Saturday, January 11, 2014

Nikkei Shinbun's Interview of Haruki Madarame (1/7): "#Fukushima I NPP Wasn't Much of a Topic in March 11, 2011 Meeting Despite Station Blackout and Emergency Core Cooling Failure"


Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
================

Dr. Haruki Madarame was the chairman of the now-defunct Nuclear Safety Commission at the time of the start of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. He became instantly infamous and reviled in Japan when it was reported that he had reassured then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan on their way to Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant in the morning of March 12, 2011 that there would be no explosion. A few hours later, the Reactor 1 building blew up in a hydrogen explosion.

Nikkei Shinbun interviewed Dr. Madarame recently, who was as candid as he had been in the past few times he had spoken about his role in the early days of the nuclear accident, readily admitting his errors. (In his testimony to the Diet Commission that investigated the Fukushima I NPP accident in February 2012, Dr. Madarame said he didn't remember the 1st week of the accident, as he was so tired from lack of sleep.)

Nikkei's article from the interview is very informative but also quite long, so it will be in 7 installments.

In the first installment below, Dr. Madarame paints a picture of the Kan administration and himself not knowing what was going on and not knowing what to do.

As is quite usual in the Japanese media, no other media even writes about this Nikkei article.

From Nikkei Shinbun (1/10/2014):

班目氏、3年目の証言 「あり得た、フクシマ最悪の筋書き」
編集委員 滝 順一

Testimony of Dr. Madarame, in the third year of the accident: "Worst case scenario was possible for Fukushima"
by Junichi Taki, editorial board member

東日本大震災で起きた福島第1原子力発電所の事故当時、原子力安全委員長だった班目春樹氏(東京大学名誉教授)。原発事故時には政府に技術的助言を与える立場にあったが、的確な助言ができなかったとして非難を浴びた。2012年夏に退任して以来、表舞台に出ることはほとんどなかった同氏がこのほど日本経済新聞の取材に応じた。

Dr. Haruki Madarame (professor emeritus at Tokyo University) was the chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission when the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident happened after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. He was in a position to give technical advice to the national government, but he was later criticized as not having been able to give accurate advice. He has maintained a low public profile since he retired as the chairman in the summer of 2012, but Nikkei Shinbun spoke to him recently.

その中で班目氏は、溶融核燃料が格納容器の外に飛び出る最悪の事態を一時想定したことを明らかにした。また現在の原子力防災の体制については、福島の教訓を十分にくみ取っていないとも指摘。首相の近くにいて事故対応にあたった班目氏の証言や分析は今後の原子力行政を考える上で参考になりうる。当時を振り返りながら、弁明も含めて重い口を開いた。

In our interview, Dr. Madarame revealed that he had at one time assumed the worst case scenario whereby the melted fuel would be ejected from the containment vessel. He also pointed out that the current nuclear disaster countermeasures do not fully reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. We believe the testimony and analysis by Dr. Madarame, who was close at hand by the prime minister and advising him in dealing with the accident, could be useful in thinking about the future nuclear policy. He opened up reluctantly, looking back at those early days of the accident and sometimes defending himself.


■「部屋で行われていることが何かわかっていなかった」

"I wasn't sure what was going on in the room."


――東日本大震災の発災時にはどこにいたか。
-- Where were you when the Great East Japan Earthquake hit?

「(3月11日の)2時46分には原子力安全委員会(霞が関の中央合同庁舎4号館)のオフィスにいた。1時間ほど過ぎたころ、原子力災害対策特別措置法に基づく10条通報(全交流電源喪失)があり、やがて15条通報(非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能)もきた。原子力災害対策本部が立ち上がるはずだが、連絡がなかなか来ないので、行って待っていようと考え、首相官邸へ行った」

"At 2:46PM (on March 11, 2011), I was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission (in the Central Government Building No.4 in Kasumigaseki, Tokyo). One hour later, the Article 10 notice (station blackout) based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness came in. Then the Article 15 notice (emergency core cooling system failure). The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters should now be established, but there was no message [from the Prime Minister's Official Residence]. So I thought I'd go there and wait."

「15条通報の文書には、原子炉への注水ができず炉内水位が見えないので、念のため通報するとあった。このことから私は、直流電源(蓄電池)は生き残ったと思い込んでいた。水位計は壊れていて水位が読めないのだなと楽観的に考えていた。直流電源は少なくとも8時間、おそらく半日くらいは十分にもつだろうから、早く電源車などを確保して直流電源を維持すればよいと考えていた」

"The Article 15 notice said the notice was by way of precaution, as it was impossible to inject water into the reactor and the water level inside the reactor couldn't be measured. So I [erroneously] got it in my head that the DC power (storage batteries) was still available, and that the water level couldn't be measured because the water gauge was broken. The DC power would last at least 8 hours, probably half a day easily, so I thought we would just need to keep the DC power by securing power supply cars.

「19時ころに原災本部の会議が開かれたが、このときは地震と津波の対策協議が主で、原発はそれほど大きな話題にはならなかったと記憶している。私に発言の機会はなかった」

"Around 7PM, a meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was held. But as far as I remember, the topic of the meeting was mostly about dealing with the earthquake and tsunami, and the nuclear power plant was not discussed much. I didn't have an opportunity to speak [I wasn't asked for an opinion]."

「その後いったんオフィスに戻ったが、官邸から呼ばれ、21時ころに官邸地下の危機管理センターの横にある中二階の小さな会議室に初めて入った。政治家の人たちが大変心配していて、これからどうなると尋ねられた。部屋には原子力安全・保安院の平岡英治次長(当時)らがいたが、質問に答えられなかったのだと思う」

"I went back to my office after the meeting, but then I was called back to the Prime Minister's Official Residence and at about 9PM went into the small conference room in the mezzanine floor next to the Crisis Management Center in the basement of the Prime Minister's Official Residence for the first time. Politicians in the room were very worried, and they asked me what would happen next. People from Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, including Deputy Director-General Eiji Hiraoka, were in the room, but none of them seemed to have been able to answer the questions."


班目氏の行動(3月11日)
14:46 地震発生(原子力安全委員会オフィスに在席)
15:42 10条通報(1~5号機の全交流電源喪失)
16:00 安全委臨時会議を開催し緊急技術助言組織を立ち上げる。臨機応変の対応を宣言
16:45 15条通報(1、2号機の非常用炉心冷却装置注水不能、直流電源喪失の連絡はなかった)
17:40ころ 首相官邸へ。電源車の調達を知り、是認
19:03 原子力災害対策本部開催(発言機会なし、20:00ころいったん安全委オフィスに戻る)
21:00ころ 官邸へ。3km圏内避難指示、炉心損傷を防ぐため注水とベント(排気)を助言

Dr. Madarame on March 11, 2011:
2:46PM Earthquake (he was in the office of the Nuclear Safety Commission)
3:42PM Article 10 notice (station blackout of Reactors 1 through 5)
4:00PM Held emergency meeting of the Nuclear Safety Commission and set up the emergency technical advisory. Declared that his organization would take such steps as the occasion demanded.
4:45PM Article 15 notice (ECCS failure in Reactors 1 and 2, but there was no mention of loss of DC power)
5:40PM Went to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Approved of the procurement of power supply cars
7:03PM Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (no opportunity to speak, returned to his office around 8PM)
9:00PM Went back to Prime Minister's Official Residence. Advised on evacuation within the 3-kilometer radius from the plant and on water injection and vent to prevent core damage

(To be continued to Part 2)


So Dr. Madarame wasn't asked for his opinion, and he didn't volunteer any.

It took two hours and 18 minutes after the Article 15 notice to set up the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and when it was finally set up, they didn't even talk about the nuclear emergency.

Banri Kaieda, who was Minister of Economy at that time, said in May 2012 that then-PM Naoto Kan couldn't decide whether to declare a nuclear emergency without knowing the legal basis in detail. And there was no one who would shout back at Mr. Kan.

Misfortune of Japan for having the wrong people at the very wrong time.

Was the Fukushima nuclear accident preventable? Dr. Madarame seems to think so. Stay tuned for the next installment of the interview.

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

The Nikkei newspaper is more pro nuclear than Tepco: I noticed they purge Tepco press releases of the less favourable information.
Madarame is part of the nuclear estabilishment, he should not have worked as a controller. He thinks the disaster was avoidable?? of course he'd like you to think so, in order for the industry to keep doing business as usual.
The fact of the matter is that the disaster was NOT avoided, and it is not the first nuclear disaster (not to mention the close calls that did not end up in large releases of radioactive materials).

Beppe

Anonymous said...

Beppe, keep an open mind.

Anonymous said...

5:09 explain exactly what you perceive as closed.
B.

Anonymous said...

Concerning the "worst case scenario": as far as I recall Kan had to recruit experts outside the NISA in order to have be depicted the worst case scenario. Madarame was NOT among those experts. The worst case scenario implied the evacuation of Tokyo and losing about half of Japan territory to radioactive contamination; a similar scenario was envisioned by the US authorities who evacuated the relatives of the military personnel of the Yokosuka base.
Finally, according to the NY Times, fuel HAS been ejected from Fuku 1 since fuel pellets were found a few miles away from the plant.
Beppe

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