(UPDATE-2) Common Spent Fuel Pool cooling is scheduled to resume at 8AM on March 20.
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(UPDATE) Jiji Tsushin reports that TEPCO hopes to resume cooling of the SFPs of Reactor 3 and Reactor 4 at about 8PM (Japan Time). (It's about 3:45PM in Japan now.)
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Information from NHK Kabun (Science and Literature) tweet, about 20 minutes ago:
１９日午後２時２０分頃、福島第一原発の電源復旧。１号機燃料プールの冷却再開
At about 2:20PM on March 19, power was back on at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. Cooling of Reactor 1 Spent Fuel Pool resumed.
No information about other Spent Fuel Pools or other facilities. No details as to what caused the power failure to begin with.
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9 comments:
Well that's a relief if true. I really want to know what caused the power failure in the first place. Shouldn't they have learned to keep redundant backup systems around and on call since 3/11? This shouldn't have gone on for half as long as it did...
>keep redundant backup systems around
That's what I thought too, that it had been done already, long time ago. Then this cabinet secretary comes along and say they will prepare for the alternative methods...
No words yet as to the cause.
An irrelevant question. Shouldn't NHK Kabun be (Science and Culture) instead of (Science and Literature)?
Redundant backup systems would cost money. Nuclear power is "safe", there's no need to worry! In a way.
There is no worry in 9800 ways... so many are the maintenance tasks skipped at the Monju fast breeder reactor, including checks on the emergency generators and other important safety devices (NHK)
Beppe
I'm almost sure this problem involved the failure of some duct tape to do its job.
It's OK now. Power back everywhere but why still unknown.
Well, it's only partial redundancy.
Complete redundancy would mean all parts present at least twice, without interdependencies.
Way too expensive.
if, a non-redundant part fails, like in this case apparently a switchboard, then there remains only the hope that it can be fixed before things get serious.
Hodo Station was mentioning the failure of an important electricity distribution panel (配電基盤?). The Tepco speaker was blaming it on the fact that the panel installation is a temporary one (still? after 2 years?) therefore it is harder to control the environment it operates in (did it rain on it or something?).
Also, Fuku 1 receives electricity through multiple lines but reportedly the distribution panel is a single point of failure.
Really this is "same old" nuclear security: in theory it is safe but in practice there are too many close calls and too many major disasters (once every 25 years is way too much).
On the other hand, when skipping maintenance is a common practice, the gap between theoretical safety and practical results is hardly surprising.
Remember that upon April 2011 earthquake a npp in Tohoku (Higashidori?) had to use its emergency generators but one of them failed because they installed some gaskets the other way around? Apart from shoddy work, do they ever *test* safety equipment?
Especially right after March 2011 earthquake you'd think they would double check at least the emergency generators but no.
Beppe
Beppe
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