(UPDATED) Newly Released TEPCO Teleconference Video: "It Didn't Occur to Us that Water Puddle Would Be Highly Radioactive..."

(UPDATE) TEPCO, under the new Abe administration, will not release any video to the general public this time. Only the reporters who belong to the Japan Press Club can visit TEPCO's headquarter building in Tokyo and view the video. Some openness.

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According to Yomiuri Shinbun, TEPCO has just released the third batch of its teleconference videos in the early days of the nuclear accident at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. No video available so far at TEPCO's site for the general public yet.

As Yomiuri reports, the plant manager Masao Yoshida is heard saying to the TEPCO headquarter people that it didn't occur to him that the water in the turbine building for Reactor 3 could be highly radioactive the next day after the radiation level had been checked.

Three workers from TEPCO affiliate companies were exposed to 2 to 6 sieverts of radiation on their feet on March 24, 2011.

From what little Yomiuri reports, it looks like teleconferencing may not be such a good thing to have during an extreme emergency like this. It may serve to fragment the effort, and have too many people without direct knowledge of the situation dictate the effort, as clearly happened between the plant and TEPCO headquarters in Tokyo.

From Yomiuri Shinbun (1/23/2013):

高放射能水の可能性失念…公開映像で吉田所長

Possibility of highly contaminated water didn't occur to the plant manager Yoshida, video [disclosed by TEPCO] reveals

東京電力は２３日、一昨年の福島第一原子力発電所事故直後、東京の本店と現場などを結び、事故対応を検討したテレビ会議の映像約２週間分を追加公開した。

On January 23, TEPCO made additional teleconference videos of about 2 weeks. [TEPCO] used the teleconference system that connected its headquarters in Tokyo, the plant, and other locations right after the start of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident nearly two years ago to deal with the accident.

東電は昨年８月から段階的に映像公開を進め、３度目となる今回の公開で、事故から１か月間（２０１１年３月１１日～４月１１日）の映像が出そろった。

TEPCO started to make the videos public in August last year, and this is the third installment. Now the videos that cover the one month period (March 11 to April 11, 2011) have been made public.

今回公開されたのは、３月２３～２９日と４月６～１１日の映像。３月２４日には、３号機タービン建屋地下にたまった高濃度汚染水で、関連会社の作業員３人が大量に被曝(ひばく)した。前日の現場確認時より汚染水が増え、作業環境が悪化することを予想しなかった結果だった。

This time, the videos cover from March 23 to 29, and April 6 to 11. On March 24, three workers from TEPCO's affiliate [subcontracting] companies were exposed to massive amount of radiation from the highly contaminated water in the basement of Reactor 3 turbine building. It happened because no one had thought that the amount of contaminated water might increase when they had done the survey of the work location, and that the work condition might worsen.

吉田昌郎所長（当時）は「高放射能のたまり水の可能性を失念し、次の日も（作業環境が）変わらないという思いこみがあった」「こんだけ（作業が）パラ（同時並行）で走っている。本店主体で進むと、現場のケアが十分じゃないという感じがしていた」と指摘。現場の状況を十分把握せず多数の作業を指示する東電本店に対し、不満を示した。

Masao Yoshida, then the plant manager, [is heard] saying "It didn't occurred to us that there might be highly contaminated water, and we took it for granted that (the work condition) would remain the same", and "So many jobs are being done in parallel (simultaneously). I have the feeling that if the headquarters people are the ones who tell us what to do, they may not know enough about what's going on at the plant", showing his dissatisfaction with the TEPCO headquarters that directed many jobs without fully understanding the situation at the plant.

So, Mr. Yoshida is saying TEPCO had surveyed the condition of the Reactor 3 turbine building basement, and didn't think it would be full of highly contaminated water the next day when the workers from affiliate companies entered. That doesn't still explain the testimony of one of the affiliate company workers that TEPCO workers also entered the basement the same day, and they withdrew after measuring 400 millisievert/hour radiation in the water.

TEPCO workers could have told the affiliate workers to get the hell out, but that clearly did not occur to them either.

On March 25, 2011, that water "puddle" in the Reactor 3 turbine building basement was:

• 1.5 meter deep; and

• had 3.9 million becquerels per cubic centimeter.

From March 20 to March 23, 2011, black smoke was rising from the wreckage of Reactor 3 building. During the same period, elevated levels of radiation were measured in wide areas in Tohoku and Kanto. Some "event" may have been happening in Reactor 3; one researcher, Fumiya Tanabe, speculates that's when the melted core in Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel melted through the RPV down to the Containment Vessel, as the amount of water being injected dropped to 24 tonnes per day (probably due to high pressure inside the RPV) from the previous 300 tonnes per day.

For more on the affiliate worker's allegation and the incident on March 24, 2011, see my November 1, 2012 post.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant Accident: TEPCO Didn't Procure Fire Engine from Its Own Thermal Power Plant Because It Was Afraid of Breaking the Law

Remember my post about how TEPCO employees at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant tried to "buy car batteries" in their desperate efforts to save the reactors from core melt, instead of just taking them? TEPCO headquarters and Toshiba also dutifully follow the law and waited for the permit to transport batteries on the highway.

I also wrote then that hardly any Japanese thought it odd that TEPCO hadn't just taken the batteries or that Toshiba hadn't simply shipped the batteries without a permit. Reaction from almost all Japanese who read the news was either:

• "Why didn't they have enough money?" (Or worse, "Why didn't they use credit cards?"

• "Why didn't the national government issue them the permit?"

• "We need more laws and regulations for emergencies!"

Asahi Shinbun, who watched all teleconference videos disclosed by TEPCO, has put their findings in a book. One of Asahi reporters who attended the early press conferences tweeted the link to a site that has the summary of the book.

According to the summary of Asahi's book at the site (which seems to be run by several anonymous journalists from the established media companies in Japan), TEPCO, who was incapable of deciding when to follow the law and when not to follow the law (like in an emergency after the nuclear accident), decided to follow the law also when it came to procuring a fire engine to cool the reactors.

From Book Navi website (1/9/2013; part):

消防車の確保で言えば、福島第一原発から南に20kmと一番近かった広野火力発電所の消防車は福島第一原発に投入されることはなかった。その理由は、広野火力発電所は石油コンビナート等災害防止法に基づく特定事業所で、大型消防車1台を「備え付けなければならない」と義務づけられており、広野にはその1台の消防車しかなく、なけなしの消防車を福島第一原発に送ることによる法令逸脱のリスクを誰も負わなかったということだ。誰かが、広野の消防車はあきらめようと判断しているのではなく、この消防車について誰も語らなくなってしまうという怖さが見て取れる。

As to procuring fire engines, the fire engine at Hirono Thermal Power Station, closest to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant at only 20 kilometers south of the plant, was never brought to Fukushima I Nuke Plant. The reason was that Hirono Thermal Power Station was designated as "specific station" under the Act on the Prevention of Disasters in Petroleum Industrial Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities. The Act obliges the Hirono Power Station to always have one large fire engine. There was only one such fire engine. If the engine were to be sent to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, there was a risk of deviating from the law. No one wanted to take that risk. It was not that someone actively decided they should give up on bringing the fire engine from Hirono. It was scarier, as people simply stopped talking about this fire engine.

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TEPCO's Teleconference Video on March 16, 2011: "Lunch Menu is Biscuits and Canned Saury"

About 50 minutes into the March 16, 2011 video linked in the previous post, there is an announcement from the Workers Welfare Section of Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant:

This is Workers Welfare Section. Lunch is distributed at ... Today's menu is biscuits and canned saury. Please bring your own spoon. If you don't have one...

I'll never forget the NISA official who said in March last year that it was none of the government's responsibility to provide the workers at the plant with decent food. He said, "Yes we're aware of the situation, but it's basically TEPCO's problem. No, we're not going to do anything about it."

The workers didn't have enough blankets in the beginning, either.

As hardly anyone in Japan has paid attention to details on what happened and why, this will be repeated in the next accident.

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TEPCO's Teleconference Video from March 16 to April 6, 2011 Shows TEPCO HQ's Ineptitude, Meddling by the Government (1)

Fukushima I Nuclear Plant Manager Yoshida said angrily to a manager in TEPCO HQ:

"If it [Reactor 3] explodes, we'll all die. Do you understand? Take it seriously and come up with the procedure!"

He was talking about the SDF helicopter's water dropping operation at the request of the Kan administration, which eventually took place on March 17, 2011.

On November 30, 2012, TEPCO released the 336 hours of its teleconference video from March 16 to 23, and from March 30 to April 6, 2011. TEPCO only made about 2 hours worth of the video available to the general public (online). The rest of the video is only available for viewing at TEPCO's headquarters and only by the qualified press (Japan press club members).

One such qualified press, Sankei Shinbun viewed part of the video, and wrote a series of articles on what they found.

Excerpts from Sankei Shinbun (12/1/2012) on the Self Defense Force spraying water onto the Spent Fuel Pool of Reactor 3 paint the scene as that of confusion and anger. The first segment below is from March 16, 2011, which is part of the video only available to the qualified press, and the second segment is on March 17, 2011, in the video TEPCO made available to public (embedded below, in Japanese only).

One caveat: Sankei has been highly critical of the Democratic Party of Japan's administrations, and they often go out of the way to emphasize the ham-handed meddling by the DPJ politicians.

[On March 16, 2011, Plant Manager Yoshida sternly speaks to a manager in TEPCO HQ. When the HQ manager suggests Yoshida should plan for emergency, Yoshida gets angry, and stops using the polite form of Japanese and breaks into a rather rude form, which I cannot fully render into English but tried my best.]

吉田昌郎所長「どういう水の入れ方をしていくのかというのをもうちょっとはっきりご指示いただきたい。手順書の形でもなんでもいいから」

Fukushima I Plant Manager Masao Yoshida: "How are they going to inject water? I would like you to instruct us a bit more clearly. Any instruction will do, like a procedure manual."

本店社員「手順の確立も大事なんですが、速やかに退避するとかそういう態勢、準備も必要かと」

Manager at TEPCO HQ: "It is important to establish a procedure, but I think it is also necessary to prepare for emergency and quick retreat."

吉田所長「そうなんだけど、そういう手順書を本店で作ってほしいのよ。ないの、そういうの。ただ水入れりゃいいと思っていたのかよ。周りでわれわれみてんだぜ。それでお前、爆発したら死んじゃうんだぜ。やるけどさ、これ今やらないといけないことは分かるけどさ、だったらもっと真剣にそういうものは作っておいてくれよ」

Yoshida: "Yes, but I want the HQ to create a procedure manual. Don't you have it? The manual? You thought simply pouring water would do it, is that it? We'll all be watching, around [the reactor]. And you know what, if it explodes, we'll all die, you understand? We'll do it, I understand it has to be done right now. So get serious, and come up with the procedure, please!"

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《翌１７日午前９時４８分、最初の放水用ヘリが到着、３号機に水を投下する場面がテレビに流れた》

(March 17, 2011 at 9:48AM, the first helicopter arrived, and the dumping of water on Reactor 3 was shown on TV.) [It's about 33 minutes into the video.]

原発所員「これか。（水が）かかってねーよ」

A worker at Fukushima I Nuke Plant: "This is it? Where's the water?"

別の原発所員「あー。３号（水が）とどいてねーや。なんだよ」

Another worker: "Agh. (Water) didn't reach Reactor 3. What is this?"

原発所員「ああー。霧吹きやなあ」

The first worker: "Oh well.. It is just a spray."

Spraying the water from air and capturing it on video and releasing the video worldwide was an idea by the Kan administration to appeal to the world that the administration was in control of the accident. After seeing the video, according to the former State Department official Kevin Maher, the US government officials called in the Japanese ambassador and said to him,

"Look, you have to take this stuff seriously. We don't know what's going to happen."

Maher said the US government was terrified, in his interview in January this year, recalling the time. He published a book about the accident and the government response ("決断できない日本　The Japan That Can't Decide") last year, but no one in Japan seems to have paid any attention, as it contradicts the official stories of Japan and the US which were all praise of this daring operations caught live on camera.

Speaking of helicopter, Maher also said last year that one of the items freely offered by the US government to the Japanese government right after the nuclear accident started was an unmanned helicopter. After going back and forth, with the Japanese government asking about the technical details and trivial points about the helicopter and its operation, the big question finally came from the Japanese government: "In the event that the helicopter is contaminated by radiation, what will happen with regards to compensation?"

US officials must have thought they were speaking with the space aliens.

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Japanese Net Citizens' (Anecdotal) Response to TEPCO with No Money to Buy Batteries and No Permit to Transport Batteries: "TEPCO Should Have Used Credit, and We Need New Emergency Laws and Regulations"

One month after it was first reported by Asahi Shinbun, some Japanese net citizens on Twitter seem to be slowly realizing what happened on March 13, 2011 when Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant workers didn't have enough money to buy car batteries which would have given them a good fighting chance.

Sadly, their response to this revelation indicates to me the same thing would happen again and again.

The tweets that I've seen on the subject are limited in numbers, I don't have that many followers (4,700, give or take) and I don't follow that many. So the following is nothing but anecdotal.

About TEPCO workers collecting money to go to Iwaki City and buy car batteries at large auto parts stores, managing to buy only 8:

• They should have asked nicely.

• They should have bought on credit.

• Maybe the stores didn't trust TEPCO to sell on credit.

• I'm embarrassed for Japan, what would the world think of us Japanese?

There is no indication that any of them even thought about "other" solutions (see my previous post for some).

About 1,000 batteries from Toshiba stuck in Tokyo because there was no permit to transport them on the highway, I tweeted in Japanese. Not many have read Asahi Shinbun's article (partly because it appeared in the subscribers' only section of the online paper), and they simply do not know about the episode. But I got this response　from an independent journalist:

That's understandable, because we don't have laws and regulations for emergency situations like that. I think there are some who predicted it [that Toshiba or TEPCO waited for the permit while core melt was occurring]. But it is us [the citizens of Japan] who have allowed it [the lack of emergency laws and regulations] to continue. So we have to change many things, but that's hard to do. If an earthquake and tsunami of the same magnitude happened right now, it is likely that we would repeat the same [mistakes].

To him, and to many others in Japan, it is a matter of creating new laws and regulations so that people can follow follow, and NOT of individual initiative and how to start thinking independently. And thinking fast.

I wrote back to him,

It's not the matter of whether you have the laws and regulations in place. If a government bureaucrat told Toshiba or TEPCO they couldn't transport the batteries on the highway without the permit, even as they knew (though they dared not tell the public) the reactor core was melting, Toshiba or TEPCO could simply say, "Oh OK, yes we understand, sir", and start driving to Fuku-I anyway. People are not trained to be bold and cunning, able to make judgment on their own on the fly in a situation like that. So what they might be fined or even arrested afterwards for transporting dangerous stuff on the highway? That would have been much better than having nuclear reactors blowing up one after another.

I'm afraid he doesn't know what I'm talking about. But we're in agreement as to repeating the same mistake in the future.

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#Fukushima Reactor 3 Explosion, Reactor 2 Core Melt, Possibly Because TEPCO Couldn't Break the Rules to Bring Batteries to the Plant

What rules, you ask? Good social rules like "If you want something from a store, you purchase it with money." Or "In order to transport potentially dangerous materials or equipments, you apply for a government permit and wait until the permit is issued." They are all good and proper in peacetime.

TEPCO was no longer in peacetime, starting March 11, 2011. But the company and the workers clearly didn't know how to operate in an extraordinary situation they found themselves in. So they stuck to what they knew best - be a law- and rule- abiding good citizens.

From the teleconference video that TEPCO newly released, at 7:17AM of March 13, 2011 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant (Video 05-06 at TEPCO's Photos and Video page for October 5, 2012):

資材班です、すいません。これからバッテリー等を買出しに行きます。えーと、現金が不足しております。現金をこちらに持ち出している方、是非お貸しいただきたいと思います。すいません、申し訳ありませんが、現金をお持ちの方、貸していただけないでしょうか？よろしくお願いします。

This is Materials Group, sorry to interrupt. We are going out to buy batteries and other things. But, uh.., we're short on cash. For those of you who have cash with you here, we would really appreciate if you could lend it to us. We're sorry [and embarrassed] but if you have cash, could you let us borrow it? Thank you in advance.

After this announcement, a senior executive (I believe it's Mr. Komori in TEPCO's Headquarters in Tokyo) is heard muttering, "No money? That is miserable. We have to do something..."

Asahi Shinbun transcribed the entire 150 hours of TEPCO's teleconference video, and has written several articles (subscribers only) about their findings. This battery episode was in the third installment of the series of articles that were published in early September. The following is my summary of the situation, based on the Asahi Shinbun article on September 5, 2012, based on their own transcription of the video:

Early morning on March 13, 2011 (28 hours or so before the Reactor 3 building exploded). TEPCO's workers had figured out that by rigging up the car batteries they could provide just enough power to operate the main steam safety-relief valve (SR valve) to release pressure inside the Reactor 3 Pressure Vessel. Ten 12-volt batteries were all they needed for that operation for the moment, they figured. The problem was that they didn't have 10. They asked the workers with cars to please remove the batteries so that they could be used.

20 car batteries were offered. But they needed more. Much more, in order to monitor the conditions of Reactor 3 and Reactor 2. The monitoring systems in the central control room were also down, because of lack of electricity. They needed the batteries in the order of 50, 100.

Iwaki City was 30 kilometers south of the plant, and there were big auto parts stores in the city. So, TEPCO workers decided to drive down there and buy car batteries at the store.

But 8 car batteries were all they managed to buy in Iwaki City. Asahi Shinbun article doesn't say whether it was lack of money or lack of inventory at the auto parts stores.

It was not that TEPCO's Headquarters in Tokyo had sat paralyzed. It had already ordered 1,000 batteries from Toshiba on March 12 and arranged for having them shipped to the plant immediately.

There was a problem. A government permit was needed, apparently, to transport that many batteries on the highway, and the permit was not readily coming. The vehicle loaded with 1,000 batteries couldn't leave Tokyo unless the issue of the permit was resolved somehow.

In the end, 320 of 1,000 batteries did arrive at the plant, in the evening of March 14, long after the Reactor 3 explosion. The core inside the Reactor 2 Pressure Vessel had already been exposed.

This single episode, I believe, epitomizes what's fundamentally wrong with the Japanese in a crisis situation: They cannot break rules.

So they couldn't monitor the reactors, couldn't open the SR valve, but knew if they had batteries, even the car batteries and plenty of them, they would be able to do both. If they didn't, there would be core melt, and a large amount of radioactive materials would be released. It was not the time to observe rules and regulations imposed by the society or the government.

1. Instead of going all the way to Iwaki City to buy car batteries, they could have stopped any and every car and truck they encountered outside the plant, asked, begged, threatened, the drivers to give up their car batteries because otherwise there would be multiple meltdowns at the nuclear plant.

What would the drivers do? Refuse? Somehow, I don't think so. They could even ask the residents to spread the word that the plant needed car batteries to prevent nuclear catastrophe.

They could have asked the Self Defense Force to round up car batteries from the neighborhood for them. The SDF could still have said "no", though, needing a permission from the prime minister.

2. If they went to Iwaki City, they could have just taken the batteries, instead of trying to buy them, if lack of money was the issue. This was the biggest emergency in TEPCO's corporate life. They could have simply told the store managers to bring all the car batteries in stock and just taken them. They could write a note saying how many batteries and how much, and TEPCO would pay for them later, after the reactors were restored.

What would the store managers do? Refuse to give the batteries to TEPCO unless they they were paid on the spot? I don't think so.

3. If the government was making a fuss about the permit to transport batteries, either Toshiba or TEPCO (I don't know who was in charge of transportation) could have told the government to take a hike and just started driving. Or said nothing to the government and just started driving.

What would the government do? Stop the truck by force? When the reactors were on the verge of blowing up? I don't think so.

4. Also, if the Japanese government was a pain in the neck even in the emergency like that, TEPCO could have asked the US government/military for help. Could you bring the batteries to us? The US military could have easily transported battery vehicles in their Chinooks. Would the US government/military say "No we can't do anything, without the request from your government"? When transporting batteries to the plant might save the reactors from meltdowns? I don't think so.

What would the Japanese government do to the US government/military? Get angry that the US helped stop meltdowns? Let them get angry.

50, or 100 batteries may or may not have prevented the meltdowns, but at least they would have given the workers under Plant Manager Masao Yoshida a fighting chance - a better grip on the situation, a little more control over the reactors, and ability to lower pressure so that they could continue to inject water easily and prevent the core from getting exposed.

Fight or flight. 火事場の馬鹿力 (Extraordinary strength at the scene of a fire). TEPCO tried to fight, that much is apparent from the teleconference videos. But they tried to do so within the boundaries of socially acceptable rules and norms in Japan during peacetime when nuclear reactors were operating normally.

When I read the Asahi's article for the first time, the truth is that it didn't occurred to me either that TEPCO could have broken all the rules in an emergency like this. I just thought, "Bureaucrats are bureaucrats no matter what..." over the permit to transport Toshiba batteries on the highway. I mentioned that to an American friend, who immediately said, "Why did they (TEPCO) have to wait for the permit in a make or break situation like this?"

I'm Japanese after all. I was thinking like TEPCO.

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#Fukushima I Nuke Plant: Safety Equipment (Rupture Disk) Delayed the Vent, According to TEPCO's Teleconference Video

The Japanese media (members of Japan Press Club) can still view the video of TEPCO's teleconferences in the early days of the nuclear accident that TEPCO was willing to disclose (about 50 hours worth of video), and here's the latest from Tokyo Shinbun.

According to the newspaper, one of the reasons why TEPCO workers couldn't inject water to cool the reactor core, or open the vent line to release the pressure inside the Reactor Pressure Vessels in Reactors 2 and 3 much sooner was because the rupture disks didn't break because the set pressure was too high.

Why was the set pressure too high? Because the Japanese engineers were afraid of radioactive leak from the Primary Containment Vessels and wanted avoid the leak at all costs, says the paper quoting a nuclear researcher.

Much like TEPCO allegedly welded shut the blowout panels in each reactor building at Fukushima I Nuke Plant, except for Reactor 2.

From Tokyo Shinbun (8/29/2012):

福島第一事故　安全装置　ベント妨げる

Safety equipment prevented the vent in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident

昨年三月の東京電力福島第一原発事故で、早い段階で原子炉への注水に向け、ベント（排気）をしようとしたのに、配管の途中にある安全装置の設計が悪く、対応が遅れる大きな原因になっていたことが、東電の社内テレビ会議映像から分かった。放射能を閉じ込めるための安全装置が、逆に事故を深刻化させていたことになる。

It was found in the teleconference video of TEPCO that the bad design of the safety equipment installed along the vent pipe delayed the response when they tried to vent in order to inject water into the reactors in the early stage of the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident in March last year. It can be said that the safety equipment designed to contain radiation ended up worsening the accident.

事故では、２、３号機とも高圧で注水する装置が使えなくなり、消防車などで注水しようとしたが、原子炉（圧力容器）の圧力が高く難航した。

During the accident, the equipment to inject water at a high pressure failed in both Reactor 2 and Reactor 3. TEPCO tried to inject water using fire engines, but had difficulty doing so due to high pressure inside the reactor (Pressure Vessel).

炉の圧力を下げるには、格納容器に蒸気を逃がす弁（ＳＲ弁）を開け、合わせてベントをする必要がある。だが、ベント配管の途中に設置されている「ラプチャーディスク（破裂板）」と呼ばれるステンレスの円板が、ベントの障害となった。

In order to lower the pressure, they needed to open the SR valve to release [the pressure inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel) into the Containment Vessel, and at the same time do the vent. However, the rupture disk - a stainless-steel disk installed in the vent pipe - hindered the vent.

ディスクは、配管にふたをする役目をしており、一定の圧力がかからないと破れない仕組み。誤ってベント弁を開けてしまっても、放射性物質が外部に漏れ出さないようにするのが目的だ。

The rupture disk plugs the pipe, and it is designed not to break unless it is under certain pressure. The purpose is to prevent the leak of radioactive materials when the vent valve is accidentally opened.

しかし、ディスクの設定圧力が高すぎ、早く炉の減圧とベントをして一刻も早く注水をしたいのに、なかなかディスクが破れず対応が遅れ、その間にも核燃料が過熱していく悪循環を起こした。

However, the disk's set pressure was too high, and even when they wanted to lower the reactor pressure and vent so that they could inject water as soon as possible, the disk didn't break, delaying the response and causing the overheating of the nuclear fuel.

テレビ会議の映像には、「ベント前に炉心損傷ということになっちゃう」（十三日午前五時すぎ、３号機への対応で）、「ラプチャーが開くのを待っているところ」（十四日午後十時ごろ、２号機への対応で）など、もどかしい現場の様子が何度も出てくる。

The teleconferencing video shows the frustrated staff at the plant. "Reactor core may be damaged before the vent can be done" (5AM on March 13, regarding Reactor 3), and "We're waiting for the rupture disk to open" (10PM on March 14, regarding Reactor 2).

東電の宮田浩一・原子力安全グループマネジャーは「ベントをしたいと思った時にできなかったことが最もつらい状況だった」と振り返る。

Koichi Miyata, Manager of TEPCO Nuclear Safety Group, reflects, "The hardest time was when we couldn't vent when we wanted to."

経済産業省原子力安全・保安院は事故の反省を踏まえ、ディスクがベントの妨げにならないよう見直すべきだとの考えで、原子力規制委員会に対応を引き継ぐ見通しだ。

As one of the lessons learned from the accident, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is of the opinion that a revision is necessary so that the rupture disk doesn't get in the way of venting. The agency is to ask the [soon-to-be-created] Nuclear Regulatory Commission to devise countermeasures.

北海道大の奈良林直教授（原子力工学）は「欧州ではディスクを迂回（うかい）するルートを設け割れなくてもベントをできるようにしている国もある。日本はこれまで『格納容器から漏らさない』との呪縛にとらわれており、それが設計にも反映されていた」と話している。

Professor Tadashi Narabayashi of Hokkaido University (nuclear engineering) says, "Some European countries have systems to bypass the rupture disks so that the vent can be carried out even when the rupture disks don't break. So far, Japan has been caught in the trap of "no leak [of radioactive materials] from the Containment Vessel", which is reflected in the design".

According to the report by the Fukushima Accident Independent Investigation Commission set up by the Cabinet Office, the set pressure of the rupture disk was "0.528MPa　abs" for Reactor 2.

The same NISA and Professor Narabayashi (one of the three "Plutonium Brothers") were last heard together in December last year, when NISA officials admitted to the possibility that the very act of venting may have caused the hydrogen explosions in Reactor 1 and Reactor 3.

Further, a Tokyo University researcher (Katsumi Shozugawa) indicated in his paper (link is in Japanese; see the chart in the post) published earlier this year (online in January, published in paper in April) that it may have been the dry vent (= vent directly from the Containment Vessel, without going through the Suppression Chamber) of Reactor 2 on March 15 that released the huge amount of radioactive materials in the surrounding environment, not the explosions of Reactors 1 and 3.

Several days ago, Professor Yukio Hayakawa, speaking in front of a study group of politicians, also said that TEPCO did the vent, and NISA allowed the vent, on March 15, 2011, when it was obvious to them the wind was from the north, blowing toward Tokyo. Professor Hayakawa continued, "Was the vent necessary at that time? I don't know, as I'm not a nuclear engineer. But if the contamination is from the vent, this is a man-made contamination." (Video of the meeting is here, if you understand Japanese.)

To be sure, the wide-area contamination of Kanto region is supposed to have happened on March 20 - 22, 2011, with the rain.　At that time, Reactor 3 building was smouldering, uncontrolled, white smoke then black smoke seen issuing from the wrecked operating floor. But if Reactor 3 building exploded because of the vent, the possibility of which NISA admits, it would be indeed man-made contamination as Hayakawa says.

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Jiji Tsushin: NISA Ordered TEPCO Not To Talk About Rising Pressure in Reactor 3 on March 14, 2011 Because NISA Official Couldn't Reach His Supervisor

That, according to Jiji Tsushin, is captured in the video TEPCO released and has been allowing the media to view at TEPCO's Headquarters in Tokyo. The company has made 1.5-hour video for the public consumption, but the media has been reporting new findings in the video only they are allowed to view, and this is one of the latest.

TEPCO was ready to hold a press conference immediately after it learned of the rising pressure in Reactor 3 in the early morning on March 14, 2011. But an elite bureaucrat at the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency at an elite ministry (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) needed to find his boss to decide whether TEPCO could hold a press conference to tell the general public of such a terrible news. This bureaucrat told TEPCO, "Absolutely not", because he couldn't find his supervisor and he didn't want to be the one in charge at NISA when this bad news was disclosed.

Fit for an agency whose Director General, being a liberal arts major as he claimed as an excuse, went home from the Disaster Response Headquarters at Prime Minister's Official Residence in the evening of March 11, 2011 and never returned.

I suppose this official knew, as a matter of fact, what had happened to the NISA official who had talked about a possible core melt in Reactor 1 at the noon press conference on March 12, 2011. He was dismissed immediately after, by the Kan administration.

From Jiji Tsushin (8/13/2012; emphasis is mine):

保安院指示で公表遅れ＝水素爆発直前、３号機の圧力上昇－「上司と連絡取れなかった」

Delay in disclosure because of NISA's order - rising pressure in Reactor 3 right before the hydrogen explosion because [NISA official] "couldn't locate my supervisor".

東京電力福島第１原発３号機が水素爆発を起こす直前の昨年３月１４日朝、同機格納容器の圧力を示す数値が急上昇したことを受け、東電が記者発表しようとしたところ、経済産業省原子力安全・保安院から公表を待つよう指示されていたことが、同社のテレビ会議映像などで１３日、分かった。

On the morning of March 14 last year right before the hydrogen explosion at Reactor 3 at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, TEPCO was about to give a press conference on the news that the parameters that monitored the pressure inside the Reactor 3 Containment Vessel indicated a sudden spike in pressure but the company was ordered to wait by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, [we learned] on August 13 [after viewing] TEPCO's teleconference video.

同映像によると、３号機では１４日午前６時ごろ、格納容器の圧力の値が異常に上昇したことを把握。吉田昌郎所長（当時）は水素爆発が起きるかもしれないとして、現場にいる作業員を一時的に退避させたが、この情報を保安院が公表したのは同日午前９時すぎ、同機原子炉建屋が水素爆発を起こす約２時間前だった。

According to the video, [TEPCO] learned of the abnormal rise in pressure inside the Containment Vessel of Reactor 3 at about 6AM on March 14, 2011. Plant Manager Masao Yoshida feared for a hydrogen explosion and instructed the workers at the scene [near Reactor 3?] to take shelter. However, it was not until after 9AM that day when NISA finally made the announcement of this information, about 2 hours before the hydrogen explosion at the Reactor 2 building.

福島第１原発の東電広報班はこれに先立ち、報道向け広報文を準備したが、本社とのやりとりの中で担当者は「国から止められ、プレス発表を行わずに待っている状況」と発言。本社の社員とみられる人物も「この事象に関しては、保安院の方もプレスへの情報を全て止めていると。事業者からの公表もやめろということです」と話した。

TEPCO's press relation team at Fukushima I Nuke Plant had prepared the press release, but the person in charge at the plant said during the exchange with TEPCO Headquarters, "The national government has ordered us not to, and we are waiting, without giving any press conference." A person at TEPCO Headquarters was heard saying, "About this event, NISA has stopped all communication to the press, and we as the plant operator are told not to disclose anything."

さらに、本社では「先ほどのプレスに関する情報です。保安院に確認しましたら、絶対に駄目だというのが向こうの見解で、このプレスは行うなという強い要請、指示だそうです」との声も録音されていた。

Further, at TEPCO's Headquarters, someone was recorded saying "[Additional] information about the press release. I've confirmed it with NISA, and their opinion is "absolutely not", this press release must not be made, it's a strong demand and order."

保安院は公表が遅れたことについて、「上司と連絡が取れず、東電にも発表を待ってもらっていた」などと説明している。

On this delay in disclosure, NISA [official] explains, "[I] couldn't get hold of my supervisor, so I asked TEPCO to delay the release of information."

国会の事故調査委員会も７月に公表した最終報告で、この問題について「（保安院の発表まで）危機的状況が（少なくとも）２時間以上も国民に知らされなかった」などと指摘していた。

In the final report by the National Diet Fukushima Accident Independent Investigation Commission released in July, the Commission pointed out "(Until the announcement by NISA) citizens were not informed of this critical situation for (at least) more than 2 hours."

Reactor 3 building would still have blown up regardless of whether TEPCO or NISA held a press conference, but it might have made a tremendous difference in alerting the residents in the surrounding areas and evacuate them sooner. After all, from last year's articles and my own posts, Reactor 3's explosion was so downplayed by the government that residents were given conflicting information about whether there was an explosion at all, several hours after the explosion took place.

There were many people still remaining in Namie-machi, Minami Soma City, and people even in Futaba-machi and Okuma-machi (whose residents should have been evacuated by then), looking for survivors of the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011.

We would never know, but I always wonder. What would have happened if TEPCO had said "NO" to NISA's order and held a press conference? What could NISA do? Fire TEPCO? Fine the company for not following orders? Sue the company for fanning "baseless rumors" and create panic?

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Translation of TEPCO Video on March 14, 2011 When Reactor 3 Exploded: Steam Explosion, or Hydrogen Explosion? Or Both? (Or Just Confused?)

In the video, Plant Manager Yoshida seems to be saying it was "steam explosion" (水蒸気爆発） in Reactor 3. When a TEPCO senior executive (perhaps Mr. Komori, from the voice) talks to NISA, he is saying "possible hydrogen explosion". The official account is that it was a hydrogen explosion.

The video gets surreal halfway toward the end, when someone who sounds like then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano is heard talking about controlled rolling blackouts.

My translation of the sound as heard in the video:

"Video from March 14, 2012, around 11:01AM, explosion in the Reactor 3 building"

(at 0:05 -)
About the dose level, it is 39.406 microcurie/hour.

(at 0:20, the upper right screen for 1F (Fukushima I Nuke Plant) shakes.)

(at 0.58 -)
HQ?: Well, right now, 3-meter tsunami warning issued for Hamadori [coastal Fukushima], can you hear us, 1F? 3-meter tsunami warning has been just issued for Hamadori. Please pay attention.

(at 1:13 - )
Plant Manager Yoshida at 1F: HQ! HQ!

HQ: Yes, this is HQ.

Yoshida: HQ! HQ! It's bad! It's bad!

HQ: Yes!? Yes?

Yoshida: Reactor 3, probably steam explosion, it just happened!

HQ: (in a weak, almost disappearing voice) Alright... (someone else) O..OK.. Emergency communication...

Yoshida: (overlapping the HQ person) Happened at 11:01AM.

HQ: 11:01AM. (totally unexcited,) Roger. We will make emergency communication...

Yoshida: OK!

HQ: That, that is the same as Reactor 1 [explosion], isn't it?

Yoshida: Yes, in the building, inside the Anti-Seismic Building here, we can't tell, but a side-way shake, clearly different from an earthquake, came, and there was no after-shake like in an earthquake. So I think this is an explosion, just like what happened in Reactor 1.

HQ: OK. Roger.

In Yoshida's background at 1F: Parameters! Somebody look at the parameters of Reactor 3! Call the central control room for Reactor 3 and find out!

Yoshida: And the workers on the scene, will take shelter, take shelter!

HQ(?): We'll notify people immediately. Emergency communication...

(From 2:17 to 2:25, yelling and shouting in the background, probably at 1F. Someone at the Off-Site Center - upper left screen - sits with folded arms.)

(2:25)
Yoshida: Well, NISA [Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency] and Prime Minister's Office...

In Yoshida's background: The environment inside this room [the emergency response headquarters on the 2nd floor of the Anti-Seismic Building at Fukushima I], no change in gamma rays and neutrons. Report over.

Yoshida: ... keep them connected, real-time.

Yoshida's background: Hey! (beep)

(2:40, someone is heard making a speech. It sounds like Yukio Edano, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary and the administration spokesman)
"... causing troubles for you. However, the actual power suppl..." (cut off)

(2:57)
(HQ? 1F?): To Mr. Takeguro...., directly... [Takeguro, TEPCO's representative at PM Official Residence]

(3:10 Voice that sounds like Mr. Edano comes back)
"...as you prepare, to minimize your inconvenience..."

(3:21)
HQ (Probably Mr. Komori?, executive director, making a phone call to NISA): At 11:02AM, (was that 11:02?), at 11:02, in Reactor 3, there was a possibility of hydrogen explosion, we've been just informed by the plant. It's the first report...

At 1F (Yoshida, overlapping Komori): Please take shelter, make sure everyone is safe, take shelter. Then, measure the dose rate carefully and report. Now, everyone, please gather closer, and make sure everyone is OK.

(4:06)
Yoshida: And there's also a tsunami warning. As a precaution, please withdraw [to shelter] as soon as possible.

(4:18)
(Beep)

(4:20)
At 1F: Uh... as soon as you confirm, to the [worker] welfare unit, please report to the welfare unit once people take shelter. Please report to the welfare unit.

(4:33)
HQ (TEPCO's then-president Shimizu): This is Shimizu, head of the [HQ Response team]. Inform the related parties and report back right away...

================================

On checking the news articles from March 14, 2011, it was indeed Yukio Edano, doing the press conference as Chief Cabinet Secretary, at 10:55AM, and right at that moment, speaking about the planned rolling blackouts (Asahi Shinbun, 3/14/2011).

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