた。

Taking the disclosed memos together, Noda as the Minister of Finance told the meeting participants, "If the nationalization of TEPCO is in the news, the share price will hit the stop limit. Of 600,000 shareholders of TEPCO, 590,000 are individual investors and the impact on the economy will be large. I want you to refrain from saying things that may weaken TEPCO", restraining others from criticizing TEPCO.

I think Koichiro Genba, then-minister in charge of national strategy and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, may be the other minister who was worried about the stock market and particularly about TEPCO. He was the one who said "Let's all cheer for TEPCO" in late March last year.

No surprise, it all makes sense. Noda has already told the foreign press that no one is responsible for the accident, and everyone is responsible for the accident.

Monday, March 19, 2012

Kan Administration Demanded TEPCO Not Record Kan's Tirade on March 15, 2011 Over TEPCO's "Withdrawal" from #Fukushima I Nuke Plant

Contrary to what TEPCO's PR person told the reporters during the media tour of the plant in February, it has turned out that the video and audio copies of the teleconferences between the parties involved (Fukushima I Nuke Plant management, TEPCO HQ, the Japanese government) do exist.

It has also turned out that the Kan administration officials may have instructed TEPCO to delete the audio portion of the contentious meeting in March last year between then-Prime Minister Kan and TEPCO officials where the prime minister threatened TEPCO not to withdraw from the plant.

Denki Shinbun is an industry newspaper covering energy and electricity issues, and it reports on this incident as follows (3/19/2012):

東電本店乗り込み時、菅氏怒声の録音停止指示か

Someone may have instructed TEPCO to stop recording when Mr. Kan angrily confronted TEPCO officials at the TEPCO headquarters

昨年3月15日に菅直人首相 (当時) が東京電力本店を訪れた際、官邸側の意向でテレビ会議システムの音声を一部消した可能性があることが、関係者の証言で明らかになった。 菅氏は東電が福島第一原子力発電所から全面撤退しようとしていると思いこんでおり、異常な興奮状態にあった。 そのため菅氏の同行者が、そのまま発言を記録されることを懸念したとみられる。 結果的に歴史的な事故の記録の一部が失われる事態に至ったことは波紋を呼びそうだ。

It has been revealed by the source involved that the Prime Minister's Office may have requested that part of the audio recording to be deleted during the teleconference when then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan visited the TEPCO headquarters on March 15 last year. Mr. Kan seemed possessed with the idea that TEPCO was planning to withdraw completely from Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, and was in a state of abnormal excitement. People accompanying Mr. Kan may have been worried that his remarks would be recorded verbatim. It may cause repercussions that part of the record of this historical accident has been lost this way.

国会の事故調査委員会によると、菅氏が東電本店2階の緊急時対策室に乗り込み、幹部をしかりつけている映像が残されていたが、その際の音声が途切れているため菅氏がどのような発言をしたかがわからなかった。

According to the investigation commission set up by the National Diet, there is a video of Mr. Kan scolding the TEPCO officials in the TEPCO's emergency response room on the 2nd floor of the TEPCO headquarters [in Tokyo]. But there is no audio to the video, and the commission has no way of knowing what Mr. Kan said.

菅氏は居並ぶ東電幹部に対して、 「逃げようとしたのはおまえか。おまえか」 と一人一人指を差していったという。 関係者の一部はこのときの様子について、東電側はこの際も通常通り録音を行うとしたが、同行者の一人が録音をしないように働き掛けたと証言している。 (本紙1面より抜粋)

According to the sources involved, Mr. Kan pointed the finger to each individual TEPCO official present, saying "Is it you who wanted to flee? Or is it you?" The sources told [this paper] that TEPCO was about to record the event as usual, but one of Kan's entourage told TEPCO not to record. (extracted from the article on the front page of this paper)

Personally, from what I've read from the interim report by the investigation committee set up by the Cabinet Office, I do not believe TEPCO intended to do so or that there was anything TEPCO could have done at that point (it took fire fighters to pour water from the fire engine booms to the spent fuel pools to lower the radiation levels somewhat).

It looks like someone fed the excitable prime minister some incomplete information about TEPCO's intention. I do not know whether that was intentional or unintentional; it may be the case of "Chinese whispers" game. Asahi Shinbun reported that Takamasa Shimizu, then-President of TEPCO, was desperately trying to reach Minister of Economy Kaieda, not Kan, that day, after the radiation levels in the plant compound spiked to a lethal level.

It has sure helped boost Kan's standing that he stood up against the villainous TEPCO.

Monday, March 12, 2012

Naoto Kan Writes for Foreign Affairs on March 11 Anniversary

Washington Post (Noda)? Nah. Former Prime Minister Kan will write for the limited, more sophisticated global readers who read Foreign Affairs magazine about the Fukushima nuclear accident.

Kan is smarter than Noda, and he opens the piece by talking about his father. Personalizing the accident. Clever ploy. His father told him about Prometheus, Kan says. Nice story. In addition to reading "Japan Sank (日本沈没)" by Sakyo Komatsu after the Fukushima accident started, he must be reading the Asahi Shinbun's "Trap of Prometheus" (which details his administration's horrendous response to the nuclear disaster).

From Foreign Affairs (3/8/2012), my comment in blue italic in square brackets:

Former Japanese PM Naoto Kan on the Fukushima Disaster
A Changing View of Nuclear Power

By Naoto Kan
March 8, 2012

My father was an engineer, and when I was a child, he told me the story of Prometheus, a famous Greek myth in which Zeus grows angry at Prometheus for giving humans the wisdom of fire, knowledge capable of bringing on disaster. As punishment, Zeus chains Prometheus to a rock, where an eagle pecks incessantly at his liver. Today, I cannot help but remember that story when I think about the development of nuclear technology, a modern-day incarnation of the wisdom of fire. [Alright, decent enough opening, you've got my interest. Now what?]

In college, I studied science and technology, and ever since, I have had a great admiration for the Pugwash conferences, a forum dedicated to the elimination of nuclear weapons (the group won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993). That is because nuclear weapons, which have the power to kill large numbers of people indiscriminately, are fundamentally at odds with the purpose of science, which is to contribute to people's well-being. To put it another way: Nuclear weapons contradict the very nature of humanity. In fact, this concern was the major reason why I aspired to be a political leader. [Uh... I don't see a connection.]

Long before the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, I knew there were serious unresolved issues regarding the safety of nuclear power and the disposal of radioactive waste. I took the position that these issues could be overcome by technology. With adequate safeguards, nuclear power plants could be operated safely and utilized wisely. Especially in recent years, in order to prevent global warming, nuclear power has been an effective replacement to power plants that feed on fossil fuels and pollute the atmosphere. In fact, before Fukushima, Japan had a plan to expand its network of nuclear plants. [The party line. No mention of nuke plants utilizing only one-third of heat generated and dumping the rest into the ocean, thus actually raising the temperature of seawater which may be contributing more to man-made global warming.]

Then, while I was serving as prime minister, the Tohoku earthquake occurred at 2:46 PM on March 11, 2011. Immediately, all reactors in operation at Fukushima Daiichi were shut down; nuclear activity there came to a halt. An hour after the earthquake, I received a report from Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) stating that several power generators at the Fukushima site were experiencing a total loss of power. An hour after that, there was an accident that suspended the cooling function. The earthquake had toppled the steel towers supporting power transmission lines. Saltwater damage rendered the emergency diesel generators inoperable. All power sources had been lost.

I was fully aware that total power loss and the suspension of cooling functions could then cause a meltdown and lead to further serious accidents such as the destruction of the reactor and the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. [Well you sure didn't act like you knew it was a meltdown.] We took every possible precaution, but our preparedness against total power loss proved insufficient. Over the next five days, Units 1, 2, and 3 melted down. Later, hydrogen explosions occurred inside the building of Units 1, 3, and 4. Fuel pools, used to store spent fuel, adjoin each reactor, and at one time, there was a possibility of the meltdown of this fuel pool, too. In the event of the meltdown of the fuel pools, a large amount of radioactive materials would have been discharged into the atmosphere, and if it continued, the evacuation of the entire metropolitan area, including Tokyo, might have been necessary.

If the reactors and spent fuel pools had gotten out of control, an enormous amount of radioactive material, possibly even several times more than the Chernobyl accident [Several times more? That's new info], would have been discharged into the atmosphere, impacting neighboring countries. To prevent this from happening was our responsibility as a nation. I was determined to fight to resolve the accident until the very end and at any cost, including the risk of my own life. [He could have volunteered to open the vent.]

The invisible menace of radioactivity would have seized Tokyo. The city is our nation's political and economic nerve center. Some 30 million people live in the metropolitan area. The impact of evacuating them all would have been immense. The impact on not only political matters but also the economy and human lives would have been immeasurable.

Fortunately, thanks to the life-risking efforts by TEPCO personnel, Japan's Self-Defense Forces, and local fire and police departments, injecting water into the reactors and fuel pools prevented further meltdowns and brought the entire accident under control. A very bad situation was narrowly prevented from becoming an accident of catastrophic proportions.

This accident was a war with an invisible enemy. [was? I thought it was still on-going.] The worst case scenario [which Kan declared "doesn't exist" and hid it until January this year] would have brought serious harm to the nation of Japan as well as a considerable inconvenience to its neighbors. [inconvenience?]

I have thought very hard about the types of safety measures necessary to prevent any such disaster from happening again. However, when one weighs these measures against the tremendous risks, it is clear that no amount of precautions will make a country completely safe from nuclear energy. I have reached the conclusion, therefore, that the only option is to promote a society free of nuclear power. My administration, as a result, changed its policy to reduce Japan's dependency on nuclear power, and the current administration is basically following the same policy. [No it doesn't. As to Kan's changing policy, it was considered a ploy to curry favor with the population who didn't want anything nuclear after the accident.]

Furthermore, the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste, which needs to be isolated from humans for more than 100,000 years before decaying to a safe level, is a serious issue. Far into the future, it is possible that current nations or boundaries could look very different. Therefore, we need to address whether responsibility for final disposal should rest solely with each nation. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) currently states that the onus lies with each country, many nations, including Japan, do not have any clear solutions.

At the same time, this high-level radioactive waste problem presents a "generation ethics" issue: should we leave our burdens to future generations?

Despite the accident at Fukushima, plans abound for new nuclear power plants. Emerging nations such as China and India propose to meet their increased energy demands with new nuclear power. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty established clear rules. However, with regard to nuclear power, there are insufficient mandates when it comes to safety. In large part, so long as a country's nuclear program does not involve weapons production, its operation and control are considered to be the responsibility of that state alone. Likewise, the export of nuclear power plant technology is also often just a business issue, not one of international security. [Kan was the one pushing nuke plant to Vietnam and other developing countries in the world.]

At the current rate, by the year 2030, the world can anticipate at least 100 more nuclear power plants in addition to the 432 already in existence. With this expected increase, the problems of whether the safety of the world can be secured without establishing an international institution to guarantee protection against severe accidents and the safety of final disposal of high-level radioactive waste weigh heavy on my mind.

International rules regarding nuclear power plants should be discussed not only at the international organizational level on nuclear power such as the IAEA but also at the level of the United Nations.

While the Fukushima accident was caused by a total loss of power as a result of the earthquake and tsunami, other means -- such as terrorism, civil war, or war against other countries -- could bring about the same result. Taking advantage of the lessons we learned from the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, Japan should become a model country that is able to supply all its energy needs without depending upon nuclear power or fossil fuels.

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that every nation seriously consider a new framework for international rules regarding the safety of nuclear power plans and the disposal of high-level of radioactive waste. The costs of not doing so could ultimately be far too much to bear. [Why would international rules be any better than the national ones, particularly when the government like Japan and the company like TEPCO don't even follow their own rules?]

Well, the only intriguing part was the opening paragraph.

In case you missed, here's Kan's hagiography at Wall Street Journal on January 25, 2012. Kan definitely has a better PR agent than Noda.

Monday, February 27, 2012

Independent Investigation Commission on Fukushima Accident: Confusion from Interference by PM Kan and His Ministers Made the Situation Much Worse

The Independent Investigation Commission set up by a private foundation called Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation has issued the report of its findings of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident.

Unlike the investigation commissions set up by the administration and the Diet, the RJIF Commission has collected and studied information from the general public as well as from the experts.

The Commission will hold a press conference at 3PM on February 28, 2012 and discuss the findings, but Jiji Tsushin has a preview of the topics.

From Jiji Tsushin (2/28/2012):

官邸の介入で混乱も=「疑心暗記の連鎖」指摘-民間事故調報告書・福島原発事故

Confusion caused by the interference by the Prime Minister's Office, chain reaction of "doubts begot doubts", a private investigation commission on Fukushima Nuclear Plant accident says

 東京電力福島第1原発事故で、民間の「福島原発事故独立検証委員会」(民間事故調、委員長・北沢宏一科学技術振興機構前理事長)は28日までに、「官邸が現場に介入し混乱を呼んだ」などと指摘した事故報告書をまとめた。

The private "Independent Investigation Commission on Fukushima I Nuclear Plant Accident" (Chairman Koichi Kitazawa, former head of the Japan Science and Technology Agency) has compiled the report on the accident. In the report, the Commission points out that "the Prime Minister's Office meddling in the response at the scene of the accident caused confusion".

 民間事故調は昨年9月に設立。菅直人首相(当時)、枝野幸男官房長官(同)ら政府首脳を含む約300人から事情を聴取。事故発生時の首相官邸や経済産業省原子力安全・保安院の対応や、情報公開の在り方、事故の背景にある「安全神話」成立の背景などを調べた。

The private Commission was set up last September, and has heard from about 300 people including then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan and then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano and other top government officials. The Commission investigated the response at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, information disclosure practice, and how the "safety myth" arose, which contributed to the accident.

 報告書は、菅氏が原発に運ぶバッテリーの大きさまで確認するなど、官邸が現場に直接介入したことが混乱の一因になったと指摘。その半面、菅氏が全面撤退を考えていた東電を押しとどめ、制御不能になった原発事故が連鎖する「最悪のシナリオ」を防いだ功績もあるとした。

The report points to the direct interference of the Prime Minister's Official Residence into the response at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, causing confusion. For example, the report says Prime Minister Kan personally checked the size of the batteries to be brought to the plant. On the other hand, the Commission gives some credit to Kan, as he didn't allow TEPCO to pull out completely from the plant and prevented the "worst-case scenario" where an uncontrolled nuclear accident would occur one after another at the plant.

 事故調は東電の清水正孝社長(同)や吉田昌郎同原発所長(同)ら同社関係者の聴取も要請したが、東電側から拒否されたという。

The Commission says it asked the TEPCO officials including then-President Masataka Shimizu and then-Plant Manager Masao Yoshida to speak in front of the Commission but the request was declined by TEPCO.

In my rare defense of TEPCO, it is a lie propagated by Naoto Kan himself that TEPCO wanted to completely withdraw from the plant. TEPCO's president wanted to protect workers who were not directly involved in nuclear emergency response by evacuating them from the plant, when the radiation level at the plant spiked to extremely dangerous levels. In the early days of the crisis, the radiation levels at the plant were sometimes hundreds of millisieverts per hour in certain locations.

Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he knew all about nuclear power plants because he got his BS degree in applied physics (more like engineering). According to the investigation committee set up by the Diet, Kan insisted he be the one to tell TEPCO when to conduct the vent of Reactor 1.

He insisted he visit the plant on the morning of March 12 when everyone at the plant was scrambling to figure out what was happening (or figure out what to do about the meltdown that was happening). When he arrived, he went shouting and screaming at the plant management and workers.

I hear that the BBC documentary on Fukushima paints Kan as "decisive leader who made tough decisions". Unbelievable.

He, Edano, and Kaieda should have been the ones who carried hoses in the darkness in 100 millisieverts/hour radiation on the plant, not the Tokyo Metropolitan firefighters, as you see in the clip from the BBC documentary "Inside the Meltdown":

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Same Old Excuse from Goshi Hosono for Hiding the "Worst-Case Scenario": "We Were Afraid of a Panic in Tokyo"

Goshi Hosono, current Minister of the Environment and Minister in charge of the nuclear accident, was a special assistant to then-Prime Minister Kan when the March 11 triple whammy of earthquake/tsunami/nuke accident hit Japan last year.

He's already famously said that the small group of top officials in the Kan administration knew it was a core meltdown at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant right after the accident, but they "just didn't feel like announcing it".

Now, about the "worst-case scenario" from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency that the administration officials received on March 25 and which the administration declared it "didn't exist" after reading it, Hosono has this to say:

From Kyodo News (1/29/2012):

最悪シナリオ閲覧「数人」に限定 「混乱恐れて」と細野氏

The worst-case scenario perusal restricted to only "a handful", as "we were afraid of a panic", says Mr. Hosono

 細野原発事故担当相は29日までに、共同通信のインタビューに応じ、最近まで公開しなかった福島第1原発事故の「最悪シナリオ」に関し、情報漏えいによる混乱を恐れて当時の菅首相はじめ閲覧を「数人」に限った経緯を明らかにした。「当時公開していたら、東京から人がいなくなった可能性があった。そうなれば事故対応は危うかった」と言明。事故対応を優先した結果、一部しか情報共有を図らなかったと説明した。

Minister in charge of the nuclear accident Hosono allowed an interview with Kyodo News by January 29, and explained that how the "worst-case scenario", whose existence was hidden until recently, was shown only to a handful of officials including then-Prime Minister Kan for the fear of a panic if the information were to leak. He said, "If the scenario had been made public, people might have fled Tokyo. Then it would have been difficult to respond to the accident". He explained that the information was shared among only a small group of people because the response to the accident was the first priority.

Ummm. Mr. Hosono, the nuclear power plant is in Fukushima Prefecture, not Tokyo. Ordinary residents of Tokyo did not, and do not, have any role in coming up with measures to deal with the Fukushima I Nuke Plant accident. You did, and so did the administration that you were part of.

It's one thing not to have disclosed the information, but it is totally another to have simply sat on it and done nothing to prepare for the worst case or to properly instruct citizens, in particular residents of Tokyo Metropolitan areas, to take precaution.

Instead, the administration that Goshi Hosono was part of launched the safety campaign for the citizens and attacked people who were telling the truth (in retrospect) about the situation in Fukushima I Nuke Plant. The administration sent radiation "experts" from Nagasaki University to Iitate-mura who told the villagers it was totally safe to play outside, eat vegetables and drink water from the well. It laughed off the IAEA survey of radiation contamination in the village, saying it had its own standard to decide the danger levels, only to order the evacuation of the entire village 11 days later on April 11, 2011.

Goshi Hosono is doubling down on his already tarnished reputation by pressing the disaster debris contaminated with radioactive materials to municipalities all over Japan, totally oblivious to the fact that there is this thing called the Internet, and the citizens now know much more about the contaminated disaster debris than the government officials who can only talk in terms of "emotion" - let's help out people of Tohoku! - while some people in Tohoku itself are wondering why the debris has to be shipped outside, instead of building the plants inside the prefectures to process the debris.