(Now They Tell Us) Only 10% of Water Was Reaching #Fukushima I Nuke Plant Reactor 1 Between March 20 and 22, 2011, As Newly Disclosed TEPCO's Teleconference Video Reveals

It took TEPCO and the national government who owns and regulates TEPCO more than 2 years to come clean.

It was just a few weeks ago that we finally learned that less than half the water being injected into Reactor 3 was reaching the reactor before the reactor building blew up on March 14, 2011, because the pump to the condenser was dead when the power went out. Water was filling up the condenser.

Huge spikes in radiation levels in wide areas in Tohoku and Kanto between March 20 and 23, 2011 (as seen in the chart from Asahi Shinbun, 8/8/2011) have been a mystery. TEPCO has so far said it doesn't know what was causing these spikes. Fumiya Tanabe, former researcher at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the current head of the Research Institute on Safety of Technology Systems, has proposed that Reactor 3 had a second meltdown, so to speak, when the water being injected into the Reactor Pressure Vessel dropped significantly starting March 20, 2011, and that the melted core dropped from the RPV to the Containment Vessel, releasing a large amount of radioactive materials from the Containment Vessel breach somewhere.

That may be, and now we are told that only 10% of the water being injected from the fire hydrant was reaching Reactor 1's Pressure Vessel, and the Pressure Vessel was near empty. Where did the remaining 90% of water go? No one knows.

This release of radioactive materials that happened between March 20 to 23, 2011 is what contaminated the wide areas in Tohoku and Kanto, because the release was met with the rain.

One of the local papers in Fukushima picked up the scene from the teleconference videos that TEPCO recently made available which covers the period from March 16 to April 11, 2011. I don't think anyone else did. Another set of videos covers the period from March 11 to 15, 2011.

From Kahoku Shinpo (3/31/2013; emphasis is mine):

福島第１原発　１号機注水９割漏出か　現場、水圧で認識

90% of water injected into Fukushima I Nuke Plant Reactor 1 may have leaked, the plant management knew by water pressure

東京電力福島第１原発事故で、電源喪失後に１号機原子炉へ注入した冷却水の約９割が途中で漏れていた疑いのあることが、東電の社内テレビ会議の録画映像で分かった。現場は消火栓の吐出圧で漏出を認識していたとみられる。原子炉へ水が十分入らなかったため２０１１年３月２０日から２２日にかけて炉心損傷が進み、放射性物質の拡散につながった可能性がある。

TEPCO's teleconference video during the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant accident has revealed that there is a possibility that after the power was lost, about 90% of the coolant (water) injected into Reactor 1's Pressure Vessel leaked before it reached the reactor. The plant personnel seem to have known about the leak from the discharge pressure of a fire hydrant. As not enough water was entering the reactor, the reactor core was further damaged during the period from March 20 to 22, 2011, resulting in the release of radioactive materials.

東電は１１年３月１２日から、建屋の消火設備ラインを通じて原子炉へ注水していた＝図＝。

Since March 12, 2011, TEPCO had been injecting water into the reactor via the line of the fire extinguishing system (see the diagram).

テレビ会議映像によると２２日午後１時半ごろ、吉田昌郎所長（当時）が本店に「１号機の注水ラインをチェックしたら、途中にある消火栓で吐出圧が０．１メガパスカルしかない」と報告。「１メガパスカルで注入しているのに途中で０．１メガパスカルということは、流出しているとしか考えられない」と述べた。

According to the teleconference video, Masao Yoshida, then-plant manager, reported at about 1:30PM on March 22, 2011 to the TEPCO headquarters [in Tokyo], "We checked the water injection line to Reactor 1, and at a fire hydrant on the line, the discharge pressure is only 0.1 megapascal." He continued, "We are injecting the water at 1 megapascal, and it is 0.1 megapascal on the way to Reactor 1. The water must be leaking."

東電は消防車の送水圧力から原子炉への注水量を算出、公表しているが、吉田所長の発言は送水のほとんどが途中で漏れたことを意味する。

TEPCO published the amount of water injected into the reactors by calculating the amount based on the water supply pressure from the fire engine [in this case, 1 megapascal]. However, Yoshida's remark means almost all of water from the fire engine leaked before it reached the reactor.

東北大流体科学研究所の円山重直教授（熱工学）は、原子炉の温度や圧力のデータから「１号機は２０日から２２日、３号機は２１日から２３日ごろにかけて水がほとんど入らず、空だき状態だった。入った水もすぐに蒸発した」と分析。「格納容器の破損した部分から蒸気とともに放射性物質が大量に出ていた」と指摘する。

Based on the temperature and pressure data of the reactor, Professor Shigenao Maruyama of Tohoku University Institute of Fluid Science (his specialty in thermal engineering) says, "There was hardly any water entering Reactor 1 from March 20 to March 22, and Reactor 3 from March 21 to 23. The reactors were being heated without water in them. What water that went in evaporated right away." He points out that a large amount of radioactive materials and steam were leaking from the breach in the Containment Vessels.

国立環境研究所の計算では、３月２０日に放出された放射性物質が風に乗って宮城県北から岩手県南に到達。雨と一緒に地上に降ったとされる。東電は２０日以降の放射性物質の漏えい量と原因を「未解明」としている。

According to the calculation by the National Institute of Environmental Studies, radioactive materials released on March 20 were carried by the wind and reached northern Miyagi and southern Iwate, where they met the rain that fell on the ground. TEPCO describes the amount of radioactive materials released after March 20, 2011 and the cause of the release as "unexplained".

１号機は２０日午後、原子炉圧力容器周辺の温度が４００度近い高温と判明。原子炉へ注水できていないと考えた現場が注水ルートを調査していた。２２日朝には原発内で「１号機の炉心損傷割合がここ数日増えている。水が入らずカラカラの状態の可能性が高い」との報告があった。

In the afternoon of March 20, 2011, the temperature around the Reactor 1 Pressure Vessel was found to be high near 400 degrees Celsius. The plant personnel determined that water was not reaching the reactor, and start examining the water injection line. In the morning of March 22, there was a report at the plant that "the core damage of Reactor 1 has been increasing in the past few days. It is highly possible that water is not reaching the reactor and the reactor is dry".

東電の姉川尚史原子力設備管理部長は「注水量に不確実性があることは認識している。今後、当時の炉の状態と放射性物質の拡散状況を明らかにしたい」と話している。

Takafumi Anegawa, TEPCO's manager in charge of nuclear facility management, says, "We are aware that there is an uncertainty in the amount of water injected. We would like to determine the condition of the reactor at that time and

◎全映像公開こそ責務／放射性物質拡散解明の鍵

It's TEPCO's responsibility to disclose all videos, keys to understanding how radioactive materials dispersed

東京電力福島第１原発事故で、１号機原子炉への注水が機能していなかった疑いが浮上した。放射性物質の広域拡散につながった可能性のある問題で、詳細な調査が必要だ。

A doubt has surfaced that water injection into Reactor 1's Pressure Vessel was not working. It may have been one of the causes for the wide-area dispersion of radioactive materials, and we need to examine very closely.

東電が事故直後に公表したデータでは２０１１年３月２０日ごろから、１、３号機で注水量が激減していた。東電は１１年９月、送水元だった消防ポンプの流量計の値を基に注水量を上方修正し、大量の水を入れたと発表した。

According to the data made public by TEPCO right after the accident, the amount of water injected dropped dramatically in Reactor 1 and Reactor 3, starting March 20, 2011. In September 2011, TEPCO recalculated the amount of water based on the data from the flowmeter of the fire engine that pumped the water, and announced a large amount of water had been injected.

テレビ会議映像に残る吉田昌郎所長（当時）の水圧に関する発言は、修正前の注水量が実態に近かったことを示す。ほかにも東電が格納容器の損傷を早い時期に認識していたことを示すやりとりがあり、テレビ会議の映像は事故の詳細分析に役立つ資料だ。

The remark in the teleconference video by Masao Yoshida, then-plant manager, regarding the water pressure indicates the original amount was closer to the reality. There are also dialogs that indicate TEPCO had known about the damage to the Containment Vessels from early on. The teleconference video is a useful data to analyze the accident in detail.

東電は、社員のプライバシー保護を理由に映像の一部しか公開していない。多くの人がチェックできるようにして、さまざまな視点から検証を求めることが、事故を起こした企業として当然の責任ではないか。

TEPCO have disclosed only part of the video, citing protection of privacy of its employees. However, isn't it the responsibility of a company who caused this accident to make it widely available so that many people can examine, and to ask for such examination from all angles?

自ら積極的に調べたり公開したりする姿勢に欠ける東電。「事故を反省し世界トップレベルの安全文化を有する組織に生まれ変わる」（広瀬直己社長）と強調しても、そうした体質を根本から変えない限り企業としての再生はあり得ない。

TEPCO lacks in taking initiative in researching and disclosing. "We reflect on the accident, and make a fresh start as an organization with the world-class safety culture", says President Naomi Hirose. I don't believe there will be a fresh start for the company unless it fundamentally changes its character.

（解説＝報道部・末永智弘）

(Commentary: Tomohiko Suenaga, News Department)

Well, remember the "Water Entombment" idea that was tried in April 2011? The idea was to fill the Containment Vessel of Reactor 1 with water to cool the RPV inside the Containment Vessel. If they knew early on that the Containment Vessel was broken, what was this farce of "water entombment"?

TEPCO finally came clean on the breach of the Containment Vessels (Reactor 1 and Reactor 2) on May 24, 2011.

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