TEPCO Submitted the Uncensored Severe Accident Manual, But Didn't (and Couldn't) Use It Anyway

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) is currently reviewing the document to determine which part can be safely disclosed to the public, but it doesn't seem to matter anyway.

In yesterday's (October 17, 2011) joint press conference of all relevant government agencies and TEPCO, TEPCO submitted the progress report on its "roadmap" (link is TEPCO's English) to stabilize the situation at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. In the press conference, there was a mention of the "Severe Accident Manual" that TEPCO had been criticized for blackening it out almost completely for "confidentiality" concern.

Independent journalist Ryuichi Kino asked TEPCO's Matsumoto about the Manual, and it turned out that TEPCO didn't (and couldn't) use the Manual anyway. Kino tweets:

じゃあ地震の時にはシビアアクシデント手順書を使ったのかと思ったんだけども、松本さんの答えはＮＯ。地震直後は自動でスクラムしているので、通常の運転手順書で作業したと。ではシビアアクシデント手順書はいつから使ったのかと聞いたら、使ってないと回答

So I thought TEPCO must have used this Severe Accident Manual on March 11 earthquake. [TEPCO's] Matsumoto's answer was "No". The reactors were automatically scrammed after the earthquake, which was the normal operating procedure. So the company proceeded with the normal operating manual. So I asked when TEPCO started using the Severe Accident Manual. The answer was that it never did.

津波以降の事象は想定を超えているものであり、全電源喪失で真っ暗になった中で弁を開閉する作業のようなものは、シビアアクシデント手順書には書いてないと。この記事の追認だけども、最初から使える状況ではなかったっていうことみたいだなあ。→ http://bit.ly/ofttef

The events at the plant after the tsunami were beyond what was expected, and procedures like opening and closing the valves in the complete darkness after all-station blackout are not in the Severe Accident Manual. So, just like this article (Kyodo News) says, the Manual was not usable from the beginning.

The link Kino gives goes to Kyodo News Japanese article (10/2/2011). Most newspapers used the part about "no hydrogen explosion in the Reactor 2 suppression chamber", but not about the Severe Accident Manual. From 10/2/2011 Kyodo News:

東京電力福島第１原発事故で、過酷事故などに対応する「運転操作手順書」が役に立たなかったとする報告書を東電の社内事故調査委員会がまとめたことが２日、分かった。手順書は、非常用ディーゼル発電機などが動くことを前提としていたが全て動かず、事故対応に生かせなかった。

It was revealed on October 2 that TEPCO's accident investigation committee concluded that the Severe Accident Manual had been useless. The Manual had assumed that the emergency power supplies like diesel generators would be operational; in reality they all failed, and couldn't be used to deal with the accident.

　また２号機の圧力抑制プール付近では水素爆発はなかったと、従来と異なる判断を示した。

The committee also determined that there was no hydrogen explosion near the Suppression Chamber of Reactor 2, a different conclusion from what it had been assumed.

TEPCO's (for that matter, all nuclear power plant operators') severe accident procedure relied on having electricity available somehow.

So what DID TEPCO use to deal with the accident?

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